

## V

### THE PAPUANS BETRAYED

**T**he West Irian victory provided a great boost to nationalist Indonesian pride, and particularly enhanced Sukarno's prestige and position among his own people and in the Third World in the fight against colonialism and imperialism. But Sukarno continued to push his own dogmas of the 'continuous revolution' and the struggle of the 'new emerging forces'. In reality, he was a dictator, who tried to stay in power through his mesmerising demagogic talents, the constant juggling between the major political contenders and by keeping his nation on a permanent war footing. Thus the West New Guinea problem was followed by the anti-Malaysian campaign.

After the nationalisation of the Dutch business sector and the vast armaments purchasing program the national economy continued to deteriorate, pushing the nation into bankruptcy and causing widespread poverty, starvation, malnutrition and disease. The bubble of indoctrinated hallucinations about national Indonesian grandeur finally burst as a result of the 30 September 1965 coup in the wake of which more than a million people were murdered. Sukarno had utterly failed in his dream of leading his people into a millennium of social justice and prosperity.

Ironically, the economic cost of the West Irian victory in fact turned out to be one of the major causes of Sukarno's fall, and in contrast to the expectations of the Indonesian left the destruction of Dutch economic power in Indonesia had not plunged the Netherlands economy into the expected disarray. On the contrary, the Netherlands during the 1950s entered into an era of

rapid economic development, producing a higher standard of living and prosperity for the Dutch people than ever previously enjoyed in the nation's history. In comparison, Sukarno's dictum that a revolution could not live on bread only, uttered during his speech on 17 August 1963 celebrating the return of West New Guinea to the fold, had a hollow ring to it as millions of Indonesians were starving.

The biggest losers were the Papuans, who had been betrayed by the United States, and most of the rest of world, and had been sold against their will as chattels to the Indonesians. As in the heyday of 19th century imperialism the human rights of a subject people had been trampled upon.

Papuan nationalism had, since 1949, grown more strongly and in 1963 a sense of belonging to a nation rather than only to a specific tribe or clan was felt by more people, particularly in the urban centres. Still, the vast bulk of the population was not affected and their reactions and feelings remained focused on purely local affairs. Those living outside tribal and clan boundaries were considered as foreign enemies, and that included also, of course, any colonial usurper, whether Dutch or Indonesian. In addition, not all of the territory had been explored and brought under effective Dutch colonial control.

### **Papua under traditional colonial rule**

In the early 1950s it was believed that it would be impossible to achieve autonomy or independence for Papua within the immediate future. Similarly, the Australian colonial government of the neighbouring Territory of Papua and New Guinea was convinced that it would take at least thirty years to prepare the Papuans properly for nationhood. Furthermore, in West New Guinea, the enthusiastic and iconoclastic reformer and Papuan champion, van Eechoud, had been replaced in 1950 as governor by van Waardenburg, an administrator of the old Netherlands-Indies school. He was supported by top level bureaucrats of the De-

partment of Overseas Territories in The Hague, most of them with a similar Netherlands Indies background. Van Waardenburg then tried to run West New Guinea as an old-fashioned colony. As such little interest was shown in the rapid expansion of education and vocational training facilities for the indigenous people.<sup>1</sup> The aspirations of the budding, small Papuan nationalist elite, although not entirely ignored were nevertheless put aside as being unrepresentative of the population. The official policy was to move the masses into the 20th century without avoiding unnecessary cultural dislocation and political unrest. All this sounds familiar and recalls the Dutch colonial education policy in the early 1920s in Indonesia, which had been designed to stifle radical nationalist agitation by reducing the growth of an indigenous Western-educated intellectual proletariat.<sup>2</sup>

The colonial administration regulations of 1949 had projected a New Guinea council, which together with the governor would hold legislative power. This body was to be composed of twenty-one members: ten Papuans to be elected; nine Dutchmen, of whom seven were to be elected and two appointed by the governor; and two members from the non-Papuan communities were added, one to be elected and one to be appointed. But the actual establishment of the New Guinea council was postponed indefinitely, not only because of the great difficulties in organising proper elections, but even more so because of the lack of experience of prospective members of democratic institutions. Instead it was decided to first institute advisory councils to deal with specific indigenous concerns to act as training grounds for modern Papuan politicians. On 28 April 1951, three of these councils were set up, wherever possible, with a Papuan majority. In 1950 also, a National Education Council had been established, counting only one Papuan representative with the majority of members having been drawn from the Christian missions.<sup>3</sup> The earlier experiment with advisory sub-district councils during van Eechoud's term of office had failed, with the exception of the Kankain Kankara Biak, founded by Vic de Bruyn. This council

dealt with *adat* questions as well as public health and hygiene. In this connection mention should also be made of the generally un-Papuan institution of the *rajas* in twelve areas of the predominantly Islamic Raja Empat islands and the Fak-Fak area. Unlike their Indonesian self-ruler namesakes, the *rajas* in Papua wielded no official power but acted as a link between a number of village heads and the Dutch colonial administration.

In 1951 in The Hague, an interdepartmental commission, consisting of officials from the departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Administrative Affairs, was set up to deliberate on the question of political development in West New Guinea. The commission agreed that the gradualist policies adopted by the colonial government in Hollandia leading from training in village government, to regional and finally to the national level, would be preferable. On the other hand it stressed that the spirit of the times and international pressure would preclude such a time-consuming approach and that the New Guinea council would have to be set up considerably earlier than was envisaged. It was suggested that owing to the limited competency and low educational standards of Papuans the powers of the New Guinea council should initially be restricted, as the Netherlands-Indies Volksraad had been given on its inception in 1918, to the right to assist in the preparation of the budget and to propose amendments to legislation. In conclusion, the commission recommended that an overall plan should be adopted having as its first priority to rapidly bring the whole of the territory under direct Dutch colonial control; secondly, it should accelerate the spread of education, health, proper housing and agricultural extension services. Thirdly, it should speedily open up more opportunities for Papuans to be appointed to the public service, including the judiciary. The commission also believed that the introduction of Western village councils and courts would be more useful tools to create national unity than genealogical-based institutions.<sup>4</sup>

The earliest call in the Netherlands parliament to protect the right of Papuan political self-determination dates back to the

efforts by the Liberal Party leader, Oud, during the debates on the RTC negotiations in 1949. He repeated this demand in parliament in May 1950, but his calls remained ignored until 1953, when the second Drees government adopted the principle of Papuan self-determination as an important plank of the West New Guinea platform.<sup>5</sup> The government pointed out that during its first term a more positive policy had been put in place and in the 1952 Queen's address to the nation it had been announced that the government intended to advance Papuan social-economic, and political development, although a time frame was not set within which self-government would be expected to be achieved.<sup>6</sup>

The Minister for Overseas Territories, Kernkamp, put it to parliament at the end of 1954 that in view of an overestimation of the economic potential of West New Guinea it was absolutely necessary to proceed carefully and gradually in the way of national development.<sup>7</sup>

In fact the Dutch government persisted until the end of the decade with this gradualist approach. As late as 1958 the cabinet, pointing to a very slow Papuan national awakening process among Papuans, emphasised the prime importance of indigenous economic development and the creation of wider opportunities for education and vocational training. But it showed less interest in political training on the grounds that it was impossible to predict how long it would take for the acculturation process to run its full course and to create a feeling of Papuan national identity. Hence, it concluded that it would be impracticable to lay down a date for self-government. As a result only a minimum of democratisation occurred and the territory remained governed in the old-style colonial pattern with power centred on the governor, advised by a council of departmental heads.

The successor to Governor van Waardenburg was Dr van Baal, an anthropologist with considerable local field experience in West New Guinea and who held more progressive views on Papuan emancipation. His attempts, however, to increase Papuan par-

ticipation in government administration were obstructed by some of his own officials and the Department of Overseas Affairs in The Hague. A government commission on constitutional revision for West New Guinea in 1956, led by the ultra-conservative and colonial diehard Professor Lemaire, a parliamentary running mate of Welter's break-away National Catholic Party, in its recommendations remained wedded to traditional colonial practice.

In 1952, van Baal, still in parliament as an ARP member, had severely criticised the West New Guinea constitutional regulations as unworkable and demanded an entirely new approach in which the governor would be responsible for the running of the territory assisted by an executive council. In addition an appointed legislative council should be established, reflecting the various interests in the colony and a New Guinea council, as envisaged in 1949, should be instituted. Van Baal further suggested that the territories be divided into a number of regions each with its own advisory council, and that smaller units should be created for example in the Sentani and Nimoran areas with councils to concentrate on special local concerns. Another part of his scheme was to enlarge the civil service and to set up more specialised departments. Finally, van Baal pushed for a five-year plan to stimulate auto-activity and self-help among the Papuans, and demanded a total reorientation of attitudes and objectives: '... in which we must free ourselves from stereotypes particularly from the late Netherlands Indies which still influences the thinking ... of officials of all ranks ...'<sup>8</sup>

However, during his tour of office as governor (1953 to 1957), van Baal, owing to the obstructionist tactics of the old colonial clique in the Netherlands as well as from some local officials, was only able to realise a part of this reform program.<sup>9</sup>

Van Baal was opposed to having the old Dutch colonial local ~~and regional government system of Java, anchored on the~~ *lurah*, the village head, planted on West New Guinea soil. The model of the *lurah*, appointed for life and wielding a great deal of arbi-

trary power and dovetailing into the semi-feudal Inlands Bestuur, was unsuitable for Papuan conditions. He argued that it would be futile to introduce such an entirely foreign element into an essentially very loosely organised and strongly anti-authoritarian structure, where power rested on clan heads and magicians. As it was, the concept of the village as an administrative unit was not known in Papua, since most Papuans lived in clan groupings, numbering no more than 200 or 300 people. Van Baal believed that for the government to achieve a higher degree of social bonding and eventually a feeling of national identity the process should be started by setting up supra-clan Papuan-run administrative units.<sup>10</sup>

In 1955 the first local advisory councils were established in Hollandia, Manokwari, the rural areas of the Schouten Islands, Japen, and Sorong. This was followed by regional advisory councils in Fak-Fak (1958), and Biak-Numfoor (1959). These communities were empowered to take part in the implementation of general ordinances; to regulate and administer certain local affairs; and to enforce local ordinances and to levy taxation. Dafrosoro council was elected directly, while for the others the indirect ballot was used; and to reflect the multicultural nature of the various areas about 20 per cent of members were appointed. In addition, the regional communities were empowered to subdivide their areas into village communities. As such the Biak-Numfoor regional council set up eighteen village units. In the Mimika region village councils had already been in existence since 1953.<sup>11</sup>

Spurred on by the ever-increasing international pressure and the Indonesian threat of invasion in 1960 this policy of building a democratic system organically by leading gradually from the grassroots to national representative bodies, was abandoned. Instead, the long-vaunted New Guinea Council was inaugurated. This body was invested with extensive powers. Legislative power and the responsibility for framing the budget were shared with the governor and a council of departmental heads. Furthermore,

members enjoyed parliamentary immunity, and held the rights of petition, interpellation, and amendment. Twenty-two out of the total of twenty-eight seats were held by Papuans.

