TEXT AND APPENDIXES

OF

THE NETHERLANDS MAIN CONSTITUENT

OF THE

REPORT OF THE MIXED COMMITTEE

NEW GUINEA/IRIAN

1950
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When the Indonesian people started to realize its right of self-determination in its own independence the question arose for the Netherlands what was to be done with New Guinea, forming a part of the Netherlands Indies jurisdiction.

Whereas Indonesia, prepared to this end since many decennia by the formation and steady extension of representative councils, was about to become from a non self-governing a self-governing territory in the broadest sense of the word, it was clear that New Guinea had not yet reached such a degree of development as to be able to take part in this movement. This is why the question whether the population of this territory itself could in a democratic way express the wish whether or not it wanted to be part of Indonesia was, at the R.T.C., not only on the Netherlands-, but also on the Indonesian side, as stated by H.E. Drs. Moh. Hatta, answered in the negative.

This situation confronted the Netherlands with a special responsibility. Also in respect of some less developed territories in Indonesia the question could be put whether the administering power was justified in presuming that the population of these territories was already capable to manipulate its right of self-determination in a truly democratic way. Here however purely Indonesian groups were concerned, entirely surrounded by other, more developed, Indonesian groups. In New Guinea however a separate border-territory was concerned, with a population which, racially, linguistically and culturally, cannot be considered to belong to the Indonesians, standing moreover originally on a much more primitive level than any other people in Indonesia.

This is why the Netherlands have from the beginning advanced and maintained the special position of New Guinea. The Linggadjati-agreement was not signed until the Netherlands side had explicitly stipulated that it should be possible for New Guinea to obtain an own status in respect of the Kingdom (new style) and the United States of Indonesia.

The standpoint of the Netherlands was that in respect of its decision on New Guinea it had to be guided by the obligations incurred at the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. In its clause 73 the Powers responsible for the administration of territories whose population has not yet achieved a sufficient degree of self-government, acknowledge that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are „paramount”. Accordingly, at the Round Table Conference the standpoint of the Netherlands Government in respect of the question whether New Guinea was to be included in the transfer of the sovereignty was formulated as follows: „Is an alteration of the administra-
tion of New Guinea in accordance with the demands made in respect of such an administration according to prevailing norms, in the interest of the population?" It is regrettable that this question which must be considered acceptable to every member or candidate-member of the Organization of the United Nations, because it tallies with the letter and spirit of the Charter, was not acceptable for the Indonesian delegations at the Round Table Conference as a starting point for the discussions. Much as the great significance of the interest of the population was recognized, still the representative of the B.F.O. declared that the question of the care of the interests of the population was to the B.F.O.-delegation a problem of a secondary nature. It was primarily put that New Guinea is undetachably connected with the Indonesian territory and that therefore also the sovereignty of New Guinea has to be transferred.

The Republican delegation at the Round Table Conference has declared itself in agreement with this exposition so that this is the official standpoint on the Indonesian side.

Forthwith could be argued here that this opinion on the Indonesian side disregards the fact that a transfer of the sovereignty does not in the first place concern the territory but the people living there, and that the argument advanced does consequently not touch the nucleus of the matter. This is however not the moment to go further into it. For the present it may suffice to state that this attitude of the representatives of Indonesia has contributed to bring about a deadlock where all matter-of-fact discussions had to come to a dead end.

The Netherlands members of the Committee had hoped that the opinion of their Indonesian co-members had been that, in spite of the objections raised against it at the time, the interest of the population should nevertheless have proved to be a good basis for the discussions to be held. It would then have been possible to draw up a joint report, expressing, and dealing exhaustively with, the various difficulties and differences of opinion existing in this regard. They have however experienced that the deadlock, arisen at the Round Table Conference, also presented itself in the Joint Committee. The wish to achieve a joint report stranded on the impossibility to come to a real discussion of the interests of the population and of everything connected with its situation.

The difficulties in this respect started practically immediately after the Committee had seriously commenced its factual task. Before the Committee left for New Guinea, on the Netherlands side a memorandum was presented rendering the two standpoint as truly as possible and further, formulating a number of questions which could serve as a guide for the work of the Committee in New Guinea. It was opined that an investigation in consideration of these questions could lead to a better founded opinion about the interest of the population
on the one hand, on the oneness of the population of New Guinea with the Indonesian people as professed on the Indonesian side on the other hand. 1)

In these questions attention was therefore given to the mutual standpoints so that they could contribute to a fair opinion on both and could be a starting point for an exchange of opinions between the two groups of members concerning the question whether the sovereignty of New Guinea, being vested in the Netherlands, is or is not to be transferred to the United States of Indonesia.

This proposal met with opposition from the Indonesian members. The questions concerning the interests of the population (this idea, taken in the broadest sense of the word, therefore including the general situation of the population) were considered to be irrelevant, those referring to the professed oneness and solidarity of the population of New Guinea with the Indonesian people being even called inadmissible (vide the elucidations of Mr Latuharhary and Mr Muh. Yamin in the record of the fourth informal meeting). In a written clarification of these objections this Indonesian standpoint was clearly confirmed 2) It was also repeated that an investigation as wanted by the Netherlands members suggested a strengthening of the standpoint of the Netherlands Government, qualified as one-sided. There was however more said about it. It was opined that attention might be paid to the questions put by the Committee, "however with the knowledge that the answers obtained (might) could not influence the determination of the political status of Irian". Eventually the task of the Joint Committee was formulated by the Indonesian group as follows:

1. An investigation to be made concerning the problems and factors connected with the question Irian, necessary for determining the transfer of the sovereignty to the R.I.S. within a year after the date of transfer by means of negotiations.

2. Drawing up a report to be presented to the Governments of the two partners not later than the 1st of July, containing particulars of a factual nature and materials for a definitive determination of the transfer of the sovereignty at the 2nd Union Conference of Ministers or at a Conference of the two Union partners, to be especially convened to this end in the course of this year (1950).

The Netherlands group received the memoranda concerned a few days after its arrival in New Guinea. Instead of being able to attend exclusively to a joint investigation it was now necessary to pay attention to two fundamental questions, viz:

1. The contents of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and

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1) See Mem. nr. C Ir I/AM/P/1 (Appendix to C Ir I/Rep./4).
2) See Mem. nr. C Ir C I/AM/P/2 and 3(Appendix to C Ir I/Rep./5).
2. The right of the Netherlands members to collect arguments, based on an impartial investigation, as well in support of their own standpoint as to contest the standpoint of the opposing party.

This was done in the memorandum of the Netherlands group dated 22nd May No C Ir/AM/P3, emphasizing that not the question how the sovereignty of New Guinea is to be transferred is being disputed, but whether it is to be transferred, a stand being also explicitly taken against an opinion that the investigation by the Committee was only to be made for the purpose of strengthening the Indonesian standpoint and could not contribute to a strengthening of the Netherlands standpoint.

The result of this reply was that, an answer being postponed, it was agreed that prominent persons were to be heard, but that the right was reserved to come back to the question under dispute.

The practical result was that everybody could put every question without discrimination, provided no suggestive questions were put. In this way the time spent in New Guinea could after all be successfully employed.

The fundamental difference of opinion however remained and there could be no question of a discussion of the crucial points before an answer was received to the Netherlands memorandum of 22nd May. This reply did not arrive until after the return to Djacarta, in a second and a second-supplementary memorandum of the Indonesian group, dated resp. 6th and 7th July 1950 1)

The first of the two documents drew the attention because at the end of it the interests of the population were mentioned, however with reference to the contents of the Indonesian memorandum of 20th May in this respect. A consultation of the documents proved that this reference could only apply to the wording sub IV of the Indonesian memorandum concerning the task of the Committee (doc. C Ir I/AM/P/3), dealing with measures which will be necessary at the transfer of the sovereignty. The only conclusion to be drawn from it is that the Indonesian side was not disinclined to discuss the interests of the population, but exclusively under the presumption that the sovereignty of New Guinea shall be transferred. The interest of the population remains in such a way factually of secondary importance, viz. a matter only coming up for discussion when a fundamental decision has been taken on the main point.

The supplementary second memorandum was of special importance because it admitted that indeed the transfer of the sovereignty of New Guinea itself is under dispute, further being remarked that the intention of the Indonesian group has never heen to deny the Nether-lands group the right to put questions which the latter considered

necessary, but that the Indonesian members did object to certain groups of questions being dealt with in a Committee. They adhered to their objectum "against any act presuming a separation between the population of Irian and the other Indonesian islands".

Consequently once more the Indonesian starting point — the oneness of New Guinea with Indonesia — was placed outside any discussion and declared unassailable.

The Netherlands members have nevertheless continued their endeavours to arrive at a joint report. They considered it not right to decide at once on making a separate report, bearing in mind that the instruction given to the Committee did suggest a joint report. Moreover they considered it extremely useful because the very drawing up of a joint report would necessarily result in a discussion of the points under dispute. By way of a first step to this end they therefore proposed on the 6th of July in the last joint meeting held in Indonesia that both groups should now first of all draw up a provisional contribution for the final report according to their own ideas, after which upon the arrival of the Indonesian group in the Netherlands, in mutual consultation the drawing up of the final report was to be made. This proposal was accepted.

In order to carry out this decision they proposed on 26th June to exchange these contributions (as far as ready) mutually, so that the two groups could consider them. This proposal was "in the main" accepted by the Indonesian members in the meeting of 28th June. Simultaneously however a statement was read which compelled the Netherlands members, after they had received the text and studied it, to take the matter into further consideration. For, what was the case? In this statement, included in the appendixes under No C Ir I/AM/P/7, a standpoint was adopted, not only radically at variance with the Netherlands standpoint (as the Netherlands members had expected) but at the same time rendering the latter standpoint as regards the New Guinea controversy in such a way that it could only be called a caricature.

The Indonesian members argued that both parties had to prove their better claim on New Guinea. They reproached the Netherlands group that the latter, instead of treating the controversy as being a dispute between equal parties, dealt with it according to the formal procedure of a civil action, only one of the parties (i.e. Indonesia) having to prove its posita and rights and the other (i.e. the Netherlands) having no more to do than to deny the pretended claims of its opponent and further oppose these alleged arguments. It was opined that the controversy had to be treated as a dispute in which both parties had equal rights and that consequently also the Netherlands had to substantiate its claim on New Guinea.

This way of rendering the facts is indeed most surprising to him
who remembers the trouble the Netherlands members had to take to have their case to collect material in corroboration of their standpoint acknowledged. During the whole voyage across New Guinea this right had been an undisputed point at issue and hardly a month later the Netherlands members were blamed for having so to say defied the Indonesian members to produce their rights, veiling themselves in silence. The real course of things has — as appears from what precedes — been quite different.

It equally puzzles the Netherlands members that the whole question New Guinea is being compared with a juridical dispute. The impression is given that the sovereignty is viewed here by the Indonesian members as a transferable matter without the population being involved. However this may be, in any case this is not how the problem lies as far as the Netherlands members are concerned. For on this side the startingpoint has always been the commitments incumbent on the Netherlands ex clause 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, meaning that the Netherlands side has in respect of New Guinea always and unabatedly adhered to an idea of sovereignty, the limits of which are determined by international law. The positive wording of the aforementioned clause 73 to which the Netherlands side has always appealed show that here the sovereignty has always been understood to be responsibility and not an alienable property. This latter conception would altogether be contrary to the fundamental principle of self-determination.

Another remarkable point is the following:

The Indonesian members argued that the Netherlands members were of the opinion that the question whether linguistically, zoologically, botanically, ethnologically, geologically and anthropologically New Guinea is or is not a part of Indonesia (the order is derived from the Indonesian memorandum) would be decisive for the rights of Indonesia on this territory. Their further argumentation along these lines led them to remark that in reverse ratio the Netherlands too would have to prove that linguistically, zoologically and in other respects New Guinea belongs more to the Netherlands than to Indonesia. This remark turned the state of affairs entirely upside down. The Netherlands side has never pretended that New Guinea forms a natural oneness with its own country and people, but Indonesia will also have to prove that oneness.

This is however not the proper place to enter fully into all the arguments advanced. It suffices to point out that the interest of the population, which for the Netherlands group has from the beginning been the nucleus of the problem, was indeed mentioned, but only at the end of the statement, and here again not in such a way as if it was meant to be a matter which on the Indonesian side was
considered to be of paramount importance in connection with the transfer of the sovereignty.

The Netherlands members had now to face the question whether there was any sense in considering the invitation included in the statement to further discuss the matter by way of preparing a joint report. Here an opportunity to discuss was given indeed. But it was an opportunity which actually brought the state of affairs back again to the situation of circa the 20th of May. It demanded that the Netherlands standpoint were once more elucidated, and this in the prospect that no progress whatever would be made towards the drawing up of the report, which should actually have been ready on the 1st of July. Since the Netherlands standpoint, after having been circumstantially elucidated, was still misunderstood so completely, account had to be taken of the fact that such a discussion would take up considerable time. For this reason further discussions and putting the Governments in the position of having to face the fact that the Committee which is to give its advice was still meeting at the moment when a decision would have to be taken did not seem justified. The Committee had already been active for two months and agreement had been reached in so far that a basis had been found for starting a discussion, as remote as when the start was made. It may be that the discussions would be elucidating, but they certainly could not conduce in good time to an end of the instruction given to the Committee.

Meanwhile another objection had arisen. The statement as well as the contribution since received from the Indonesian side showed that the standpoints were so divergent that also for this reason the drawing up of a joint report was an impossibility. Bearing in mind the criticism, only recently incurred by a government committee, that its report looked more like the minutes of a debating-club, the Netherlands members refrained, also for the sake of the readability of the report, from this procedure which proved more and more forced.

They then invited the Indonesian members to a meeting on the 5th of July on which occasion they explained their objections. This is not the proper place to give a survey of the discussions held; in this respect reference may be made to the minutes and reports. It tends to make us grateful that eventually in spite of the acerbity of these discussions a modus could be arrived at to which both groups could agree.

Has, since the endeavours to come to a joint final report failed, the work of the Committee been in vain? If one bears in mind, that within the Committee even a discussion of the possibility of possible intermediate solutions could not be arrived at, one is inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. Nevertheless this answer is premature. The discussions have or may not have brought the standpoints closer to each other, but they have put them in a clearer light and shown
more vivid outlines. In the following chapters the Netherlands members have tried to give a synopsis of what they consider important in order to judge the problem under dispute. They have let themselves be led by the idea that a judgement of the interest of the population has to be preceded by the knowledge of its surroundings, its history and its circumstances in life.
CHAPTER II

NATURAL SURROUNDINGS

New Guinea, after Greenland the largest island in the world, belongs geologically to an other part of the earth than the Indonesian Archipelago. The latter is directed towards Asia, partly it consists of the islands formed by the so-called circum-Sunda-mountain system, the latter made up of two ranges of islands, grouped round the Sunda-flat, viz. the Northern range, formed by the Philippines, and a Southern range, starting at the South-Moluccas, continued across the Smaller Sunda Islands and Java and Sumatra on to the Brahmapoetra Valley in Assam. Excepting only the Aru islands the whole present Indonesia can be considered to belong to this formation.

New Guinea is entirely outside it, this island belongs partly to the Sahoul-flat, connecting its Southern shore with the Australian continent, the previously mentioned Aru islands being the farthestmost Western boundary. Another part of New Guinea belongs to the so-called circum-Australian system, which surrounds the Australian continent with a large belt, starting at the mountains of New Guinea and continuing Eastward and Southward via the Salomon islands as far as New Zealand. To the West this latter formation shows only rather unimportant offshoots: there is only a presumption of its being linked up with the highlands of Halmahera, where the circum-Australian system is crossed by the circum-Sunda system. Thus New Guinea is not a borderland of Indonesia, itself a borderland of Asia, but of Oceania, a position which can very clearly be seen on the skeleton-map included in the recent article by M. F. Glaessner in the Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists in the May number of this year.¹)

In agreement with this difference in the geological history is the fact that the flora and fauna of New Guinea show great differences with those of Indonesia.

"Having been connected with Australia as recently as Pleistocene times, New Guinea has a fauna and flora that are more closely related to those of Australia than to those of Asia or the western islands of the East Indian Archipelago", thus M. W. Stirling in the Smithsonian War background Studies.²) This statement specially emphasizes the Australian character of the country. It is certainly not difficult to point out next to it important Asiatic elements in the fauna and flora. In doing so however one gives the impression that


New Guinea is only a mixed territory and one would by-pass which is, according to biologists, especially botanists, the most interesting part of the animated Nature of this territory, viz. its unusually strong own character as manifested in a very large number of endemic elements. This conception is very strongly expressed in the following statement by E. D. Merrill in his treatise: "An Enumeration of the Philippine Flowering Plants IV (1926) p. 153, where he says about the flora of Malaysia as a whole: "In considering Malaysia as a whole it is clear that two secondary centers of origin and distribution have been established since the break-up of the Cretaceous continental area. One of these is composed of the Sunda Islands, or Sundaland; the other is New Guinea, or Papualand". Clearer still this author comes back on it in an Essay of 1936: "plants and animals extended their ranges from those two centers: from the first (viz. Sundaland) most of them went north into the Asiatic continent and northeast into the Philippines, and from the second, they went north through Gilolo, the Moluccas, and Celebes into the Philippines, south into eastern Australia, and into Polynesia".  

The same idea is developed by Miss Gibbs in connection with her investigation in the Amrak mountains, where she writes under the heading Phytogeographical conclusions: "New Guinea, the centre of distribution for many so-called Polynesian, Australian, and to a lesser extent Malayan types, of which the Papuan species are not older in type, but also show extraordinarily pronounced specific differentiation".  

This specific geological, botanical and zoological character of New Guinea typifies the country as a border territory, constituting its entirely own natural surroundings which, though owing to its tropical character offering Eastward and Westward all kinds of points of contact, is nevertheless clearly differentiated from it. This character of border territory accentuates also the geographical position of the islands, its remoteness being its main feature.

Being a border territory leaning to the West against an other border territory, viz. the Indonesian Archipelago, which cuts off the Asiatic continental world, and to the East against the enormously large stretch of islands of the Pacific which was mainly explored from the farthermost East and South, it necessarily had to be the last to be included in the world traffic.

History would probably have been different if the island had been more accessible and hospitable.


But it is not without reason that the streams of peoples have for centuries left the island aside. The coastal districts have become known through the pernicious malaria prevailing here. The kinds of anopheles conveying this disease differ entirely from those outside New Guinea (excepting those found on a few groups of islands lying in the neighbourhood). They stand out from the rest by their exceptional potency and by being very little particular as regards their breedinggrounds, ideal conditions being created in this way for the malaria, the pre-eminent disease of New Guinea.

Also in other regards the island is little attractive. The report of the New Guinea Study Committee from which the preceding was taken, characterizes the islands as being warm, very damp, and in general little fertile. The highlands are wild and steep; as one climbs higher the rains become more frequent, the lixification of the soil being thus promoted. The rock-formation of the soil too, mostly sand and limestone, marls and slates, are chemically poor, eruptive rocks constituting richer soil being only present to a limited extent.

The far greater part of the country is covered with tropical rain-forest which, though being an important feature in preserving the soil, means at the same time a tremendous obstacle for opening up and bringing the land into cultivation 1).

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CHAPTER III

THE POPULATION

The population of New Guinea lives scattered in a tremendous number of mostly extremely small groups and tribes, being originally constantly mutually at war. In this way each little group lived in great isolation, the consequence of which has been a remarkable diversity of languages and culture.

The total of this population is at present estimated to be an odd million heads, a rough estimate based on the circumstance that the inaccessible highlands mostly to be reached through the air, proved to be more densely populated than was surmised before. Taking this fact into consideration, a higher estimate was arrived at than before. In this way one gets closer to the total of the population of Australian New Guinea which is estimated at "more than one million" ¹).

Nevertheless the density of the population of this territory, taken at these higher figures, remains small. The surface of Netherlands New Guinea (including the islands pertaining to it) is circa 390,000 km², meaning that the density of the population is circa 2.5 per square kilometer. It is therefore not to be wondered at that still a small part of this population has been brought under administration.

The registered population was, at the end of 1949, 267,447 heads, a lower figure than the administration had attained before the war. This is due to the fact that the post-war difficulties did not make it possible to complete the reinforcement to its full extent, though these very last times considerable progress has been made in this respect.

Moreover the geographical circumstances make the extension of administration extremely difficult. The central highland is from the coast practically exclusively accessible through the air; especially the so-called Lake-Plateau is a very important obstacle.

Of greater significance is the fact that the registered population has indeed been brought under administration and that a good contact exists, which is in particular due to the activity of the Missionary Societies. What this contact is like is to be seen from the great number of schools in this territory, all under supervision of these corporations. There are no less than 531, attended by 25,883 pupils (as reported at the end of 1949). This means that nearly 10% of the registered population goes to school, a very satisfactory situation when bearing in mind that, in Java, in 1938 only

4% of the population went to school. Assuming that every pupil goes to school for four to five years (practically all schools are people's schools with a three years' course, but repeating a class occurs here rather often, especially at the so-called civilization-schools) the result is that by far the greater part of the children of the population brought under administration, is being educated. The qualification bringing under administration therefore means much more than that once a year a visit is paid by a district-head. The great dispersion of the population involves that a great number of civil servants is essential. The territory is divided into four sections, North-, West-, South- and Central New Guinea, the last one still having to be effectuated. It is projected for the central highland where, so far, only the sub-section Wisselmeren could be formed. The other sections are divided into respectively 5, 4 and 3 sub-sections, each under a Controller. These are sub-divided into districts administrated by an administrative assistant. The number of districts is 73.

Of the 276,000 heads being the group of Papuas brought under administration, the greater part are Christians (circa 160,000). Islamites only occur on the West coast and in the Radja-Ampat islands. Their number is estimated at not more than 15,000. In addition to the number of immigrants, viz. circa 5,000 Netherlanders, 8,000 Indonesians and 2,000 Chinese.

An endeavour will now be made to give a short sketch of the characteristics of the autochthonous population, anthropologically, linguistically and culturally.

1. **Anthropology.**

Taking the at present most current differentiation of the races into three head races, viz. the leukodermic, the xantodermic or mongoloid and the melanodermic, it is clear that the population of New Guinea is, without any exception, to be counted to the melanodermic head race. This does not mean to say that amongst them no further race discriminations can be made. Especially the British authors show a great predelection for a threefold differentiation of the types occurring in New Guinea, viz. the Negritos (to which the Pygmoids of the central highland are to be counted), the actual Papuas in the lowlands and on the coast and the Melanesians, whose presence is limited to the farthermost East of the island (Melanesian languages have a greater spreading than Melanesian race characteristics). The latter can however better be looked upon as being Papuas, showing Polynesian and occasionally also Caucasian influences (cf. i.a. Chamberlin in Enc. Brit. latest edition, under Melanesia; Bijlmer in Dr W. C. Klein, New Guinea, part I, pp. 221 etc.,
mentions Polynesian influences which comes to practically the same effect). This differentiation does however not mean that the oneness of these races is not noticed. As well Haddon (Races of Man, pp 121 sqq. of the revised edition 1924) as Armstrong (Enc. Brit under New Guinea) point out that essentially they all belong to the negrids.

