

has been written off as far as economic development is concerned there is bound to be future discontent.

Rumours always move about in New Guinea. They are now rife in the border zone, and are not being countered by the Administration, which has retained an astonishing reluctance to publish the facts. In some instances this reticence has been due to its own lack of information, but some is due to an ingrained bureaucratic fear of divulging information and a paternalistic interpretation of the capacity of the 'natives' to understand. The time has come, however, to approach the various problems associated with the Irian boundary in a clear and open fashion, involving as much as possible in the discussions and decisions those people who in the not too distant future will be the inheritors of Australia's accomplishments—and failures.

## 6

## Epilogue

The preceding chapters have traced the history of New Guinea's boundaries. In the beginning there was darkness, and even Modjopahit's brilliance of a later period was a mere glimmer on the horizon. The Dutch East India Company maintained some contacts with a tiny part of the westernmost rim of the giant island. Haphazard as these were, they contributed to laying the foundations for a future claim. British activity off the north-west coast of Australia in the 1820s spurred the Dutch into an expedition. The Proclamation of 1828 claimed the greater part of the island's western half as a Netherlands possession and Fort Du Bus became the first Dutch attempt at effective occupation—painful and short-lived though it was. The decree of 1848 extended Dutch pretensions, under the cover of its Tidore Protectorate, and they ranged from the 141st meridian of East Longitude in the south to Cape Bonpland, near Humboldt Bay, in the north.

Rising concern in the Australian colonies over the threat of French and German expansion in the western Pacific led to increased pressure on the British to live up to their 'imperial responsibilities'. The Queensland boundary was extended across the Torres Strait to the shallow waters of coastal New Guinea in 1879, but the initial British reluctance to 'protect' the eastern half of the island provided Germany with an opportunity to make its entry on the New Guinea stage. Tripartition was accomplished in 1885.

Carving the bird of paradise was a European act. Ignorant about all except its colourful feathers, the powers concerned thought only in terms of neat portions, not about the anatomy of the bird. In defining boundaries in other inaccessible parts of the world 'compulsory ignorance' had led to adoption of 'the worst of all possible expedients—the straight line'.<sup>1</sup> With minor exceptions this was the case in New Guinea. In 1848 the Dutch were still reluctant to advance a claim to the unknown interior. The line they drew was at most provisional, dependent upon investigation of the geographical features of the country and the political institutions of the inhabitants. The scramble for colonies in the 1880s ended this sensible and restrained approach. Topographically, this situation foreshadowed the need for costly demarcations if ever the need arose to have the boundaries properly drawn and the parties involved stuck to the absurdity of the original agreements. In terms of human

relationships the artificial lines were likely to play havoc with tribal and linguistic patterns. The effect of a similar situation along the Kenya-Tanganyika border was reported by the Hilton Young Commission of 1929:

The boundary cuts this people [the Masai tribe] in two with no more concern for their ideas or for the justice or convenience of their administration than the scythe has for a blade of grass.<sup>2</sup>

Geography, however, prevented the Irian boundary from creating serious injustices to the border peoples. Along most of its 470 miles the terrain is such that the scythe receives plenty of wear but meets few blades of grass. The only small clumps are in the Waris-Jaffi and Moejoe-Ninggerum border areas, just to the north of the Sepik and Fly rivers respectively.

No such fortuitous geographical circumstances, however, operate along the border between Papua and the former German New Guinea. The Anglo-German compromise of 1885 brought about 'a fair and equal division of the territories' whereby equality in size apparently was equated with fairness (and one must assume that the underestimation of their share by the British by some 27,000 square miles was unintentional). With a recklessness approaching that of a non-professional gambler, the negotiators further stated that the 'conventional line' which they drew through the heart of New Guinea would nearly approach the water-parting line, or natural boundary. In actual fact—as the penetration of the Highlands almost half a century later revealed—there is no correlation between the territorial and the natural boundary and tens of thousands of people have their habitat in close proximity to the geometrical line of division. To Australia's good fortune the elimination of German authority sharply reduced the boundary's international significance and prevented the border peoples from becoming pawns in a likely clash of interests.