### **Social and economic development**

In May 1961 the Dutch government adopted a ten-year plan for socioeconomic and political Papuan development. Without wishing to lay down a definite date for self-government, the plan envisaged the escalation of training of Papuan cadres and educational facilities. The stated goal was to fill the civil service at a level of 90 to 95 per cent with Papuans, including a number of top-rank positions requiring tertiary qualifications. It was expected that by 1970 only a small number of foreign technical experts would still be needed.<sup>11</sup>

In the period 1950 to 1960 the number of pupils in village and urban three-year elementary schools teaching the three R's and social skills, had only increased from 25,791 to 32,686. More important in terms of emancipation was that a significant increase had occurred in Papuan attendance in the more advanced primary school types such as the *Vervolgscholen*, the number of pupils growing from 804 to 2734. A certificate from the *Vervolgschool* provided entrance to technical and vocational courses. The number of Papuans in teacher training courses had grown from ninety-five to 404; and in technical schools from seventy to 212.<sup>12</sup> The number of Papuan students in secondary schools remained small, growing from only twenty in 1950 to 116 in 1958.<sup>13</sup> Some improvement occurred and in 1960 the number of Papuans attending the junior high school (MULO) had increased to 430. In 1960, twenty-nine Papuans were studying in the Netherlands: three at university, two at the tertiary level Tropical Agriculture Institute, seven at secondary schools, and the remainder undertaking college-level vocational and technical courses. In 1961, fifty Papuans went to the Netherlands to follow advanced training courses. In addition, Papuan students

were sent to Port Moresby, seven to attend the medical college and six to take a radio engineering course; another two were at the Auxiliary Medicine and Dentistry School in Fiji.<sup>14</sup> The Government Administration School set up by van Eechoud in 1946 had gradually improved its standards, delivering a growing number of graduates, with the result that in 1960 almost half of the seventy-four districts in the territory were run by Papuan patrol officers. Furthermore, there were 966 Papuan village schoolteachers, 270 nurses, but only sixteen Papuan teachers in continuation schools.<sup>15</sup> The number of Papuans in the civil service had grown from 1290 in 1956 to 2192 in 1960, holding mainly lower ranked positions.<sup>16</sup>

Obviously by 1962 only a very small Western-educated Papuan elite had been created. To many observers at the time this was too insignificant in terms of numbers and experience to run a modern, independent Papuan state. Against this there stood the example of the recently declared independent African nations, most of which were certainly no better equipped and prepared to take care of their new states. It could even be said that in 1945 and 1949 Indonesia had hardly any better chances in this respect. Surely in percentage terms of the population the size of the Indonesian Western-educated elite was not that much larger than the one in West New Guinea. Admittedly in Indonesia the nationalist movement had developed far more strongly and widely. Still, the question remains why an independent Papuan nation was not allowed to emerge in West New Guinea. In accordance with the stipulations of the UN Charter the Papuan people, after a further period of UN trusteeship, should have been allowed a genuine choice to determine their political future. The act of self-determination staged by Indonesia in 1969 was a sham and a shocking betrayal of the principle of universal human rights. This outcome had clearly been predicted, as the documents testify, in Washington, the Netherlands and in Australia.

In addition to human rights another essential question that must be looked at was the economic viability in 1962 of an in-

dependent Papuan state. It would be unrealistic to expect a miraculous metamorphosis to have occurred between 1949 and 1962 in the basic structure of the West New Guinea economy. This in fact remained for the most part totally underdeveloped in the modern capitalist sense. Still some success had been achieved in the coastal areas and in the north-west island groups where a larger number of Papuans had been drawn into the modern labour force, the export production sector, and the money economy.

In 1960 there were 461,858 people living under direct Dutch colonial administrative control, as compared to 342,600 in 1956. In addition, a further 71,079 people had been brought within the radius of regular government patrolling. An estimated 169,020 Papuans, mainly in the Central Highlands, still remained outside the government umbrella.<sup>17</sup> They were living in their original self-sufficient economic pattern with trading activities based on barter. Food production was primitive, the largest crops being sago and tubers such as taro and yam, sweet potato, sugarcane and banana. Domestic pigs were almost exclusively kept for ceremonial and religious purposes and as bride dowries. The population was generally suffering from dietary insufficiencies.

Under these circumstances the possibility of the accumulation of savings and capital from indigenous sources were obviously non-existent. Therefore, the funds needed to construct a modern infrastructure of roads and communications, and the apparatus to run a modern government, had to be provided largely from the outside, namely by the Netherlands taxpayer.

This lack of indigenous capital also forced the economic development of the island to be run on traditional colonial lines. Accordingly, emphasis was put on further exploration and exploitation of minerals, the vast forest resources, and Western-run and owned plantations, with the local population supplying the required labour force. Over-enthusiastic reports spread by the West New Guinea lobby about the island's economic

wealth, proved to be unrealistic. As it happened oil, as the supposed mainstay of exports, did not live up to expectations. In the late 1950s reserves began to dry up and no new fields had been discovered. To make matters worse a government report of 1959 marked the death knell of earlier optimistic expectations regarding lead, zinc and copper deposits. The only promising discoveries made were of cobalt and nickel in the Cyclops Mountains and on Waigeo Island, and in 1962 a Dutch-American mining company, Pacific Nikkel Mijnbouw, was founded. The search for gold and uranium also remained unsuccessful.<sup>18</sup>

Timber exports were also slow to get off the mark, as the industry had to be built up from scratch. A major problem was that despite being covered with dense rainforests only relatively few stands of timber were available for commercial logging. The forests contained a great mixture of species, most of which were commercially useless; and in addition the rugged terrain made areas inaccessible.<sup>19</sup> To obtain a realistic estimate of timber resources the government Forestry Service conducted a large number of aerial mapping sorties in the 1950s and also reforested areas with more commercially viable species. These surveys also tried to estimate the timber resources available for indigenous use. Another measure taken was to encourage the traditional indigenous gathering of forest products such as copal and damar resins and attempts were made to improve copal production by introducing conservation practices, improving access and starting new plantations. The Forest Service was also involved in the managing and development of commercial timber stands and set up a timber mill in Manokwari. The production of logs increased from 18,472 cubic metres in 1955 to 49,963 cubic metres in 1960. In the same period the output of sawn timber grew by 151 per cent with its export value rising from 51,000 guilders in 1955 to 1.118 million guilders in 1960. The production of copal and damar in the period 1958 to 1960 oscillated around an average of 714 tonnes per annum with the highest

export value of 2.1 million guilders reached in 1959.<sup>20</sup>

Attempts to improve the fishing industry were less successful. A government-sponsored tuna fishery project failed, as the Papuan fishermen were technically inferior to their Japanese competitors and trawl fishing experiments in the Arafura Sea had to be abandoned owing to the rippled structure of the seabed.<sup>21</sup>

Soon the model of a classical colonial plantation economy, as envisaged in The Hague, had to be discarded as being entirely unrealistic. A major factor was that the required fertile and arable land was simply not available in West New Guinea. Soils were generally of poor quality and only a few areas were suitable for plantation agriculture. Only 5 per cent of an estimated total of 41.5 million hectares were arable. These approximately 2 million hectares, half the size of the Netherlands, were, however, widely scattered over a large number of relatively small pockets, severely reducing the possibility for economically viable plantation operations. Two other factors worked against the establishment of a plantation economy. The first was the scarcity of Papuan labor that would have necessitated the import of foreign indentured workers from Indonesia and other Asian countries. For example, the labor force in the oilfields in the Sorong area was overwhelmingly Indonesian. The second factor was that Dutch government policy was committed to developing the country for the Papuans themselves. Van Eechoud already in the 1940s had warned against the danger of transforming the Papuans into a nation of coolies. Other similarly enlightened officials such as the outspoken Governor van Baal put Papuan interests as their central concerns.

The colonial authorities were of course well aware that long-term foreign investments needed to accelerate and sustain economic development would be difficult to attract as long as the political future of the territory remained under a cloud.

Government policy tried to safeguard as much as possible the national heritage and wealth of the Papuans by education, training, and by encouraging them to take the modernisation of their

country into their own hands. To enable more Papuans to accumulate savings it was necessary for them to participate directly in the emancipation process, and colonial administrators, like van Baal, advocated the creation of a class of Papuan farmers producing export crops. Van Baal wrote in 1957:

Real independence is dependent on economic development. This again is affected by many external factors. But in any case the creation of a class of independent farmers must be strongly pushed forward. When 15,000 family heads can be persuaded each to plant 2 ha of cash crops, this already means an increase of 30 million in export income ...<sup>22</sup>

This, he argued, would prevent the creation of a people composed of coolies with no economic stake in their own country, and after independence would safeguard foreign businesses from immediate nationalisation.

During the few years remaining the Dutch administration made serious attempts to put these policy directives into practice. An important role in this was taken by the government agricultural extension services, agricultural schools and courses, and the provision of selected planting material. Some tangible gains particularly in the production of copra and nutmeg were made. During 1955 to 1957 and 1958 to 1960 respectively, 1055 and 2004 hectares of coconuts were planted with copra production between 1952 and 1960 increasing from 2945 to 5847 tonnes, adding in 1960 an export value of 3.9 million guilders to the economy.

The production of nutmeg and mace peaked in 1936 at 503 tonnes and 80 tonnes respectively, but had seriously declined after the war. Rehabilitation of the industry in the 1950s had been aided by favourable export price patterns and, in 1960, the area under nutmeg and mace in the Fak-Fak area had grown to 470 hectares. In the period 1956 to 1960 production had grown from 355 to 600 tonnes, increasing export earnings from 1.9 to 3.45 million guilders.