In consideration of the preceding it appears more correct to insist with Bijlmer on the oneness of these races, in particular of Negritos and Papuas. The difference between the actual Papuas and the Negrito population in the interior mainly consists in the fact that the latter are considerably shorter and have a broader skull than the dolichocephal Papuas of the coast. On the other hand however the oneness in habitus and form of the face is very striking. In this connection it is not unimportant to state that the broader skull of the inlanders is, according to Bijlmer, to their advantage, als this is considered to be a symptom of higher development, which tallies with the more favourable experiences incurred with these people 1).

Starting from this original oneness the supposition is enhanced that this negrid population of New Guinea has been the more original population of a larger territory than New Guinea alone and has, outside — as is fairly generally accepted — been flooded by immigrants from elsewhere, the islands (the Moluccas and Timor) now belonging to Indonesia, having been drawn within the Indonesian cultural circle and those North and East of it within the Melanesian (unless it would be beeter simply to agree with Murdock mentioning a Malayo-Polynesian cultural territory, the Indonesian and Melanesian being different facets of it.

After the preceding it is decidedly superfluous to further elucidate the anthropological difference between Indonesians and Papuas. Both belong to different chief-races of humanity. The Mongoloid characteristics so typical for the Indonesians shall be looked for in vain amongst Papuas whether living on the coast or in the highlands. 2)

2. Linguistic

The linguistic position of New Guinea proves to have more than once caused confusion outside professional circles. Sometimes one comes across the idea that New Guinea comes under the territory of the Melanesian languages. The cause of it is not far off; the first languages that became known from New Guinea were indeed Melanesian languages, spoken by the inhabitants of the coasts of Eastern

1) Cf. H. J. T. Bijlmer: Naar de Achterhoek der Aarde (to the outlying parts of the world), Amsterdam, 1939, ch. XVI and XVII.
2) Only the Radja Ampat group and P. Adi are exceptions, where intermixture of blood did take place with Indonesians, in particular amongst the ruling families.
(Australian) part of the islands. That these are practically exclusively coastal languages did not become known until later, thanks to the work of S. H. Ray and P. Wilh. Schmidt.

The occurrence of such "von den Austronesischen durchaus unab-hängigen" Papua languages in the territory of Netherlands New Guinea was already mentioned by Schmidt in his Mon-Khmer-Völker ¹), having already in 1920 pointed out that the North-West coast of New Guinea as well as the whole interior belong to this idiom. ²)

The time is meanwhile not yet ripe to give general characteristic particulars of these anyhow not Austronesian languages.

How little is known in this respect outside this vague general information is best shown in the little map on page 215 of the thesis of Father J. H. M. C. Boelaars, "The Linguistic Position of South-Western New Guinea", which book is just out. The far greater part of these islands is still a blank and much is still to be done to obtain a passable survey.

An extraordinary difficulty are in this respect the tremendous differences existing even between languages spoken by peoples living in each other's closest vicinity. The difference in vocabulary is one of the most striking characteristics of this group of languages. How many and which languages are to be distinguished amongst them is not at all clear and any endeavour to make a classification is at this moment premature. It can only be argued that these languages are grammatically more intricate and therefore also much more difficult to approach than the languages belonging to the Austronesian idiom which represents a type of language much easier to approach. In particular the attention is drawn to the fact that Papua languages, contrary to the Austronesian, have a very complicated conjugation of the verb with an incorporation of the object in the construction of the sentence as well as in the predicate, unknown in the latter languages. This is meanwhile important because it also shows — if this were not already clear for many other reasons — that there is no question of any affinity with these languages.

There is however another curiosity on the previously mentioned map, worth mentioning in connection with what was argued in respect of the Papua elements in the anthropology of the inhabitants of Eastern Indonesia. It indicates where outside New Guinea Papua languages occurred, viz. in North-Halmahera and in the interior of Timor. Here the old Papua element has been able to hold its own in so far that the grammatical structure still clearly testifies the non-Indonesian origin of these languages. Where in other East-Indonesian

¹) Die Mon-Khmer-Völker (1906), page 2, note 1, where he mentions the languages of the Marind-anim (Tuger) and of the Santarlake.

²) Deutscher Kolonial Lexikon III, under Pupuasprachen.
languages traces of this influence are still discernable they are usually restricted to a few peculiarities of the vocabulary which are of no great general importance.

It is important that also the reverse occurs, viz. the penetration of Austronesian elements in the languages of New Guinea.

The occurrence of Melanesian\(^1\) elements in the language is specially known on the coast of the mandatory territory where various Melanesian languages are spoken. Also in Netherlands territory similar influences are noticeable. There however Melanesian languages are less frequent: they are restricted to the actual coastal area, viz. up to the coast of Hollandia, up to the mouth of the Mamberamo, up to the islands and the coast of the Geelvinkbaai, including the islands, where people from Biak, talking Numfores, have settled. In between, off and on, pure Papua languages occur, their territory reaching up to, or very near, the coast. It is therefore only a very restricted territory where this Austronesian influence makes itself felt, be it that here and there it may be further discernable in the vocabulary (remarkable is for instance the occurrence of Austronesian numerals in typical Papua languages like those of the central highlands). Of the spreading of these Melanesian languages Ray gives an altogether plausible explanation. "Where the spheres of the two types of languages associate, the comparatively simple character of the Melanesian causes it to become the lingua franca of communication. It is always easier for the Papuan to become bilingual than it is for the Melanesian to acquire even the rudiments of Papuan speech"\(^2\).

How this influence in Netherlands New Guinea should further be qualified, viz. as Indonesian or as Melanesian, is a rather precarious controversy, because no definitive criteria have been determined for the differentiation between Indonesian and Melanesian languages. The Melanesian group of languages cannot be accurately defined, leans in a Westerly direction against the Eastern Indonesian languages (in particular the South-Halmahera group), showing themselves Papua influences, so that it is difficult to come to a decision in this respect. The safest way is to speak here of Melanesian, as this agrees best with the whole situation of the territory.

For the purpose aimed at here, it suffices meanwhile to have pointed out that on the North coast there is a limited territory where languages have been mixed, the far greater part of the island having to be considered to belong to the territory of the, for the rest, little defined Papua languages.

\(^1\) The Melanesian languages belong, as is known, to the Austronesian idiom. They are i.a. different through the occurrence of peculiarities which are considered to be Papua elements.

\(^2\) S. H. Ray in Festschrift Meinhof (1927), page 381.
3. Culture

Giving a characteristic of the Papua cultural territory is a fairly hopeless task, as the diversity of forms in this respect is similar to those encountered in the linguistic field, at least in respect of the tribes living in the lowlands. Socially however the attention is drawn to the fact that all Papua communities known to us are characterized by the patrilinial structure of the basic form of their social groupings, in which regard they differ very clearly from the Malayo-Polynesians living in their neighbourhood. Murdock in his recent endeavour to include all the peoples in the world in a classification, therefore incorporates the Papuas in a group of their own. It is important to remark in connection with what previously has been said about the Melanesians that he classifies the latter together with the Malayo-Polynesians, however under this provisal that they show many divergencies which he explains as being due to Papua influences.

"In many cases it is probable that the ancestors of the present population (of Melanesia) once spoke another language and acquired their present Malay-Polynesian dialects through contact with a wave of later immigrants, as is indeed suggested by the survival of so-called "Papuan" languages in the interior of several of the larger Melanesian islands". ¹)

Apart from this fundamentally different social structure from the Malayan-Polynesian — defined by Murdock as Hawaiian which i.a. includes a bilateral system of relationship considered by him also in the cases where at present a unilateral or double-unilateral system prevails, as being original — these Papua cultures are different by a very rudimental development of material culture. The handling of iron has only penetrated as far as Biak, the Radja Ampat islands and the coast of the ancient Onin and Kowiai. This would lead to the conclusion that the Melanesian influences in New Guinea have rather come from the East than from the West. Had they come from the West, the introduction of iron also in other districts where Melanesian languages are spoken, would have to be considered probable, the handling of iron now having remained unknown outside the territory influenced from the Moluccas. The total absence of weaving-loom points in the same direction. Also in Melanesia they are absent, barring the Santa Cruz looms.

In general it can therefore be argued that the cultural situation agrees with the surmise gathered from the anthropological analyses, viz. that here is an archaic type of culture weaned from the great discoveries of the more developed civilizations in which Indonesia took part, viz. the use of cereals, the working of metals and weaving.

Where there are indications of Malayo-Polynesian elements in the Melanesian influences, these influences belong to a culture which can decidedly not be identified with the Indonesian culture, which has attained a much higher level. Excepting the more recent Indonesian influences on the North and Northwest coast of New Guinea, to be found e.g. in the knowledge of handling iron at Biak, these cultural elements to be taken as coming from cultural streams from elsewhere, have to be attributed to the Melanesians. It is important to state at the end of this chapter that also anthropologically and culturally New Guinea is a territory of its own, to be characterized as a border territory of the Pacific. It may have clear offshoots towards Indonesian territory, it is also clear that the greatest affinity is turned towards the Pacific. On that side the influences of the Melanodermic race related to the population of New Guinea are the furthest reaching and cultures are to be found offering through the low level of technical development points of contact for a comparison with those of the Papuas. But here too prevails that New Guinea is first of all a territory with a character of its own and its own specific peculiarities, making it entirely different from other territories, from other groups of languages and from other races.

The only area where specific Indonesian influences are noticeable is formed by the Radja Ampat islands lying in front of the Vogelkop and the coast of the peninsula Onin, where, as appears from the remarks made by A. Haga, of old intercourse was kept up with Ceram, Halmahera and Tidore, in which we notice the inhabitants on the one hand as providing slaves, on the other as much dreaded pirates not shirking from extending their raids as far as the coast of Oram and Halmahera. In this territory also the Islam has been spread, which is a clear proof of the deeper influence the Indonesian cultural center has had here. This is not to be wondered at; a glance at the map is sufficient to make clear how closely the Papuan and the Indonesian cultural centers approach each other here.

Next to these older influences are of course to be put the younger ones, which have emanated via the missionary associations from Keise and Ambonese gurus. Of these the influence of the latter is the most noticeable. It makes itself particularly felt in features concerning worshipping and clothing. For the rest there is not much

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1) In many regards this contact has become fatal to the inhabitants of the Radja Ampat islands. Fairly densely populated some centuries ago, these islands have now only a small number of inhabitants. In particular the wars of the Tidorese prince Nuku and his conquest of Ternate have withdrawn thousands of people from this territory without ever having returned there. For the contrast in respect of Tidore, being connected with it, reference may be made to the articles by Ds. F. C. Kamma in Indonesia, volume 1 and 2.
to be said of such an influence, as it forms a part of the prevailing process of acculturation, which covers a much wider field. Typical is e.g. that attempts to introduce Keiese dances in South New Guinea — which would have meant a specific Indonesian influence — have failed 3).

The most recent political influence representing a different aspect of the process of acculturation has not yet settled down in organized cultural forms. The life roused in this field in the most developed areas, is still in the stage of taking definite shape.

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CHAPTER IV

RELATIONSHIP OF NEW GUINEA WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

In the preceding one or two things have already been said about the ties between New Guinea and the surrounding countries, ties which in general did not prove to be of great importance. In this chapter they have to be further investigated in their historical growth, after which it will be necessary to dwell more circumstantially on the consequences and results of the so extremely important, most recent, period of contact for the population of this island.

1. Historical Development 1)

The oldest reports on New Guinea and its relations with the outer world, in particular the Moluccas, date back from the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. In these reports the Radja Ampat islands and the coast of the peninsula Onin are mentioned in particular. The islands kept up relations with the Moluccan princes, the coast of Onin stood in a special relation to the inhabitants of Ceram and Goram. Whereas in the relations between Onin and Ceram ca. reciprocity was preponderant, in those of the Radja Ampat the element of acknowledgement of the supreme power of the princes was the most remarkable item.

When the curtain of history rises, we notice that Batjan lays claims on Misool (which it transferred later to Tidore) and Tidore on the other islands of the Radja Ampat. The authority of Tidore does not seem to have been well established. A Tidorese fleet is in 1538 defeated even at a point so near home as the island Gebe. The extent of the Tidorese sphere of influence on New Guinea is obviously much smaller than in later years. Tidorese claims on the territory of the Geelvink Baai are first mentioned in 1710 and that in a manner which raises serious doubt as to the value of these claims.

It is important to trace how these claims have developed under the patronage of the East-Indies Company. In these days one often hears that the Netherlands have carried on a colonial administration of Indonesia for 350 years. No assertion is more contrary to the real character of the authority of the Company. The Company was not at all in favour of establishing an administration. It was only interested in one thing, and that was its trade with all that pertains to it, in particular the maintenance of the monopolies it had acquired. If it takes recourse to a display of its power, this is always done to protect those monopolies and to keep away those who would like to break

1) For a more elaborate treatment of the matter cf. appendix A.
these monopolies. As long as those in power in Indonesia adhere to the monopoly agreements concluded with the Company, and check piracy, all these authorities wish to do or omit is quite the same to the Company. This attitude of the Company made it also easy for the princes to acknowledge its supreme power, an acknowledgement the Company needed in order to maintain the fulfilment of its monopolies with sufficient strength opposite competitive foreign powers. It therefore gave these princes so much freedom as they could possibly wish outside these engagements to the Company. Only from sheer necessity — and even then under repeated opposition of the Gentlemen XVII — the Company off and on takes the authority into its own hands.

From this situation it is clear why the Company has favoured the claims of Tidore on New Guinea. She herself was not directly interested in this island. What did matter to her was that it could not be used as a stepping stone for British or Spanish intruders, a danger to which its situation — so near the splendid spice-islands — was apt to contribute. In exchange for this favour all the Company expected of Tidore was that it would check the Papuan piracy.

Not until 1761 the Company developed something more than benevolent indifference. Then however there are reasons for it, for the English have been signalled on the North coast. A committee is set to work to investigate the Tidorese claims on the island, which committee, though not at all blind to the fact that "these wild peoples" are off and on little concerned about orders (of the king) declares the sovereignty of the sultan on a number of places on the North coast and in the Geelvink Baai where four Numfores districts are mentioned, beyond dispute. It gives however no opinion on Tidore’s sovereignty of the West coast. This comes only up for discussion when in 1826 rumours circulate about a possible English establishment on the South coast. Then however an other procedure is followed and an official entering into its possession is made by proclamation (1828). As the farthest Eastern boundary to the South, now for the first time the 141st degree of longitude is mentioned, to the North the Cape of Good Hope, barring the Tidorese rights on the Numfores districts mentioned by the committee of 1761. The last addition meant that the boundary to the North remained undefined.

The previously mentioned proclamation was the beginning of an attempt to establish real authority on New Guinea, an attempt which was bound to fail because in those years one was powerless against the tropical diseases raging here, their origin being unknown. In 1836 they were compelled to vacate the establishment made in 1828 at Merkus Oord. This did not mean that the Netherlands claims on the island were given up; through its situation and extent it formed
an ideal barrier against attacks from across the sea, and in this way the old policy of acknowledgement of the Tidorese rights was returned to, an important extension being even given to it in the following years. In 1848 a secret resolution is arrived at (it has not remained a secret for long as was not the intention either) registering the Tidorese possessions in New Guinea, viz. the coast of New Guinea, starting from Cape Bonpland at 140° 47’ Eastern longitude on the North coast, along the whole coast in a westerly direction up to the 141st degree of longitude on the South coast, with all the land lying in between as far as it shall prove to be Netherlands territory.

For a moment it looks as if in this way the sultan has once for all been declared free to do in New Guinea as he likes. This is however a misconception. As so often, what seemed to be the end of the development, means the starting point of an entirely new period. Though the rights of Tidore had been acknowledged, this did not mean at all that the traditional way of wielding authority by the sultanate met with the Netherlands Government’s approval. For it consisted of the yearly sending of a hongi, a fleet, which had to collect the yearly tribute due in the territories tributary to Tidore. But that was not where the matter rested, on the contrary, these expeditions were more like predatory expeditions and where the fleet of Tidore appeared, the population fled to the interior. When the sultan appeared to take the decree of 1848 as a passport for more extended hongi expeditions, the government soon had to take action and in 1861 a total prohibition was issued, unless the governor had previously agreed to it.

Meanwhile also private interests in New Guinea grew. From Ternate and Banda trading concerns carried on a regular trade on New Guinea, thus forming, owing tot the good relations these traders developed with the population, a first start for later contacts.

At the same time also the Mission starts it work. The Netherlands is the first country sending missionaries to New Guinea, who settled in 1855 at the Geelvink Baai, where they are to persevere for fifty years under great exertions before the first result of their work can be seen.

Also in the Eastern parts of the island — in particular after 1860 — an increasing European interest is noticeable. Still it is not — owing to the inhospitality of nature — until 1883 and 1884 when German and British authority establishes itself.

The result of all these facts is that the standpoint taken after 1836 becomes less and less acceptable, especially because Tidore exercises no real administration or authority. It can give no guarantee for the steadily increasing Netherlands interests on the island, neither can it in the long run safeguard the Netherlands sovereignty. For,
after 1885, the principle more and more recognized is that sovereignty must appear from factual occupation and therefore the Netherlands government decides at last in 1897 to cut the knot and to establish itself at Manokwari and Fakfak, both being made the centers of sections. Soon after — in 1902 — Merauke is created.

One would have expected that now simultaneously an end was put to the phantom administration of Tidore, for which already in 1860 — having learned from the experiences with Tidore’s ideas in respect of exercising its supreme rights — the arms had been disengaged by including in the new contract of that year that the Netherlands Indies Government would at any time be entitled to take over the administration of the whole province or of a part of it, an authority which was, in 1909, taken over in a provision of the same purport in the renewed regulation of the relation towards the sultanate. Nevertheless this possibility was not made use of at once. It was only used to bring the section South New Guinea, the capital of which had no connection with the North Moluccas, under direct administration. Plans to withdraw also the Northern part of the island from the administration of Tidore and to join it to the direct administered territory, which plans were based on the consideration that Tidore took no notice whatever of the administration of New Guinea, stranded at the last moment on a still further reaching plan, viz. to dissolve the whole sultanate. The reason for it was that in 1904 the sultan’s seat had become vacant and no suitable successor could be found. In 1907 however it was decided all the same to maintain the sultanate. This decision was arrived at because in the directly administered territory of South New Guinea, of which the expectations were high, there was great disappointment and because it was thought advisable to wait in intensifying the government, connected with this form of administration, in the North until exploration had given more information about the possibilities of this area. The most important item was however that the regulations prevailing in direct administered territory, called into being in view of the conditions in Java and Sumatra, were altogether unsuitable for New Guinea. The advantage of the indirect form of administration was now that the network of regulations prevailing in direct administered territory were evaded and that one was free to administer in a way better corresponding with reality. In this way the self government of New Guinea, which had never been more than a form and, as the Resident Haga remarked in 1935, was not capable from a viewpoint of capability of administration to govern, as well as from that of communications to exercise authority, continued to exist for many more years after in reality an exclusively Netherlands government had come into being.
Meanwhile consciousness grew that New Guinea needs its own organization and regulation ad administration 1). After an endeavour had failed to achieve it in the years 1920—1924, the Resident Haga proposes in 1936, on the occasion of the preparation of the reform of administration of the Outer Territories, to raise New Guinea to a separate Government. Though this proposal could not meet with the approval of the Government, the result is nevertheless that the governor general declares that with the Council of the Indies, he is of the opinion that it will be necessary in New Guinea, to admit the necessary exceptions to the general regulations and administrative provisions in order to make a smoothly functioning government possible.

In this way the road has at last been opened for the realization of a separate legislation doing justice to the special position of New Guinea (1937). The separation of New Guinea from the sultanate of Tidore is now only a matter of time, of the suitable moment, since the only reason to continue the nominal authority of Tidore had lapsed. By its aloofness and impotence the sultanate itself had created no reasons which could make its maintenance plausible. This suitable moment arrived when in 1945 the wellknown decree, embodied in Statute Book 1944 No 8, according to which the self-government of Tidore in already liberated territory, is exercised by or on behalf of the governor general, had to be withdrawn. This withdrawal was made in S.B. 1945 No 149, only for the self-governing territories outside the sections North- and West New Guinea. In New Guinea the self-government remained with the Resident as representative of the governor general. The decree to separate New Guinea from the sultanate of Tidore, effectuated in the middle of 1949, was therefore factually not more than the confirmation and regulation of an already existing situation. This provision elicited no reaction at all on the side of the autochthonous population of New Guinea. On the contrary, on the occasion of a visit made a few months before by the sultan of Tidore to New Guinea, the population made everywhere sharp protests against his arrival. In the sultanate a real authority had never been seen and of the legal fiction, handled by the Government, nothing had never been understood. The recollections of Tidore were only disagreeable. The aloofness of the sultanate had even spread farther than it was expected. During an investigation by a committee in the Radja Ampat islands in November 1949 it appeared that there too the authority of Tidore was not wanted but that the wish was to

1) Cf. the article of the late Resident of Ternate, Mr W. A. Hovenkamp, "Administration, jurisdiction, police and finances" in Klein, New Guinea I, pp. 407 seq., where the solution is looked for in this direction that New Guinea is separated from Tidore and subsequently obtains the status of a government-province, through which the simpler legislation could remain.
remain in the part of New Guinea administrated by the Netherlands. This declaration was explicitly confirmed by the Heads of the population (who are more closely related to Tidore than this population itself) on a visit our committee paid them.

2. **The present situation of the population**

The original world of the Papuas was a closed world, containing no more than the own tribe or the own village and attributing to what was outside, no greater value than a more or less shadowy one. The events that matter, therefore the actual events, happened inside that own world. There he could feel a real human being, the *anem-ha* (Marind) or *nunggu wano* (Waropen), the human being that matters, in contradistinction of the people of neighbouring tribes. This self-sufficient world, living in a continuous strive with other suchlike little worlds in the neighbourhood, has been broken since the establishment of the Netherlands government. Where this made its influence felt, the mutual strive came to an end, having in many places in New Giuea taken the most appalling forms and a window was opened to an entirely other world, which was not only new to the Papua, but which also robbed him of his brave self-confidence, viz. that only his own little world mattered. This involved that the contact with the West has had serious repercussions on the feelings of the Papua. In particular education which taught him that his tribe is not a center of New Guinea and New Guinea not the center of the world, but rather a remote insignificant out-of-the-way-place, unavoidably shocked his self-confidence which was, also in other ways, put to the test. The proofs that other peoples had greater richess and lived better and more agreeably, had to lead to it as well as the avowed qualification he had to hear severely about his barbaric way of living.