Over the last eighty years New Guinea's boundaries have generally received little attention. The main exceptions may be briefly noted. In the 1890s, MacGregor's vigorous objections to the incursions of the Tugeri into British New Guinea directly contributed to the adoption of the Convention of 1895 which redefined the southern sector of the Irian boundary. Indirectly, his caustic comments about Dutch sovereignty being 'totally unknown and totally unexercised' resulted in the establishment of a Dutch post at Merauke and greater administrative concern on the part of the Netherlands with its colonial stepchild. MacGregor's efforts to modify the 'injurious' Queensland boundary were notably successful and turned Pyrrhic only because of what amounted to a breach of faith by the Queensland government. Dutch diplomatic activity in the years 1902-9 was mainly motivated by Netherlands concern over the undefined nature of the common frontier with German New Guinea. Although crowned by the actual establish-

ment of a Border Commission in 1910, the labours of this body did not result in any joint consideration of possible modifications of the astronomical boundary. The thoughtful recommendations of the Dutch members of the Commission gathered dust therefore, although adoption of its suggestions would have gone a long way to ease the work of future surveyors.

The Anglo-German Commission of 1909 owed its existence to the discovery of gold and activities of miners in the immediate proximity of the border at the Gira and Waria rivers. Part of the boundary between the shore and the 147th meridian of East Longitude was surveyed and some twenty miles were marked. Mining activities once more contributed to further surveying in the 1933-4 period when a border stretch of about twenty-seven miles was surveyed from the intersection of the 147th meridian east and the 8th parallel south in a north-westerly direction. Finally, in more recent years, Administrator Colonel Murray harped on the need for local boundary surveys and was the first to draw Australia's attention to the existence of possible Dutch enclaves north of the Sepik River and to support aerial photography of the Irian border. On the other hand, his well-meant suggestion for a provisional determination of the boundary in specific trouble spots was in a way self-defeating. These palliatives concealed and postponed the need for a major operation and were to leave the patient in continued uncertainty.

The record of surveying and marking New Guinea's boundaries is a dismal one. This is even true when compared, for example, with British activities in Africa where, of the total length of British frontiers of some 16,000 to 17,000 miles, over 10,000 miles had been surveyed and about 6000 miles marked on the ground as early as 1909.<sup>3</sup> To highlight the inertia in New Guinea boundary affairs it seems useful to focus briefly on the Irian boundary during 1948-60, because by that time one would expect it to have received belated attention. General knowledge of the frontier even then, however, remained slight and Australia expressed little awareness of the eddies which whirled under the outwardly placid waters surrounding West New Guinea (*Irian Barat*). A select few who were anxious to tackle the task of a boundary survey were not in policy-making positions. To spend more than the customary minimal sum of money on New Guinea was a novel development; to allocate it to a boundary survey involving a major task of aerial photography seemed extravagant. Such an act, moreover, would cut into the limited funds available for similar photographic/mapping projects within Australia which appeared more urgent and practical. Even if it was conceded that occasional incidents occurred in the frontier zone they probably could be solved most appropriately by officials on the spot in a calm atmosphere, devoid of fear and suspicion on either side. A general feeling of timelessness in Territorial affairs also contributed to the inertia. Local political developments within Australian New Guinea were viewed in terms of generations. The presence of the Dutch looked reasonably

assured (especially in the 1953–60 period) and it seemed possible that Indonesia's 'Irian complex' could gradually work itself out as that country became more and more preoccupied with its internal political and economic predicaments. Nonchalance reached extreme proportions in the case of the Waris-Jaffi enclaves. Here an area well over 100 square miles, inhabited by several thousand people located within Australian territorial jurisdiction, was administered and evangelized by the Dutch with the connivance of the Australian authorities who claimed inability to make administrative provisions for the area at the time. The territory and its people were only 'reclaimed' in mid-1962 when Indonesian control seemed imminent.