The newly introduced cultivation of cocoa, which had proved to be so successful in the Tolai area in Australian New Guinea, also showed signs of promise in areas of north-west New Guinea. By 1960 the area under cocoa had increased to 1015 hectares and between 1958 and 1960 a rise from 3.2 to 52.0 tonnes had been produced with export earnings increasing from 6000 to 90,800 guilders.<sup>23</sup> Other newly introduced crops such as coffee and rubber were still relatively insignificant, with rubber holding the best prospects.

In order to turn people away from traditional slash and burn production methods and to transform them into sedentary farmers, a number of experimental projects were conducted in Nimboran, Mappi, Japen, Biak, the Warmare plains, Akimura and Ajamaru-Teminabuan. A nucleus of farmers was allowed small plots of land of 3 to 4 hectares each to grow food crops, fruit, and export crops such as cocoa and coconuts, under supervision. In 1960 a pilot project in the Nimboran area had been completed with the fourteen participating farmers allowed to continue without any further financial aid. The Mappi project in south New Guinea had since 1956 trained seventy-five families from seventeen villages resulting, in 1960, in almost 1000 hectares of coconuts having been planted. Most of the 114 hectares under cocoa had failed, but better results were expected of the rubber crop. In Japen-Waropen in 1960 there were thirty-two agricultural nuclei consisting of 880 farms. The area under cocoa had increased to 517 hectares producing 43 tonnes.<sup>24</sup> These were promising results, although the proportion of Papuan-engendered export income still remained relatively small, and the balance of trade heavily tilted towards imports, causing an ever-growing deficit to be covered by the Netherlands.

By 1962 the economic development program had still not gained full momentum. A money economy had only penetrated into parts of the coastal districts, particularly in the urban areas of Hollandia, Biak, Manokwari and Merauke. Barter still remained common in the interior. The number of Papuans em-

played in the modern sector was still small and in fact had stayed static in the last few years.

	<b>Registered Workers</b>	<b>Urban %</b>	<b>Building Trade %</b>
<b>1956</b>	17,326	70	33
<b>1957</b>	15,901		26
<b>1958</b>	15,886	73	24
<b>1959</b>	16,746	66	30
<b>1960</b>	15,910	64	33

In 1960 the government employed 57 per cent of the Papuan work force. In the private sector the building industry accounted for 33 per cent, followed by small industries that were responsible for 13 per cent of registered workers.

The recruitment of Papuan labour was beset by a number of problems caused, in the first place, by the sparseness of the population as a whole. As a result the labour demand in Hollandia, for example, would not be fully supplied from its surrounding rural districts and some workers had to be brought in from further afield, causing socioeconomic dislocation in the areas concerned. In order to ensure a balanced development in both the countryside and in the urban centres the government imposed regulations and, if necessary, restrictions on recruitment. This way the government tried to prevent a fall in the production of food and cash crops and hoped to stop a social drift from the country to the towns. The results were not entirely successful. An investigation by Broekhuijse, in 1960, of Papuan immigration into Hollandia pointed out that this policy was not realistic, as the country surrounding Hollandia offered very limited chances for self-betterment. Most of the land was not suitable for farming or horticulture and the only opportunity to gain employment was in the town.

In 1959 only 3.2 per cent of the rural population were involved

in government-sponsored economic development projects and only 17 per cent were employed in the western economic sector; 77.8 per cent of the population still lived in the traditional self-sufficient economic sphere.<sup>26</sup> Only the Nimboran area was showing local economic potential through its copra and cocoa production, although this was not expected to provide any income comparable to urban wages until the end of the decade. Opportunities for people in the rural areas to improve their socioeconomic situation remained very restricted. Those with high intellectual ability were normally selected by the Christian missions to study for the priesthood or for teaching training, with others ending up in the civil service or the police force. The majority found employment as unskilled labourers in Hollandia. The indigenous population of Hollandia had grown from 20,943 in 1952 to 73,240 in 1960. The ratios of men to women had markedly changed from 1:8 to 1.9:1 and the number of children per woman from 1:0.92 to 1:2.22. This was a strong indicator of permanent migrant settlement and the reduction of temporary workers. Broekhuijse's investigation was limited to the lower strata of the migrant population, mainly slum dwellers, not the Papuans with proper housing, that is, mainly civil servants and police, who enjoyed a comparatively higher standard of living. The investigation was based on a sample of 377 men, representing 20 per cent of the group as a whole. Of the sample, 289 were married and eighty-eight were single; ninety-six originated from the Hollandia countryside, sixty-two from Nimboran, seventy-six from Sarmi, sixty-one from Biak, thirty-four from Serui, and, interestingly, twelve from Australian New Guinea.

The estimated annual migrant intake was put at 100 families. Economic advancement often proved to be disappointing, because despite a higher income than in the countryside, wages were generally found to be too low to compensate for higher city prices and the more varied consumption patterns. The situation was often aggravated by *penumpang*, invariably young, unmarried, male relatives who, in accordance with the traditional Papuan

family system, expected to be fed and housed. Almost all families investigated supported *penumpang* of whom 7 per cent contributed to the house rent, 25 per cent to food and 34 per cent helped with household duties. In 7.5 per cent of cases extra income was earned by taking on additional work; 35 per cent of the sample added to their income by growing garden crops; and 23 per cent still received material help from their home villages. On the other hand, 40 per cent were able to send 24 guilders per month to their families in the village. About 7.9 per cent of the labourers were unemployed, but mostly for short periods. Broekhuijse pinpointed two crucially important problems that demanded immediate remedy. The first was the lack of training facilities, which were absolutely necessary for new migrants to advance socioeconomically, and secondly, housing was generally substandard. Still, more than 50 per cent of the new migrants indicated their desire to become permanent settlers, while 43 per cent desired to return to their villages. Significantly, 85.7 per cent of married men, 73.5 per cent of women, and 78 per cent of *penumpang* were deemed to be literate; but only 3 per cent had received education beyond the village school. The rate of literacy in this group was certainly much higher than in most villages in Indonesia at that time. These villagers perhaps felt the need to satisfy the demands of their new educational status by moving to the city.

In conclusion, Broekhuijse warned that the neglect of the government and the racist-tainted disregard and aloofness on the part of the white community, as a whole, for the economic plight of the Papuan urban dwellers could turn their still generally pro-government stance into hate. By the early 1960s the Papuan national awakening and demand for political emancipation, the first glimpses of which had appeared in the immediate postwar period, had adopted a much more strident voice.

### **Papuan nationalist reaction**

In the years 1950 to 1960, typified by van der Veur<sup>27</sup> as a period

of Dutch neo-colonialism, the traditionally hierarchical colonial government apparatus still ruled supreme and society was run on strictly racial lines. Papuan disapproval of government policy and practice was discouraged and was repressed if too strident. Indonesian allegations of Dutch political suppression in West New Guinea, although overdone, were certainly not entirely off the mark. More vocal Papuans complained of the colonial attitude of many Dutchmen: 'When trying to further their own [Papuan] personal interests, they were often told that they were too uncivilised, pro-Indonesian or even communist'.<sup>28</sup>

Papuans were expected to follow the official line and to carry out orders. Students were reportedly wary of going public due to fear of harming their further educational and career opportunities.

The anti-Dutch rebellions and agitation after 1945 and the activist members of the pro-Indonesian PKII party, mainly organised and directed by local Indonesian citizens, had been resolutely repressed. Marcus Indey, a prominent PKII member, told the joint session of the 1950 Nieuw Guinea Commissie that he had been imprisoned from 1946 to March 1950 and that more than 1000 persons had shared the same fate.<sup>29</sup>

In 1960, during an inquiry by Grootenhuis, a government official, more educated Papuans openly censured the European community for its racist and 'apartheid' behaviour and attitude. As an example the polyclinic in Hollandia harbour was cited. It had two entrances: one featuring a sign in Dutch for whites and the other one in Malay for the natives. Moreover, waiting Europeans made it abundantly clear to Dutch-speaking Papuans that they were not welcome in their queue. Another case noted was of a Eurasian bus driver waiving Papuans through to the back and allocating the front seats to Dutchmen. Similarly Europeans were served first in shops even though they arrived after waiting Papuans. The rancour caused by these discriminatory practices was accentuated by the social position the educated Papuans found themselves in, forming the highest class in their

own society and the lowest in the European-Eurasian dominated Western society. The situation was further complicated in the workplace where educated Papuans were filling lower echelon posts while often being lorded over by Eurasians, who generally were insensitive to Papuan feelings. It was a scenario reminiscent of prewar socioeconomic tensions between Eurasians and Dutch-educated Indonesians in the Netherlands Indies.<sup>30</sup>

Events during most of the 1950s created an anticlimax to the political turbulent times of the immediate postwar period. Overt anti-Dutch national agitation was suppressed, although in the Indonesian nationalist affected areas such as Serui, Fak-Fak and Sorong, anti-Dutch colonial feeling smouldered under the surface. Furthermore, the departure for Indonesia in 1949 of the charismatic Papuan nationalist leader Silas Papare left the pro-Indonesian movement largely leaderless.

The Dutch colonial authorities, as they had done in the Netherlands Indies, attempted to lead Papuan nationalist feeling into less revolutionary channels by increasing the rate of indigenous participation in public administration and advisory councils and encouraging Papuans to set up anti-Indonesian organisations.

