

3 Integration into Indonesia: Administration and Education

Over the past decade, the monetised sector of Irian Jaya has been integrated substantially into wider Indonesian administrative and economic systems. The northern towns have been transformed. Today they all have considerable employment in the small-scale service and manufacturing industries that are characteristic of Malay-Indonesian towns. Jayapura today is a vivid contrast to the relatively high-wage, white-administered, import-dependent, ordered town that was Hollandia and to the towns of Papua New Guinea.

But integration into Indonesian systems is not complete. Irian Jaya towns are more dependent on government expenditure than others in Indonesia, and incomes are higher. And outside the small money economy, most people are little influenced by developments elsewhere in Indonesia. Unique features of government have developed and survived in Irian Jaya's special geographic and cultural conditions.

This and the following chapter describe the process whereby some parts of Irian Jaya have become very Indonesian. This chapter looks at changes in administration and formal education. Chapter 4 covers the response of individual persons and firms to the freeing of movements of people, money and goods between Irian Jaya and other parts of the Republic. Together, they provide a basis for discussion of economic policy and economic development in Irian Jaya as a province of Indonesia.

Administration of West New Guinea passed from the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority to the Republic of Indonesia in May 1963. Some major economic and administrative changes were delayed until after August 1969, when the Act of Self Determination required by the agreement with the Netherlands was completed.

Although the United Nations representative requested the use of a 'one man one vote' system, at least in urban areas,¹ the Indonesian government chose to determine the wishes of the Irian Jaya people through a mutual

¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General Regarding the Act of Self Determination in West Irian*, New York, November 1969. Note Annex 1, the report of the Secretary General's Representative in Irian Jaya.

consultation (*musjawarah*) system amongst selected representatives. Under close surveillance, seventy-five to one hundred and seventy-five residents in each administrative district (*kabupaten*), most of them Irian-born, were addressed by central and provincial government officials and the United Nations representative and voted unanimously to remain with Indonesia.²

Irian Jaya's unique historical relationship with the Republic has led to unusually tight central government control. Central government supervision of administration in Irian Jaya is vested with the Sektor Khusus Irian Jaya (Special Section for Irian Jaya) within the Department of Internal Affairs.³ Before 1969 all the activities of central government departments in Irian Jaya were financed, staffed and co-ordinated through the Sektor Khusus. In 1969 Irian Jaya was granted autonomous status similar to that held by other provinces in Indonesia.⁴ Theoretically the new regulation gave the provincial government control over the activities of specified departments: agriculture, social welfare, health, education and culture, and public works. It placed other departments under the jurisdiction of corresponding central government offices. Sektor Khusus has in fact maintained its influence over the decisions of autonomous departments because the province is reliant on the central government for staff and finance. Other departments also continue to rely for their Irian Jaya expenditures on a special budget provided through Sektor Khusus.

The Sektor Khusus is responsible for co-ordinating development programs in Jakarta at the formulation stage. This task is especially important and especially difficult because there are four separate programs⁵ and five special budgets for development in Irian Jaya: the provincial component of the national five year plan, Pelita; the Fundwi program divided into United Nations and counterpart budgets; the Task Forces program for development of the inland and highlands; and the much smaller central government financed *kabupaten* program. The United Nations component of the Fundwi program is financed by a 1962 Netherlands grant of \$30 million, which lay dormant until Indonesia rejoined the United Nations in 1967. The Task Forces program for inland village development grew from the President's visit to Irian Jaya in 1969.

Bappenas, the national planning organisation, develops the Pelita program

² *Ibid.*; 1025 persons were involved in the consultations. For a sensitive description of the strained atmosphere at a *musjawarah* session, see P. Hastings, *New Guinea*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1969, pp. 237-41.

³ The Sektor Khusus was until 1969 known as the Direktorat Irian Barat.

⁴ See Basic Law No. 12, 1969.

⁵ This excludes the military's 'civic mission'.

in close consultation with Sektor Khusus. Both organisations are involved in supervising the execution of Pelita. The Fundwi program is based on the report of a team of foreign experts,⁶ which used priorities set out by the Sektor Khusus as a frame of reference. The program was worked out in detail in 1968/69 by the United Nations Development Programme in consultation with Sektor Khusus. Sektor Khusus in co-operation with Bappenas and other government departments appoints Fundwi counterpart personnel and assists in the supervision of Fundwi projects. A special section within Sektor Khusus is responsible for formulation and execution of the Task Forces program.