A resolution of boundary problems in colonial territories involves bureaucratic obstacles. Considerable delay may occur while correspondence finds its way from the field to colonial capitals, from there to overseas colonial departments, and eventually to foreign affairs departments or embassies. In Australia's case, Papua-New Guinea matters were further complicated because the Department of Territories—mainly by default but also by its own insistence—played a major role in the whole process. There were excellent reasons for this in the pre-World War II period—the small size of the External Affairs Department being a main one.<sup>4</sup> This situation, however, was not an unmixed blessing in the 1950s. Sheltered from an appreciation of the revolutionary developments in neighbouring countries, the Department of Territories missed that sense of urgency which an External Affairs Department, if keyed to these developments, might have possessed.<sup>5</sup> One further gains the impression that whatever activity and efforts were spent by Australians on this issue remained below the ministerial level and rarely seemed to percolate upward. Although this reflects the nature of the decision-making process, it also confirms the unimportance attached to the boundary issue by the government as a whole. Furthermore, the position of the responsible Minister as a junior Minister outside the Cabinet may have created difficulties for him in persuading his colleagues.

Given the minimal interest in New Guinea it is perhaps not surprising that no man of standing made the completion of a survey of New Guinea's boundaries his aim and ambition. Or maybe Australia just did not possess a Sir David Gill, Director of the Cape Observatory, who pursued his dream of surveying the African 'arc of meridian' not only with relentless determination, but also with an ability to interest prominent public figures in his ideas.<sup>6</sup> Even in his case, however, lack of interest together with red tape were not the only obstacles. Some twenty years after Gill's death, the Director of the Geodetic Branch of the Survey of India commented on a paper on 'The East African Arc of Meridian':

It is positively heartbreaking that these things which are so difficult to organize, and for which it is so difficult to acquire the necessary local knowledge, should be carried to the point almost of completion

and then abandoned on the ground of finance. It is complete madness—no other word could describe it.<sup>7</sup>

In the case of New Guinea both lack of finance and the difficulty of attracting qualified personnel curtailed even those activities which were considered vital. Weighing such factors as cost and taking away the few qualified surveyors (when available) from their 'regular' work against need and utility, a boundary survey was almost always on the losing end. The red thread which runs through all of the correspondence can be traced from 1848 when Weddik's suggestion for a survey of the unknown interior was (not unreasonably at the time) brushed aside by the Dutch colonial government with the comment 'admittedly very necessary' but highly impractical. The erection of border monuments at the northern and southern ends of the boundary was considered to be of little benefit but the colonial authorities were willing to keep the matter under consideration 'if it could be carried out without great costs'.

Administrator Musgrave's suggestion in 1903 for the stationing of an officer at the Anglo-German border caused Atlee Hunt, Secretary of the Australian External Affairs Department, to comment that this could not be recommended 'principally on the ground of expense and the absence of proof' that there was any immediate necessity for the creation of such an officer. And three years later, Von Tschirschky, Secretary of the German Foreign Office, answered Dutch requests for a Commission to explore the possibilities of establishing a natural boundary between Netherlands and German New Guinea with the statement that it seemed 'more opportune to postpone the demarcation until the need for the permanent establishment of the frontier had been convincingly proven by the mutual economic interests of the two colonies'. British Boundary Commissioner Gustavus Sabine in 1909 had to keep requesting more funds (£1000 at a time), and aroused the ire of the Treasury by his continual requests.

The flurry of activity along the Papua-New Guinea border in the mid-thirties was short-lived. The members of the Permanent Mandates Commission were told that the reason was that there was no further mining activity in close proximity to the boundary, that the survey was not of an urgent nature, and would be continued as opportunity offered, when instruments on order had been received, and when survey and patrol staff were available. The Dutch suggestion of 1939 for the placing of markers at the northern and southern intersections of the Fly River and the respective astronomical boundaries received the response from Lieutenant-Governor Murray that he had no officer to participate in this task and that the matter should be permitted to be postponed until after the war. The 1951 proposal for the aerial photography of the Irian boundary was curtailed by the Australian Commonwealth Survey Committee on the ground that such a major project would adversely affect mapping projects in Australia. When two years later the sum of

£162,000 could have saved the life of the R.A.A.F.'s Photo Reconnaissance Unit—to the benefit not only of the Irian boundary mapping project but several other tasks in Papua-New Guinea and Australia as well—no approval for such a sum came forth. And in 1960 Netherlands New Guinea's Governor P. J. Platteel questioned the expense of a boundary survey on grounds of need and utility.

If the European powers which controlled New Guinea left little of lasting benefit in terms of border surveying activity, what heritage did they leave in the actual boundaries and documents which define them? To answer these questions let us turn briefly to the boundary between Queensland and Papua, the one between Papua and New Guinea, and the Irian boundary.