This implies not only a certain feeling of inferiority towards the immigrants who have penetrated his country, but the total demolition of the values on which his mental world is built. His gods prove to be of no further use to him, they have no power to protect him, his magic is of no further avail, his ancient religious festivals give him no more solace, as regards the things he formerly admired most in his own culture he now feels ashamed towards third parties. His life loses its sense and he is no longer sure of himself. He feels a stranger in a world which, only a generation ago, was entirely familiar to him and offered him a spiritual home.

Even the most innocent things have in this process of contact with the outer world the power to lead to serious disturbances of the social and mental equilibrium. Such an excellent matter as the introduction of iron tools resulted in many places in a fundamental disturbance of the distribution of work amongst the sexes, the functions of the
male sex already diminished by the termination of the permanent state of war, being reduced to very small proportions without the social system proving to be capable of an adaptation to the new situation. The new tools did not lead to new technics or an extension of activity, but only saving of time in respect of the old method, owing to which the contribution of the men in the village economy required not more than 1/10 of the time previously needed for it.

This complete cultural disorientation appearing everywhere makes close observation necessary. Practice teaches that such a situation in such primitive territories goes together with a decreasing population, many instances of which can be pointed out in the history of Oceania. For a long time the wrong idea has prevailed that such cases could be imputed to imported diseases; though these have decidedly contributed to a decrease of the population, they are no conclusive explanation for the complex of these phenomena. Specially Pitt Rivers has, led by W. H. R. Rivers, proved that in this decrease not the dying-out is the most striking point, but the deficiency of birth 1), venereal infection not to be taken as the cause of this diminished fecundity. This appears moreover from a remarkable accompanying phenomenon of this deficiency of birth; where it occurs, a disturbance appears in the distribution of the sexes in favour of the male sex. A pronounced instance are the figures of the population for 1921 of the districts Morobe, Aitape and Madan in North-eastern New Guinea (territory of New Guinea): 17,406 men, 10,866 women, 8,075 boys and 5,921 girls 2). Remarkable is in this regard, that the phenomenon of deficiency of women also occurs in the younger generation, which indicates (as is confirmed by other material) that this deficiency of women is not be imputed to a higher mortality of the female sex at a somewhat later age, but that a lesser number of births of girls than of boys should be taken into consideration. It stands to reason that such a disproportion between the number of men and women, if no redress appears, must, in consideration of the already small number of births, lead to further extirpation.

There is no explanation for this peculiar phenomenon. It is only known that it occurs where there is a serious cultural disorientation. Though Netherlands New Guinea has in general been spared such a serious decrease of population, as Pitt-Rivers has encountered in the

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2) Vide Pitt-Rivers, p. 298. It is important to remark that these figures are not conclusive for the whole territory of New Guinea; as they are for New Britain c.a.
territories he deals with 1), nevertheless here too the phenomenon is noticeable of a very slow decrease of population, coupled with a relatively slight disturbance in the division of the sexes. Here too there is a certain disproportion between the number of men and women, already present in the younger generation.

The conclusion can therefore be that in New Guinea there still is a serious cultural disorientation, requiring a special policy in respect of the population, not only aimed at creating by hygiene better conditions for the increase of the population, but above all at opening by cultural work a new perspective for the life of these people, whereby they may regain line and purpose in their lives. An important support is, that the Papua has, where the contact with the administration was established, these last decennia himself asked for education. There is in him a clear desire to be included in a greater whole and to be shown the way in the new world opened to him. Along this road something can certainly be achieved. In this connection may be referred to the results achieved in New Zealand with an entirely modern approach of the Maori problem. The Maoris considered in 1920 to be doomed to extirpation, doubled their number within 30 years. This result pleads for a progressive policy, opening the road to the Papua to take his independent place in the world traffic with as little shocks as possible.

Meanwhile the time is not yet ripe to make this now possible. Though the Missions have been working for nearly a hundred years in New Guinea, it took more than fifty years before the first results of their work were noticeable. Neither has education, given since then in a number of places on the island, made such progress that the population of New Guinea would already be able to take its independent place in the world. Amongst the more educated Papuas there are not yet persons with a university education, not even with a schoolteaching H.B.S., A.M.S. or Mulo (various kinds of secondary schools) so that the instructors which would have been able to give independent guidance in any field — excepting a few exceptions — are lacking. Only recently the "normaalschool" has started giving fully educated pupils being equivalent to those who have had a western education. In addition three quarters of the population has not yet been brought under administration and they are therefore tabula rasa as regards their aspirations towards education and

1) An exception is the territory of South New Guinea, where venereal granulation and influenza played havoc amongst the population. The necessity to take action against the sexual abuses prevailing here, led to more serious forms of cultural disorientation than elsewhere. This territory has also had the serious attention of the government; cf. J. van Waal, Zuid Nieuw Guinea onder Nederlands Bestuur (South New Guinea under Netherlands Administration): 36 years, Tijdschr. Bat. Gen. 1939, pp. 309—414.
participation in the world traffic. This can also be said in this way, that the process of acculturation in New Guinea is still in full swing, c.q. still has to start and has nowhere attained such a level that their own representatives could already be entrusted with the management of their affairs. Neither is this to be wondered at, as acculturation is a process, not of learning, but of acquiring as one's own spiritual property. This implies that one adopts towards the matters of the modern culture an other attitude of life adapted to them, which makes the handling of these cultural goods self-evident. Such a change of fundamental attitude of life is a matter which is not concluded in a single generation. It requires in, originally such primitive, territories at least three generations; the period for it has, in New Guinea, not yet come to an end, not even for the most advanced territories. An accentuation of the lead these latter territories already have, would, by an extra anticipation of their development, lead to a set-back of the less developed territories which would, in this way, come entirely under the power of the more developed areas, no guarantee being present for a decent employ of the power thus obtained.

There is another reason for not over-estimating the degree of acculturation achieved in New Guinea. New Guinea has in the initial period of the adaptation to the world traffic had the advantage that for labour needs it could draw from the big reservoir offered by Indonesia. Therefore, it was not necessary in this territory to recruit labour under penal sanction, as was necessary in Australian New Guinea. Thus the adaptation could initially proceed in a much smoother way; the Papua was less lifted from his own sphere than was the case yonder. In the long run however this advantage proved to be a disadvantage. The easy way in which labour could be obtained from elsewhere, led to the fact that not only lower but also lower intermediate positions, for which the Papua was suited (e.g. teacher, hospital attendant, policeman, etc.) were longer occupied by Indonesians than was necessary and desirable and the danger was not imaginary that the Papua was in this way to become a stranger in his own country. The war has brought in this development a favourable turn for him. It was then and also afterwards necessary to use him for all kinds of work for which before Indonesian labour was employed. He then proved — be this especially in the beginning far from easy — also to be useful, and an employment of the Papua, who had before stayed too much behind in his original surroundings, proved to give him more satisfaction.

This does not mean to say that this process of acculturation, provided as much use as possible be made of the Papua, will further pass off without shocks. The process itself is a whole series of shocks, in which at any moment the Papua is confronted with expectations which cannot be fulfilled because they are based on mis-
understandings. In this connection reference should be made to the great significance the belief of these peoples puts into the magic of thinking. Often the need of education has been taken for genuine studiousness. It was then thought that the Papua wanted to understand the things handled by the westerner. But often he only wanted to know it because he also wanted to learn the trick by which all kinds of goods (e.g. by boat) could be made to come to one. Cargo-cults in various forms are also known in Netherlands New Guinea and they have their origin in secular desires raised by the westerner and interpreted in the Papua way, in which the imported riches are not viewed as the fruit the handling of natural coherences based on logical analyses, but as the product of a special understanding with a religious reality, the secret of which has only to be known. This idea is so profound, that it takes generations to conquer it.

This shows once more that acculturation is indeed not only a question of learning, but above all a fundamentally different institution. It will undoubtedly take many more years before this is achieved.

Above all, for a sound acculturation an other thing is required, viz. that the Papua takes his own place in the process of production. The way things go now he is dependent on charity for his education as well as for his medical care and for all the other things a modern government provides.

Such a situation can of course not continue. The Papua community cannot be left in a lasting dependence, assuming that the administrating government would be prepared to continue this philanthropy for an indefinite period of time. For the country is a deficit territory, and all this has to be paid. The things now given to the Papua, will only then become his real property if he can pay for them. The goods of the western civilization, which have to be unavoidably assimilated by the Papua in order to obtain his own place in this world, are out of reach without-, and not separable from a higher level of prosperity. In the process of acculturation nothing will ever be attained if the economic education is neglected.

Two roads can be taken. The first is the establishment of western enterprises and industries. They can in the initial stage of acculturation be very useful to broaden the horizon of the population. By offering work they open on the one hand the possibility to acquire the so much coveted import articles, on the other hand to lay contacts between the numerous tribes, whose sons come to work for some time on the enterprise.

But the enterprise cannot be the only thing. It may contribute to make the country self-supporting, but in this way not the Papua. The Study Committee New Guinea was right in pointing out in its report that in this way a onesided labour population specialized as
coolie is obtained, severed from its original social surroundings and entirely dependent on the European enterprise and, with it, on the world conjuncture. It will therefore be necessary from the beginning to work as well in an other direction, viz. in that of stimulating native agriculture, foodstuff as well as export produce. Along these roads the population will have to be enabled in the long run to earn everything that is now being given to it.

The time is however not yet there. The population is still in all matters dependent on the government by which it is administrated and on the Missionary Societies, its teachers. On the budget stands against an estimate of expenditure of 35 million, an amount of 12 million revenues. From this it is sufficiently clear what exertions are still to be put up with before this territory will become independent.

3. The relation between the population and immigrants

This is the proper place to go further into the relation between the Papua population and those who assist it in the process of acculturation. In the preceding paragraph it has already been argued that the contact with other peoples before 1900 has been very insignificant. It reached nowhere further than the coast and also there it was only a commercial friendship in the cases where the contact could be called successfull.

The subsequent penetration however led to an entirely new situation. Especially when education and the police care were extended, many Indonesians, in particular from Ambon and the Kei islands entered the country. Also fowling attracted immigrants from elsewhere, the trading possibilities enticing the Chinese, who settled down in the country. In this way a double colonial layer came into being, viz. a thin upper layer of European intellectuals, mainly in the service of the government or the Missions, and a broader underlayer of teachers, small functionaries and Indonesian or Chinese traders.

The European, Indonesian and Chinese immigrants remained each in his own group and they did not with each other or with the autochthonous population. Also between the Indonesians and the Papuas the distance was too great to be easily bridged. Though the women were sometimes taken from the Papua population as a result of the scarcity of women amongst the immigrants, usually a legal marriage was not contracted and in any case there was in most of the places a fierce opposition against a possible marriage of an Indonesian girl and a Papua man. Especially in Merauke the opposition was strong and the possibility of such a marriage was, on the Indonesian side, strongly denied to the commission. On the north coast the relations are somewhat less sharp. This is also because many Papuas from these areas have resided for many years in Am-
bon or Menado or elsewhere in Indonesia and have taken with them Indonesian women from there. Outside New Guinea there is of course not such a strong race-class-feeling as regards the Papuas. It should however be remarked that also the Indonesians residing on the North coast proved to have objections against marriages between their daughters and Papuas, though a single case was brought to the knowledge of the Committee. But the case in itself is typifying, as it clearly shows the superiority relationship of Indonesians towards Papuas. Of old the former feel themselves far above the autochthonous population and the saying \textit{Papua bodoh} (stupid Papua) has become an expression only too well known in New Guinea.

This expression has hurt the Papua considerably. This became apparent specially after the war, when the autochthonous population, grown somewhat overconscious of its value by the part it had played in the warfare of the allies, strongly opposed against all that had come from outside and in many places demanded the departure of all foreigners. On the Arguni Bay even all the Gurus were compelled to leave. Especially ill blood seems to have been bred by the haughty attitude of many teachers in the past. The hearings of the Committee clearly testify it\(^1\).

Interesting in this connection are the considerations concerning the relation between Indonesians and Papuas in chapter II of the report of the Study Committee New Guinea (1948), which chapter was worded by Messrs Prof. Dr. G. J. Held, J P. K. van Eechhoud, A. E. Kajadu, L. Latuperissa and S. Jamsuddin Adjidjuddin. They too point out the sharp contrast between the two groups, but they are of opinion that it has to be bridged in the interest of the Papuas, mentioning with satisfaction the success of the Controller De Bruyn to improve the relations in Biak.

Nevertheless the members of our Committee had to state, when they recently visited this island, that, though the relations outwardly have possibly considerably improved, there is still no question of lifting the so-called Amberie-aversion.\(^2\) The question therefore arises whether the Study Committee was by its aim and composition sufficiently able to realize the caste-like character of the Indonesian group in society at New Guinea. This very peculiar and, in the given circumstances, unavoidable, position of the Indonesian immigrants, being viewed by the Papuas themselves wanting to go ahead, as a superior class standing in the way of its development, leads to it that

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\(^1\) The echo of this feeling is even to be heard from the side of one of the persons called up by the Indonesian members of the Committee.

\(^2\) By Amberie the Papua of the North coast indicates all foreigners (cf. the Pu-anim of the inhabitants of the South coast). In the local vernacular however the word Amberie is often limited to Indonesians; vide Rep. Stud. Com. New Guinea, p. 27.
an aggravation of the relations is more natural than a growing towards each other of the two groups.

In this connection two questions have to be further gone into. In the first place the clear conflict of interests between the autochthonous population and the Indonesian immigrants should be pointed out. Previously the circumstance was already mentioned that the presence of the latter has led to the fact that a too small part of the lower intermediate employments had come into the hands of the Papua population. To this is still to be added that the same was the case in those areas where an important group of small Indonesian traders was established, as in the sub-section South New Guinea. There they had the monopoly of buying copra and dealing in commodities. It was the interest of these traders to keep off the autochthonous population as much as possible from trading on their own. Complaints in this respect on the side of those who aim at self-activity of the population, are countless since many years. For the sake however of their own existence these traders are compelled to thwart the development of the Papua, whereas also amongst them a clear sense of superiority in respect of the Papua was discernible ¹), all this did not contribute to create good relationship.

In the second place may be pointed out the special influence the war has had on the relations. Previously it has already been remarked how the insight they have in respect of the richness and capabilities of the foreigners, is crossed by pictures derived from the magic sphere of thought. In the Papuas still something is alive of the expectation that this richness will, in some mysterious way, also come their way. This primitive expectation was satisfied by the arrival of the American army. On the Schouten islands it deposited its richness on the very spot, indicated by the people's belief in Manseren Mangundi, the Saviour. On top of it all the Papua could not gather from the generous attitude of the souvenir hunting G.I. that these goods were stored for an other purpose than to make them happy, and when, after the war, it was the task of the Netherlands authorities to bring the Papuas back from their highly strung expectations regarding these stocks to reality, the result was obvious ¹).

In various places unrest started, the natives going in one case against everything that was foreign, in an other against nobody else


¹) The difficulties started already when the Americans were still there. The population was not allowed to enter the American camps, but the soldiers themselves called the Papuas in. The result was, that theft was the order of the day until it got too bad for the Americans, and the Nica was asked to intervene, to search the houses and to seize any army outfit they found. The consequence was of course, that in the yes of the population the Netherlands government, taking away everything the generous Americans had given, was the badly reputed instance (Rep. Res. van Eechhoud).
but the Netherlands and in another especially against the Indonesians. It stands to reason that in this way an ideal opportunity was created for the activities of political agitators. That these latter have eventually achieved so little and that also the well-conducted republican propaganda outside Serui — enforced residentie of the late Dr Ratulangi — have nowhere succeeded to keep a lasting preponderance, proves how deep the ill feeling against the Indonesian immigrants, already active since many years, had rooted. If there was one group of population susceptible of propaganda against the power placed above it, it was certainly the Papua society immediately after the end of the war, in which they had played such an important part as snipers. Whoever plays on the expectations the Papua has of the future — this has again and again proved to be true on the whole island — touches his weakest point, viz. the dreamt expectation in a world in which he himself feels more or less displaced since his world is no longer his real world and has lost its most central interest for him.

That this was nevertheless the course of things, and that in the main they turned away from the Indonesians and kept their faith in the Netherlands, is to be explained from the past. In the attitude of the Indonesians, changed after the war in many places, giving up to a not inconsiderable extent their haughty attitude of yore, one notices too clearly the political manoeuvre on behalf of a Greater Indonesia (Indonesia Raja), to have faith in it. The relation to the Netherlands had in the past never that acerbity which typifies the relation towards the Indonesians. The number of the former was smaller; they were mainly the missionaries and civil servants with whom the Papua came into contact and they were the people who considered it to be their vocation to give them protection. This has created a sphere of good faith which was never lost in spite of the rather fierce postwar reaction.

This sense of confidence in the Netherlands is however not only based on the past, but also on the expectation they have of them for the future. The Papua wants no longer to be Papua bodoh and he realizes only too well that he has to expect the lifting of that situation in particular from the intermediary the missionaries give him in this respect. When his own world fell away, they were the only ones who tried to catch him up, who also by his admittance into a Church spanning the world, introduced him as a full-bodied human being in the new world he had just encountered. The Church is the road by which the Papua attains the new citizenship of the world and the education it gives him teaches him the language he has to speak there. Of the mainly islamitic Indonesia he expects nothing.
The fact that also the Indonesian movement has its adherents, detracts nothing from all this.

For the rest, those in whatever way interested politically, form in New Guinea only a very small group; they are practically only to be found amongst the Biakese, the inhabitants of Japen and a part of the population of the North- and West coast and also in the neighbourhood of the Sentani Lake. They who amongst them express an opinion as regards the political interests of the moment, are the ones that are the most cultured and have also been for some length of time from home, often outside New Guinea. That there are amongst them partizans in favour of an alliance with Indonesia, is only natural. Thus it draws the attention that the most important politician amongst the pro-Indonesians, Martin Inday, spent his youth (from his fourth until his nineteenth year) outside de New Guinea and returned here more as an Indonesian than as a Papua.

Moreover the expectation every Papua has somewhere deep in his heart of the world and its possibilities, the expectation of salvation, which led to so many cargo-cults, makes him liable to all kinds of feelings of deception and spite in respect of every government which interferes with the country. In this connection it may be recalled to mind, that in the trust territory (territory of New Guinea) the desire is sometimes shown to return to the German colonial administration, a matter on which very readable remarks are to be found in Reed, *The Making of New Guinea*. It is therefore not to be wondered at that adherents of the R.I.S. are to be found amongst the Papuas, but surprising is, that also amongst the more cultivated they form such a small minority. For the total absence of a real feeling of oneness with Indonesia amongst the Papuas, this is very illustrative, the more so because the great freedom left to all kinds of people on New Guinea, has made propaganda largely possible.

The members of the Committee have been the more struck by the fact all the answers given when asked about their feelings of relationship with other Papua tribes, with whom on the North coast they were fifty years ago still on a permanent and fierce footing of war, were very positive. This was not to be expected; the report of the Study Committee New Guinea made them expect that the answers to these questions would mostly be only vague. Nevertheless at the North coast evidence in favour of an Irian oneness was encountered. Though the members have for obvious reasons practically only met the most prominent and cultured representatives of this society, this proves that in this country there is something growing, a feeling of oneness which can be taken as a first beginning of a realization of an own nationality. If this is taken for granted, also
the attitude towards the Indonesians becomes clearer. The solidarity leads to the fact that they become conscious of certain controversies. 1)

Very important in this connection are the reactions at the recent meeting of representatives of all non-selfgoverning peoples in the South Pacific, in which also two Papua representatives of Netherlands New Guinea took part. This meeting has opened new possibilities and directed the eyes of many towards the East, towards the peoples of Oceania amongst whom no symptoms were encountered of superiority conceit towards the Papuas. Here a new relation has been discovered which can lead to feelings of alliance, to a further turning away from the islamitic world in the West to the christian world in the East, viz. towards the side in the direction of which the country is through its natural condition and anthropological connection preponderantly orientated.

1) In this connection may be recalled to memory the decision of the partly islamitic inhabitants of the Radja Ampat group, who placed their alliance with the rest of New Guinea above anything else.
CHAPTER V
THE INCLUSION OF NEW GUINEA IN THE WORLD TRAFFIC

For a long time New Guinea was a forgotten outer part of the earth. Its remote situation, its inhospitable character and unhealthy climate, its scanty and backward population, the absence of tangible promises of richness of the soil quickly to be realized, all these are factors which have contributed to it. By making this remark the Government need not yet be declared in default, viz. that it would have lagged behind in the fulfilment of its duty. The difference in the degree of government care for the various provinces of territories under its administration readily reflects the twofold fact:

1. that energy and capital are in the first instance directed towards those territories which promise the greatest profit;
2. that payments to the Echequer serve in the first place for a government policy for the benefit of those areas or to fight or prevent the occurrence of emergency cases elsewhere.

It is for the rest also known from one’s own country, how the government care in those provinces which have initially lagged behind in development, has been the least intensive.

How little was the part New Guinea took not long ago in the activity of the world, appears from the small value of its foreign trade. From 1934—1936 incl, the average export only amounted to fl 631.000 and the import to fl. 1.136.000. These figures show moreover great fluctuations from year to year. The survey in Dr. W. C. Klein, New Guinea II, shews on pages 696—697 that the value of the export between 1929 and 1936 varied between fl. 2.264.000 and fl. 357.000 per year. In the economy of the late Netherlands Indies New Guinea was therefore a factor of no account. This is reflected in the manner in which the business relations were organized. Everything went via Macassar, which had developed into the staplemarket of the Great East and had surpassed Ternate and Ambon though they were much better situated for keeping up the commercial traffic with New Guinea. This meant a direct disadvantage for New Guinea. This territory itself was not equipped ¹ for transit traffic towards Europe or America, and the required sorting of the export products had therefore to take place in the great port of transit Macassar. This entailed high costs of interinsular transport. These could have

¹) This had no connection with nautical circumstances (there is sufficient opportunity to make ocean harbours in the bays on the North coast) but with economic circumstances.

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been evaded to a considerable extent if the people in New Guinea had been able to dispatch the products ready for transshipment. But this was not arrived at because, though the K.P.M. gave advances for local shipments, it did not do so in case of shipment for transshipment, to which a lower tariff applied. Taking into consideration that a territory like South New Guinea is by its natural situation directed towards shipment to North Australia and that it is now compelled by circumstances to ship its products towards Macassar via a line which is very unfavourable for shipping, having between Dobo and Merauke (this is a distance of 520 miles) no intermediate ports, it is easy to understand that, economically, the close tie with the old Netherlands Indies was not considered to be advantageous. The report of the Study Committee New Guinea therefore rightly states that there can be no question of a community of interests between New Guinea and the rest of the then Netherlands Indies (vide p. 177 of its report).