Execution of the Pelita, Fundwi and Task Forces programs is co-ordinated at the provincial level by Lakbangda (Pelaksana Pembangunan Daerah), the provincial planning agency, which has the Governor as its chairman and the provincial Commander-in-Chief as its vice-chairman. Lakbangda's *de facto* role in co-ordinating formulation of the development programs has been of considerable importance in the early stages of preparing the second Five Year Plan. Government policy-making power at the provincial level is formally vested with the Governor and the Provincial Consultative Assembly (DPRD), both first appointed by the President in 1963. But in practice an advisory group to the Governor comprising mainly military leaders is the major policy-making body. The advisory group, called Muspida, is chaired by the Commander-in-Chief with the Governor as deputy and provincial armed forces and police chiefs as members. These *de facto* power relationships are recognised widely and the Lakbangda secretariat acts frequently on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.⁷

The *kabupaten* governments covering areas with populations similar to the districts in Papua New Guinea were also granted a measure of autonomy in 1969.⁸ They are now responsible for implementation of government policies and supervision of projects in their areas.⁹ Staff of most government depart-

⁶ United Nations Development Programme, *A Design for Development in West Irian*, New York, 1968.

⁷ The central role of the military in Lakbangda that was observed in 1972 was due in part to the personal strength of the Commander-in-Chief Brigadier General Acub Zainal. In mid-1973 Acub Zainal was replaced by Kolonel Sutrismo and some weeks later was himself appointed Governor. This is likely to increase at least formally the strength of 'civilian' structures in decision-making.

⁸ By 1962 the Dutch had established six *afdeeling* (regencies), with capitals at Hollandia (Jayapura), Manokwari, Biak, Fak-Fak, Merauke and Enarotali. The Indonesian administration has added three more *kabupaten* with capitals at Sorong, Serui and Wamena, and has shifted the capital of the Paniai *kabupaten* from Enarotali to Nabire on the north coast.

⁹ See Basic Law No. 12, 1969.

ments are stationed in all the *kabupaten* headquarters. Co-ordinating authority is vested with the Bupati (District Commissioner) and the *kabupaten* consultative assembly, but local Muspida also play a crucial role in decision-making at this level.¹⁰

Each *kabupaten* contains about four KPS (*daerah kepala pemerintah setempat*) administrative units. The KPS have a much smaller complement of government officials than the *kabupaten*, with representatives only of departments actively engaged in extension or other village activities.¹¹ Each KPS contains about three or four districts covering on average around thirty scattered villages and administered by an appointed district head (*kepala distrik*). The official administrative structure is completed by appointment of a village head (*kepala kampung*). The district and village heads are merely channels for central government instructions and they are not appointed in many areas.¹²

In order to allow introduction of administrative structures used in other provinces¹³ and to lower the cost of administration, the government has begun in some areas to bring together five or six villages into large *desa* units. Attempts at village consolidation have had only limited success. Distrust among neighbouring villages and failure to integrate new village units with opportunities for new, more productive types of economic activity appear to have been the major obstacles. As shown in chapter 1, there is powerful economic logic in traditional patterns of settlement, given traditional patterns of production and transport. It would seem that perceived benefits from new economic activities in which economies of scale are important, including health, education and other government services and trade with or through the towns, will need to be large if the villager is to participate willingly in resettlement.

Insurgency movements have hindered administration and the implementation of policies, especially in the Bird's Head *kabupaten* of Manokwari. Between 1965 and 1970, tens of thousands of tribesmen from a group inland from Manokwari are reported to have left their villages, and smaller groups made

¹⁰ At the *kabupaten* level, Muspida is chaired by the *kabupaten* military commander, with the Bupati as vice chairman and local senior officers of the armed forces and police as members.

¹¹ These include agriculture, health, community development and police.

¹² This was noted by official reports in 1970, which also observed that some *kepala distrik* did not cover all villages within their jurisdiction. On average, one district head has to cover approximately 3000 square kilometres and is responsible for administering a population of 6000.