The new elite of Dutch-educated and nationalistically inclined Papuans was divided between a relatively small but vociferous group advocating incorporation with Indonesia and a larger group of leaders opting for cooperation with Dutch policies to eventually achieve full Papuan nationhood and independence. The pro-Indonesian faction was centred mainly in Serui, Sorong, and Fak-Fak and was organised as the PKII set up in 1946. In its propaganda it targeted educated Papuans employed in the civil service, the teaching sector, and succeeded in recruiting some Christian mission teachers, as well as assistant district officers, policemen, and health workers. PKII workers in the Telecommunications Department had between 1945 and 1949 been able to maintain telephone contact with the republican government in Java. During 1950 the Dutch government took a number of repressive measures against the PKII. The importation and dis-

tribution of the Yogyakarta-published periodical *Suara Irian* was forbidden and the Papuan staff in the Telecommunication Department was replaced by Dutch officials. Furthermore, military reinforcements were sent from Biak to prevent possible anti-government actions.<sup>31</sup> The repatriation, however, of the Indonesian nationalist detainees from Serui, and the departure of Silas Papare for Indonesia in September 1949, his fare having been paid by his followers, weakened the leadership of the party. The organisation now continued to work more covertly. In the village world Silas Papare became a cult figure, expected to bring back the *koreri*, the promised utopia, on the backs of the invading Indonesian armed forces.<sup>32</sup> The people said: 'We have paid for Papare's trip (*sudah buang ongkos*) and we want to see the results of our money (*dulu ongkos kembali*)...' <sup>33</sup>

Those interviewed indicated their fear of the Dutch government (*kami takut pemerintah*) and expressed their belief that once united with Indonesia, Papuans would be able to study anywhere in the world.<sup>34</sup>

This strong pro-Indonesian sentiment was still in evidence in Serui in the early 1960s. PKII adherents remained suspicious of the Dutch colonial government's policies and intentions. This pro-Indonesian stand seemed almost axiomatic, although now more rational arguments were being put up against the Dutch attempts to speed up Papuan self-government and independence. Among these were that West New Guinea was still too underdeveloped and if granted independence the country would fall back again into darkness. Another important point was the self-image held of Serui being the most emancipated and advanced area in the country, while most of the rest was seen still as very backward and the objection was: 'If we must wait until all the others have advanced to our level before we are able to gain independence we will never be free (from the Netherlands) ...'

Obviously, local group chauvinism played a role here in sticking to the Indonesian option. The Netherlands government was also blamed for promoting the idea of Papuan independence

without the necessary education and training opportunities being provided. Here, regional rivalry came into play as the government was being upbraided for being biased towards Biak, seen as a Dutch ally, in allotting higher education places.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the introduction of the New Guinea Council and regional councils was dismissed as diverting attention away from urgently needed improvements such as in education. At village level the councils were criticised as being superimposed by the government and the people were unable to participate in them because of a lack of education. The Dutch were accused of following a policy of *gila kedaulatan* (independence madness), thereby running the risk of creating a Congo-like situation. Papuans who decided to cooperate were fooling themselves. In general the people of Serui felt politically suppressed and the voices of the people were being ignored. These ideas as a whole were strongly held among the older generation.

But among the younger people with an educational level beyond the village school the ideal of Papuan independence rather than the goal of joining Indonesia was gaining more support in the early 1960s. In this group the Papare cult was also losing ground.<sup>36</sup> In addition, District Officer Assink reported in 1960 that the Indonesian propaganda about Dutch neglect of socio-economic development in Serui had lost a great deal of appeal, since the lot of the people had improved considerably in recent years, as better housing, electricity and water had been provided. He warned, however, that the political situation might be affected by an influx of unemployed workers returning from the Sorong oilfields. Among these were many workers from Waropen, staying in Serui looking for work, who 'infected' by the propaganda of their Indonesian co-workers in Sorong would cause a good deal of political trouble.

In 1950 a pro-Indonesian youth organisation, Pemuda Indonesia (PPI), had been founded in Serui. Its leadership consisted mainly of Indonesian nationals and some local youths. In September 1950 the PPI was proscribed by the Dutch colonial au-

thorities for subversive activities and its leaders sentenced to long prison terms. After their release in 1954 an attempt was made to revitalise the organisation under another name, Pemuda Baru. To avoid a second jailing they stayed in the background, but found it difficult to find other leaders.<sup>37</sup>

Another important location of pro-Indonesian sentiment and activity was Sorong where a sizeable Indonesian labour contingent was employed in the oilfields. This resulted in many Papuan workers being indoctrinated by their Indonesian colleagues, who disseminated Indonesian propaganda after their return to their own villages. The fall of oil production since 1959 had caused hundreds of Indonesian workers to be repatriated, thereby markedly reducing Indonesian political agitation. The Indonesian cause suffered further with the sudden decision of the Jakarta government to put a stop to this repatriation of its own nationals, causing dismay and disillusionment. More harm resulted when the leader of the Indonesian group in Sorong, a Menadonese called S.K. Tumengkol, considered by Dutch intelligence to be a master spy, disappeared out of sight, causing a serious succession struggle. Of course Dutch suppression also had an impact. For example, one member of the Sorong group, an Indonesian called A. Ruman, who on the island of Misool had set up an anti-government organisation, was arrested by the authorities and he and his followers were sentenced to prison terms. By 1960, according to Dutch intelligence, Sorong was no longer a major centre of Indonesian subversion.<sup>38</sup>

The traditional pro-Indonesian sentiment in the *raja* districts of the Fak-Fak area and the Raja Empat Islands remained intact. Islam and family relationships in Indonesia bonded the *rajas* to the Indonesian cause.<sup>39</sup> In his *Memorie van Overgave* of 1962, Controleur Mahler typified the attitudes of the *rajas* as follows. The *raja* Fatagas A. Uswanas showed no overt inclination one way or the other, waiting to show his colours until the political future of the island had been definitely settled. Among his relatives, however, some were definitely pro-Indonesian. The *raja*

of Rumbati was only out for the most profitable outcome for himself, and was open to all offers, although among his family strong support for Indonesia could be found. The *raja* of Argaeni, M. Rimosan, was considered politically trustworthy, but was not a dynamic person, keeping himself in the background. Also the *raja* of Ati-Ati was found not to have been affected by anti-Dutch propaganda.

There was still little political party activity in Fak-Fak. The Gerakan Rajat Irian party, wanting fusion with Indonesia, had recently been founded. There were few people actively involved in the Papuan independence movement. The growing newly educated Papuan elite consisted mainly of teachers and lower echelon government clerks. The status of this group was soon to be raised by the return of seven students in colleges in the Netherlands and two in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

The Indonesian colony from the island of Buton, which in 1946 to 1947<sup>40</sup> had been deeply involved in anti-Dutch plotting, was still politically active. It exercised a strong influence particularly on the Islamic Papuan families, who had helped Indonesian infiltrators that had come ashore near Kokas. The Butonese had, in 1958, founded the Partai Iran Barat that was almost immediately suppressed by the colonial power.<sup>41</sup>

Controleur Mahler concluded in 1962 that in the Fak-Fak area the Papuan population generally did not prefer an Indonesian takeover, as they appreciated that their economic situation and their educational opportunities had been improved under Dutch rule. On the other hand he pointed out that an Indonesian takeover would not result in massive popular resistance as many people had relatives in adjacent Indonesian islands. If the Indonesians introduced an humane administration there would be no opposition to them. He also reported that overt threats were being made by fervent Papuan nationalists against local Indonesian residents. Mahler gives the impression that, although restrained by the official government line, in reality he wanted to convey that in his area the majority of Papuans were basically

pro-Indonesian or at least politically passive.<sup>42</sup>

In 1950, in addition to repression, the Dutch government tried to attack the pro-Indonesian movements by establishing in Biak its own political organisation, the Gerakan Pemuda Nieuw Guinea. This was the brainchild of Captain Sneep, an officer in the territorial intelligence service.<sup>43</sup> At the same time a similar organisation, Persatuan Perwakilan Politik Irian (PPPI), appeared in Hollandia. In its periodical *Warta Irian* it pushed a strong anti-Indonesian tone, and exhorted Papuans to cooperate with the Dutch government to achieve a national Papuan identity and a government structure free from Indonesian influences. Soon afterwards both these parties were amalgamated into the Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea (GPNG), with branches set up nationally. Interestingly, a GPNG branch from the staunchly pro-Indonesian lion's den of Serui, in 1952, defiantly sent a resolution to The Hague expressing support for continued Dutch rule. While this token of adherence no doubt had some propaganda value, particularly in the Netherlands, it of course fooled nobody in the country itself and in Indonesia for that matter.

In 1953 the GPNG took a stand against the promotion of the idea of creating West New Guinea as a new fatherland for refugee Eurasians from Indonesia. It similarly rejected the idea pushed at the time by some RMS followers of incorporating West New Guinea into a Great Moluccas State. As it was, the GPNG remained a rather weak and sluggish body, unable to generate the necessary energy to prove that it was more than a mere Dutch colonial government propaganda tool. So, in 1954 some government quarters dismissed the GPNG as a failure and called for its abolition.<sup>44</sup>

More important in advancing Papuan political emancipation was the Perkumpulan Sekerdja Kristen Di Nieuw Guinea (PERSEKDING), a labour union and the Papuan wing of the Christelijk Werknemersverbond Nieuw Guinea. Founded in 1952 it was mainly interested in wages and other socioeconomic issues such as education and housing and fought hard for just

wages and humane labour conditions to be enshrined in the law. In addition, women's clubs, and literacy classes, some covering political topics, were established under its umbrella. By 1960 the organisation's membership had grown to 3000 and acted as an important training ground for budding nationalist politicians, providing almost the whole of the top leadership of the most effectively organised Papuan nationalist party, the Partai Nasional (PARNA), set up in 1961.<sup>45</sup>

### **The Democratische Volkspartij**

The GPNG was eventually replaced in 1957 by the Democratische Volkspartij (DVP), but soon lost its initial widespread and enthusiastic support owing to its inefficient and corrupt leadership. The party became disorganised and was torn apart by personal rivalries. The Western-style organisational structure was largely a façade behind which power was diffused along traditional clan lines where mutual suspicions and diverging personal demands still ruled supreme, pushing both the party's and the national interests into the background. In these circumstances it was those endowed with a strong, charismatic personality who came to the fore, bending or ignoring the rules to suit their own whims and advantages and putting more store on increasing their own social standing and power than the welfare of the community.