There is nothing peculiar in this: on the contrary, the small development of the connections between New Guinea and the rest of the then Netherlands Indies reflects the fact that until flying became an established fact, New Guinea was not a link in the relations with other territories, but a barrier, closing off the Pacific from the Indonesian Archipelago and Australia from the North Pacific and the countries of East Asia. It was a massive that in four directions gave protection and in all these directions also meant a terminus of traffic. Only the great ships of the international lines used to pass this barrier; all that was below the measure, hastened to return at New Guinea. In this situation flying created a total difference. From being the barrier for the traffic New Guinea became practically at once an exceptionally suitable intermediate station, proving its qualities as such especially in the last world war. In this way the position and significance of the island has changed radically. Whereas before everybody profited by its remaining as it was, viz. a quiet outer part of the world, the interest has now been roused to have it fulfil its part as point of junction for the traffic. It is not only the strategic interest which benefits by a hinterland with developed sources and a population prepared for war. The inclusion in the world traffic in consequence of this revaluation of the territory demands that the population concerned shall also contribute in normal times to the international economy.

This has become of more topical interest since in the Far East various territories, the products of which are needed by the world, have fallen out or are deficient. As the world population keeps on extending, it is absurd that such a vast territory as New Guinea, even if the soil is of an inferior quality in many places, were to remain outside the process of production. On the other hand the
population living there, which was thrown by the war in a very abrupt manner in the world traffic and learned the world in this way in its most severe and inclement aspects, is also entitled to have its share in the better and more uplifting gifts of the modern world.

This puts a government which understands in these days its duty and can cope with it, unavoidably before the task to include the country and the people for a maximum of production to the extent in which this can be made to agree with the real salvation of the population. The first requirement to this end is to know the chances that are offered. In other words, exploration will have to come before exploitation.

It would be unreasonable to deny that investigation of the soil and explorations have already had the necessary attention for a considerable time: already in the years 1909—1914 across the whole island a very fruitful exploration was undertaken, which has been one of the most important peace operations of the army. But, though much has been done in an absolute sense, especially after 1930, this is relatively speaking still decidedly insufficient: proportionately, i.e. in respect of the total extent of this enormous territory and specially in proportion to the required degree of accuracy for a positive judgement, whether exploitation is or is not justified. For many more years therefore an item will have to be on the budget from which such exploration work has to be financed. For it is a public interest that this be done, and though it may be considered to be a favourable circumstance if private concerns partly take over this task, this can be no reason for the government to wait for it to happen.

In how far does the experience gained so far with exploration work tend to make us hopeful as regards exploitation possibilities? It is good to warn in two directions.

It is wrong to give up in this stage of not yet sufficient insight all faith in paying forms of investment and to consider every penny spent on New Guinea as thrown away. This is a following of the line of least resistance, a capitulation before the fight; shortly: a too cautious attitude by the propagation of which harm is done.

But certainly it is at least as wrong and harmful to depict New Guinea as a land of promise with unlimited possibilities in the field of mining or agriculture, in its lack of capital and deficiency of population only waiting for supplementation and supply from outside in order to come into full bloom. Indubitably — next to the well-known mineral oil — various minerals have been found, but so far as we know only very little is known about the extent and richness of the formations and about the possibility of a paying exploitation. And as regards agriculture the condition of the soil and the climate are, taken as an average, certainly not favourable. Only a small part of the soil is of volcanic origin and fertile, but for the greater part one
is apparently confronted with poor weathering products of limestone, marls, slates etc., the soil in the plains in addition mostly swampy. Besides, in general a tropical rainfall hardly interrupted by periods of draught and therefore leading to lixiviation of the soil.

Nevertheless further exploration and more intrinsic investigation can give more luminous parts against the dark background of this picture. Specially in the field of mining surprises — and here meant as agreeable — are never excluded. And it is quite sensible to expect that, leaving aside the tremendous surfaces which are not suitable or would require a very large capital for improving it, still sufficient soil remains which can yield reasonable profits if tackled in the right way.

It does seem as if the resistances inherent to all pioneering work make themselves specially felt in New Guinea. The result of it is that where chances are offered, the costs which have to be made before profit is gained shall weigh much heavier than elsewhere. If, for instance, in connection with the problem of transport we bear in mind the inaccessible character of the central highlands, the swampiness of the plains in which the roads threaten to sink away 1), or, elsewhere again, the limestone formations causing holes in the roads and wearing out the motor car tires quickly.

Assuming for instance that somewhere there are reasonably good changes for agriculture in a vast swampy territory in the interior, great problems will have to be overcome before this territory can be successfully exploited. It is really not only a question of clearing away the vegetation of the swamp and clearing the ground, but also the malariologist an the civil engineer have to do the necessary preliminary work to make the area free from malaria, to regulate the water problem and to make roads.

On the budget therefore for a number of years not only exploration costs shall appear, but there is no getting away from the fact that also for exploitation for a long time an appeal will have to be made to the Exchequer.

Shortly, even when taking up an optimistic attitude as regards possibilities of the future, the sober reality makes it necessary to realize fully that for a country like New Guinea — quite unexpected pieces of good luck being left out of consideration — it will take a long time before, from the stage of investment, one has arrived at the stage of profits. This consideration undoubtedly contains something oppressing.

1) Between Sorong, the center of the concession of the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company, and the production field Klamono a road was made 45 km long, which proved for this reason not usable in the full rainy season.
It has already been remarked previously that under the present world conditions the government is confronted with the necessity to mobilize at short notice the land and the country for the "battle of prosperity". So far, in our considerations full stress was laid on the land as a potential factor of production. In what follows now, the people will mainly ask for our attention. In this respect two items are to be considered: in the first place the Papua as producer, a function which is, especially in the life of the modern human being, extremely important, but which nevertheless does not mean everything his life contains; in the second place the social welfare of the Papua, which contains his whole existence.

In the contribution society expects for strategic and economic reasons from the inhabitant of New Guinea, provisionally mainly his significance as a workman prevails. The government however has in the first place to consider that broader idea of the real interest of the population entrusted to its care.

Whereas of these two criteria the latter has a broader tendency, having the human being as its aim instead of, as is the case by the former standard the human being as means, fortunately between the two there need eo ipso be no conflict, there even is a natural parallel. For, if in the interest of world strategy and world economy much manpower and many products are demanded, development of the people is, for this purpose, a condition sine qua non. If however one is directly led by the salvation of the population, no less a stand will certainly be made against the threat of depopulation and teaching and education will be favoured. The latter as well to meet a desire becoming apparent in the population in its budding urge towards independence as also because information in the broadest sense of the word arms against the decomposing tendencies the clash of cultures causes. In a broader connection it can finally be argued that the need of products for the world market and the effectuation of a prosperity programme for the population are desires which are running parallel. Thus the conduct of a prosperity policy is costly and can only be perpetuated when New Guinea proves by sufficient production to be financially capable to do so.

Let us now for a moment go further into the part the population would have to play in the process of production, especially in view of the salutary or non-salutary influence it has to bear by it.

The process of production seems chiefly to refer to mining and agriculture (including forestry, fisheries, etc.). In the first case the capital-intensive enterprise is mostly the proper form in which the production is organized. The Papua will be included here as workman, as wage earner, at his best as skilled labour. What are the dangers that assioil him here? Transplanted from his own familiar sphere into strange surroundings with new temptations, outside the
sphere where the adat prevails, left to his own insight, receiving money which he has not yet been taught how to use, he can lose his hold, go adrift, slip down morally. Encumbered in his formerly ever present contact with nature, symptoms can develop of his becoming psychically split, disturbing his mental equilibrium even more.

When the government and the employer are conscious of these bad chances in advance, much can however be prevented. This labour can, as much as possible, be recruited and housed in groups. If the Christian religion is confessed, this can remain also abroad a reliable anchor, specially if the necessary be done for the care of the soul. The contracts can be made for a relatively short duration and in case of renewal a fair interim period must remain open in order to feel once more at home in one's own surroundings and not to feel disrooted.

If in this manner the sharp sides have been smoothed, the advantages can at the same time materialize which employment as a workman in the big enterprises also has. In the first place there can be question of a beneficial training of the wild human being, which becomes disciplined by regular work and by the strengthening of his will becomes more suitable for modern life. In the second place the workman learns in his new surroundings to eat rice, provided by the estate. Once he has started to like this menu, he shall advertise this food in his own residence, which makes it possible that presently in a vast area the diet of sago or tubers is replaced by rice. If they should then also come to planting this crop (some examples of which are already present) the great profit would not be so much situated in a better main food as in working themselves up to the much higher demands of development corn growing makes of its cultivators. In the third place wage saved — this is learned from the oil center Sorong — is gladly used for textile, with which he who comes home raises the respect in his circle considerably. One could imagine that this would lead to making textile in the interior a much coveted good. In this way a new want is introduced which can only be satisfied from outside. This contains the germ to incite to work, through which one's desires can be satisfied. As regards agricultural production, this is not typically connected with big industry. In the picture of an agrarian development of New Guinea there is room for the estate form as well as for the farm (where we shall let the problem in how far the agrarian raw materials have at all a good future, also in connection with synthetic substitutes, rest). The estate has the advantage that it produces wholesale, and the whole product is available for export. This is an advantage not to be underrated if the thing that matters is to supply the world market as quickly as possible. Moreover the capital of the big estate makes it possible to make radical improvements in the field of hygiene, water supply, transport, planting mat-
erial etc., the influence of which can extend until far beyond its boundaries. Specially when the government, by cooperating in this respect with private concerns, knows how to make the most of it in the general interest.

If one should take the *economic* advantage as the essential point for a comparison between the two types of organization, the judg-

ement is — specially in the beginning — in favour of the estate. But if one takes the social merits as point of departure, farming takes the palm.

In contradistinction with the estates where the far greater part of the workers are dependent wage earners, the production task of the farmers’ community is divided amongst a very large number of men who are their own masters and can feel happy in being so. It is there-

fore of the greatest importance to steer in future towards the forma-

tion of a firm farmers’ community. In this way not only a middle class is created, so important for obtaining a harmonic structural building, not only also that in this way a source of sound strength and virtues of the people is left intact, out of which a nation can always rejuvenate later, but in addition such a farmers’ community is all over the world in its sound conservatism, in its sober-mindedness and level-headedness and in its ”have” position a stronghold against revolutionary currents such as communism and against series of in-

novators and adventurers. In this respect the social advantage of the farmers’ community can make in this political stormy corner of the earth a constructive contribution to world peace. Finally only from such farmers the initiative and the autoactivity are to be expected to bring agriculture by their own forces on a higher level, and to be ready to meet possible difficulties.

All this certainly still sounds like music of the future, but it is right to keep already now the roads open for a development in that direction, even to stimulate this development. In such primitive areas as are under consideration in New Guinea, native agriculture shall be inclined to restrict itself to growing the food that is necessary for their own consumption. For the world economy such a self-sufficiency is of course of no significance. And it will not be simple to induce the people — without giving up their care for their own food produc-

tion — to grow in addition other crops that have to be sold.

It should not be presumed that wage earning on agricultural estates educates the farmers in that way by their becoming familiar with economy and the export trade. It is known from elsewhere how the farmers employed there miss or have lost the very characteristics the farmer wants to look after his own work. They cannot develop any initiative, not even oversee the small indigenous enterprise, accu-

stomed as they are to the routine of working according to definite instructions and indications from their employer.
Better chances are offered by speculating on the want of the farmers of certain goods which they cannot make or take, so that they are committed to barter or purchase in order to obtain them. Therefore something in the spirit of textiles, previously dealt with. This possibly works as a premium for making agrarian surpluses or superfluities. If care be now taken of giving cautious guidance to the first coming into touch with economy, the introduction of a reasonable barter system could probably be attained between articles which might be useful to the Papua of the interior and the agrarian products valued for the export and the growing of which the Papua probably still has to be taught. It may be that he will be found prefer growing certain trees which as fruit trees more or less readily fit into the frame of the agriculture, he is quite familiar with: horticulture with its tuberous plants as main food stuff. In this respect for instance coconut, capok and cocoa should be considered. As the trading instinct awakens or (and) the standard of living rises, the share in the market will become more important and probably closed orchards or plantations will come into being.

Also suitable as a commercial crop being best adapted to the character of the forest in his surroundings is a plant like rubber, whose demands are little and which, taken into these natural surroundings, helps in keeping the soil under humus and in preventing washing away.

It would eventually not be surprising if the native agriculture would in the long run contribute the most important part to the export and would then take the lead not only socially, but also economically. This expectation is also supported by the fact that in times of depression, when prices are no longer remunerative for the big estate, it remains posible for the native enterprise to continue, owing to the production of food it has as its basis, producing commercial crops for the world market.

At the end of these considerations we would for another moment dwell upon the relation between estate agriculture and native agriculture. As we are in New Guinea in the very beginning, one is free to make a scheme aiming at a community of interests between the two, at an interwovenness of the capitalistic big industry and the farmers' enterprise. The eminent significance of it catches the eye of him who knows the agrarian history of Indonesia. Also the attempts made there in the latest decennium before the war in this direction, can contain some teachings.

The estate benefits by such an interpleating in the first place by the good-will cultivated in that case between it and the population, by the social peace going together with it and the possibility to continue its work undisturbed. It is not to become an ivory tower of prosperity in which the population has no direct share and which
the latter only feels as a *Fremdkörper*, as being something vague. Before all its presence must not give cause to continuous friction owing to interests crossing each other. It is of a course not possible to predict the future. Nobody can say whether the coming into being of national consciousnees would here too lead to such fierce resistances against what has come from outside, as could be remarked these last years elsewhere. There is reason to presume that an other and more favourable development is posisible here. But everything is to be done to evade friction which, in consequence of controversies of interests, could lead in a direction of settling with enclaves of foreign capital which is — correctly or incorrectly — supposed to check the development of native prosperity.

The native farmer has in the first place to become aware of the fellowship of fate by the *direct* profit accruing to him without the resistance having to be conquered of stepping into a world foreign and even inimical. If this is achieved, he automatically includes the big enterprise in the normal picture of his familiar surroundings.

The question how these things can be realized lies outside the scheme of this report. It leads necessarily to suppositions and plans which are more or less loose from the present reality, because they have to supervise a long series of possibilities of development. Nevertheles the Netherlands members have considered it necessary for the sake of the necessary perspective to go into a consideration of the manner in which a realization of all this is possible.

For this consideration however reference may be made to appendix II.

The economic development of the population has meanwhile still other facets. The significance of forestry and fisheries may be mentioned in this connection. In case of the former the gathering of forest products is specially borne in mind. This is undoubtedly of importance for the stimulation of the export. In the long run however it will not be possible to work in this direction, as eventually the gathering of forest products cannot be combined with regular agriculture. In the transition period towards an other way of living here lie however important possibilities to enable the population to satisfy its first felt want. In the long run only a systematic forest administration will be able to lead to an economically justified exploitation of the timber richess of New Guinea. The primary forest in its present state required by the scattered occurrence of valuable trees too much labour to be permanently remunerative. Fishing in the shape of sea-fishing can probably, even more than forestry, become an important means of existence for the population. In South New Guinea fish is very abundant in the sea, and before the war there was here a fairly important export of dried fish and trassi. Also on the North coast, where the population has been sea-faring of old, important
possibilities lie in this field for making the population economically strong, whereby it remains in its own surroundings.

Where this chapter deals with including New Guinea in the world traffic and this in a manner by which the Papuas benefit, it is natural to investigate what social-economically the presence of Indo-colonists can signify on the island.

This topical question has a qualitative and a quantitative side. Starting with the first factor it is the nature of the influence of the immigrated Indo-Europeans on the population. A priori it seems to be a favourable circumstance that the difference in standard of prosperity is not so large that the existence the Indo can make himself — therefore his way of earning his living — would not be within reach of the better educated Papua and be directly imitated in many regards. In that train of thought elements are present for the formation of a middle class. Applied to agriculture — from which the greater part of the immigrants expects its salvation — it could e.g. be said that the successful Indo enterprise means shaping one's living in such a way that production for the market takes an important place and as such a model enterprise lying for the greater part within reach of a native agrarian top class.

Such an ideal influence is however subject to two conditions:

- the social success of the Indo as a colonist;
- a gradual identifying of the Indo colonists community with the autochthonous population.

A short consideration of either condition. So far — barring exceptions — the rehabilitation of the Indo immigrant was no social success. This had various reasons, but the chief mistake has been that good guidance was lacking and too much was left to opportunism. Such a precarious problem has — if there is to be a chance of a good solution — to be tackled with sufficient means and by experts. One always has to be conscious of the fact that New Guinea is far from being the land of Cockaigne. In agriculture e.g. only those who are conversant with this work and who can and are willing to work hard, can make a living which is far from being at a high standard but which can give satisfaction by pioneering and farming.

As regards eventually conforming oneself to the population the following consideration of a prominent Papua interested us:

"In general my people has no objections against the settlement of Indo-Europeans in our large territory. We consider their admittance to be a sample of our Christian duty if we take into consideration that they often feel no longer safe in the country where they were born and reared, and where they feel the population as being too inimical to become Indonesians. But they are only welcome to us if they do not consider themselves superior to us and
will live amongst us freely and in good relation. When we see how they want to remain on their own and haughtily turn away from us; if we see their entirely different ways of living: going fowling but not to church on Sunday, we now already begin to fear the future when our children will have their own State. Shall we then have to tolerate that there is amongst us a separate group of population which possibly multiplies quicker than we and will have a large influence on the life of our people which we do not desire? No, in that case their tragedy will be that they will have to leave again the land that has become their native soil, It is therefore important that already now they be led in their life by the idea that it will be necessary to have adapted themselves after a couple of generations entirely to the population and be solidary with them.”

We have just argued that the social economic influence in the Indo colonist on the autochthonous population in connection with New Guinea being included in the world traffic has a qualitative side next to the quantitative one. The latter is defined by the living possibilities New Guinea can offer the Indo-Europeans and it is therefore a matter of capacity of absorption. We have already pointed out that the natural surroundings are rather antagonistic, so that the further available land can only answer its aim when the plans are carried out on a large scale and capitals have been spent.

This in itself makes it an illusion to try to solve the Indo problem by this transmigration. It is of course true that not all of them specially want agrarian work to be able to live. But for special employs amongst non-agrarians specialized in certain employs there are as an average only few possibilities in a practically unopened country.

Viewed in this way presently there may possibly be room for a few thousands of colonists, who, if they comply with certain demands, could find a reasonable existence and can also do splendid work for the promotion of the population to the world traffic, but there could be no question of a much larger number.

From the preceding it also becomes clear that, for a transfer of all Indo-Europeans who would like to emigrate, the restriction is not only due to the scarcity of possibilities in New Guinea, but is also ruled by the capabilities and the character required for the colonist.

From the preceding is also to be deducted that from the Netherlands also New Guinea is not to be viewed as the country towards which the pressure of the population of the fatherland is to be unburdened by definitively transplanting an important part of our younger generation. For such Dutchmen who decidedly want to settle there, naturally the same restrictions apply as those mentioned in respect of the Indo-Europeans.
The Netherlands members have more amply considered the preceding than is usually considered correct within the frame of a report. They were of the opinion that they could not refrain from doing so in this case, not because they thought their considerations would be a panacea for the difficulties existing here, but because only in this way it was possible to give an insight in the large and many-sided task incumbent on the government, wanting to exercise the administration of this territory in accordance with modern standards. It is not only asked to invest capital and to promote by energetic measures the progress of this territory, but at the same time also a considerable degree of reservedness and consideration in order that, by too great zeal, the whole process of acculturation be not forced and thereby disturbed. The social engineer who thinks that this is only a question of organization, is here a greater danger than the easy-going person, who leaves things to themselves. He who loves simple solutions and therefore favours the idea simply to flood the country with labour from elsewhere before the Papua has been made sufficiently strong to maintain himself opposite the foreigner, commits a crime towards the autochthonous population which, after so many bad experiences elsewhere, can in these times no longer be possible in New Guinea. Immigration of labour can therefore be only restricted and accurately observed. A solution of the labour problem will in the first place have to be found in a quick opening up of the interior, where still a rather important population lives which, as experience elsewhere teaches, in the first generation of contact energetically aims at obtaining work on the coast. Provided there is a good medical service, there need be no objection against using it.

Only a cautious administration, supported by a selected staff of experts whose training and experience enable them to weigh measures and tempo will be able to bring this task to a good end. For this task is very complicated in two senses. It is technically complicated by the great difficulties encountered by the wildness and emptiness of the country. And it is humanly complicated because the original population of this island asking for guidance has, by its contact with the world, traffic, been thrown in a state of cultural disorientation, for which there is no remedy except by exercising much patience and wisdom. In the problem New Guinea this human factor is the most assailing one.
CHAPTER VI

THE OPINION OF THE AUTOCHTHONOUS POPULATION ABOUT ITS FUTURE STATUS

By Government decree of 15th March 1948 No 3, in Indonesia a committee was set up, the well-known Study Committee New Guinea, whose task it was to collect material which could be useful for a judgement of the future status of New Guinea. One of the most important parts of this report is for our Committee chapter II, the wording of which was entrusted to two Netherlands and three Indonesian members 1). For, that chapter deals with „the possibility for the autochthonous population to form an opinion on a future status and to express itself in a democratic way on this subject“. The elucidation by the Study Committee in this respect is still of sufficient topical interest to be included here in extenso. It reads in this regard as follows:

„190. This question involves peculiar difficulties. The question can e.g. be read in this way: can the autochthonous population judge? The answer to that question would have to be in the affirmative. For, judging signifies, that one chooses in a certain situation between the possibilities one sees. The one possibility is then accepted and the other rejected.

191. This forming of an opinion belongs to the normal sphere of life of the ordinary human being. As regards an animal, there can, in respect of such a way of forming one’s opinion by judgement, only be not much question if any at all. One can — by way of expression — make a dog hear the most beautiful music or give it a costly antique little plate to eat from — this does not interest the dog. His judgement goes no farther than the degree in which the bone is palatable.

192. The seemingly simple and clear argumentation: a Papua is a „natural man“, half or entirely „wild“ and he has no opinion — will not do. It is to be considered superfluous to spend any more words to check all kinds of fallacies connected with the idea „natural man“. Als soon as the Papua comes in a situation in which his opinion is asked, he will give that opinion peremptorily.