¹³ There are plans to substitute *kecamatan* on the model of other parts of Indonesia for the current KPS and district divisions.

a series of attacks on widely dispersed government and military outposts.¹⁴ The revolt was broken with the surrender of the two major leaders Lodewijk Mandjatan and Ferry Awom in 1969 and 1970. Less widespread and protracted outbreaks have occurred in other regions both before and after the Act of Self Determination, and a number of clashes have occurred in the vicinity of the border with Papua New Guinea. In each case the army has acted quickly to control the situation.¹⁵

Threat of insurgency and the necessity for strict control for the Act of Free Choice have justified a large military presence, and tight security, including curfews and strict control of movement within Irian Jaya. The dominance of the army has been encouraged by the expansion of military power elsewhere in Indonesia in the years following Irian Jaya's admission to the Republic. In the new province, there were no established centres of civilian power to resist the expansion.

The military influence on provincial administration is pervasive. Independently of the Commander-in-Chief's role in Muspida and Lakbangda, the military intervenes frequently to override civilian authority at all levels. Even at the district and village levels, the military co-ordinates the activities of departments involved in extension work and community development when, as is often the case, civilian mechanisms break down.¹⁶ The military is entrusted with implementation of a large part of the Task Forces program and has contributed through its 'civic mission' to road construction and other public investment. The Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier General Acub Zainal, developed an ambitious program of community development in the highlands and began its implementation in 1971 before it was absorbed into the Task Forces program in the following year.¹⁷ In practice the support of the military is necessary for successful implementation of any economic program.

Although the dominance of the military with its own clearly defined hierarchy allows some firm decisions to be taken when civilian processes have produced hesitance and confusion, its activities are an important drain on scarce government funds.¹⁸ And duplication of development efforts by civilian and military bodies and existence of competing hierarchies adds

¹⁴ See Kodim XVII Tjenderawasih, *Irian Barat masa ke masa*, Jayapura, 1971.

¹⁵ Other isolated outbreaks occurred in Enarotali (Lake Paniai), Piramid (Baliem Valley) and Etambo (Merauke) before the Act of Self Determination in 1969 and in Biak during 1970.

¹⁶ Personal communications, Jayapura, October 1972.

¹⁷ The community development program is known as *operasi koteka* taking its name from one aspect of the program, the efforts to persuade highlanders to discard their *koteka* (penis gourd) and to wear clothing.

¹⁸ Precise data on the size of the military budget are not available.

further complexity to the problems of co-ordinating development activities in Irian Jaya.

As in other parts of Indonesia, there is tight government control over political processes. The provincial and *kabupaten* consultative assemblies are relatively unimportant in policy decision-making, except as channels for bringing local grievances to the notice of the authorities. *Kabupaten* assemblies were formed in 1968 and the provincial assembly was elected for the first time in 1969.

A limited number of political parties was permitted to participate in the 1971 General Elections. The elections in Irian Jaya were covered by a special law, which compromised between the desires to follow Indonesia-wide procedures and to maintain some consistency with methods employed during the Act of Self Determination.¹⁹ Only representatives to *kabupaten* assemblies were elected directly from constituencies. One representative was elected from each district in areas covering about 30 per cent of the population.²⁰ The government party, Golkar,²¹ campaigned strongly²² and won a majority in all but two *kabupaten* and twenty-eight of the thirty-two seats in the provincial assembly. All Irian Jaya representatives to the Jakarta assembly came from Golkar.

Education

The education system in Irian Jaya has expanded rapidly under Indonesian administration (see Table 5). Enrolments at primary schools in 1972 (123,700) were more than double the 1961 level. Although there was rapid growth in government primary schools, in 1970 85 per cent of provincial enrolments were in mission schools. In other Indonesian provinces, most primary enrolments are in government schools.²³ Bahasa Indonesia is the language of instruction in all schools.

¹⁹ See Government Regulation No. 3, 1970.