The boundary between Papua and Queensland was defined in 1878 and laid down in an Order in Council the following year. Unable to interest Britain in proclaiming a protectorate over New Guinea, Queensland had grabbed as much as she could and had gone as closely as possible between the islands and the coast of New Guinea, 'taking in practically everything'. This was understandable, if not very reasonable. However, the proclamation of a British protectorate over the south-eastern shores of New Guinea in 1884 and the annexation of 1888 removed the reasons which had led to the Queensland boundary extension. A series of British New Guinea administrators, Queensland governors and premiers, and Colonial Office officials all favoured some sort of revision in order to adjust the anomalous situation. All their efforts came to naught.

In terms of population and economic resources the coastal islands are of little benefit to either partner. The sparse population has become oriented to Australia and would be loath to be deprived of the manifold benefits which this association has entailed. They may well prefer departure to Australia above association with Papua-New Guinea.<sup>8</sup> This does not, however, detract from the need for a boundary revision whose propriety is even more evident now than it was in the past from a political and international law viewpoint. Sir William MacGregor observed in 1893 that in a number of places the Queensland boundary was 'within less than a bowshot' of the New Guinea coast. This is an incongruity. Coastal Papuans, unfamiliar with Western concepts of territorial sovereignty or with Van Bijkershoek's dictum that sovereignty ends where the power of arms ends—*terrae potestas finitur ubi finitur armorum vis*—were unable to appreciate the significance of MacGregor's statement. There has been no international disagreement, however, about the fact that the *minimal* delimitation of territorial waters should be a three-mile belt.<sup>9</sup> It cannot be disputed that a median line such as may be drawn between the Papuan shore and the islands under Queensland jurisdiction has been an accepted procedure in drawing territorial boundaries in lakes, bays, and between islands belonging to different states. Nevertheless, the boundary which faces the Territory of Papua is unique in that

an inter-territorial (and in the future probably an interstate) boundary parallels the sea-shore for over sixty miles.

The boundary with Queensland excludes from Papuan jurisdiction not only off-shore islands but also waters that were the traditional fishing grounds of the coastal tribes. This situation, combined with the effects of the recent pearl fisheries regulations and the Australian continental shelf proclamations, deprives the territory of part of its potential resources. It could be argued that Queensland now holds title to the Torres Strait and off-shore New Guinea islands by prescription—adverse holding over a long period. But with a friendly administration in New Guinea, Queensland's government has been willing to reconsider the boundary and suggest revisions more equitable to the Territory within the short period of Papuan recorded history. These revisions even emerged in an official British Order in Council. One might argue, therefore, that Queensland's present title is *mala fide* in origin. The matter of prescription could hardly be raised with regard to the recent Australian proclamations affecting the sea-bed and the subsoil underlying the waters close to the Papuan shore. Whatever the legality of the case, increasing political awareness among the indigenous leaders of the Territory of Papua may well give the matter a different perspective. As Fenwick put it:

Long-continued possession by a powerful state seemed no ground of title to subject peoples whose silent acquiescence in their dispossession had been due chiefly to the fear of contesting the will of a stronger power.<sup>10</sup>

MacGregor's 'Blue Line' and the border revision as laid out in the never implemented Order in Council of 1898 still seem reasonable suggestions. Looked at from Australia's strategic interests, the adoption of a boundary correction along these lines would retain for the Commonwealth the complete command of the Torres Strait. It safeguards the navigation of the Inner Route inside the Great Barrier Reef from Brisbane through the Adolphus Channel and from there either through the Prince of Wales Channel or Endeavour Strait. It also retains Australia's exclusive control of the Outer Route from Bligh Entrance (south of Bramble Cay) through the Great North-East Channel to the Prince of Wales Channel (see Fig. 3).<sup>11</sup> In spite of the constitutional hurdles it is judicious to reopen the boundary matter and seek a fair and speedy decision before national-minded Papuans see it as an unfair heritage of a colonial past and a 'Papua irredenta'.