193. Reed mentions that in the mandatory territory the population of the upper Sepik river had the sharpest judgement about the Australian Governmen and was the most exuberant in its praise of the former German Government. The peremptory

1) Vide pp. 4 and 5 sub 9 of the report of the Study Committee.
way in which the population gave its judgement here was reversely proportioned to the amount of knowledge they could possibly have of the two systems. It is stated here that there could be no question of pro-German propaganda. Only once, in 1931, a German missionary has been for one day in contact with the population. It is therefore probable that the Germans were being praised because they had not yet taken notice of this population and that they blamed the Australians because they had started regular patrolling since 1929. The little interest shown by the Germans was explained (which is typical Papuan!) as being respect for the culture of the population.

194. It is possible that somewhere in remote areas of Netherlands New Guinea groups of the population are to be found, having no outspoken attitude concerning the political status because they are outside the whole matter and it does not interest them.

In most areas however it is to be expected that the population will have a very pronounced opinion in some direction if they be at least given the opportunity to judge according to their own feelings.

It is clear that the Papuas are of opinion that nothing would be better than if they were left as soon as possible to do everything themselves.

They will simply consider those offers which seem to give them the most guarantees in the direction they want.

195. The matter can be taken to a higher level by saying: that the Papuas, once they are put in this situation, not only can, but also will, give a judgement, can be considered acceptable. But is this a judgement which is justified?

196. In that case the little knowledge on which the Papuas can base their judgement is to be noticed at once. In the first place it is to be remembered that teaching at school has already given the Papuas a considerable amount of knowledge. When looking at the atlas of the tropical Netherlands (1938) on page 9, giving the density of education (number of schoolchildren per thousand inhabitants) it will appear that already in 1937 New Guinea was higher than Java.

In Biak there are practically no more illiterates amongst the people under 35 years of age.

197. But it is altogether extremely difficult to deny a person owing to little knowledge the right to judge such important matters as his political status. The argument of having little knowledge has far too often been used by those who are better situated against the lower classes. Nobody would any longer
think of denying e.g. the modern labour classes, owing to their having little knowledge, the right to judge in matters of public life. Freedom of conscience and freedom of expressing one's opinion are rightly considered to be a costly property of human cultivation. It is impossible to decide how much knowledge a people must have in order to form a judgement which is justified. In many cases history proves that the judgement of a small uneducated group of people was after all quite correct.

198. The thing that matters to the Papua is a judgement on certain living conditions, not a technical judgement on some technical questions. In general the Papua will not be able to judge the technical-juridical merits of a proposed political status. He can however form himself a judgement on the question: where does he want to belong to and in what does he believe. It would be an undignified trick to formulate the question of the political status in such a complicated way that a Papua knows no longer what he does actually choose. And if he be given the choice, e.g. by means of a plebiscite, this plebiscite shall still have to be prepared and the question at issue be translated into Papuan values.

199. It can easily be admitted that the Papuas have little knowledge, but it would certainly make a very queer impression if the Papuan population were subjected to conditions which do not apply to other groups. Nobody will seriously maintain that outside New Guinea all public judgements are justified by the knowledge the voters have of the matter.

200. Adhering therefore to this restriction that a decision cannot be taken as to whether the judgement of the Papuas, considering their knowledge, will prove to be justified, the Committee would like to confirm that the Papuas have indeed shown that they are not indifferent where the matter of their politicial status is concerned.

They have an opinion abou it, as has been convincingly proved in the movements of 1946 and 1947. That this judgement and the subsequent action taken by the Government had to be qualified as „impossible“, does not influence the question put.

201. Consequently the Papuas have an opinion.

Can they also express it in a democratic way? That is the second part of the question to be answered by the Committee.

202. Another difficult question. Does this question mean: are there in the Papuan society forces which impede the free personal expression of opinion of the individuals?
The answer to it is in the negative. There is no pronounced class system through which a certain part of the population would become under age.

203. The Papuan society does have a vertical structure: there are people with a high and a low status, but there is no social pressure through which certain groups would be compelled to act against their conviction. This appears clearly in cases of adoption of the Christian faith. Mostly the whole kampong embraces it at once, usually at the instigation of certain influential people. Often these are the elder ones, and not by far always the younger ones who do as they please. Frequently even then there are individuals who refuse to become Christians.

These individuals are, as far as we know, never inaccommodated. Everyone is free in his conviction and no one who has a divergent conviction will be hindered or coerced. There is little danger of direct intimidation in case of a possible plebiscite inside the Papua community. In this respect the group-binding is mostly too strong.

204. Nevertheless it is reasonable that a positive content be attached to the conditions that the Papuas have to express themselves in a democratic way on their political status. It is not sufficient to decide that in the Papuan society there is no direct fear of coercion.

Without going into the question what a democratic way of expressing one’s opinion is understood to be, it can all the same be stated that here too certain conditions have to be made. There must not only be certainty that the Papuas will express themselves, but also that they are aware of the fact of also giving form to world history by this expression, and that they are also further responsible for it.

205. And this very consciousness is lacking in the Papuas, as has been more amply proved in the preceding paragraphs. Only in case of a few groups consideration was given to the fact that Papua-land can only exist in the modern world provided it be included in a larger relationship. It is clear that the Papuas have only little shown that they seriously wish and can take into account the indeed little enviable position they have as a small, technically little developed, group of population, in a gigantically large country.

206. If, in the one area, Papua kampongs officially declare war to the Government, in an other area knock down a Japanese official with a chopping-knife, elsewhere declare the state of paradise, one may talk of a pronounced self-consciousnesses, but
then of such a strong regional institution, that this is in the traffic of the peoples rather a disadvantage than an advantage. Whatever the idea „democracy‟ may further mean, the fact is that in case of a population which proves to be so little conscious of the necessity of mutual relationship between the peoples, there is not much question of a democratic way of expressing an opinion. And, lest anybody remarks in this respect that, in the case of the Papuas, there is question of a certain group of „oppressors‟, it be here stated once more that the Papuas have remained consequent in their rejection of the outside world. No Indonesians, no Dutchmen, no Japanese, exclusively their „own people” was their slogan; no other Papuas either, not counted to their own people.

207. The only possibility for the society of an increasing number of many peoples in one small world is: cooperation and mutual appreciation. This is the more important because in the case of the Papuas it is not a matter of a powerful people which, even if it thrusts its culture on to others, can still serve humanity in general, but here we have to deal with a small, not expansive, isolated group of people.

The opinion expressed becomes in this way an escape holding out no prospect, which can have little in common with the lofty aim without which democracy deteriorates into a senseless and dangerous movement of the masses.

208. If once again the opinion of the Sepik-population about the Australian government may be referred to, mentioned in clause 193 of this report, it becomes clear how senseless it is to speak here of a democratic expression. How could one small tribe ever exist in splendid isolation? The attitude of the Papuas is a very human but disgraceful prayer to modern civilization. The democratic freedom however we wish for the Papua is not the freedom of the fugitive, but the freedom of the independent people, having faith in the future and sharing in the blessings of human civilization.

209. What will be the consequences if the Papuas be now invited to express their opinion, need not be amply depicted. Exaggerated expectations will be superseded by deceptive political squabbling and eventually by new deceptions and final despondency.

210. It is not a question of excluding the Papuas and binding them in advance to a certain political status. The choice they can now make regarding their political status is nothing but a by-product of the sterile isolationistic tendency they
show. How this choice would look in practice would in the first instance depend on the factual organization of a plebiscite to be held. All that matters is to show clearly to anyone who has eyes to see with, and a sympathizing heart, that here democracy would be made a mockery.

211. It may be forgiven that here a sensitiveness is shown which in itself does not fit in a report which only wants to give facts. The matter is serious. It is an important and dangerous conclusion not to let the population itself judge such an important matter as its political status. There is a serious warning in the well-known words spoken by Lord Baldwin: „Good government is no substitute for self-government‟.

212. The opinion the Committee has arrived at applies of course in a overall sense to the whole territory as far as our knowledge reaches. There is no doubt that amongst the Papuan population persons are found much in advance of their fellow-country-people in their understanding modern times and their exigencies, Thus ds. Kijne says: „It is an irrefutable fact that also in territories where the calling into being of a factual renovation was aimed at, for the greater part provisionally a non-factual renovation occurs ......“. This overall judgement can however not be declared applicable to the few people which have shown to possess more insight.

213. In ds. Kijne’s opinion however it must be stated that also such persons cannot comprise the problem the Committee deals with. „Most of them, and these are certainly not the worst, or the least intellectual, therefore refrain from giving a final conclusion”.

214. Most worthy of consideration is ds. Kijne’s warning that the difficulties involved in having the population take part in judging these problems, are not to be given as reasons for a blunt refusal to hear them further in this matter.

The must have confidence that the question of their political independence is not a priori a foregone matter.

215. With the Committee however ds. Kijne is of the opinion that „a democratic judgement, and this undoubtedly means a judgement by way of a plebiscite, is not possible”. He even thinks it difficult to ask for the independent judgement of the group of Papuas become conscious in respect of certain subjects. „They would, in combining it and working it out, want assistance and guidance, but in my opinion (viz. ds. Kijne’s) their judgement is important for the decision to be taken”.

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216. The Committee would like to advise that the promoting of giving the prominent personalities amongst the Papuas the full opportunity to make themselves heard should carefully be continued as much as possible. They must have the conviction that the government is indeed seriously aiming at lifting them as soon as possible from the group of the „dependent peoples”.

217. Summarizing the answer of the Committee is: though the autochthonous population would, if the question be put to them, have most probably an opinion on its future political status, this can, in view of the present cultural status of this population in general, at present not yet be considered to be a really democratic manner of judging. The autochthonous population in general is therefore, in the opinion of the Committee, not able to give a democratic judgement on the question under consideration.”

To this conclusion of the Study Committee the Netherlands members can agree in general. They would add to it that a plebiscite, if held now, would in addition be a judgement of the minority, binding the far greater majority. An odd 3/4th of the population is out of reach, still lives in the stone age, from which the accessible minority has only just emerged. Binding this far greater majority to the judgement of a minority which would, in this way, decide once for all on the status of the country, being itself still considered to be incompetent to give such a judgement, appears to the Committee to be the opposite of what is called democracy and right of self-determination.

Meanwhile account has to be taken of the fact, as the Study Committee has also remarked (page 81 under 212 of its report) that amongst the Papuan population there are persons who are much in advance of their fellow country-men in understanding modern times and their demands. Though this does not imply that their judgement could be conclusive for the question under consideration — as the Study Committee has moreover not given us as its opinion — it is decidedly a wise policy to offer them, as advised by the latter, the full opportunity to make themselves heard. For this reason the Netherlands members have considered it useful during their visit to New Guinea to enable prominent persons to make their insight known. In connection with the composition of the Committee on a Par, as much as possible everywhere an equal number was heard of the people which had appeared at the request of either group of its members.
During these so-called hearings various facts were noticeable. In the first place it appeared that it cannot be correct to treat all foreigners alike, as the Study Committee does in clause 206 of the report previously mentioned, and to pretend that the only wish was to have New Guinea for the Papias and to differentiate no further. Though there is some truth in this statement — one hopes of course so far as one looks ahead, to reach independence eventually — taken in general this is decidedly incorrect. The population clearly differentiates between Indonesians and Netherlanders, and if there are foreigners whose departure is wanted, they are the Indonesians and not the Netherlanders.

This anti-Indonesian disposition manifested itself in all kinds of ways, and the most striking was that it also occurred to such a great extent especially amongst the more developed Papias with whom the members of the Committee had the most contact. This does not include that the less developed ones would not share that disposition — in respect of the places on the North coast visited by the members they could notice the opposite — but it only means to stress that the process of becoming conscious of their own nature and community, this starting awareness of an own people’s-existence, does not go together here as far as the leading group is concerned, viz. the more developed, with opposition against the Netherlanders but with opposition against the group of Indonesian immigrants.

One of the first symptoms of the anti-Indonesian disposition was the necessity of police-protection on behalf of the Indonesian members of the party in Biak, Hollandia, Manokwari and Sorong. That this was no superfluous luxury appeared from the contents of the resolutions presented to the Company, showing repeatedly unkindness opposite Indonesia. In Biak it was tried, in spite of the preventative measures taken against it by the government at the request of the Committee, to arrange a demonstration, already at the arrival of the Committee, which was directed against the Indonesian members. An other time a village-head fiercely protested against a visit paid by these members to his Kampong. Somewhere else posters had been put up. It looked for a moment as if the visit to Sorong could not take place at all, owing to protests arisen there against the visit of the Committee and at Manokwari a delegation of eight heads of the population, having asked admittance, flatly asked what the Indonesian members actually had to do with them.

This disposition also manifested itself in an other way. It may be recalled to memory how fiercely in the past few years the autochthonous population behaved against the Indonesians, on which occasions these latter were only saved from being molested by interference of the Government (at least where this was possible with the means available directly after the war: on the Arguni-Bay a
temporary dispersal of the gurus by the population could, at the time, not be prevented owing to lack of means of power).

Many officials, departed from New Guinea on leave, and teachers, therefore did not wish to return. All these years especially the mission had great difficulty to induce gurus departed on leave to return. In the hearings this sentiment directed against the Indonesians becomes clearly noticeable, the fact being emphasized of their being repeatedly humiliated by the former. One of the persons heard declared i.a. that the population came for the first time into contact with Indonesians after the arrival of the Dutch and pointed out that they never behaved as equals of the Papuas; they despised them and ill-treated them because they were so stupid at school and in their work. About the Netherlands, thus the report of these hearings, there were no such complaints. The difference between Papuas and Netherlanders is sufficiently clear to anybody, but they can very well go together. The Indonesians and the Papuas however, this informant said, are like iron and wood; they cannot be welded together so as to make a whole. An other complained that only recently an Indonesian had dismissed a Papua, whose daughter he wanted as his wife, calling him a "dirty Papua". Still an other gave various other instances, the theme always being that they did not at all feel themselves related to the Indonesians and did not want to go together with them either. Let them, thus one of them, return to their own country to vote and fight there together with their own people. Still an other, when being asked from the Indonesian side whether he did not want to be merdeka, replied: freedom has many significances: there is freedom to shoot, there is freedom to rob, there is freedom to kidnap, there is also freedom to live. We all have this freedom to live and we can take pleasure in moving about wherever we like.

It is important that, apart from arguments based on strong sentiments, which therefore need not be less important, also other motives were heard; special mention may be made of the motivation that they did not want to come under a mainly Islamicit government but, as Christians, also desired to have a Christian government.

That this was not only the case of representatives of a certain group, but rather of the exponents of the conviction prevailing in society, became apparent in many ways. It could be seen from the great number of accompanying supporters, it was noticeable from the police measures considered necessary, it appeared in no less degree from the resolutions presented to the Committee, representing through their number and signing the general disposition very clearly. As far as pro-Indonesian resolutions and motions are concerned, the
Committee received only one copy 1). This motion, presented by the P.I.D.R.I.S., the pro-Indonesian party at Hollandia, was signed by 25 persons, stating to represent 800 adherents. The next day however two of the proposed signatories came to the Committee to inform it that the so-called print of the tip of their thumb was not theirs and that their name had been put on this document without their being willing to do so and their knowing anything about it. It stands to reason that this event cannot strengthen the confidence in the truth and serious meaning of such a resolution.

Opposite this one pro-Indonesian resolution stand nine pro-Netherlands ones. In Biak four were received from various sections of the Gerakan Persatuan Irian, strongly refuting an alliance with the R.I.S. and demanding a going together with the Netherlands. Two more declarations were received, of a similar trend, respectively presented by Papuas serving in the army and in the police. Further, a resolution of the people and the kampong heads from the districts Kaipuri and Waropen Bawah and a resolution of adat heads, village heads and people's representatives in the neighbourhood of Hollandia. Eventually the Committee received in the Netherlands another motion, dated 21st June, drawn up by a number of adat heads and leaders, representing together 22,000 persons. The contents of this motion and the last previously mentioned resolution the Netherlands members consider to be of sufficient interest to be attached to this report as a translation, because, as appears from the signatures on them, there being no doubt about their value, they represent a considerable and important opinion of the people. They are, in consideration of the arguments they contain, extremely instructive for the knowledge of what is alive amongst these leaders of the people and their adherents.

Putting this activity of those who wish to see the tie with the Netherlands maintained opposite the activity of those, wishing to orientate themselves on Indonesia, it is remarkable how much more spontaneous the former sounds. Here one can not only listen to a starting consciousness of an own existence of the people, but also to the stress and the passion with which these assurances were

1) There was a second one, but this was from the Indonesians established at Merauke. Further, from the pro-Indonesian side a letter was received written by the chairman and the (Indonesian) advisor of the P.I.M. at Biak, complaining about the Government, which letter the Committee did not consider any further. However the Netherlands members did unofficially collect information whereby it appeared to them that these complaints were, in the main, unfounded. Eventually for the sake of completeness a letter is mentioned here from the Fighting Committee Irian at Jogjakarta, which the Netherlands members decided to leave out of consideration because the activities of this corporation are unacceptable to them, it having been possible for those concerned, to present their wishes personally to the Committee.
expressed — facts, one can of course not read from the documents but which have therefore struck the members not less —, give it its cachet of being genuine and of the conviction that it is borne by the community. The correctness of this viewpoint is confirmed by an analysis of the genesis of the political parties in New Guinea. The impression is often given as if these parties are the proofs of the Irian love of liberty and struggle for freedom against the „colonial oppression” of the Netherlands. Reality however teaches the opposite.

The first party set up was the Komité Irian Merdeka (at Hollandia in 1946). Chairman was the physician Mrs Gerungan, members of the Board two Javenese, a Ceramese and a Sumatran. Only the runner was a Papua. The action therefore started from the Indonesian side. The same applies to the subversive actions; at Hollandia they were conducted by the manager of the boys boarding-school, a Javanese who was, owing to his position, able to make great mischief. More than one young man deserving during the war was in this way brought to revolt. The two persons heard at Hollandia by the Committee on the Indonesian side, have, in this way, become imprisoned for a period of time. The P.I.D.R.I.S., set up last year and in fact the continuation of this political movement, is now under the leadership of one of the victims of wrong information.

Also the political movement at Serui owes its origin to Indonesian leadership. The Partai Kemerdekaān Indonesia Irian is the result of the residence of Dr. Ratulangi and Mr. Latumahina to whom this island was assigned as dwelling-place by the Netherlands Indies Government. Incidentally it may be remarked that the fact that they had this opportunity is the best proof against the imputation that the Netherlands Government were to prevent the freedom of meetings. This moreover appeared also in Biak, where as late as in October 1949 a pro-Indonesian party was set up, conducted by an ex-convict.

In contradistinction with Hollandia a Papua, Silas Papare, was entrusted with the management of the association at Serui; deputy chairman however was once more an Indonesian.

In Biak, where in October of last year L. Rumkoren set up a political party, an Indonesian was appointed as advisor. The action however is languishing. That it should not be taken too seriously appears from the fact that at the last meeting (29th April) at the suggestion of the chairman it was decided to postpone the meeting because they were too busy preparing the celebration of the Queen's birthday the day after.

Opposite these parties set up after an Indonesian example and under or with the aid of Indonesian management, and of which only the one at Serui can be considered as being still alive, stands a
pro-Netherlands movement, which has gone in quite a different direction and organized itself only (quite recently) in Biak as a party. This did not happen elsewhere. The Netherlands side has always refrained from promoting this way of forming a political opinion so strongly propagated by the Indonesian immigrants. The Papuans have taken an other way. The prominent people amongst them have approached all those who have a reputation locally and have thus formed their own movement consisting everywhere of local meetings and expressing the political opinion of the population in their own way. Along this road numerous sharp protests against an alliance with Indonesia have been expressed spontaneously by the population.

Under these circumstances such an alliance would undoubtedly lead to serious disturbances. The accompanying explosion of an anti-Indonesian sentiment would then lead to a lasting hostility of the population of New Guinea against Indonesia. As New Guinea would be incorporated as a part of Indonesia, redress would be impossible. In the opposite case however in which New Guinea remains for the time being under Netherlands administration, the possibility also remains that the population of this island, once it has reached political independence, will of its own free will vote for Indonesia.
CHAPTER VII
INTEREST OF THE POPULATION AND TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION

It is now possible to consider the question more fully whether an alteration of the administration of New Guinea is, in accordance with the demands incumbent on such an administration according to prevailing norms, in the interest of the population. Before doing so, it is however advisable to summarize the preceding in order to regain the view on the whole problem.

1. Synopsis of the preceding

1. New Guinea forms geologically as well as biologically and geographically a territory with an own character, which cannot be counted to Indonesia. It is a border territory that, as far as it is to be included in a larger whole, joins the Pacific more closely than South East Asia of which Indonesia is a part.

2. The population of New Guinea forms anthropologically an own group showing no relationship at all with the races constituting the Indonesian world of peoples. The fact that in the East of the Indonesian Archipelago groups occur showing Papua characteristics, does not alter this fact, as people with such characteristics appear in much larger numbers and to a greater extent East of New Guinea, so that for this reason no relationship with Indonesia can be pretended.

3. Also linguistically New Guinea forms an own territory. Where forms of blending occur and languages of an Austronesian structure, these can be characterized as being Melanesian languages. Whether and in how far Indonesian variations of languages have contributed to their formation is not known.

4. Culturally New Guinea also forms a territory separated from other areas, by its considerable degree of primitivity rather to be counted to Oceania than to the highly developed Indonesia. The Melanesian cultural influences on New Guinea point in no lesser degree to the East than to the West.

5. Indonesian influence is only noticeable amongst the coastal inhabitants of the Vogelkop and the population of the Radja Ampat- and Schouten islands. This Indonesian influence, which was accompanied by a lengthy series of clashes, has however not given the population concerned a general or special feeling of solidarity with Indonesia or parts of Indonesia.

6. The claims of Tidore on New Guinea have been favoured and developed by the East Indies Company as well as by the Netherlands
Indies Government, however with no other aim than to safeguard the Netherlands sovereignty on the western part of the island. The sultanate Tidore has however made no use of the opportunity opened in this way to strengthen its influence there. Instead of aiming at really establishing the authority of the sultanate, it has restricted itself to a manner of exercising its authority which only aimed at the safeguarding of supreme rights. The hongi-trips made to that end could not lead to the establishment of a super-structural authority as its character of armed expeditions and raids checked the development of good relations. The agreement of 1860, which made it i.a. possible to withdraw New Guinea from the territory of the sultanate, was the unavoidable consequence of this policy of the sultanate. Neither has it used the chance at that time still left to it. Tidore has not profited from the circumstance that after the factual Netherlands occupation of New Guinea the form of self-government was maintained for the greater part of the island. It has kept aloof and has never succeeded in creating itself a basis in the feelings of affection of the population which has always shown that it had no use for relations with Tidore.

The maintenance of the tie between the sultanate and New Guinea until 1944 is a consequence of the circumstance that the form of self-government is better adapted to primitive relations than any other form of direct government. The government itself however was in the hands of Netherlands officials and the maintenance of the nominal authority of Tidore was not connected with the merits of the sultanate.