²⁰ The sixteen elected and four appointed *kabupaten* representatives chose provincial deputies and the provincial DPRD in turn elected representatives to the DPR in Jakarta. A chairman of Golkar announced that the use of 'one man one vote' at the *kabupaten* level indicated that 'the Indonesian Government has been successful in raising the democratic awareness of the people'. Reported in *Expres*, 31 May 1971, p. 6.

²¹ For a description of the composition of Golkar, see P. McCawley, 'General Elections - or an Election of Generals', *Australian Quarterly*, 42(3), 1970.

²² *Expres*, 31 May 1971, p. 6.

²³ Biro Sensus dan Statistik, *Irian Barat Dalam Angka Tahun 1970*, Jayapura, 1972; and R. Daroesman, 'The Finance of Education', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 7(3), Nov. 1971.

Table 5 Educational enrolments at various levels, selected years

Level	1963	1967	1970
Kindergarten	716	1401	1592
Primary	58,913	81,014	107,058
Secondary	3232	6947	13,473
Courses (primary and secondary)	131	530	735
Tertiary (University)	104	546	632

Sources: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Masalah Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan di Propinsi Irian Barat* and Biro Sensus dan Statistik, *Irian Barat Dalam Angka Tahun 1970*.

Enrolment ratios are highest in urban areas and lowest in the highlands. Although primary school enrolments in the highlands *kabupaten* of Jayawijaya increased eight-fold between 1961 and 1969, the Jayawijaya ratio was only one-third the provincial average in the latter year. In 1969 all but two hundred of the 6600 school enrolments in Jayawijaya were in primary schools.²⁴

Secondary school enrolments in the province have grown at an even faster rate, although there are still far too few places for all graduates of the primary schools. Expansion in government vocational schools has been especially rapid (see Table 6). The Department of Agriculture runs a number of small forestry, agriculture and animal husbandry schools and their graduates have been appointed quickly to public service positions.

Table 6 Enrolments at secondary schools, by type of school, selected years

	1963	1970
General		
Junior High School	1232	4788
Senior High School	184	952
Technical training		
Junior	240	1283
Senior	40	208
Economics		
Junior	66	901
Senior	18	458
Home crafts		
Junior	91	1726
Senior	5	82
Teacher training	1356	3346
Others	0	102

Sources: As for Table 5.

²⁴ Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Masalah Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan di Propinsi Irian Barat*, Jakarta, 1970.

Accompanying rapid expansion of schooling, there has been some discussion of major problems in the education system. The content and rationale of primary education is drawn from other parts of Indonesia. The major emphasis is on providing inputs into higher education and on catering for the presumed needs of the public service. Yet there were places for only 10 per cent of primary graduates in lower secondary schools in 1970. In an economy where most opportunities for unskilled wage and self employment are taken by immigrants, most primary school graduates will remain in their villages. Primary schooling with its current content will be of little use to them.²⁵

Growth in enrolments has placed severe strain on teaching resources and has been at the expense of the quality of education. Primary pass rates have declined markedly in recent years.²⁶ Many village schools have only one or two teachers and the Task Forces program has provided 200 teachers for highlands schools on an emergency basis. A majority of all school buildings and over 60 per cent of primary school buildings were classed as temporary²⁷ in 1968. Wages and salaries for the 5437 persons in the Education Department account for virtually all the routine budget allocation to education. Pelita allocated only Rp 38 million (less than \$100,000) for school buildings over five years and the Fundwi effort is limited to provision of two model schools for the highlands.

Vocational training is an important part of the education effort. Apart from the vocational schools run by the Education and Agriculture Departments, the Department of Manpower conducts many short courses in typing, ceramics, cabinet-making, mechanical work and other subjects. At the request of *kabupaten* officials, mobile training units have travelled to most urban centres to give courses. Many government departments have run short courses aimed at upgrading the skills of their own personnel.

Some mission schools also have a strong vocational emphasis, especially in the south. Although desperately short of teaching aids and equipment, the Catholic Mission at Merauke has made a major contribution to dissemination of simple artisan, especially house-building, skills.

²⁵ At an education conference at Cenderawasih University in December 1971, it was argued that special courses for students not continuing beyond primary grade 4 should be introduced. See A. Duijnste, 'Inland Village Education. A suggestion for Irian Barat', *Irian*, 1 (2), 1972, pp. 24-6.