The mainland border between Papua and late German New Guinea is the result of the 'bartering of territory in foreign offices'. The Anglo-German Arrangement of 1885 defines it in a series of geometrical lines, beginning at the coast near Mitre Rock on parallel 8° South Latitude through the mountainous interior to meridian 141° East Longitude which it then follows to the Pacific Ocean. Little of this boundary has been surveyed or marked and it is impossible to find it in the field. The

statement that the lines thus drawn 'nearly approach the water-parting line, or natural boundary' is almost identical with the one defining the boundary between Alaska and British Columbia where the border was to follow 'the crest of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast'. Closer observation of the Alaska-British Columbia border failed to discover any parallel chain: the whole country was mountainous and 'the skyline, as seen from the sea . . . did not correspond with any well-marked line of peaks'.<sup>12</sup>

Internationally, the present need for a marked boundary between Papua and the Trust Territory may be considered slight. This happy fact is due not only to the ousting of the Germans from what once was Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and to the post-World War II establishment of the administrative union between the territories concerned, but also to the fact that since the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples the distinction between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories has practically disappeared. However, the matter does continue to have practical implications. District boundaries conform to the dividing line—thereby orienting Highlanders along it to different administrative centres. The creation of two Electorates which straddle the territorial boundary may be more expressive of geographical realities than the paper border, but it is also indicative of the slapdash approach to the whole boundary matter. The constituents of these Electorates are administratively under Districts which are on opposite sides of the border. The existing division between Papuans and New Guineans expresses itself in a number of ways. The clearest is juridical in that the former are British subjects while the latter are Australian Protected Persons. The administrative union of Papua-New Guinea may well survive the departure of the Australian steward, but its fate will be in the hands of Papuans and New Guineans. Even in the case of a federal union, moreover, it would seem desirable to know where the one state ends and the other begins.

The Anglo-German partition of the Solomons originally placed Shortland Island, Choiseul, and Ysabel (present-day Santa Isabel) under German authority. Following the Convention of 1899 and the Exchange of Notes of 1904, the boundary line no longer dipped south-east before reaching Shortland Island, but continued in a general north-easterly direction west of the Bougainville Strait. The official documents create some confusion. The reference to the location of Komolcai Point is an example. The two alternative methods which the Exchange of Notes of 1904 suggested for drawing the boundary south of Bougainville also permit minor variations in the maritime boundary line, depending upon whether one uses points that are intersections of meridians and parallels or known features along the coast.

The possibility of ending the division of the Solomons has been raised on a number of occasions in the past. Certainly a strong case could have been made in the immediate post-World War I period for

either bringing Bougainville and Buka into the British Solomons or for merging the latter into the Australian Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Whatever chance of success proposals of this kind may have had at the time, it seems unlikely that opportunity will knock again.

With regard to the Irian boundary, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, Mr Paul Hasluck, recently stated:

The border between the Territory of New Guinea and Papua, under Australian administration, and the territory now under Indonesian administration is quite clear. There are international instruments which describe the border in exact terms and these international instruments are accepted by all governments concerned.<sup>13</sup>

Jones, in his standard work on boundary-making (p. 66), warns, however, that a 'discussion of delimitation must stress the many mistakes that have been made. Rarely has a treaty been free from them'. Would the Irian boundary prove the exception, or was Hasluck's statement for public consumption?<sup>14</sup> The answer is not hard to give. The Irian boundary remains quite unclear and the 'international instruments' which define it (the Anglo-Dutch Convention of 1895 and the Australian-Dutch Exchange of Notes of 1936) contain sections which are not so much inexact as misleading, contradictory, or open to interpretation. This is not to say that an Indonesian government anxious to reach a clearly defined boundary will necessarily question agreements to which it has become the successor. It does mean, however, that both parties must pay some attention to a number of points which may look more important to the Indonesian partner than they did to the Dutch predecessor.