7. Of the population of New Guinea only a fourth part has been brought under administration, which involves i.e. that the far greater part of the population is still in a very primitive state, owing to which it is unable to express itself politically. If this population should come into contact with the modern world without being properly led and under modern supervision, great dangers threaten it. It is to be feared that in that case at the opening up of the country the sad story would repeat itself of what has happened elsewhere in Oceania in the years about the end of the last century.

8. Also the part of the population brought under administration has not reached the stage of political majority automatically. Though a political formation of a judgement is decidedly possible and present in a part of this population, the situation of another and not small part is that an anticipation of that stage could lead to very undesirable consequences.

The contact with the modern world means in these primitive surroundings an extremely fierce shock which can lead to a serious degree of cultural disorientation. Its symptoms are undeniable every-
where in New Guinea and every policy which omits to observe these things, must end in a calamity for the population.

9. The only justified policy in such circumstances is the one which does not neglect the religious element in the contact with the modern world but makes this take part in the form of Missions, in order to offer those who are thus spiritually torn up, a new basis for their life, enabling them to take part in the world traffic as human beings with an own vision of life. It is however not less necessary that for this new life, which makes much higher demands, an economic basis be created, enabling the Papua to take part in the world production process and to help bearing the costs of education, administration and public health which, in this stage, are being given to him for practically nothing. Only in this way what is new will become his real property. This involves not only important costs and capital investments, but also a considerable degree of specialistic knowledge is required of those who have to give guidance here in government service.

10. New Guinea has in the past period had few profits of the fact that administratively it was part of the Netherlands Indies. For, owing to this, the very special needs of the islands could only in a contorted way be attended to as they needed. It led to maintaining the fiction of the Tidorese self-government which was not known or not liked amongst the population, tying the island economically to a center like Macassar which was too far away. Since, this territory has become in the second world war from a terminus of traffic a point of intersection and the population has in this way been thrown into contact with the modern West, the needs of the island and its population have multiplied in such a way, that an administration set up specially in this territory and detached from other territories — as already strongly advocated before the war by some people — has become necessary. Only in this way it will be possible to meet as well the demands to open up the country and its employment within the complicated whole of modern society, as the very special conditions, a policy justified by the population puts in this territory.

11. The setting up of such an administration specially meant for this territory, entirely to be guided by the special needs of this territory, meets the political desires amongst the better educated part of the population where solidarity of the Papuas — apart from all speculation in respect of participation in larger entities — is being felt as a real binding factor amongst the groups of population, only recently so inimically disposed towards each other. In this respect it is of exceptional importance that this population has shown great confidence in the Netherlands administration and an outspoken fear
of Indonesian domination. Though this latter fact is to be explained by the history of the contacts with Tidore and the attitude of aloofness adopted by many immigrants of Indonesian origin opposite the population, it is remarkable that the population has persevered in its confidence in the Netherlands administration. The disappointment due to the fact that the expectations of salvation of an unreal nature, especially kindled during the war, which found in this country of old such a fertile soil, could easily have led to a reversion of this disposition, had it not been deeply rooted and this the more so because the numerous Indonesians working in New Guinea have repeatedly conducted a propaganda specially aiming at it. That this population is nevertheless accessible to political influences from outside, appears from the impression the conference at Fiji has made, which has in the small circle of broader orientated Papuas opened new perspectives and has roused expectations of going together with other peoples of a Christian faith and darker skinned.

12. It was finally proved that this territory, to whatever State it is going to belong, will provisionally and in fact be administrated as a non self-governing territory, as it altogether lacks the forces which could be entrusted with an independent administration. If it be argued on the Indonesian side that administration of this country in accordance with clause 73 of the Charter of the United Nations is impossible for Indonesia because Indonesia views the Papuas as its fellow country-men, this alters nothing to this reality. The administrating officials on the level of heads of sub-sections could in an Indonesian administration as little be Papuas as at this moment in the Netherlands administration. That they should feel, in exercising their administration, to be fellow countrymen of the Papua, means little to the latter, as he on his part does not look upon the Indonesian as being his fellow country-man and will therefore consider himself, before and after, under foreign government.

2. Conclusion

The conclusion of the Netherlands members can, after the preceding, be no longer doubtful. Transfer of the administration of New Guinea to Indonesia is contrary to the interests of the population. The considerations on which this conclusion is based, are the following:

1. By such a transfer the right of self-determination of the autochthonous population would be practically abolished. For, Indonesia has always argued that it considers this population as Indonesians. The territory would therefore be automatically incorporated in Indonesia. This would take place without the inhabitants of New Guinea having been heard in this respect, or, if they had been
heard and would vote for Indonesia (which is for the rest very improbable), in result of an opinion expressed by a quarter part of the population, this would decide for the whole population without it being competent in this respect according to the unanimous opinion of experts. In this way the Papuas would, before having been able to handle their right of self-determination, have for good been deprived of the possibility of ever handling this right in a justified manner. For, by such a decision, they would be definitively tied to the Indonesian state in spite of the fact that linguistically, culturally and racially they cannot be counted to belong to the Indonesian people.

On the other hand, in the case of a continuation of Netherlands Government, the road is left open to them to realize that right of self-determination at a later date in a justified manner, since the Netherlands is in duty bound by the provision of clause 73 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Transfer of sovereignty of New Guinea to Indonesia would mean a considerable reduction of the guarantees created for the population of this island by the Charter of the United Nations. Though this population would remain after such a transfer a non-self-governing people as well as before, and it would be equally dependent on the decisions taken by the Indonesian Government in its regard as it is now on the Netherlands Government, it would officially be part of the Indonesian people and lose, in this way, its status of non-self-governing people with all the guarantees attached to it.

3. Indonesia, itself belonging to the underdeveloped countries and having in addition to envisage the tremendous difficulties to settle its own affairs and to arrive at an economical reconstruction, lacks the financial means necessary for developing also New Guinea.

4. Indonesia does not have sufficient officials for an administration of New Guinea, complying with the requirements attached to such an administration in accordance with prevailing norms. Only recently, after for a serious of years the normal training of its own officials had practically come to a standstill, for the sake of the nationalization of the administration the Netherlands civil servants and numerous experienced administrative persons had been removed, so that everywhere a pinching deficiency of suitable persons has to be faced. Everywhere in Indonesia also teachers are entirely lacking.

Of the available teachers many are insufficiently qualified. Neither is there a sufficient number of physicians which is in particular noticeable in far-away countries. Whereas — to give an instance — in the Moluccas 18 physicians were employed before the war, at present only 9 are available.
The consequence of a transfer of the administration would therefore be the complete disorganization of administration and medical care, through which for the acculturation of this population and the opening up of the country the minimum conditions will be lacking, as in this very respect an increasing care and the employment of experienced specialists is essential. Only education which is in the hands of the Missionaries could remain functioning on condition that this can count on the same financial support of the Government as is the case now.

5. It is however problematic whether a preponderantly Islamic country will in the long run be prepared to give that same financial support to the work of the Missionaries as they receive now. Here too the fact is, that assurances of such a trend have only a small basis. For, it is to be considered improbable that a country with a majority of Mohammedan inhabitants and a high percentage of illiterates would reserve the relatively considerable amounts necessary to keep education at its present level in an outlying area with a Christian population, where education in consequence of the work of civilization undertaken here, is proportionately much broader.

6. Transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia would lead to serious disturbances because a very strong current amongst the population is very much opposed to the R.V.S.I. The divergence of interests, already now noticeable between Papuas and Indonesians, would also become stronger, especially if the R.V.S.I. should wish to carry out its intention to reserve New Guinea as a territory of colonization. In the preceding it was pointed out that in case of an unlimited immigration the danger threatens, that the Papua becomes a foreigner in his own country.

7. Contrarily it can be stated that the population appreciates a continuance of the Netherlands administration and that the Netherlands have, for this aim, the means as well as the people. Under Netherlands administration the island remains assured of what it wants so much, viz. a special position and special treatment, paying full attention to all the difficulties connected with the process of acculturation.

Summarizing their considerations the Netherlands members are of opinion (referring for their viewpoint as regards the arguments used on the Indonesian side to Appendix E) that, whereas continuation of Netherlands administration now contains for this country positive promises of progress and elevation and gives certainty to the world that this country too shall be included with its population in the world traffic and can take there a respectable place, the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia would necessarily lead to
a quick decay of what has been built up there in fifty years and — irrespective of the foreign political complications — to unrest and disturbance, because the population would undoubtedly offer resistance against such a transfer.

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Prof. Dr. J. M. Pieters
Prof. Dr. R. Van Dijk

The main source for this history is the book by A. Haga, Nederlands Nieuw Guinea en de Papoese Eilanden (Netherlands New Guinea and the Papua Islands, Batavia—'s-Hage, 1884), dealing in particular with the development of the political relations and therefore of greater significance for the aim of our Committee than A. Wigmann, Entdeckungsgeschichte von Neu-Guinea ¹), which is more specialized in geography.

The oldest reports on New Guinea are not pre-eminent in clarity. A secondary source of confusion is the use of the term Papua islands. Whereas at present they are understood to be only the Radja Ampat islands, this name was formerly — as Haga proves — used for a much larger group of islands. Surprising is in this respect, that the name was not only used for New Guinea itself, but also and specially for Halmahera and Ceram and the islands lying between the former and New Guinea. Pigafetta, the first author mentioning Papuas, already speaks of a Radja Papuan at Gilolo. On the contrary Ternate, Tidore and Batjan, and also Ambon with the Uliassers were not included in the Papua islands. They are the rulers having relations with the outside world, and therefore occupy a higher position in which the inhabitants of Ceram and Halmahera, though closely related, do not participate in the years of the first contacts with Portuguese, Spaniards and Netherlands.

The relations between these Papua islands and the rulers in Tidore and Ternate on the one side, mutually, and towards the coastal inhabitants of the peninsula Onin of the main land of New Guinea on the other, are rather complicated. Though in later years the relation between the Moluccas and New Guinea was often viewed as a relation of sovereignty, based on conquest, this does not render the situation correctly. Again and again it appears from literature, that in particular the inhabitants of the actual Papua islands, — herefore the Radja Ampat group — enjoyed a considerable degree of independence and were even guilty of piracy within Moluccan territory. In 1610 mention is made of a Misool settlement in Ceram, it being later mentioned a few times, that Papua pirates of the Radja Ampat made raids towards Ceram and even towards Buru and Amblauw. Quite innocent savages the inhabitants of these islands


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were therefore not, even though not without reason more than once one of the Moluccan princes was suspected to have had a hand in these raids. As regards the Radja Ampat group it can be stated that, at least in later years, the supremacy of Tidore was accepted and that tribute was paid to it as being the stronger one, but that the former still enjoyed a larger, be it varying, degree of independence. Initially however the power of Tidore can have meant very little. The oldest reports of the Spaniards, as mentioned by Haga, certainly do not point in the direction of an established authority. Thus Tidore is in 1538 beaten off in front of Gebe, situated in the neighbourhood.

A relation of reciprocity (in primitive circumstances certainly not incompatible with incidental raids) we find in the relation between the Moluccan islands and the coast of the peninsula Onin, to which in later years Tidore laid also claim, favoured by the Company. There the Ceramese and Goramese heads had made monopoly-agreements with various tribes — this relation was called sosolot — which agreements these heads managed to maintain by force of arms if necessary. When Keyts visits these areas in 1678 and keeps an elaborate diary, this diary shows nothing of Tidorese influence, on the contrary however the close relationship with Goram and, above all, the main object of this relation: the coast of Onin produced slaves, apart from „massooi”-bark, and the very slavertrade made this relation so exceptionally important for the Goramese. It also appears that these trading coastal inhabitants must have been permanently at war and have stimulated it in order to be able to continue this trade.

Also between Tidore and the Radja Ampat trade was carried on and though it contained more than mainly slaves (ambergris and gutta-percha came from here), the slave-trade nevertheless played an important part here. If we consult the reports on the relations of Tidore with its possessions outside the territory of the Radja Ampat group, it appears that the expeditions made towards those areas were nothing but raids where slave-trade was the main point, bona fide trade relations being restricted to only a few places which were visited regularly. The so-called hongis, where by the Tidorese princes used to levy their tribute from the areas subjected to them, caused fright and disturbances everywhere. Where a friendlier relation existed and the tribute was collected without force, as little could be spoken of a regular administration exercised by Tidore. The relation between the local ruler and his feudal lord differed very little from similar relations between the Company and rulers under its supreme power in places where the former was not established and had only inconsiderable interests. Here there was no interference of administration, neither was it expected or intended by either party.
It is therefore not possible to give an accurate answer to the question how far the authority of Tidore reached originally in respect of New Guinea and the islands in front of it. It does appear however that the extent of this authority — though it was only a nominal authority — has been considerably extended in the days of the Company. Originally there was no question of any authority in respect of the West coast and the South coast of New Guinea. So far as the West coast carried on relations with the outside world, these were directed via Ceram and Goram. Though here too the authority of one of the Moluccan princes was intermittently felt, this did not lead to direct dealings with the West coast and certainly not of Tidore. Batjan laid claim on Misool for many years, pretending once more having them even since 1696, though it had already in 1660 ceded them to Tidore (vide Haga, I, pp. 76 and 135 sew.).

The authority of Tidore can therefore originally not have contained more than the islands between Halmahera and the Vogelkop North of Misool and also a number of settlements on the North coast of the Vogelkop. In how far the coastal camps on the West coast of the Geelvink Baai and those on the islands Biak and Japen, later also considered to be Tidorese possessions, are to be taken as originally belonging to that kingdom, is doubtful. These relations are mentioned only late, viz. for the first time in 1710 and it is important that the memorandum of Claasz, in which this occurs, does not mention a Tidorese right on these places, but the fact that Tidore pretends to exercise rights on them (Haga I, p. 193). That the rights of Tidore on the North coast were not everywhere equally well-founded, appeared in 1737, when the crew of a ship, driven from its course, was chased away from the North coast, having been told that the inhabitants had nothing to do with Tidore.

The Company meanwhile favoured the influence of Tidore. This corporation was not at all interested in administrative interference. It was in the Moluccas for the spices and was only interested in the maintenance of its monopoly and the security at sea. In Tidore it found a suitable ally and vasal whom they could keep responsible for the sea raids of the Papuas and with whom it could always remonstrate when the Papuas had gone too far. Though this was not always of avail (sometimes Tidore declared itself incapable) the fact was that the claims of its vasal on a territory as large as possible gave the Company a legal ground to keep possible foreigners away. In spite of all complaints about the inhospitable country New Guinea with its fierce and inhospitable inhabitants, this island gave by these very characteristics great profit to the Company. It gave a gratis defence against intruders from outside who would like to settle in the neighbourhood of the Clove islands. We therefore notice that the
Company has repeatedly been accommodating in acknowledging the Tidorese claims which could bring it nothing but profit. When in 1657 the Company has at last reached a friendly footing with Tidore, it secures for this kingdom already in the everlasting pact concluded in 1660 between the Moluccan princes, the ownership of „the Papus and alle the islands pertaining to it“.

Nobody knew accurately what this amounted to, and later contacts with Tidore are therefore somewhat more cautious and mention, leaving apart the liberal clause of 1660, only the Papu islands as far as they came under Tidore, securing after all for Tidore the monopoly of trading with them (so, e.g. in 1667 and 1689; also the contracts of 1705, 1709 and 1728 contain this restricting clause which after all means nothing).

The Company becomes more accurate when in 1760 Englishmen appear in the Moluccas and visit i.a. Salawati. An investigating committee is now set up which comes to the conclusion that it is irre- futable „that the said islands (viz. Pubu Pisang, Gebe, Misool, Bantanta, Waigeu, Salawati, Boo and Poppa) and also the countries and islands of New Guinea mentioned by Claasz (meaning the memorandum of transfer previously mentioned, in which Tidorese claims are mentioned on the coast of the Geelvink Baai), come under the territory of the king of Tidore, since they are mentioned not only in practically all the contracts made between the Company and that king, but also because the king of Tidore has always pretended to possess them and has used the supremacy on all the Papu islands“ 1).

Haga, from whose book we have taken the previous information, adds to it that the reporters were sufficiently honest, thinking i.a. of the commissioner Bernhard who called Tidore’s authority chimerical, to register: „though it is not to be doubted whether the Papu islands come under the king of Tidore, it is however also certain that these wild peoples have once in a while cared very little for his orders, in which respect they greatly benefit by their remoteness and the difficult manner of arriving there, persevering in their raids and murders along the surrounding coasts without the recommendations or threats of Tidorese commissioners making them desist from doing so“. Though from all this no Tidorese rights on the North coast East of the Geelvink Baai or on the South coast East of the Arguni Bay can be deducted, it is certain that, starting from this moment, the claims of Tidore have acquired a more solid footing by the subsequent acknowledgement. In the contract made in 1814 under British supervision between Ternate and Tidore, the Geelvink Baai — be

it once more without being clearly described — has been explicitly included by the enumeration of four obviously Numforesse districts 1).

Haga correctly points out that the uncertainty about Onin continues to exist here, which meanwhile does not include that Tidore would have no claims on it. When in 1824, after the return of the Netherlands authority, the territory of Tidore is once more described, clarification is lacking. The description is limited to „that part of New Guinea which is under the sovereignty of Tidore“.

When however in 1826 rumours are again circulating about British attempts to establish themselves in New Guinea (this time on the South Coast) the question takes a new turning. The Governor Merkus asks and receives — though from an investigation the rumours did not appear to be true — royal instruction to take possession of the West coast of New Guinea. On 24th August 1828 the occupation by proclamation takes place of „that part of New Guinea and the countries in it, starting from the 141ste longitude of Greenwich, and from there to the West, Northwest and North as far as the Cape the Good Hope, situated on the North coast; without prejudice however to the rights the sultan of Tidore might have on the districts Mansarij, Karondefer, Ambarpura and Amberpon“. Together with the solemn occupation goes the setting up of the Fort du Bus at Merkus Oord, which establishment went through an endless martyrdom until it was discontinued in 1836.

The discontinuation of the actual settlement and the uncertainty of the frontier to the North made it necessary — especially since many exploring-expeditions brought New Guinea more into the limelight than had been the case during the previous centuries — that a closer description of the frontiers and a better foundation of the Netherlands rights were considered. Moreover these were explicitly asked for on the British side in the year 1842. Since direct establishment gave so many difficulties owing to the bad climate and the extremely primitive state of the inhabitants, this time an other road is taken. After an investigation held by a commissioner the frontiers are determined completely, viz, by decree of 30th July 1848, according to which in the North the frontier is taken near Cape Bompland at 140° 47' E.L. and in the South at 141° E.L. It is however not a decree which just declares this territory to be Netherlands territory: on the contrary, it declares it to be Tidoreso territory and contains to this end no more than a description of the territory of Tidore in New Guinea. The fact that the Netherlands government itself shrank from establishing itself owing to the difficulties encountered, made it take recourse to this means, which according to the then prevailing

1) L.c. I, pp. 460 399.
ideas could be considered to be sufficient to put the Netherlands sovereignty beyond dispute.

It stands to reason that this did not involve that the island was meant to be left to the sultan to do with it as he liked. A very start was made immediately to contradict this aim by issuing that very same day a decree instructing the Resident of Banda to advise on the appointment of heads in the Netherlands territory of New Guinea, which was not under the sultan of Tidore! The latter, on his part, hurried to consolidate his authority; he sent hongi expeditions to the North coast as well as to the West coast, whose task it was to appoint heads wherever necessary, which took place in particular in the territory on the West coast, where the Resident of Banda could be expected. Some of the heads appointed by the latter later proved to be in fact already in the possession of a Tidorese deed of appointment.

The sultan's position however did not benefit much by this activity. De Bruijn Kops published later a report on the hongi dispatched, of whose arrival he had been a witness on the North coast. He mentioned that the hongi was beaten off with a loss of 6 persons killed and many wounded, in their endeavour to subject (this is the word De Bruijn Kops uses) the coast East of the Geelvink Baai. Not for 60 years the expeditions of Tidore had been as far as the Humboldt-Bay, and this first attempt to establish authority met with immediate opposition. But also where the authority of the sultan was nominally acknowledged, there was no question of a normal relation of authority. When the hongi appears before Doreh, where the Circe with De Bruijn Kops on board happened to get ready to sail, all the women and children fled, taking with them everything valuable in order to escape the rapacity of the crew. Haga, the greatest expert on this period of time, therefore writes: "these expeditions...... in fact only destined to collect the tribute due to the lord of the country, always deteriorated into robberies and murders". 1) If possible sharper in its opinion was the Committee of 1858, whose report is to be found in volume V (New Series) of the "Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (1862)". 2) In this way these expeditions resulted in a sharper supervision of the faits et gestes of the only recently acknowledged lord of the land. In 1861 an interdiction was even issued to undertake such expeditions, without the governor general having previously given his approval, which, in practice, came to a total interdiction.

Meanwhile it was also made known in an other way that the decree of 1848 exclusively meant the determination of the frontiers

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2) See in particular pp. 186—200.
of the Netherlands possession. When in 1854 the hongi expeditions were restricted by the interference of the Government, it was already suggested to induce the sultan to give up his rights entirely or partly. The governor general Duymaer van Twist openly stated in 1855 that the Residency Ternate was the most miserable part of the Moluccas and that not much amelioration would be possible there as long as the agreements with the princes of Ternate and Tidore remained unaltered (Haga II, p. 103). This was however not meant to be done before a further investigation was made in respect of the possibilities of an establishment in New Guinea. Though the result of this report was that the establishment was given up provisionally, the government meanwhile did not refrain from freeing its hands in respect of Tidore. When the contract with this kingdom was renewed in 1860, the provision was included that the Netherlands Indies Government could, as soon as it considered it desirable, take the administration of the whole kingdom or part of it in its own hands, which provision has remained in force in later contracts with Tidore, be it somewhat differently worded since 1909. In this way the definition of the frontiers was entirely liberalized of the consequences which could be connected with it in respect of the self-government of Tidore.