The idea for the DVP actually came from Brandenburg van de Gronden, president at the time of the Eurasian-dominated organisation Nieuw Guinea Verbond, and it was he who chose its first leader, Lodewijk Jacadewa, a bizarre and dubious figure. Admittedly the range of choice in the Papuan world was of course very limited. More educated personalities such as Kaisiepo and Jouwe were wary of being branded as government stooges and most of the rest of the leadership of the modern intelligentsia such as Weajoi, Waruma, Ajamiseba, and Wettobossy were considered to be too pro-Indonesian. Still, the choice of Lodewijk

Jacadewa, with his unsavoury record, was certainly not reassuring. In 1946 Jacadewa had been sentenced to three and half years jail for anti-Dutch activities. Again in 1951 he had been sentenced, this time for possession of dynamite. In 1957 he grasped the opportunity of the visit of the Dutch Minister for Overseas Affairs, Helders, to put himself in the limelight and, granted an interview, he propounded the DVP objectives as the retention of Dutch rule, the rejection of Indonesian claims, and the improvement of indigenous socioeconomic conditions. Putting aside Jacadewa's dubious reputation, people joined the DVP in droves. Most of the support came from the north coast areas, but Biak and the villages around the Humboldt Bay, the tribal area of Nicolaas Jouwe and Kasiepo, stayed aloof. Jacadewa himself originated from Tanah Merah Bay, situated more westwards from Hollandia. Tribal and clan considerations still played a role in the determination of political allegiance. The Hollandia regional authorities from the beginning showed strong reservations about the DVP leadership and with just cause. Recruiters were going around the districts collecting membership fees without official approval. Many complaints were received in Hollandia, suspicions about corruption. The assistant district officer of Depapare (west of Hollandia) reminded authorities that previously Jacadewa had been involved in a case of a cooperative venture in his home district of Tanah Merah from which 6000 guilders had disappeared without trace. The Resident of Hollandia then ordered that the DVP should be steered away from political activity, and should concentrate its efforts in the socio-economic field. The suggestion for an organisation to collect money for young, capable Papuans to be sent to the Netherlands to further their studies, though accepted by the party council, ended up with most of the funds disappearing into the wrong pockets. Only the party's treasurer put the money he had collected into the bank, leaving the passbook in the district officer's office for safe-keeping. Funds collected during another campaign for a school building project suffered the same fate.

In May 1958, Lodewijk Jacadewa, ignoring the official prohibition to stay out of the political arena together with his brother Mezach, a mentally labile figure, sent a letter to Prime Minister Drees, objecting to possible Japanese timber concessions in the Sarmi region, and accused the political opposition, including Nicolaas Jouwe and Womsiwor, of being involved in the deal. All this of course helped to heighten Lodewijk Jacadewa's prestige and power within the party council and the rank and file. Nevertheless, his days of political prominence were numbered. Suspicions about financial irregularities continued and questions were asked about how the party's leadership paid their expenses albeit unemployed. Finally, in 1959, Lodewijk Jacadewa was accused of having misappropriated 200 guilders and of later having falsified a bank passbook. He was found guilty and sentenced to four months in jail.

As a result the DVP fell into decline. Its original backer, the Eurasian leader Brandenburg, pushed forward Romainum, a local administration officer, as leader. More intelligent than Jacadewa and endowed with an even more delusionary imagination, Romainum proved to be equally unreliable and self-seeking. He was a confidence trickster who, as an intelligence informer, had managed to sell the same information to both the police as well as to the legal firm de Rijke, gaining a pretty sum out of these dealings.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the Western image of the party, the DVP's leaders were only partly progressive, and their objectives and actions were still often culturally hidebound and their horizons restricted to local and regional concerns. With their education generally not above the village school level most DVP leaders could be classed as still pseudo-mythical and in some cases even showed a traditional messianic orientation. Furthermore, as many of the initiators of the party had served in the postwar Papuan Battalion, a social bond of long standing existed between these party stalwarts, partly explaining their anti-Indonesian attitude. Having served under the Dutch flag and having been instrumental in the sup-

pression of Indonesian plots and rebellions, they saw the DVP as an instrument to continue their struggle. In fact, for Lodewijk Jacadewa, as an earlier pro-Indonesian supporter, to obtain the top leadership in the party surely testifies to his mesmerising power of persuasion. DVP support was also determined to an important extent on the basis of regional rivalries. The party saw itself as representing the 'pure' and 'free' Papuans from the Hollandia region as juxtaposed to the 'mixed' people of Biak and Serui who, for centuries, had been under the rule of the Sultan of Tidore and therefore were dismissed as pro-Indonesian spies. Other Papuan leaders such as Jouwe and Kasiepo, who turned their noses up at the DVP, were painted as self-seeking, untrustworthy, and accused of making plane trips overseas while forgetting the needs of the people. The DVP marketed itself as the only genuinely popular movement committed to Papuan socio-economic advance by supporting and cooperating with Netherlands rule and the rejection of Indonesian claims. The Netherlands was seen as the only power genuinely interested in trying to improve the lot of the Papuan people. Former Indonesians employed in the Dutch colonial service, and teachers and policemen had treated the Papuans as animals, and through their position in the civil service had prevented the Dutch from turning the Papuans into human beings. During his interviews with DVP members, Grootenhuis was surprised at the invariable litany about the ill-treatment received from Indonesian superiors. Assuming that the truth lay in the middle, he argued that this still left ample evidence to support these accusations, explaining this rancour and hate of Indonesians whose return they wanted to avoid at any cost. In contrast the Netherlands was seen as bringing light into the darkness, particularly after World War II, which had made 'people' out of the Papuans not only through education and economic welfare but also by greater social equality:

Previously we had to sit on the floor; we were not allowed to say anything. But now we are sitting at the same table and you listen to what we have to say ...

Other complaints concerned the inaccessibility of former Indonesian government officials; people waited for days to see them only to be insulted at the end. Cases of ill-treatment at school were aired, such as pupils being dismissed and upbraided as stupid and backward; their inability to speak Malay properly being attributed derisively to the stickiness in the mouth caused by eating sago. The Indonesian officials were also blamed for seriously retarding any possibility for Papuan social mobility by invariably dismissing the locals as too stupid. The Sultan of Tidore, who for centuries had suppressed Papuans considering them as chattels to be hunted down and sold into slavery, was seen as the personification of the *amberies'* attitudes toward Papuans. In fact the Jakarta government's decision to appoint the Sultan of Tidore as the governor of Irian Barat to strengthen the Indonesian claims through historical legal rights, misfired as it poured salt into old wounds still nurtured at least in north-west New Guinea.

The picture conveyed by DVP supporters of greater social equality under the Dutch was in fact highly overdrawn and idealised. As related above, racial discrimination was still widespread among the Dutch in the colony, especially among Eurasians.

The DVP likened the relationship with the Netherlands as one of a father bringing up his son to the point where he could stand on his own two feet. The Netherlands was thus looked on as the essential source of development. The earlier mythical belief that the Dutch held the secret key to knowledge and hence power and development, still seemed to linger on here.

On the other side there existed a conscious appreciation of Papuan national rights and the DVP leaders referred to articles 72 and 73 of the UN Charter and the speech of Queen Wilhelmina of 7 December 1942. To highlight the Papuan right of self-determination and the falseness of Indonesian claims the DVP had sent a number of resolutions to the UN, The Hague and Hollandia governments. The party did have a lopsided view of

the realities of the international situation West New Guinea found itself in. This is illustrated by its demand for a permanent stationing of the Dutch aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman* as a deterrent to Indonesian attack. It showed a childlike faith in the support of the Netherlands and the UN for their cause. One leader believed that all progressive countries, exactly twenty-seven in number, stood ready to rush to the aid of West New Guinea in the case of an Indonesian invasion. A DVP delegate from Depapre, west of Hollandia, tried to persuade the party to collect contributions to pay for an American mercenary army to keep the Indonesians at bay. Apparently the memories of American armed might that had staggered them in 1945 had still not dimmed.

The New Guinea Council was seen as a Papuan political training institute, and as an offshoot of the DVP that after all saw itself as standing at the centre of national Papuan politics. The DVP strongly pushed the New Guinea Council to take much more drastic action against the Indonesian and pro-Indonesian segments of the population. It was completely incomprehensible to them that these 'Judas Iscariots' were allowed to move around freely and to continue their efforts to convert 'gullible' Papuans to the Indonesian side. One informant in Sarmi wanted all Indonesians to be repatriated, if necessary by force, and played out the following imaginary scenario:

With a rifle at the ready he ordered an imaginary group of Indonesians: 'Cut down this tree to make a boat out of it. Sail home in it. If you don't want to make a boat, you will die here' (*Potong pohon! Bikin prahu! Tidak bikin prahu! Mati disini!*) ...

Others expressed a more tolerant and Christian-inspired view for all population groups: Papuan, Chinese, Dutch, Eurasian and Indonesian, to be combined into one people under a Christian state. Others again agreed that after a security check Indonesians should be allowed to stay, providing they treated Papuans as equals.

Most DVP members still stressed that the majority of the Papuan people were too backward and too poor to handle self-government not to mention independence. The guiding hand and protection of the Netherlands would still be needed for a considerable time. As far as the political future was concerned options varied from union with the Netherlands to joining a Melanesian union. The demands of others for Papuan independence in the immediate future were derisively rejected as attempts by 'intellectuals' to shamefully expel the 'father' of the people. They were ignoring the plight of the people and were only after the good jobs and nice houses of the Dutch. As officials they sported an array of fountain pens, but without their jobs they were no better than anybody else.

The DVP leadership, living intermittently in a traditional and modern mode, considered themselves as 'ambassadors' of the Dutch colonial government with the task of elucidating to their people official policy objectives. This paternalistic and 'all the way with the Dutch' attitude of the leadership, however, no longer satisfied the rank and file, especially among the young in the urban areas of Hollandia where more emphasis was put on the provision of better housing, training facilities and general economic betterment.<sup>47</sup>

In fact some DVP members in Hollandia were critical of the vague ideas and expectations of the leadership, calling for their replacement by more realistic leaders such as Jouwe and Kasiepo.<sup>48</sup> According to an investigation by Broekhuijse only 16 per cent of his sample were members of the DVP and 10 per cent of these regularly attended meetings.

During a general meeting on 24 August 1960 the DVP announced a new and more detailed political program of action. In addition to the continued support of Dutch rule a veiled criticism was raised about the speed with which the Netherlands intended to grant Papuan independence. A new feature was the demand for DVP participation in deliberations about political and economic development. Clearly, in a realistic appreciation

of the Dutch position, both internally and internationally, it was spelled out that such Papuan involvement was even more crucial now with the future of Netherlands rule of West New Guinea having become shaky. The Dutch government was also urged to appoint only those prominent Papuans who had showed a genuine interest in the socioeconomic and cultural advancement of the people - meaning of course the DVP leadership - to attend local and international meetings. Having urban membership greatly in mind the party pledged itself to fight hard for better wages, housing, and medical care for both manual workers and office staff in the private and government sector. Finally the DVP committed itself to work for the creation of a sovereign, democratic, and prosperous, Melanesian federation, and advocated that Dutch, English and French should be taught in secondary schools.