²⁶ A clear trend is apparent, despite some anomalies in the figures. Pass rates of over 80 per cent in the years 1963-5 declined to around 50 per cent in 1968-70. See Departemen Pendidikan, *Masalah Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan di Propinsi Irian Barat*, Appendix B, and Biro Sensus dan Statistik, *Irian Barat Dalam Angka Tahun 1970*, Table 17.

²⁷ Or 'emergency'. The Indonesian term is *darurat*.

A vocational training centre at Jayapura has been the major recipient of Fundwi allocations to education.²⁸ The project has been allocated \$1.56 million plus Rp 278 million counterpart funds, as much as all other development expenditure on education (see Table 7).²⁹ The VTC contains more sophisticated equipment than is used in any workshop in Irian Jaya, and

Table 7 Allocation of development funds to education in Irian Jaya, 1969-73

Project	Program	Financial Allocation	Progress
Rehabilitation of school buildings	Pelita	Rp 30.5 million	Rehabilitation and refurbishing completed for about six schools.
Sports equipment for schools	Pelita	Rp 7.5 million	Completed.
University of Cenderawasih	Pelita	Rp 97.1 million	Halls of residence and lecture rooms have been constructed, a museum is under construction and subscriptions have been paid for foreign journals.
University of Cenderawasih	Fundwi	\$0.24 million Rp 21.2 million	A professorial appointment and fellowships in the Anthropology Institute have been provided.
Supply of teachers to highlands	Task Forces	n.a.	The Task Forces budget pays 200 teachers working in highland schools.
Vocational training centre	Fundwi	Rp 1.56 million	One vocational training centre has been established in Jayapura and another is planned for Manokwari.
Education planning and administration	Fundwi	\$0.18 million	One expert has been advising on planning and co-ordination of education.
School buildings and model schools	Fundwi	\$0.09 million	One model school has been completed and one is under construction.
Teacher training	Fundwi	\$0.61 million Rp 244 million	Provision of expert advice and equipment for teachers colleges, and assistance in training of teachers, has begun.
Development of education in the highlands	Fundwi	\$0.065 million	

Sources: Official and United Nations publications.

²⁸ A Fundwi vocational training centre was also planned for Manokwari, but the project has been abandoned and a small woodworking shop established in its place.

²⁹ Other education allocations totalled about \$1.33 million plus Rp 380 million.

possibly in the whole of Indonesia.³⁰ One expatriate instructor told us that teaching aids used in the automotive shop were comparable with the best available in Europe.³¹ Seven expatriate staff were employed in 1972. The centre opened in 1971 and in late 1972 had 169 students undertaking two-year courses in automotive, machine shop, electrical, woodworking, carpentry and building trades. Nearly all second-year students and 90 per cent of first-year students were Irian-born. Fifty-nine trainees were due to graduate at the end of 1972.

Neither the background of the instructors nor the teaching aids lend themselves to transmission of skills that are applicable directly in the small workshops that serve the towns. Building courses have been modified to fit more closely local practices, but the institution is not easily adapted to local needs. The large mining companies offer the only employment opportunities for trainees in automotive and machine shop trades.

It is difficult to justify the huge public expenditures on the VTC when other urgent programs are starved for funds. Efforts are being made to train Indonesians to replace the Fundwi instructors (most of whom speak little or no Indonesian), but with little success to date. At the completion of the Fundwi program, the project may be left without personnel able to use and maintain existing equipment. It seems reasonable that the mining companies, who together with the graduates are the major beneficiaries from the vocational training centre, should contribute to its maintenance after termination of Fundwi assistance.

Fundwi has provided fellowships for short-term overseas training in a variety of skills. Eighty-six fellowships had been offered by the end of 1972, including forty-three in aviation, seventeen in education and three each in agriculture and medicine.³² Fundwi fellowships were to be offered only to the Irian-born. The Governor has sought to maintain this principle in what has probably been his most important stand against military and central government officials. All but a few fellowships have in fact been awarded to persons born in the province (*putera daerah*).

Government departments have sent employees for training in other parts of Indonesia. Twenty to thirty trainees attended four-month courses in public

³⁰ The magazine *Expres*, referring to the Governor's pride in the centre, described it as the largest, most modern and best equipped workshop in Indonesia, 9 June 1972, p. 34.