A complete safeguarding of New Guinea as a Netherlands possession had however not yet been attained in this way. As long as other countries did not pretend to have any claims on parts of New Guinea, the Netherlands, occupied with opening up Indonesia, could afford to treat New Guinea as an item pro memoria, though also on the Netherlands side the urge was not lacking to achieve something there. The Mission was already since 1855 active in North New Guinea, 25 years earlier than in any other part of the island. From Ternate as well as from Banda trade was carried on on the coasts of the island, which contributed to create the conditions under which the establishment promised something and could even be considered necessary. Nevertheless serious plans did not come up again until after 1880, when the unhealthy conditions and the inhospitality of the area were always stressed. When however in 1883 and 1884 Great Britain (Australia) and Germany proceed to occupation of a part of the island, the urge becomes stronger. In the long run however the main argument is, as appears from the memorandum Colijn of 1907, that the sovereignty "has since the Berlin Congress in 1885 ... gradually ... been interpreted in such a way that it has to appear from an actual occupation, which conception is i.a. corroborated by the considerations of the Pope in his judgement as an arbitrator in the matter of the Carolines between Spain and Germany (1886). According to this conception of sovereignty our possession of New Guinea was not unassailable, or rather, in fact it did not exist". When in addition complaints are made about violations of the frontiers by
head-hunting Tugeri (the Marind-Anim on the South coast) and at
the same time various applications for concessions are received, after
endless deliberations all of a sudden a decision is taken to occupy
the country. In the end of 1897 Manokwari and Fakfak are occupied,
and by Statute Book 1898 No 62 two sections are set up, viz. North-
and West New Guinea, the latter of which is divided into two a few
years later when Merauke is created. The newly created section
South New Guinea, in respect of the future of which there were
great expectations at the time, is then on account of its remoteness
and its being difficult to reach taken away from the self-government
of Tidore and made into an independent province. When after
10 years the economic boom, which was expected, fails to appear,
the independence of the province is once more put to an end and the
section is joined with the Residency Ambon. It remains however
withdrawn from the sultanate’s territory.

The relation with Tidore remains in respect of all this strange.
Whereas in the South a clear situation has been created by the with-
drawal of that part from the sultanate, in the North the tie with the
self-government remains, at least nominally, because there is no ques-
tion of the sultanate actually interfering with New Guinea. In order
to put an end to this situation, the then Resident of Ternate pro-
posed in 1904 to separate the entire New Guinea and its surrounding
islands from Tidore, to which proposal the sultan had agreed. A
provisional supplementary Budget was drawn up, which only re-
quired the approval of the Supreme Government. Owing to the sudden
death of the sultan however the ratification could not take place,
and when it proved impossible to arrange the succession owing to a
lack of suitable candidates, the whole question of the separation of
New Guinea was put aside because it was seriously considered to
dissolve the sultanate altogether. The captain Colijn, commissioned
to advise on this matter, comes however to an entirely different con-
clusion. Though he remarks that since 1898 — moreover without
any protest on the side of Tidore — the attitude in New Guinea had
been as if the sultanate did not exist and it had, to his knowledge,
not exercised a single right in alle these years, excepting possibly the
Western part of the Radja Ampat group 1), his conclusion is not that
it would be better — at least as far as New Guinea is concerned —
simply to put the sultanate aside. The disappointing experiences
encountered in South New Guinea compel him to advise, first to
explore the island more thoroughly before deciding to establish a
form of administration which will cost much money. Until then he
considered it to be the best thing to do to maintain the sultanate
and to restrict oneself to a supervision of a very limited nature.

1) Cf. p. 13 of the report of the Study Committee New Guinea.
It is clear that this advice — as often happens in case of official advices — does not say in its motivation what should in fact have been said. When the self-government does not administrate and gives no proofs of wanting or being able to do so, it stands to reason that there can be no question of a supervision of the authority exercised by self-government. The real cause lies elsewhere, and from now onwards it will keep on popping up in due time. Direct administration was not suitable for New Guinea because it implied the presence of an apparatus of administration along the line of the Javanese one, which surmizes a society standing on such a high level of development as is nowhere to be found in New Guinea. In case of direct administration one has to consider a total of provisions which it will be very difficult to apply to this territory. This refers as well to the field of police and jurisdiction as of taxation and agrarian rights. The provisions made to this end in direct administrated territory have been made for an Indonesian society, not for the chaotic conditions which were found in a new and unexploited territory like New Guinea. There was no way out, and it was therefore simpler to leave this territory as a self-government territory where a simpler legislation and the civil servant, as long as, like here, the self-government does not interfere anywhere, are able to do on their own initiative all that is necessary for administration. In this way eventually the unreal character of the self-government, which does not administrate at all, is the reason for maintaining it in spite of the fact that the seat of the sultanate remained unoccupied and the administration had to be carried out by a self-government committee. This however did as little in respect of New Guinea as the last sultan had done and the representative of the Committee, whom the Resident of New Guinea assumed during the few years when New Guinea formed an independent Residency (1920—1924) at the capital Manokwari, also refrained from interfering. He remained, thus a secret letter of the Director of Home Government of January 1947, an ornament. The Resident of Tidore, W. A. Hovenkamp, was therefore safe in restricting himself in his Memorandum of Elucidation, concerning the province Tidore (Appendix to his Memorandum of Transfer of 1931) to the clearly Moluccan part of it and in motivating it as follows: „The relation between New Guinea and Tidore is of a purely theoretical nature; no historical or adat-legal tie gives a basis to a firm interconnection” and could therefore simply behave as if New Guinea did not belong to it.

Meanwhile the consciousness grew that New Guinea needed an entirely separate regulation and administration. It was not only professed by the Press and by the action of the New Guinea Committee in the Netherlands, the Indies administration too becomes aware that here other measures are needed. Especially the Resident,
Dr B. J. Haga, sharply criticizes the existing situation in his secret letter of 31st January 1935 No 22, in which he writes i.a. that the objection against the then prevailing situation was not so much the fact that one had to deal with a fiction but rather the imposibility shown and the undesirability to make this fiction into a reality. „It is from a viewpoint of being able to administrate as well as from a viewpoint of roads of communication not possible that self-government power is executed over New Guinea from Tidore ...... As self-government power must root in the sense of justice of the population, it is further undesirable to put a territory like New Guinea under the self-government power of Tidore, as the far greater part of that population has never heard of Tidore” etc. Nevertheless the proposal made by the Resident of the Moluccas in 1936 cannot yet — in the plans of Reorganization of the Administration of the Outer Territories — obtain the approval of the Supreme Government, but the governor general states in a letter of the Government Secretary of 5th August 1937 No 1716-A under the heading „Introduction of a Simple Form of Administration for New Guinea” that he is, together with the Council of the Indies, of the opinion, that in respect of New Guinea it will not be sufficient to use the so-called regional competencies to come to satisfactory regulations for this territory and that „in order to make the administration run as simply and smoothly as possible, it will be necessary to allow within the framework of the existing basic legislation and organization in respect of this territory, the necessary exceptions to the general legal regulations and administrative provisions”.

After this acknowledgement the abolition of the self-government, still maintained at that moment, is only a matter of time, of finding a suitable occasion. This happened in 1945. In 1944 it was decided on the recapture of New Guinea from the Japanese, that the self-administration inside the liberated territory of Tidore was to be exercised by or on behalf of the governor general of the Netherlands Indies (S.B. 1944 No 8). After the capitulation this resolution was only withdrawn as regards that part of the province Tidore which was no part of the sections North-and West New Guinea. Here this authority remained in the hands of the Resident as representative of the Governor General. When the withdrawal of New Guinea from the sultanate becomes in the middle of 1949 at last a fact, this is in fact no more than the regularization and confirmation of an already existing situation.

The abolition of the sultanate consequently elicited no protest whatever from the population of New Guinea. Here, they had never understood anything of the legal fiction which the Netherlands Indies Government had always applied, or, where this had been the case, they had never felt at ease under it. The recollections of the
sultanate of Tidore were only bad and when the sultan of Tidore paid in 1949, a few months before the definitive withdrawal of North- and West New Guinea from his province, a visit to this territory in order to show his interest, everywhere sharp protests arose against it from amongst the population of New Guinea. Even the inhabitants of the Radja Ampat group proved not to want to maintain the relations with Tidore. They declared before a committee sent there in November 1949 that they wanted to remain with the part of New Guinea administrated by the Netherlands, which declaration was, when our Committee visited Sorong, explicitly and confirmed before us by the heads of these islands, who are more closely related to the sultanate than the population is.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A GOING TOGETHER OF ESTATE-
AND NATIVE AGRICULTURE

In chapter V the necessity was considered of promoting agriculture in New Guinea, whereby it was suggested to be possible for estate agriculture to go together with native agriculture. How can this be realized? Harmony of interests can develop most intensely in living-communities. For this, living together, at least vicinity is essential. The greatest possibilities consequently lie there where estate enterprise and native farming work in the same area. If therefore the big enterprise already sees its chances in a territory which was uninhabited up to now and cannot be made suitable unless by „big means”, private initiative and the Government should cooperate in respect of a regional plan in which, side by side with the conditions incumbent to the setting up of the estate in a narrower sense and in which therefore also the labour problem is included, the establishment of a real class of farmers with proper reservations of land is being considered.

But the usefulness of the estate is not to be restricted to that one and only creative act. There is to be a continuous contact between the estate and the farms, which is instructive and profitable for the farmer. In this connection it is an important question which crops will be grown there.

It is known from Indonesia how certain cultures as e.g. of the oil palm have been started there only by the big enterprise, other crops as e.g. pepper, capok and coconut being typically native products. Also rice is to be counted to the latter category. Up to now the mechanical rice enterprises in Indonesia were no success, and where the big enterprise in that country took an interest in paddih, it was in the form of a kind of a shared growing agreement, whereby the culture was factually in the hands of the Indonesian farmers. In the former case great technical knowledge and costly installations may be required for the production of a permanent quality-product for the market. In the latter case it may be a question of products with a high commercial value, which can, if there be sufficient land, be produced very extensively, practically without any capital, so to say grown in the forest, consequently half wild.

Then there are many more plants — we mention rubber, tea, coffee, tobacco, sugar, cassava — which are grown by the estate as well as by the population. If in the new agricultural areas of New Guinea exactly such a crop could obtain the attention of the big enterprise as well as of the Papua farmer, this would be a pre-eminent object for a lasting contact between the two. From experience
however it can be known that the harmony of interests in this respect does not develop automatically. By its nature such an object contains only great possibilities, bad ones and good ones: it becomes a curse or a blessing as the many points of contact cause only friction or start forming bindings. This required a right policy founded on good insight.

Straight from the beginning the two-fold fallacy should be dropped: that the big enterprise is as such the example enterprise to which the native enterprise has to conform and that intensive cultivation is the only true method of cultivation.

In the first place, when organizing an agricultural enterprise, its aim has to be taken into account. For the estate this is, making the invested capital pay. For the peasant however, providing for the needs of the family (and the enterprise), a direct process in the primitive stage of economic self-sufficiency, an indirect process in a further advanced phase, when one partly visualizes direct provision of the wants, partly production for exchanging or financing what is wanted from outside. As the standard of living rises, the share of the production for the market becomes larger, and when eventually in a widely extended complex of wants the possibility of satisfaction lags behind, a similarity with the big enterprise, going in practice rather far, manifests itself in an endeavour to reach an economic result at least as large as possible, by all means available.

In the second place the correct institution of an agrarian enterprise requires adequate adaptation to the surroundings. Adaptation is moreover the typical password in agriculture; adaptation to the natural surroundings, certainly, but not less also adaptation to the social center with its technical, financial, economical, historical, juridical, religious, moral, intellectual, and psychological facets.

If therefore, in case the estate and the farm grow the same crop, the natural surroundings be the same for both, and if perhaps presently even in the aim an increasing degree of relationship is to be found, even then such large differences remain in the social factors that each type requires its own structure, which is also conclusive for the manner in which the crop is being procured.

The correct attitude for the enterprise to make the farmer notice its presence as being a direct advantage, has thus been stated: it will, in consequence of an agronomical investigation, be able to give regular information and assistance in the setting up of the native enterprise, for which purpose it also has to remain in contact with the agricultural information service. If it be moreover possible to benefit in particular in the field of acculturation by the insight of ethnologists, it can perhaps assist in making the social surroundings by gradual remodeling better suited for more satisfying results of the enterprise.
If the aiming at a harmony of interests be introduced in this manner, the required cooperation in the growing of the same crop by the enterprise and the farmer obtains automatically its best chances. Often the fact will be that the population produces its product as primary material for the big estate, where it acquires by a process of working and finishing, its quality and durability, so that it is marketed in a superior quality and enables the farmer to obtain a good price. In this team-work the native culture must not only know how to be profitable, but also retain its independence.

As regards the big enterprise, where quantity, quality, and time of delivery of the native product, form, certainly in the beginning, an uncertain factor, in the setting up of the enterprise the possibility has to be taken into account of a paying exploitation, without the native agriculture having to make a contribution to this end.

But it is reasonable to educate the population gradually into larger production, better quality and more regular delivery. The chance can then, after a lapse of time, be taken to bring the most advanced farmers on this road together in a cooperation with a duty to deliver, whose part it will be, beside giving agricultural-technical and financial support to the members individually and under stimulation of the development of the own initiative, to enlarge the results of the enterprise, to convince the cooperators together more and more of the fact that nevertheless everyone’s private interest is only served as a function of a collective interest, rooted in their fate being closely connected with the enterprise. Only in this way that minimum degree of intensivity of the culture and stability of relation can be achieved, which the Western capital can accept if necessary as its working basis without too great a risk.

Many a one will consider it tot be an extremely risky suggestion, even an anomaly, to apply this social-economical means of organization in a society which is still so primitive. The starting point for it is only considered to be present where an already developed individuality and a financial economy are concerned. Viewed in the light of the history of the cooperation, this is thoroughly understandable. For, cooperation not taken as any form of cooperation but in the sense of the modern artificial term, is a child of the West, and there indeed individuality and financial economy stood at its cradle. But why should the same desired result not be arrived at also along other roads? For, the aim — or the result, if preferred — of all cooperative education is the correct relation between the individual and society; the human being in which self-interest and community-interest have approached each other in beautiful harmony. Education had to consider it and had, in the beginning, in order not to frighten straightaway, to respect a surplus of sense of freedom in order to be able to restrict it only gradually.

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For the great masses of the primitive country population the relation is different: the individual is still too much hidden in the collectivity. The result is that this mass is being easily led as a herd by its shepherd if there is somebody they trust and respect. Transferred in the cooperative field, an education being connected with reality requires a teacher and guide, acceptable to the candidate-cooperators. This man has of course to bear in mind that he has to replenish a deficiency of individual consciousness and activity amongst his pupils. But for this very reason it is necessary — and also a wise policy — fully to use the natural prestige he enjoys.

It must be admitted that it will be difficult to find the superman wanted as leader for a cooperation not emanating from individuals but from the mass, and where it is reasonable to execute supervision and give guidance, thus controled and educational that their ultimate aim is to make themselves superfluous in the person of the leader. Superior men naturally related to the missionary, faithful to his vocation and willing to make sacrifices, are scarce all over the world and do not recommend themselves. Nevertheless every people knows such figures and there is no reason to doubt it where the Papuas are concerned. Though it will be necessary to make the selected candidate-leaders not only conversant with the cooperative doctrine and cooperative movement, but also with the setting up and the function of the enterprise and the farming, in order that he may become somebody to whom both parties are pleased to go with their desires and needs, and who makes the partners understand each other’s position.

Up to now we started from the surmise that in newly opened agricultural territories the estate and the population were to grow the same crop. Where this is not possible, the estate will nevertheless be able to give assistance and information in respect of the organization and practice of native farming in the manner as we have already unfolded previously. The Western personnel will, to this end, have to enter thoroughly into the surroundings of the Papua and keep close contact with the agricultural adviser and the ethnologist.

Finally, for the future, the possibility and usefulness are not to be repudiated at once of setting up a big enterprise in areas outside the estate-sphere, where gradually already a sound class of farmers has developed. There too it may appear that if the Western agronomists have the patience to enter into this world which is strange to them with its needs and wants, a form of symbiosis can be found, yielding profit in two directions.
Translation.

To the Committee on a Par
at Hollandia-town.

Copy presented to:

2. H.E. the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Hague.
3. H.E. the Minister of Union Affairs and Overseas Parts of the Empire, The Hague.
4. H.E. the President of the First Chamber, The Hague.
5. H.E. the President of the Second Chamber, The Hague.
7. The Representative of Australia at the U.N.C.I., Jacarta-Indonesia (Critchly).
8. The Representative of America at the U.N.C.I., Jacarta-Indonesia.
10. The Indonesian and Foreign Press.

On this day, 20th May 1950, convened in Hollandia-town, we, Adat-Heads, Kampong-Heads and Representatives of the People of New Guinea, and Representatives of the Daerah Hollandia have carried a Resolution in respect of the arrival of the Committee of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, which Committee has been instructed to collect data for the determination of the Status of New Guinea.
RESOLUTIONS

Considering and having heard:

1. The motion, dated 3-7-1949 and presented by the population of Tabati (Hollandia) to Her Majesty Queen Juliana, petitioning to be allowed to remain under the Netherlands Crown;

2. The motion dated 29th August 1949 and presented by 300 harbour-workers at Hollandia-basis to Her Majesty Queen Juliana, of the same contents as mentioned sub 1.;

3. The telegram dated 9th September 1949 of the Adat-heads and the Representatives of the population of the Sub-Section Hollandia, addressed to Her Majesty the Queen, Dr. Drees (Netherlands Prime Minister), the Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation, Mr Van Maarseveen, the President of the R.T.C., the Chairman of the Delegation of the B.F.O., the Chairman of the Republican Delegation, the U.N.C.I., President Sukarno and President Sukawati of the N.I.T., most strongly protesting against any decision of the R.T.C. to make New Guinea part of Indonesia;

4. The motion dated 10th September 1949 and presented by 860 persons belonging to the population of the Campongs Asei Besar and Ketjil at Sentani-Hollandia to Her Majesty Queen Juliana, petitioning to have New Guinea placed direct under the Netherlands Crown;

5. The motion dated 11th September 1949 and presented by 800 inhabitants of Campong Ajapo-Sentani Hollandia to Her Majesty Queen Juliana, declaring that the population of Ajapo desires to see the Netherlands Government in New Guinea maintained, since the Netherlands still have obligations in respect of New Guinea;

6. The telegram dated 14th September 1949, addressed by the Adat-heads and the Representatives of the population of Hollandia to Her Majesty the Queen, the Uno, the Unci, the Prime Minister Dr Drees and the Chairmen of the Netherlands and Indonesian Delegations at the R.T.C., petitioning to refute the declaration of Indonesia at the R.T.C., pretending that New Guinea forms a part of Indonesia;

7. The telegram dated 18th September 1949, addressed by the Adat-heads and the Representatives of the population of the Daerah Hollandia, to Her Majesty the Queen, the Uno, the Unci, the Prime Minister Dr Drees and the Chairmen of the Netherlands and Indonesian Delegations at the R.T.C., petitioning to refute the declaration of the Republic and the B.F.O. at the R.T.C., pretending that, ethnologically and geographically New Guinea belongs to Indonesia;
8. The motion dated 18th September 1949, presented by 63 Adat-heads and Representatives of the population of Nimborang-Hollandia to Her Majesty the Queen, declaring that the population of Nimborang desires that New Guinea be placed direct under the Netherlands Crown, since the Netherlands have to fulfil their obligations in respect of the People of New Guinea until the People is ripe for self-government;

9. Having read the proposal made by the People of New Guinea Timur (Australian New Guinea) to the Australian minister of Foreign Affairs P.C. Spender, and the declaration of the said People that it would not agree if the entire New Guinea were to become a part of Indonesia or China, vide an article on this subject in the paper "The Papuan Times" at Port Moresby;

10. Having read and heard the declaration concerning a oneness of the Polynesian and Melanesian Peoples, which was arrived at during the South Pacific Conference dated 25-4-1950 and held at the island Fiji;

*Considering and finding that:*

1. Based on the desire of 22,000 persons belonging to the population, and also of the Adat-heads and the Representatives of the population of the Daerah Hollandia, of the Subsection Hollandia in general and also of the Representatives of the People of New Guinea, acknowledged since the year 1949, when the R.T.C. took place, up to this day, 20th May 1950, by the People of New Guinea as the real Representatives of the Irian People, viz. Messrs Ariks, Kasiopo and N. Jouwe, all those present here have found that: "based on the wish of the People, as previously described and based on the sacred wish of a People to determine its own faith":

2. We, belonging to the Melanesian People, shall never let our fate be determined by the Indonesian People, differing ethnologically and geographically so much from us;

3. We, inhabitants of New Guinea, do not need a party-policy and do not desire here political parties either, since we as Melanesians do not carry on a national struggle as the Indonesians do;

4. We do not acknowledge the political party Pidris, formed by ex-convicts, sentenced because they wanted to disturb the peace in this country and amongst the Irian People;

5. The determination of a Status of New Guinea, which should not be in agreement with the wishes of the original inhabitants of New Guinea, would breed much ill feeling amongst the whole Irian People;
6. The question concerning the determination of our own fate is a question concerning ourselves, Melanesians in Netherlands New Guinea, which also concerns the whole People of the South Pacific;

7. It has also been brought to the notice of the Committee on a Par that, if the said Committee would not shrink from separating Netherlands New Guinea and its population from the Polynesian and Melanesian Peoples related to them, this would mean that the Committee on a Par would assail the oneness of these Peoples and create disturbances in the South Pacific territory in general;

8. The Committee on a Par is being stressed to keep New Guinea outside the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, place it direct under the Netherlands Crown and have it included in the Melanesian and Polynesian Peoples which have entered into a mutual alliance in the months of April and May 1950;

9. We, inhabitants of New Guinea, do not agree to the existence of a Bureau or appointment of a High Commissioner from Indonesia in New Guinea;

10. The People of New Guinea is not to become the victim of the existence of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union;

11. To urge the Committee on a Par not to allow all the Indonesians who have already been sent away, to return to New Guinea, as they are confederates of the R.I.S., having come to work here with the intention to extend here the propaganda for the R.I.S. and to disturb peace and order;

Have decided:

1. To demand that New Guinea be placed direct under the Netherlands Crown, in accordance with the Antilles and Surinam and that it be kept outside the Netherlands-Indonesian Union;

2. To demand that the Netherlands shall not back out of their obligations in respect of New Guinea and that they shall not let themselves be coerced to leave the Country, by a Nation aiming at robbing this country;

3. To declare that the population of the Sub-section Hollandia and the People of New Guinea in general acknowledge the Netherlands Government, as being the legal Government of this Country;

4. To declare all claims of Indonesia on New Guinea to be null and void, because the People of New Guinea is a Melanesian People, having its own national feelings and not desiring „to be Indonesi-anized” („diper-Indonesiakan”).
This resolution is signed on this day, 20th May 1950.