The Convention of 1895 raises almost as many questions as it has articles. Article I defines the starting point of the boundary at the southern shore of New Guinea as 'the middle of the mouth of the Bensbach River, situated at about 141° 1' 47.9" of East Longitude (East of Greenwich)'. On the basis of observations carried out by Dutch and Australian teams in 1956 and 1958 respectively, it was agreed in 1961-2 that the location of the middle of the mouth of the Bensbach was more accurately defined as 141° 01' 07" East Longitude. Although acceptable to the Dutch at the time, an adjustment of such magnitude—involving a strip of territory some 1330 yards wide over a distance of some 150 miles—must be scrutinized in light of the treaty and its surrounding documents. The strip of territory involved may be deemed as 'worthless' now, as it was in the 1890s, but both the Bensbach-MacGregor agreement and the subsequent statements in the Netherlands States-General referred to the approximately equal exchange of territory which the arrangement entailed. The point could also be raised as to whether the newly determined astronomical position of the mouth of the river is due solely to the use of more accurate instruments or also to a change in the Bensbach's course. Even more pertinent may be the fact that the starting point of the boundary is

defined both by physical feature (the mouth of the Bensbach River) and longitudinal position (about 141° 01' 47.9" E.L.). Without entering into an argument about which is dog or tail, this would seem to be another strong reason why a move of the boundary line westward, as consented to by the Dutch, may not necessarily be agreeable to the Indonesians.

Article III appears to meet Hasluck's description of being both clear and exact. It simply states that 'From that point [i.e. the point where the Bensbach meridian meets the Fly River] the Waterway ("Thalweg") of the Fly River forms the boundary up to the 141st degree of east longitude'. Unfortunately, the Article's simplicity is its downfall as a literal interpretation would preserve the territorial *status quo ante* in the Fly River bulge. Nor does the Article contain any reference to the constantly shifting nature of the Fly River; some agreement has to be reached, therefore, regarding the question of whether the course of that river will be the boundary irrespective of any (gradual?) change or whether the river's course should be adopted at some specified date of photography.

Finally, Article V contains the free navigation clause. In answer to a question on the navigation of the Fly River, Hasluck recently declared:

That agreement [concerning Article V] was never operative; it was never invoked. There was never any occasion to invoke it. At present the exact effect of the agreement is under study by our own legal officers, first of all to see whether the agreement is still extant and secondly to see to what extent it applies to present day conditions. For the moment I am unable to say how effective the agreement is . . . .<sup>15</sup>

Apparently the Minister himself considered this Article not as clear as one would have assumed from his general statement less than a week before. To this author, the general meaning and intent of the Article is not open to doubt. The matter of free navigation (closely connected with free commerce) was popular in nineteenth-century Europe. It found application not only there, but in many parts of Africa and America, and was discussed at the Conference at Berlin in 1885.<sup>16</sup> Although Britain at that time did not concede to the request for European intervention with respect to the Niger River, it did co-operate with France (which controlled the upper course of the river) and pledged 'to adopt regulations for the freedom of navigation on the river, its affluents, branches and outlets, and facilitating the passage of vessels as far as possible'.<sup>17</sup> The application of a similar clause to the Fly River—inserted at the suggestion of the Netherlands Foreign Office—can base itself, therefore, on an impressive series of precedents. The significance of the clause, moreover, was specifically referred to ('with an eye to the future') in the joint statement by the Netherlands Foreign Minister and the Minister of Colonies in answer to the Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs of the Second Chamber of the States-General. Even within

the New Guinea territorial context a similar clause was at one time suggested by the British Foreign Office for the Gira River which wound its way across the late Anglo-German boundary.

Not much of a case could be made for restricting application of the free navigation clause merely to the boundary section of the river. This would be meaningless, unnecessary, not in line with international practice, and contradicted by the Dutch Ministerial reference at the discussion of the Treaty in the States-General to the free navigation on the whole of the Fly River. One could even argue that in line with similar agreements elsewhere, the free navigation clause also applies to the Fly River's 'affluents, branches and outlets'.<sup>18</sup>

Excessive alterations in the content of what eventually became the Exchange of Notes of 1936 (dealing with the definition of the northern sector of the border) also led to unhappy results. In the third clause of the Exchange of Notes the two parties first confirm that the boundary 'shall continue to be the 141st Meridian of East Longitude'; continue by stating that 'for the purpose of this document, such Meridian shall be deemed to be a line running true North and true South from the middle point of the said monument [i.e. the joint monument erected at Wutung in 1933]'; and conclude with the statement that 'this line shall continue to be the boundary' irrespective of the results of subsequent surveys. Given the inconsistencies within the clause and in light of the fact that the location of the 'adopted' 141st meridian is considerably at variance with its real position on the basis of recent astronomical observations, there seems no reason why the Wutung monument meridian should necessarily be accepted as the boundary by the state which has become a successor to the original Agreement.