³¹ Personal communication, Jayapura, October 1972.

³² Training provided on other Fundwi projects was also of some importance. This was especially important for 120 tuna fishermen and seventy-five workers employed in forestry.

administration every year between 1963 and 1967, and others were sent for longer periods before the government administrative college near Jayapura was opened in 1968. The Department of Industry has sent trainees to other Indonesian institutions: nineteen have graduated from the High School of Technology in Jogjakarta and twenty-six from other specialist institutes such as the textile institute in Bandung, the chemistry institute in Bogor, the technical school in Ujung Pandang, etc. A further forty-four persons are currently undertaking courses. Almost all the trainees are financed by public funds and are bonded to the government.

At the tertiary level, Cenderawasih University was established very soon after the Indonesian accession to sovereignty, opening in 1962. It has been especially attractive to Indonesian public servants from other provinces, and the courses offered and the timing of classes reflect the predominance of part-time students. Over 50 per cent of the enrolments are in the Faculty of Law, and a very small proportion were enrolled in agriculture or other technical faculties (see Table 8).

Table 8 Cenderawasih University enrolments, scholarships, graduates and teaching staff, 1970

	Enrolments			Scholarships	Graduates	Teaching Staff	
	Irian Jaya-Born	Non-Irian Jaya-Born	Total			Full-time	Part-time
Law	163	211	374	110	71	14	20
Education	42	23	65	22	18	6	15
Teacher training	82	69	151	60	37	23	9
Agriculture	28	14	42	28	10	2	29
Institute of Anthropology	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Total	299	333	632	220	126	51	73

Source: Cenderawasih University.

The University faces many of the same problems as other Indonesian universities, although they appear in especially severe forms. Standards are affected by the outside employment of faculty members and by lack of funds for books, equipment and other facilities.

The University's Institute of Anthropology was established under Fundwi auspices to initiate research and disseminate information on social structure in the province. The Professor of Anthropology entered a three-year contract in early 1971. One foreign post-graduate student is currently undertaking research in the Baliem Valley and the Professor of Anthropology is supervising

a team of Indonesian scholars in a study of social change in the Jayapura area. Through organisation of and participation in seminars and through publication of the journal *Irian*, the Institute provides forums for discussion of the complex social problems of the province. Many problems have been encountered in research, especially amongst officials who are suspicious of the nature and uses of social inquiry. However, if funds are made available to allow building on the foundations laid in the Fundwi period, the Institute could contribute to a more sensitive approach to development in the province.

The total effort in education has been very large. But formal education has not been integrated into the village lives of the majority of people. And even in secondary, vocational and tertiary education, directed at providing skills that are useful in the modern economy, there is little co-ordination between the efforts of different departments and other organisations. As in other parts of Indonesia, the activities of the Manpower Department have not progressed beyond the operation of labour exchanges and the compilation of rather crude statistics.

Education has nevertheless contributed significantly to achieving a major Indonesian objective: acculturation and the assimilation of the Irianese population. There are now groups of people in all *kabupaten* conversant with the national language; the fact that government is conducted in a language they understand makes it less distant and less alien to many of the coastal Irianese and to increasing numbers of those in the highlands.

The most rapid acculturation has occurred in the major towns, where the Irianese are heavily outnumbered by new arrivals from elsewhere. The markets of the towns are Indonesian, but they have been assimilated into Irianese economic life. Like other Melanesian markets, the Hollandia market place was once characterised by fixed prices and by a relatively limited range of foodstuffs offered for sale. Now Irianese sit at the front of the market, some with vegetables unknown or not valued before recent years and, hesitantly, haggle over prices.

In the highlands acculturation has been a more complex process. The people have had less contact with external cultures and some aspects of culture in the highlands (especially nakedness and the wearing of the penis gourd or *koteka*) are very different from practice elsewhere in Indonesia. Considerable efforts have been made to change rapidly some highland practices, especially through the widespread introduction of clothing. In some areas – around Lake Paniai and amongst the Western Dani – these efforts have had some success. But in others, especially amongst the Dani of the Baliem Valley, they have met with considerable resistance.