Signed by:

1. N. Jouwe, Representative of the People of New Guinea.
2. M. Kasiepo, Representative of the People of New Guinea.
4. P. Foelalo, Campong-Head Ajapo.
6. F. B. Ano. C. H. B.
8. O. Noekoeboi, Adat-Head.
11. M. Chee, Campong-Head Asee.
12. G. Nere, Head Asee.
14. J. Somisee, Representative of Tablasoefa.
15. F. Jerisetou, Adat-Head Campong Mambena.
16. J. Jowafijfi, Adat-Head Campong Tesro.
17. E. Saumilena, Representative of the Coastal population.
18. S. Iboö, Ondoafi Si boi-boi.
19. I. Jacadowa, Representative of the People of Ormoe.
22. A. Jouwe, Ondoafi K. Poelau.
23. M. Jouwe, Suku-Head.
25. O. Poei, Campong-Head K’Batoe.
27. J. Wamblolo, Representative of the people of Sentani.
28. Anthon Fele, Campong-Head Januai.
29. K. Poei, Ondoafi, K’Batoe.
30. Ch. Ireuw, Ondoafi Tabati Leat.
31. Simson Juo, Suku-Head.
32. P. Hannasbey, Representative of the people of Tabati.
33. F. Sanji, Ondoafi Enggros.
34. M. Roenji, Suku-Head Enggros-Roenji.
35. J. Merauwdje, Deputy Suku-Head Merauwdje.
37. E. Itaar, Ondoafi Nafri.
38. H. Itaar, Suku-Head.
39. L. Mebry, Suku-Head.
40. M. Soro, Ondoafi Skou Jambe.
41. Moesa-Kawa, Ondoafi Skou Nabo.
42. P. Aa, Ondoafi Sai.
43. Lamela Laa, Suku-Head.
44. Mathias Lomoe, Writer Skou Sai.
45. Paulus Hali, Ondoafi Skou.
47. Pelipoes Rawi, Njao Sangke.
49. Albert Nota, Adat-Head Njao Nemo.
50. Marthinus Hinoko, Ondoafi Kofo.
51. C. Sernay, Representative Bonggo Sarmi.
52. H. Korarey, Representative Inanwatan di Hindia.
54. Simon Ba, Suku-Head Skou Sai.
55. L. Ueraudje, Suku-Head Ueraudje.
56. E. Chay.
APPENDIX D

To
Her Majesty Queen Juliana,
The Hague

Copy presented to:

1. H.E. Dr. Drees, Prime Minister, The Hague.
2. H.E. the Minister for Union Affairs and Overseas Parts of the Empire, The Hague.
3. The President of the First Shamber, The Hague.
4. The President of the Second Chamber, The Hague.
5. The Chairman of the Week of the Committee on a Par (New Guinea Committee).
8. "" "" "" The U.S.A., "" ""
9. "" "" "" France, "" ""
10. "" "" "" Belgium, "" ""
11. "" "" "" Australia, "" ""
13. The Foreign and Indonesian Press for publication.

Since the question concerning our native country New Guinea is being more and more used by the imperialistic and fascistic Indonesians to abolish world-peace, we, Adat-Heads and leaders of the population of the Daerah Hollandia, counting 22000 heads, have embodied the following resolutions in a motion:

MOTION

Considering:

1. The clear standpoint of all the residents counted to belong to the People of New Guinea, in respect of the fate of our Country and People;
2. The steps to be taken to make a stand against the Indonesian People with its fascistic demands;
3. The steps also to be taken in respect of the Netherlands Government, which Government exercises the legal authority on New Guinea;
4. Whether it is indeed necessary that the People of New Guinea shall detach itself from the united Melanesian and Polynesian Peoples inhabiting the South Pacific and specially our brethren in East New Guinea;

5. That the attitude of the People of New Guinea is the attitude of a human race wanting peace;

Have decided:

1. That we, People of New Guinea, shall not budge an inch in respect of our sacred desires, being as a People fully entitled to consider, choose and determine our own fate;

2. That we, children of the country New Guinea, shall resist every measure taken by the Indonesian People against our position and our People, and that, though we be weak, we shall defend our country till the last drop of blood. We stress these measures to be taken by us because we are an entirely different people and we differ entirely from the Indonesian people as regards the characteristics and adat of our people; the structure of the soil of our country is also entirely different. We can never be compelled to adopt an other nationality.

3. Seriously to request the representatives of the People of New Guinea, Messrs Joh. Arik, N. Jouwe and M. Kasiepo, to urge the Netherlands Government to carry out further the task of the Netherlands People until the People of New Guinea can be independent (independence can be given);

4. That we shall therefore not detach ourselves from our brethren in the South Pacific territory in general, and specially not from our brethren in Australian New Guinea because we belong to the Melanesian and Polynesian peoples, inhabiting the South Pacific territory and wanting in future also to take their place side by side with the other peoples of the world;

5. That, for the maintenance of world peace, we too, People of New Guinea, fight for the democratic principles and are prepared to offer our forces, our life and our goods in the interest of an international society, wanting peace. Therefore we appeal to all democratic peoples to help us in maintaining justice, the sacred principles and security.

Hollandia, 21st June 1950.

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This motion is signed by:

2. Wellum Irew, Kampong-Head Tabati.
3. P. Hanasbeij, Leader of the People Tabati.
5. Ermos Itaar, Adat-Head Nafri.
7. Marthen Chea, Kampong-Head Asei Besar.
8. Pedelia Ansaka, Suku-Head Asei Besar.
10. Ar........ (illegible), Leader of the People Ajapo.
11. Louis Mebry, Suku-Head Ajapo.
12. Wilhelmus A........ (illegible), Leader of the People Ajapo.
15. ..........rus Aoy, Suku-Head Puai.
17. Marcus Swabu, ........ Sentani Tengah.
19. Marthen Chay, Suku-Head Kampong Pulau
20. J. Mallo, Chairman of the Meeting.
SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE ARGUMENTS USUALLY BROUGHT FORWARD FOR THE INDONESIAN CLAIMS

When discussing the grounds brought forward to justify the Indonesian claim on New Guinea, one should realize from the beginning that the point at issue for the Netherlands are two questions inseparably interconnected, immediately resulting from each other, viz.:

1. to transfer the administration of New Guinea to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia;

2. to agree, in doing so, that this territory is incorporated in Indonesia in such a way that it loses its special status of *non self-governing territory*.

The consequences thereof have been discussed elsewhere in the report (cf. in particular chapters I and VII).

The wish on the Indonesian side *first* to decide on the transfer of the sovereignty and to discuss only afterwards the interest of the population concerned, proved to be unacceptable. It implies that a decision is taken on the interest of the population before it has been discussed, to which procedure on the Netherlands side exception was taken from the beginning.

The reasons produced on the Indonesian side to justify this attitude are not very convincing. Also the statement made at the First Union-Conference, „that the Indonesian Government cannot accept the idea of being unable to undertake the education of the people of Irian”, gives no real grounds.

It would meanwhile be possible that the argumentation would be as follows: „For the moment the population concerned does not benefit by the transfer of the administration and that this deteriorates it in many fields, but on the other hand that this population is in many regards a part of the Indonesian people, with which it is connected by close ties. New Guinea has always belonged to Indonesia and a growing sense of solidarity is discernible, so that it is clear that the population of New Guinea is to be included in the process of forming an Indonesian nation”. A closer consideration of this trend of thought is certainly needed.

The oneness of the people of New Guinea and the Indonesian people has in many ways been celebrated in song. In the report it has already been pointed out that this oneness was even taken to be an axiom and was left out of discussion (cf. chapter I). Nevertheless the Netherlands members were of opinion that an investigation of this point had to be made, whereby they came to the conclusion that, geologically, botanically and zoologically, New
Guinea is a territory of its own and that, racially, linguistically and culturally, the population forms a separate group of peoples, showing no relationship with the Indonesian people and, in all these regards, having to be qualified as non-Indonesian.

In the statement of the Indonesian group (No C. Ir-I/AM/P.7) it was tried to get away from the grip of these facts by remarking: „that the linguistic, zoological, botanical oneness is not conclusive for the question whether a territory .......... cannot be a part of a state”, an appeal being made to a number of instances of linguistic and zoological differences within a certain state. In this argumentation there is nothing the Netherlands member cannot fully agree to. It does however not affect the matter. For, the question is not whether, within a territory of a state, certain linguistic, anthropological or cultural differences can occur 1), but what really matters is:

a. the combined occurrence of these differences, and

b. the nature of these differences.

If the Indonesian members had produced only one instance of two peoples going together as one nation, where both peoples show, as regards their natural surroundings and residence, as well as linguistically and in their mode of living and their cultural and anthropological habitus, such profound differences as is the case between Indonesians and Papuas, the Netherlands members would have considered this to be an important argument against the value they attach to this combination of differences. The value of these differences is higher than it often is elsewhere, because this is not a matter — irrespective of the differences in their natural surroundings —, of small, but of very considerable differences. Viewed anthropologically, the point is that they belong to an other of the principal races of humanity. Linguistically, it concerns the speaking of languages belonging to a totally different linguistic family, a difference of quite an other order than the differences between Indonesian languages mutually or even between these and Fiji or Maori. Culturally the point is finalyy neither, having an other culture within the same cultural center, but belonging to an own and entirely divergent cultural center.

Such differences are, owing to their combination as well as to their quality, of great importance. The Netherlands members would be fully prepared to accept that the people of New Guinea is one with that of Indonesia, provided such a oneness manifests itself somewhere. Anyhow, it was not shown in the previously mentioned field. It could however also be proved by history, tradition, or tangible

1) Differences in flora and fauna lie of course in an other field and also have to be dealt with in that field.
and present solidarity. This has been attempted and therefore has to be investigated.

For the oldest historical relations between Indonesia and New Guinea an appeal has been made to a passus in song 14 of the Ngarakriagama, where Prapantja mentions Wwanin and Seran as parts of the Madjapahit kingdom. As a possible significance of these names the late Prof. Dr N. J. Krom gave Onin and Kowiai, both situated on the West coast of New Guinea. There is however no certainty in this respect. Krom expresses himself very cautiously and other investigators give other significances. Thus Brandes proposed Boni and Ceram, however without commentary, in a similar way as Rouffaer had concluded that Wwanin was Onin and Seran Ceram. However this may be, if Madjapahit has ever had any contact with these coasts, it can only have been very superficial. Not a trace of it has ever been found back again, not in the tradition either, and there is no reason to presume that this contact could have been more important or more intensive than the Moluccan princes had with this territory. The panichyrist Prapantja, the author of this interesting laudatory poem, aiming at celebrating the greatness of the Madjapahit dynasty, has certainly not presented the territory of his ruler as too insignificant.

A real historical bottom is not to be found until the sources of Portuguese and Netherlands history begin to flow. The picture of the contact between Indonesia and New Guinea, as it is reflected in these sources, has been sketched in Appendix A. This contact proved there to be very superficial, concerning only the coastal areas and having even there not led to lasting ties. The historical relations between Indonesian princes and New Guinea (whereby the sultanate Tidore is to be considered in particular) have not brought Indonesia and New Guinea closer to each other.

There are however still other historical factors, viz. the tie laid by the joint administration of the Netherlands between New Guinea and Indonesia. The Indonesian side has in particular frequently dwelled upon the various wordings of the constitution, the constitutional regulations and the fundamental law, all of which comprise New Guinea within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands Indies. This is an absolute fact. The question is however whether, from that

1) The Netherlands members are not inclined to speculate upon the meaning of the snow-capped mountain mentioned in the Ramayana, in respect of which Kern says: one is tempted here to think of the snow-capped mountains of New Guinea. Everybody is at liberty to attach to this the conclusions he desires and, for a young and emotional nationalism, here apparently lies a great temptation. In doing so however one is outside the boundaries of science.
administrative oneness a social-political oneness has grown. In that case this oneness would be more than a mere administrative super-
structure, which could be annulled by an other administrative measure.

As grounds for the coming into being of such a social-political oneness are mentioned:

1. fellowship of fate, since both peoples have — in the language, off and on, heard in the Indonesian press — been equally oppressed by the Netherlands colonial government;

2. oneness in the Christian religion with and by the Indonesian gurus who brought the Gospel here in the service of the missionaries.

There is however no question of fellowship of fate, because in New Guinea the Indonesians were not looked upon as „co-pressed”, but, if this very assailable terminology might be used, at least as „co-oppressors”. The Indonesians were in this society not, like the Papuas, the „colonized”, but they arrived there with the Netherlanders as „colonizers”. This is however not the proper place to repeat circumstantially what has already been said in chapter IV under 3 about the differentiation between Indonesians and Papuas in New Guinea; there was no proof of any fellowship of fate between Indonesians and Papuas, but there was proof of a sharp contrast.

Neither has the work of the gurus, in spite of the considerable amount of work they achieved, often under very difficult circumstances at a great sacrifice, led to solidarity. When the Papua started to attain a higher level of development, the guru (and the Indonesian in general) often stood in the way of his aspirations. The group of the Indonesians, developed into a sort of superior class, rendered the more educated Papua spiteful, and even the best intentions of the Indonesians could change this attitude no more. The oneness of religion could, by the development of these contrasts, eventually not lead to a consciousness of social-political oneness.

But all this does not alter the fact that one fact can be pointed out, which can be handled as an argument, that in New Guinea something is indeed being enacted of the forming of a nation between the Papuas and the Indonesians. That fact is the occurrence of a small group of Papuas, desiring an alliance with Indonesia. Elsewhere it has been circumstantially proved how the very smallness of this group, strongly encouraged by the continuous Indonesian propaganda, is one of the many proofs that the direction of the social (or, if preferred, sociological) development in New Guinea is taking quite a different road from the one of association with Indonesia. It would be wrong to repeat here the remarks made in this respect.
It is much more important to dwell for a moment on the meaning of a "process of formation of a nation".

The starting point can e.g. be that the criterium of the Nationality is situated in the "consciousness of belonging together as an ordered group" 1), but this does not mean to say that this consciousness does not want to have an objective basis. On the contrary, Kranenburg, who formulated the criterium of nationality in this way, looks, for the source of the national consciousness for the conviction of having as a group been through the same experiences and of aiming at joint designs. Thus at once objective factors have been mentioned as conditions for the national consciousness, and Kranenburg explicitly enumerates an additional number of other objective factors such as the language, having to form as mainstay and binding agent of the national consciousness the basis of the consciousness of solidarity. The idea nationality has therefore also been described as "a natural community of human being, tied together by the oneness of territory, of origin, of morals and language, into a community of life and consciousness of solidarity", in which therefore also the moral element, the national feeling, is eventually acknowledged as conclusive, but the basis of that feeling in the social reality has been expressed more plainly.

Where there is no question of a "long past of common struggle and sacrifices" (Renau), or of a community of interests (rather of a contrast of interests), of of a joint "consciousness of prestige" or of a "politische Schicksalsgemeinschaft" (Max Weber), or of oneness in religion, culture and surroundings with the Indonesians, amongst all objective criteria which can serve as a basis for the coming into being of a real national feeling of oneness with Indonesia, here only an appeal could be made to the use of the Malay language as lingua franca in the opened up territory. Thereby it is however to be remarked that this language belongs to an other family of languages than the own languages. This is a territory where one feels very weak, the more so because a lingua franca is something quite different from a vernacular, especially if, as is the case here, it has so to say been spread from above, through the intermediary of education brought by the Netherlands.

How weak the argumentation of formation of a nation is, appears from the formulation given by Mr Mu Yamin at the Round Table Conference: "One (has) in the first place to consider the sociological process of formation of a nation, taking at present place in Indonesia, in which also New Guinea has to be involved (we underline). Wy should the population of New Guinea be given fewer rights than e.g. the Indo-Chinese and the Indo-Arabians". When following

such an argumentation one finally ends up in the statement that it is the Indonesian state which will be forming a nation in New Guinea. In this way a fascist conception of nationality is arrived at, in which the nation is created by the state ¹).

Summarizing it can be stated that the oneness of Indonesia and New Guinea has been proclaimed on the Indonesian side. This is however not sufficient. Such a declaration is not only and even not in the first place to come from the Indonesian side, but also, and in particular, from the population of New Guinea. That declaration on the side of New Guinea is lacking, and thereby the value of the Indonesian proclamation of oneness becomes void. Indulging in it, or even valuing it, would be the creation of an extremely dangerous precedent. For, a declaration as has now been made on the Indonesian side, could be made by any state and if tomorrow Australia should decide to make such a declaration, the Netherlands could, on the same ground, be compelled to transfer the administration of New Guinea to Australia.

As a starting point — leaving the question of the interest of the population alone — also constitutional and political considerations could be chosen. The Indonesian side has up to now pre-eminently stressed this side of the question New Guinea, whereby statements on the Netherlands side were pointed out in particular, which would, as is being argued, justify the expectation that also the sovereignty of New Guinea was to be transferred. It is necessary also to examine the value of these arguments. Even when considering the interest of the population to be of primary importance, one should not make light of an accusation of not fulfilling one's promises.

The constitutional argument has already been touched in passing, viz. when presumed oneness between Indonesia and New Guinea, whereby i.a. was dwelled upon the value to be attributed to the administrative oneness of these territories. The point at issue refers here however, to other arguments, viz. in the first place those derived from:

a. the Linggadjati agreement and the Renville agreement;

b. statements of the Netherlands Indies Government.

Of the claims formulated in this way, those derived from the Linggadjati agreement are the more important. For, here an appeal can be made to the provision in clause 3, that the United States of Indonesia shall comprise the whole territory of the Netherlands Indies, be it that it will be possible for a territory to call a special relation towards these States and towards the Kingdom of the Netherlands into being, if the population of that territory, also after con-

¹) François, l.c.
sultation with the other territories, declares that it does not or not yet want to be part of the United States of Indonesia. An appeal to this clause looks at first sight strong. For, since the Netherlands has declared to consider the population of New Guinea not yet able to express its opinion in a democratic way, it is difficult to see how the population of that territory could be withdrawn from the United States of Indonesia. Though it can be argued that the Netherlands as administrating power has to have right to act in the place of that population, this cannot be learned at once from the agreement. On the strength of this clause it could therefore be opined that the Netherlands is obliged to bring in New Guinea as a part of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

But the matter is not so easy and the Netherlands has never committed itself to this consequence.

Because the Netherlands Government has — before the agreement was signed — explicitely declared that „it wants also New Guinea to obtain an own status in respect of the Kingdom (new style) and the United States in het spirit of the clauses 3 and 4, though perhaps the autochthonous population will still have difficulty in expressing itself”. Thus, the Netherlands Government made an exception for New Guinea, a fact which was also known to the other party and in which it has acquiesced (cf. the letter of the Indonesian Delegation of 15th March 1947). It is therefore certain that the Netherlands have undertaken no commitments in respect of New Guinea at the signing of this agreement, on the contrary, it has irrefutably recorded for New Guinea that this territory was in its legal position not defined by Linggadjati.

Weaker still is the appeal made to the Renville Agreement. It is argued that in the first of the six additional fundamental principles of this agreement it is stated that the transfer of sovereignty would comprise the whole Netherlands Indies, to which New Guinea belongs also. This additional clause however did not in any way alter the Linggadjati accord, which was accepted by the Netherlands Government only under the, previously mentioned, explicit proviso in respect of New Guinea.

Also the appeal to the Van Rooyen—Roem statement must fail, as during the negotiations which have led to these statements, the question whether New Guinea would be included in the transfer of sovereignty, was left undisussed.

The fact that the problem New Guinea was finally put on the agenda of the Round Table Conference bij the memorandum of 22nd Juni 1949 proves that in this respect no agreement had been made.

Apart from what is surmized to be embodied in the Linggadjati and Renville agreements, great stress is laid on a statement by
Dr. Van Mook during the discussions at the Den Pasar Conference of the clause which describes the territory of the state East Indonesia. In this description the proviso was made in the draft, "that a further decision shall be taken about the classification of the territory of the present Residency New Guinea", the words having been added at that conference after the discussions in the first instance on the initiative of the governor general: "and its relation to the state East Indonesia and the future United States of Indonesia".

In the elucidation in the first instance, Dr. Van Mook said that "speaking in general it (appeared) more correct not to join such a territory, being intrinsically non-Indonesian, to an Indonesian state, but better to make it a special territory, which can, according to circumstances, be joined with the United States of Indonesia, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union or the Netherlands". In the elucidation in the second instance, after the government had proposed the previously mentioned addition, the lieutenant governor general went farther and declared, "that it is decidedly not the intention of the Government to exclude New Guinea from Indonesia, but, to consider carefully in what way it is to be fitted into the frame of Indonesia". And finally: "the addition proposed by the Government shows that it is the intention to keep the territory within the frame of the United States of Indonesia". It is this passage which is understood to be a positive promise of the government that New Guinea will remain within the frame of the United States of Indonesia.

This interpretation can however not be correct, because this statement of the governor general is, as has been said before, contrary of the Netherlands declaration of the government's policy of the preceding 10th of December, in which it is stated that in the spirit of the articles 3 and 4 of Linggadjati, New Guinea too should be able to obtain an own status in respect of the Kingdom new style and the United States of Indonesia. On the grounds thereof no binding power can be attributed to such a divergent statement of the lieutenant governor general.

Finally political arguments may be mentioned here, made in order to prove the necessity to transfer the sovereignty of New Guinea to Indonesia. As such it has i.a. been remarked that in case the Netherlands should adhere to its viewpoint in respect of New Guinea, this would prejudice the union between the Netherlands and Indonesia, that at the periphery of Asia no "colonialism" will be tolerated, that the Netherlands would by its being established in New Guinea voluntarily or unvoluntarily stimulate unrest in Indonesia and that it would give an opportunity to smuggling. The Netherlands members, appointed as non-political persons in this committee, do not consider it their task to go further into these political questions,
and they are therefore of the opinion that they must restrict themselves to one annotation not touching the political aspect directly, which does not mean that in this respect not much more could be said.

In respect of the damage to be inflicted upon the Union in case the Netherlands should adhere to New Guinea, the following is to be remarked: the Union has come into being in spite of the fact that New Guinea was under litigation, and this because both parties were convinced that this Union was a real interest both of them. To this real interest of the two parties however the interests of others, i.e. those of the population of New Guinea, are not to be sacrificed. If Indonesia would use the Union as a means to extort concessions from the Netherlands, whereby the interests of the population of New Guinea were to be dealt with en quantité négligeable, the Union would assume rather the character of a weapon used against the partner than of a means to look after the mutual interests. In this way it would become valueless.

In so far the forthcoming negotiations about the status of New Guinea can indeed be a test for the possibility of the development of a good and fruitful cooperation between the Union partners.

As regards the point that no colonialism will be tolerated at the periphery of Asia, it must be stated — apart from the political significance of that declaration — that New Guinea does not lie at the periphery of Asia, but is a border territory of the Pacific. It falls therefore outside the pan-Asiatic sphere and outside all the claims based thereupon.

The other arguments in this connection have rather the character of reproaches. They are outside the territory in which the Committee has been active and the spinning out of these reproaches could only lead to grievances on the Netherlands side about serious damage and hindrance in consequence of the behaviour of Indonesian citizens. Such an elucidation would do more harm to the negotiations than good.
AUSTRALIAN SCHOOL OF PACIFIC ADMINISTRATION