Finally, it should be remembered that if and when negotiations reach the actual stage of demarcation the men in the field must fit the boundary line to the facts on the ground.<sup>19</sup> At present it slices through what are (for New Guinea conditions) sizable groups of related peoples in the Waris-Jaffi and Moejoe-Ninggerum areas. Several villages are within a stone's throw of the boundary. The future Australian-Indonesian Boundary Commission must be willing to solve this problem in a spirit of compromise and be able to do so under the instructions each party has been given.

The significance of Dutch activity along the border in the past was highlighted at the time of the 1964 House of Assembly elections. Both the Fly River and Upper Sepik Electorates produced a candidate who had considerable experience west of the border. Kiunga's Jacob Wamabon was a Moejoe by birth and educated in Merauke; Vanimo's Wegra Kenu was a long-time resident of Hollandia. Both men had a fluent command of bazaar Malay.

The relegation of New Guinea's boundaries to insignificance seems to be a phenomenon of the past. Growing awareness among the island's inhabitants assures increased attention. The eviction of the Dutch as

neighbours and the imposition of Indonesian nationalism upon the inhabitants of the western half of the island have transformed the Irian boundary from a line on the map into a barrier of increasing significance. Unsurveyed and unmarked boundaries and peculiarities and injustices in others have only caused an occasional ripple in the past due to New Guinea's 'special' conditions. Although a correction of these aspects will not guarantee peace and harmony, any government which engages in further dillydallying would be foolhardy indeed.

## Appendixes

### I Some Notes on Administrative Nomenclature

#### A Netherlands New Guinea

A colonial decree of 1848 placed western New Guinea under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Tidore. Following continual British protests about the marauding incursions of the Tugeri into what was then British New Guinea, the south-eastern part of (Netherlands) New Guinea was separated from Tidore in 1901 and placed under *rechtstreeks bestuur*, direct administration. The other part, although *de jure* under Tidore until 1949, was in fact also directly administered by the Dutch.

The Dutch administrative structure in eastern Indonesia generally followed the pattern of Java with a division into residencies and their respective sub-divisions, the *Afdelingen* (under Assistant Residents), and *Onderafdelingen* (under *Controleurs*). The south-eastern part of New Guinea briefly formed an *Afdeling* under an Assistant Resident but in 1913 was demoted to being an *Onderafdeling* of the *Afdeling Toel* (Kei Islands) which was part of the Residency of Ternate. In the remaining (administered) part of Netherlands New Guinea there were originally only two *Afdelingen*, headed by Assistant Residents, which formed part of the Residency of Amboina, with the exception of the 1920-4 period when New Guinea formed a Residency of its own.

The remote parts of the Indonesian archipelago also had the position of *Posthouder*. Men in these posts merely served as representatives of Dutch colonial authority. The appointment of the *Posthouder* from Patani (Halmahera) to Selerika at the 'Tugeri border' in 1892 is a case in point. In the absence of qualified indigenous staff, as was available in Java, there also existed for the territories outside Java a special (Dutch) *hulpcorps* (auxiliary corps) composed of *Gezaghebbers* and *Candidaat-Gezaghebbers* who did not possess the qualifications required for the regular Dutch administrative corps. In West New Guinea before World War II most of the *Onderafdelingen* were headed by such officials. The *Onderafdelingen* themselves were divided into *Districten* under Malay (Indonesian) officials who, after 1929, held the title of *Bestuursassistenten* or *Hulp-Bestuursassistenten*.

After 1949, the chief administrative officer became the Governor, with headquarters at Hollandia, now Sukarnapura. By 1960 the number of *Afdelingen* had grown to six. With the Residents in charge of the general supervision of the whole *Afdeling*, *Controleurs* had the same task for the *Onderafdeling* with the title of *Onderafdelingshoofd* or *Hoofd Plaatselijk Bestuur*. With the increasing 'Papuanization' of the services (coupled with the departure of Indonesians unwilling to continue under the Dutch Administration) more and more *Districten* were headed by Papuan officials.

#### B Australian New Guinea

Papua inherited from Sir William MacGregor the system of Divisions under Resident Magistrates. Other officers included Assistant Resident Magistrates