In October 1960 the DVP sent a resolution to Dutch Foreign Minister Luns insisting that West New Guinea should not be declared independent until a solid national economic basis had been established. The founding of a *volkscredietbank* as well as the sending of more Papuan students to the Netherlands was considered absolutely essential.<sup>49</sup>

### **Partai Nasional**

This DVP policy departure had partly been a reaction to the arrival on the political scene of a new, vigorous Papuan party, the Partai Nasional (PARNA), which was founded on 10 August 1960. The impetus behind the establishment of this new party came mainly from the small new intelligentsia consisting of students and graduates of secondary schools and tertiary institutes. About 700 people had attended the foundation meeting. Most of the members were civil servants holding lower echelon positions, people with a wider mental horizon and a more realistic understanding of the world both at home and internationally, rejecting the DVP as too paternalistic and too grovel-

ling to the Dutch. The party program stressed the need for self-reliance for Papuans to achieve their political and socioeconomic objectives without depending on outsiders. It was a plan of action reminiscent of that of the Indonesian nationalist activist organisation, Perhimpunan Indonesia, in the heady days of the 1920s in the Netherlands.

The central committee of PARNA consisted of President Wajoi, Vice-President A.F. Indey, and among the members were K. Krey and A. Bonnas, while F.J.S. Romainum, a Protestant pastor, was appointed as an adviser. Frits Kirihiu, a Leiden university student home on leave, had played a prominent role in the founding of the party, and was appointed as party representative in Holland. Wajoi and A.F. Indey belonged to the first intake of the Vervolgschool at Joka (Hollandia), and Frits Kirihiu was a personal friend of Indey, both their fathers having been village schoolteachers. In fact Wajoi's previous encounter with the colonial authorities had not exactly been entirely felicitous. After the completion of the Vervolgschool he had been awarded a cadetship to the Bestuursschool and, in 1949, returned to Sarmi for work experience. Similarly, to the majority of people in Sarmi, also, Wajoi was pro-Indonesian and after being caught passing on sensitive political information from a report of the district officer to the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian he was convicted and spent nine months in jail. After that he wandered from the Village School Training School, to the Maritime Training School, to a course for taxation officers. Initially he had been attracted by the Indonesian freedom ideal of creating a unitary state from the various peoples at different stages of development, which, freely cooperating, would form a great empire. In contrast he believed that the Netherlands had little to offer in this respect. Subsequently, further political events in Indonesia opened his eyes: these included the rebellions against the central government, Javanese imperialism, and economic disorder, and they forced him to realise that Indonesia would merely turn out to be a suppressor of Papuans. The appointment in 1956 of the

Sultan of Tidore as Governor of West New Guinea further reinforced this belief. Furthermore, like nearly all of PARNA's top leaders, he had been involved with the labour union PERSEKDING, which had acted as a fruitful training ground for prospective politicians.

PARNA started off as a protest movement of the modern Papuan intelligentsia about their inferior status in the socio-economically stratified colonial society. They felt caught in an unenviable dualistic position, forming the upper layer in their own society while forming the lower social layer in the modern, Dutch-controlled public and private sector. One of the main slogans of PARNA was directed against racial discrimination, and a distinctly dialectical dimension came to the fore during interviews. The father-son dependency of the DVP was rejected and instead there appeared a more critical and uncompromising stance against the government and the colonial system. This criticism was directed at the lack of education and training needed by the Papuan people to become self-reliant and self-confident and to take their future into their own hands without foreign help. As in the case of the DVP, the establishment of a people's credit system was put forward as a real panacea, opening up opportunities for establishing private Papuan ventures in agriculture, fisheries, and retailing. This would destroy the existing commercial monopoly held by the Chinese and the Dutch, and would also stop the drainage of profits overseas. The government was also attacked for its failure to provide employment and housing for the urban migrant population which was unable to lift itself out of its coolie existence. In regard to its cocoa projects the government was even accused of being involved in practices reminiscent of the notorious *Cultuurstelsel* in 19th-century Java such as requiring growers to pay back the government for seedlings supplied from the proceeds of the crop. The fact that the government actually lost financially, owing to these initiatives, of course makes reference to the *Cultuurstelsel* spurious. The policy of sending Papuan students to Holland was also censured as being

too expensive and it was argued it would be much cheaper to set up higher education facilities in the territory itself. This would also benefit a larger number of deserving applicants. All this breathed a spirit of self-confidence and a feeling of Papua centric nationalism, something so different from the DVP's attitudes.

Some PARNA members objected to the export of Papuan artifacts and showed concerns about the disappearance of traditional skills and crafts. There were also signs of opposition appearing against the unwanted foreign interference of Christian missions in dismissing some traditional cultural usages and values as pagan.

But also in PARNA the extrapolation between *binatang* and *manusia* (human being) in the treatment of Papuans played an important role in the final judgement on the performances of the Dutch and the Indonesians. Until the mid-1950s the Dutch were seen primarily as a colonial power only resorting to force to keep the Papuan people under control. There was no real socio-economic development and political self-expression was forbidden. The participation of Papuans in shaping their own political and economic future had also been soft-pedalled and only official lip service given to the principle of self-determination. Thus, the Netherlands had done nothing to justify its presence. In contrast Indonesia initially had been seen as a national saviour. But disillusion about events in Indonesia sweeping away the promises of the revolution, which had included freedom and socioeconomic justice and prosperity for all, had turned Papuan support toward the Dutch. This was particularly so when it became clear that the Dutch government was seriously committed to the realisation of Papuan independence and economic development.

The first point in the PARNA political platform was the rejection of racial discrimination and the proposition that authority would be based on Christianity: that is, divine love. Secondly, it called for the entire Papuanisation of the public service within ten years, the creation of an infrastructure of main roads, the

foundation of a *volkscredietbank*, and the attraction of foreign capital.

In November 1960, PARNA sent a resolution to the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, requesting him to organise a conference of the Netherlands, Indonesia and a Papuan delegation under the auspices of the UN. In reply to DVP criticism PARNA stated that it wanted to make clear to the world at large that the future status of West New Guinea could not be decided without taking notice of the most important party involved: the Papuan people itself.<sup>50</sup>

The official PARNA preference for a separate Papuan independent state was not unanimous, as a minority still expressed support for a union with the Netherlands or joining a Melanesian federation. In fact, Nicolaas Jouwe and some other prominent pro-Dutch figures remained aloof from PARNA, after failure by Jouwe to take over the party and the rejection of his strong advocacy of a Melanesian federation.

There are, however, distinct indications at the end of Dutch rule that points to a considerable fall in pro-Indonesian support in the Papuan political leadership, even in the Serui area. A letter in April 1961, from a Papuan students' association in the Netherlands to President Kennedy, stated that the Netherlands, because of its experience, was the most appropriate power to develop West New Guinea. It dismissed Sukarno's claims about Dutch colonial suppression as deceitful propaganda, although stressing that Papuans did not want any kind of colonialism, be it Dutch or Indonesian. But the Dutch government was not considered as colonialist, as it was trusted by the people to lead them to eventual independence. Both parts of the island would be united into one independent, democratic nation. The Papuan people objected to Javanese imperialism and believed that Indonesia had nothing valuable to offer, apart from serious economic disorder. The students implored Kennedy, as the leader of the most powerful democratic nation in the world, to take serious notice of the democratic rights and national aspirations of the

Papuan people during Sukarno's imminent visit to Washington.<sup>51</sup>

This radical nationalist Papuan tone is also evident in a speech of the PARNA president, Wajoi, on 10 August 1961, in which he severely took to task the activities of the Rijkens group and Professor Duynstee: 'They consider us as Philips radios for sale. If Duynstee is a real Christian then surely he cannot deny our rights ...'

Still the Indonesian propaganda machine continued to run on overtime. On 1 January 1962, the Indonesian newsagency *Antara* reported a meeting of President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio with Frits Kirihió, a Papuan student at Leiden university and an original organiser of PARNA, in which the latter stated that most Papuans were doubtful about the Dutch policy of self-determination and that in a general election most people would prefer integration with Indonesia. The New Guinea Council was dismissed as merely a powerless Dutch puppet.<sup>52</sup>

Frits Kirihió, on his return to the Netherlands, told West New Guinea Affairs Secretary, Bot, that while he was not questioning Dutch good intentions, the aims of self-government and independence for West New Guinea could not be achieved. He pointed to political division in Holland itself and the obviously warlike intentions of the Indonesians. Therefore as the lesser of two evils the most sensible solution would be an Indonesian takeover. He then proposed to send as speedily as possible a delegation of Papuan leaders to Jakarta in order to create a better climate for further negotiations. Bot, although not entirely negative, pointed out that it was the responsibility of the West New Guinea government to appoint such a delegation. But he rejected Kirihió's request to be allowed to go to West New Guinea to mount a propaganda campaign to spread his ideas, while still on the Dutch government's payroll as a university student. Bot gave him the choice of either remaining in Holland to complete his studies as quickly as possible or to go into politics and lose his scholarship.<sup>53</sup>

In West New Guinea itself Frits Kirihió's actions had caused

an uproar. In Merauke a delegation consisting of delegates from all population groups sent a loyalty declaration to the government, severely censuring the turncoat Kiriho. Again in Merauke about 300 Papuans agitated against Indonesia and pledged support to the Dutch government. In Hollandia a telegram from 500 Papuan students was sent to Dutch Prime Minister de Quay, accusing Kiriho of treason and further assuring their trust in Dutch leadership.<sup>54</sup> Another and perhaps stronger condemnation came from the New Guinea Council, which pushed aside Sukarno's claims as senseless, because the Papuan people felt no need to be 'liberated' by Indonesia as they were not suppressed:

Our brother Frits Kiriho, who left Holland for Indonesia, is no longer considered as a brother. In contrast he is a dirty enemy and traitor of his country and people ...<sup>55</sup>

But not all council members approved of this vilification of Kiriho. Members E.J. Bonay, M.B. Ramendey and A.K. Grebse considered by Dutch intelligence as pro-Indonesian, objected. They were joined by M. Indey and B. Jufuway, both members of the Dafensoro Regional Council, who were known as pro-Indonesian. Also dissenting was H. Womsiwor, another council member, who was known for making regular trips to Japan to confer with Indonesian officials.<sup>56</sup>

### **Other political organisations**

In the early 1960s a number of other political organisations appeared, fitting into the ideological spectrum between PARNA and the DVP. An interesting case of a tribally based organisation coated with a veneer of Western trappings was the Eenheids Partij Nieuw Guinea (EPANG) which had been set up by two Arfak tribal leaders, Lodewijk and Barend Mandatjan, and a Eurasian colonist, Gosewisch. The power of the Arfak leaders was largely tradition based and depended on their ability to control the barter trade and to provide gifts essential in inter-clan

marriage relations. Power then depended on the number of wives a man could afford; Lodewijk had seven wives and Barend had four, making Lodewijk the leader of the whole of the Manokwari mountainous hinterland. The two brothers living in Manokwari acted as mediators between the modern and the traditional world. Lodewijk had been a member of the colonial regional police force, which added to his prestige among his people. His fame and power had reached its zenith during the war when he had operated as a guerrilla leader against the Japanese, using modern arms dropped by the American forces. He acted as the main contact link between the mountain tribes and the Eurasian colonists, who depended mainly on Arfak labor.

Underlying EPANG was the Papua-wide dichotomy between the highlands and the coast. The Arfak people had only been touched incidentally by the 20th century, while on the coast modernisation had been proceeding at full speed. As a man who had defended his people against the Japanese, Lodewijk considered himself as holding the 'secret' of socioeconomic development. From the Indonesians, who in any case were mistrusted owing to their past record as slave hunters, nothing positive could be expected:

In the old days they also walked about clad in a loincloth. But when, however, they had some clothes on, they thought that they would be able to do everything themselves. But of course everything ended up in a great shambles ...<sup>57</sup>

There was also great resentment against the relatively greater economic wealth in Manokwari and its monopolistic hold on education and overseas aid. In addition, the coastal dwellers were censured for their critical attitude to the Dutch and some of their leaders were seen as unreliable and pro-Indonesian. The Arfak people rejected the idea of Papuan independence in the short term, as this would mean their subjugation to the coastal area. Something they would never tolerate. Thus, Dutch rule was considered necessary until the time the Arfak people had caught

up economically and culturally.

Similar considerations underlay the founding of the *Kracht Uit Eenheid* (KUE) organisation in Sentani by prominent people in the village of Dojo Lama, who were advised by a Eurasian. Here, once more, the traditional distrust of the coastal people came to the fore as a major motive for this initiative leading to the demand for Dutch rule continuing as long as possible. The people of Biak and Sarmi were dismissed as racially mixed and unreliable. PARNA was condemned for trying to get rid of the Dutch government on which further development was so dependent:

Kirihio will push out all Dutchmen and will take over all the shops ... Wajoi wants to give New Guinea to the Indonesians ... Freedom will mean internecine war. How could the people of Servei rule us, as they are they not even familiar with the Sentani *adat*. If the government leaves we will have nothing left, no matches, no axes, no clothes ...<sup>58</sup>

Hence, independence could only become viable after Papuan society had been sufficiently modernised and developed.

In Manokwari another more Western oriented party, *Partai Orang Nieuw Guinea* (PONG), was set up mainly through the efforts of Ariks, one of the first Papuans to direct international attention to the Papuan national cause in 1949 to 1950.<sup>59</sup> PONG viewed PARNA as irresponsible and too extremist and compared Wajoi to Sukarno. The DVP was ineffective because its leadership was uneducated leaving it prone to outside manipulation. Ariks's original plan to combine the coastal and mountain peoples into one strong organisation was shipwrecked by the suspicions of the Arfak tribes and their leaders. The most crucial point PONG wanted to drive home to the international community was that the Papuan people, as a result of free choice, supported continued Dutch rule and rejected Indonesian claims. While Dutchmen and Eurasians were refused membership, the party on the other hand pushed the ideal of a multi-racial Papuan state, in which all groups, Papuans, Chinese, Indonesians, and Eurasians, would

be accorded equal rights. As PARNA had done the government was exhorted to accelerate socioeconomic development, but political development was considered less urgent. On the other hand PARNA's demands for independence after ten years were considered ridiculous, unless accompanied by the creation of a viable national economic system. Similarly the call for full Papuanisation of the government apparatus by 1970, although perhaps attainable would, because of the lack of sufficient preparation time, result in a partially trained and corrupt civil service: 'Papuaans do not yet have a sense of duty ... Papuaans holding high office will mainly try to better themselves.'<sup>60</sup>

Manokwari seems to have provided particularly fertile soil for political activity as yet another political party blossomed: the Partai Serikat Pemuda-Pemuda Papua (PARSEPP). The idea for this party had originated among the younger generation, although its leadership was in the hands of older men with a labour union background and with a DVP mentality. The program was largely directed at socioeconomic issues such as the abolition of the dowry in marriage, which was felt to be a pressing financial burden. As a modern society was in the making, a process in which youth played a prominent role, the old marriage customs (*adat*) were out of place. Secondly, education and training formed an important part of the platform and in addition to the need for more secondary and tertiary education, technical education was emphasised. In addition to learning Dutch, essential to appointment in the civil service and private enterprise, a knowledge of English was deemed necessary to master modern science and technology. Political problems seemed to hold little interest. The Netherlands was seen as the key and indispensable link with the modern world while Indonesia was considered backward. As in DVP circles the government tolerance towards the Indonesian minority was entirely baffling. The Indonesians were the 'enemy' to whom a 'final solution' should be applied, although there was a suggestion that the Indonesian minority should be exchanged with similar Papuan groups in Indonesia.

Thus a kind of bloodless ethnic cleansing was envisaged.

The Grootenhuis investigation found that the group of educated Papuans without any direct political affiliation showed the same patterns of response as party members. Many of those interviewed carried great prestige in Papuan society with some showing the same concerns about racial discrimination as PARNA. Others again seemed less concerned on this point and exhibited a strong trust in the Dutch government. All of them, though, criticised the Papuan party leadership complaining that it was either too old, too young, or too inexperienced and uneducated to successfully carry the burden of public responsibility. As a postwar legacy political parties were often seen as essentially subversive organisations. Most had only a vague notion about human rights, considering this to mean to stifle opposition. There was also little awareness of international relations or for that matter of Western political ideologies. Only a few were inspired by Asian and African nationalism. In general the reactions here were of disapproval as the most mentioned leaders, Sukarno and Lumumba, were brought up as examples of the dangers caused by hasty political decisions. Those with primary school background and employed in lower grade public service positions emphasised racial discrimination and substandard living conditions. Others called the idea of independence premature and something that would be ridiculed internationally when the shoddy social-economic condition of the prospective ruling class was known. Obviously international aid would still be needed for a long time to ensure a reasonable degree of economic development and before self-sufficiency could be achieved. Among those with higher education qualifications, mainly employed in district and regional government offices, the example of the Congo fiasco was frequently brought up. They also pointed to the common people as being still too simple-minded to understand complex political concepts such as democracy and unable to come up with rationally based criticism. Furthermore, another two essential ingredients believed to be lack-

ing were, firstly, a reliable, modern-minded and efficient national leadership, and secondly, a strong national economy. Most envisaged independence as a matter of the distant future. One informant described the Nieuw Guinea Raad as being suspended in mid-air as no input was received from the people below and stressed that group chauvinism was still the main obstacle to the growth of a sense of nationhood. Against this there were others who saw the Nieuw Guinea Raad precisely as an effective instrument to create a feeling of national bonding.

Most revealing were the views expressed in a questionnaire by senior high school students, hospital trainees, and teachers' college students in Hollandia. The high school students were the most critical of the recent rush to establish political parties, seeing this asacerbating the problem of Papuan disunity. The others, though also disapproving of parties, especially PARNA and its rash demands for independence, pointed to the current political and economic mess in Indonesia and the Congo and showed a strong dislike of the Chinese and Indonesian minorities.<sup>61</sup>

It seems then that the majority of the more politically vocal section of the Papuan community clearly believed that the indigenous population was still far from ready to take over the rudder of state. Hasty measures would lead to chaos as had happened in Indonesia and the Congo and so Dutch rule would still be needed for decades. The more radical national section, mainly congregated in the PARNA, was clearly aware of the international implications of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute, and realised that the idea of a free Papuan nation was on the point of being nipped in the bud by United States pressure, and therefore tried to accelerate the independence process as much as possible.

Another group consisting of Nicolaas Jouwe, Kaisepo, and most Papuan government officials, was less sanguine about immediate independence and advocated a long period of tutelage under the Dutch or the UN in order to achieve a more effective Papuan governmental structure and a viable national economic basis.

Nicolaas Jouwe, a leading proponent of a Melanesian federation, put his finger on the sore spot: the lack of an integrated national leadership. The existing structure was still too heterogeneous and too much ruled by traditional cultural values to prevent the formation of an effective and tightly-knit national front. Social isolation, mutual distrust and jealousy at the individual and communal level, were tearing apart any chance of lasting cooperation at the national level. He argued that the highest priority should be given to the creation of a socially responsible elite, driven by high moral and ethical values. This training should occur in the Netherlands where students would be directly exposed to the workings of a modern social democracy. He pointed out that there was already something positive embedded in Papuan culture such as individualism, a feeling of being free, and outspokenness. Unlike Indonesians the Papuans were neither suffering a *hormat* (feudal homage) complex nor being chained to a rigidly stratified social system. For such a training scheme in the Netherlands to succeed it would be necessary, before the return of these graduates, for the ground to be prepared for enough people to become receptive to these new ideas. To start off this process, emphasis should be given in education to the teaching of civic duties and social responsibility. Equally important were the emancipation of women and the modernisation of the family unit. To instil in society an acceptance of modern social virtues to the point that the creation of a modern, free Papuan state would be possible would take time.

This call for rational, modern thinking on the part of people like Jouwe could in reality remain no more than voices crying in the wilderness. This kind of reasoning would be beyond the capacity of the vast bulk of Papuans, who still lived in their traditional thought world in which messianic beliefs still formed the essential core.

In fact, to reinforce this point, early in 1960 a new cargo cult appeared in the hinterland of Sarmi. As a concession to modernity the ancestors appeared in white European clothing, prob-

ably imitating the official colonial dress code. They foretold their imminent return with large ships laden with food, clothing, axes, tobacco, and many other desirable goods. The dead were to be raised to life and a new world would come about overflowing with health and without sickness or death. Everybody would be rich. The message had to spread to neighbouring tribes before the ships were to arrive. As a result work stopped and was replaced by dancing and seances. The movement apparently gained momentum after the regional Dutch control post had been abandoned, as this caused the locals to conclude: '... The *tuau* is gone, now our *tuans* (the ancestors) will soon return ...' Dutch investigators saw embryonic nationalist feelings emerging here, showing traces of the earlier Simpson and the Koreri movements. Another more seriously rebellious cargo cult appeared in the Upper-Apauwar region of Sarmi at this time. It was led by a certain Bannie, a known anti-European stirrer, who preached that the coming of the utopia was held back by the Dutch and other non-Papuans.<sup>62</sup>

Turning again to the Papuan nationalist movement it was the Luns Plan of 1961 that made clear that the writing was on the wall, causing a number of leaders to leap into action. A five-member committee consisting of Nicolaas Jouwe, P. Tuy, Markus Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Tanggahma, and Eliezer Bonay, drafted a manifesto that highlighted the provisions of Article 73 of the UN Charter and Resolution 1514 XV of the UN Assembly of 14 December 1960, in which all colonial powers were charged with laying down target dates for granting self-government. A rider had been added for the achievement of self-government to be delayed owing to a lack of economic and political maturity. The manifesto also announced the establishment of a seventeen-membership Komite Nasional.

### **The Papuan rights for independence nullified**

The Bunker plan caused a great deal of averse and condemna-

tory reaction in the Papuan community. For example, in May 1962 a resolution of twenty-six leading personages from Nimboran and Demta, west of Hollandia, was submitted to the Regional Chief Officer by M. Suwae, a member of the New Guinea Council, and T. Bukarsjou, a district officer. It was signed by schoolteachers, officials, village and *adat* chiefs, many sporting names of prominent Old Testament figures, demanding that the rights of the Papuans to their own country and national cultural identity be fully recognised. The people of West New Guinea considered its independence, as promised by the Netherlands, as an immutable right. It was because of this that during the RTC in 1949 West New Guinea had not been integrated into Indonesia, as it was the fatherland of the Papuans, who in any case did not want a repetition of the suppression suffered at the hands of Indonesians during the Netherlands Indies regime.

Moreover, the Bunker plans were not acceptable because after a two-year UN administration it would be followed by a transfer of power to Indonesia that:

... would obviate any prospects for an independent West Papua ... If this proposal is accepted then the rights of Papuans to have their own country and national existence will have been taken away ... we consider the Bunker proposals as a fire that will burn us citizens of West Papua to death ...

Finally, the Dutch and Indonesian governments were called upon to arrive at a peaceful arrangement under which Papuan rights would not be endangered. It was stressed that the resolution was not a product of outside pressure as it represented the true feelings of the people of Nimboran.<sup>63</sup>

On 9 March 1962, in a letter to the Dutch Foreign Minister, Luns, a number of Papuan leaders, including Romainum, Itaar, Runtubay, Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe, strongly protested against the Bunker arrangement under which West New Guinea would be transferred to Indonesia. The Netherlands was held to

its solemn promise to lead West New Guinea to independence, and an Indonesian guarantee to honour the rights of Papuans to self-determination was dismissed as worthless. Any negotiations about the future status of West New Guinea should be attended by Papuan representatives, as neither the Netherlands nor Indonesia had the right to take decisions without Papuan consent. The letter ended with the warning that in the case of an Indonesian takeover widespread disturbances would occur leading to a Congo-style situation. It threatened that Papuans were prepared take up arms to prevent Indonesian sovereignty over their country.<sup>64</sup>

To many Papuans, who had continued to put their trust in Dutch promises, the announcement on 15 August of the Dutch and Indonesian acceptance of the Bunker plan caused anger, confusion and defiance.

In a meeting late in August, PARNA called for the establishment of a Papuan independent republic by 1970 and stressed that the Papuan people had the right of freedom like all other nations. Another important political event was the Kongres Nasional, called by Herman Wajoi, which was attended by some eighty prominent Papuan leaders, representing all political shades and regional interests. From the week-long deliberations an almost unanimous distrust of Indonesian intentions emerged, and in the final communiqué it was demanded that the 1969 target of a plebiscite be changed to 1963. Furthermore, they pledged Papuan cooperation during the UN interim period. But it was spelled out emphatically that the act of self-determination, as included in the Dutch-Indonesian agreement, meant the right to choose independence, and that both the Papuan flag and national anthem should be used during the UN interim.<sup>65</sup>

In the New Guinea Council the chairman, Bonay, proposed that self-government be achieved at least by 1970, preferably earlier, and that the Netherlands should continue to administer the territory in the interim. Moreover, he urgently requested the UN to send a fact-finding mission to West New Guinea in ac-

cordance with the resolution of the Decolonisation Committee. Furthermore, the need for Dutch-Indonesian reconciliation was stressed after which a conference should be organised including Indonesia, the Netherlands and a Papuan delegation to recognise Papuan independence and to agree to further cooperation on economic development. In another resolution Nicolaas Jouwe insisted that Papuans should be represented at all international negotiations affecting their political future.<sup>66</sup>

In September, during the UN debate on the 15 August agreement, the leader of the Papuan delegation clearly declared that his country wanted independence and was hence strongly opposed to integration with Indonesia. Apart from some African support and the Foreign Minister of the Central African Republic charging that the agreement contravened the principle of self-determination, these Papuan pleas were ignored.

On 19 October 1962, the Komite Nasional called another meeting of seventy leaders, during which the name West New Guinea was changed into Papua Barat, and a national flag and anthem, *Hai Tanahku Papua*, were adopted. These spontaneous actions were, however, mainly Hollandia-centred and so caused criticism from other parts of the country. The Merauke nationalist leaders complained that no previous consultations had taken place giving the impression that Papua Barat seemed only to consist of the north and the west of the country. An open letter with thirty-two signatures from Ramsiki objected to the new national anthem and the name Papua, which actually meant 'slave'. But perhaps even more significant was the fact that only forty from the seventy attending the Komite Nasional meeting had actually signed the manifesto, indicating that despite an obvious increase in national Papuan awareness the old particularist pattern of thinking was still strong.<sup>67</sup>

The same Papuan demands which had already been made at the end of August were again put to the Hollandia government by a delegation of the Front Nasional Papua. This caused the Dutch official Polderman to comment:

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... the entire interview ... had a somewhat doleful character because of the trustful and pathetic call of the last few weeks on the Netherlands for future help when in their view the curtain behind West New Guinea will be closed ...<sup>8</sup>

The end of the Dutch colonial presence in the Indonesian archipelago came to pass. The Papuan people were transferred into the hands of another colonial power. The depth of the anti-Indonesian feeling of the majority of Papuans has never wavered and the demands for Papuan freedom continue to the present day.

### Notes

1. Van Baal, 1986-1989, p. 177.
2. Penders, 1968, see chapter VI.
3. *Rapport van de Interdepartementale Commissie Toekomstige Ontwikkeling van Nieuw Guinea*, Deel I, 1953, pp. 32-3.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 41-2 and 43-4.
5. Lijphart, 1966, p. 187.
6. Lafeber, 1968, pp. 43-4.
7. Duynstee, 1961, p. 23.
8. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, Deel II, p. 351.
9. *ibid.*, p. 357.
10. *ibid.*, pp. 361, 480-81 and 570-72.
11. *Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1960*.
12. Van der Veur, 1963, pp. 62-5.
13. Cannegieter, 1959, p. 71.
14. *Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1960*, p. 100.
15. Van der Veur, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
16. *Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1960*, Tables VII and VII (a).
17. *ibid.*, Appendix IV (A).
18. Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2.
19. Beversluis, 1954, p. 353.
20. *Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1960*, Appendix XXVI (1), (3); Cannegieter, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-6.
21. Van Baal, Deel II, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-5.

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22. *ibid.*, p. 524.
23. *Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1960*, op. cit., pp. 21-4.
24. *ibid.*, p. 36-7.
25. *ibid.*, p. 68, Table.
26. Broekhuijse, 1960.
27. Van der Veur, op. cit., p. 60.
28. Grootenhuis, p. 31.
29. *Rapport van de Commissie Nieuw Guinea*, 1950, 3e stuk, pp. 86-7.
30. Grootenhuis, op. cit., pp. 38-9.
31. *Rapport van de Commissie Nieuw Guinea*, 1950, pp. 171-84.
32. Eek, 1954; Assink, 1960.
33. Grootenhuis, op. cit., Deel II, no. 1205, pp. 26-7.
34. *ibid.*, pp. 22 and 28.
35. *ibid.*, p. 24.
36. *ibid.*, p. 30.
37. BUZA, Kort Overzicht over de Politieke Situatie in NG. GG 14903x/OR, BUZA, dossier 68094, 28 October 1954.
38. BUZA, Algemene Politieke Situatie ... Geheim GS 1148x/NNG, 20 Juli 1960.
39. See Chapter II of this volume, pp. 117, 145, and 146.
40. *ibid.*
41. BUZA, Algemene Politieke Situatie in GGGS 1148x/NNG, 20 Juli 1960.
42. Mahler, 1962.
43. Courtois, 1961, p. 60.
44. BUZA, Kort Overzicht, op. cit.
45. Van der Veur, op. cit., pp. 61-2.
46. Courtois, op. cit.
47. Information on DVP based on Grootenhuis report.
48. Broekhuijse, op. cit., p. 149.
49. Courtois, op. cit.
50. *ibid.*
51. Hindom, 1961.
52. BUZA, Consul-Generaal, Singapore, J.G. Kist, 149/32, 4 Januari 1962.
53. BUZA, aan Hollandia, 14 February 1962, ref. no. 1153.
54. BUZA, Hollandia, Plaatteel, codebericht 15, 10 Januari 1962, ref.

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- no. 1214.
55. Voorzitter van de Nieuw Guinea Raad aan de Gouverneur van West Papua, 17 January 1962.
  56. BUZA, Centrale Veiligheidsdienst. Onderwerp: *Politiek stemmingsbeeld van autochtonen in Hollandia en omgeving.*
  57. Grootenhuis, op. cit., p. 6.
  58. *ibid.*, p. 63.
  59. *ibid.*, pp. 64-5.
  60. *ibid.*, p. 70.
  61. *ibid.*, pp. 94-9.
  62. Van Voskuylen, 1960.
  63. BUZA, Hollandia, de Gouvernements secretaris, A. Loosjes, 24 Mei 1962, no. 2.9. 120/15040/2.
  64. BUZA, Hollandia, 9 March 1962, telebericht.
  65. Van der Veur, op. cit., pp. 70-1; Verrier, 1976, p. 231.
  66. Verrier, op. cit., pp. 226-27.
  67. Van der Veur, op. cit., pp. 65-6.
  68. BUZA, New York, 3 September 1962. Codebericht 555, ref. no. 8525.