Dilemmas of Human Rights in Foreign Policy

Dutch and Australian Policies on Self-determination for West New Guinea and East Timor

Jeroen Bijleveld

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government and Public Administration
University of Sydney
December 1997
Abstract

This thesis explores the conditions which contribute to or impede pursuit of self-determination and human rights in foreign policy. The thesis investigates the conceptual development of self-determination from principle to right, and establishes the official criteria accepted by the United Nations for granting a claim. After the Second World War the international community pre-eminently applied self-determination to colonial situations. Since the concept was not fully established, even a claim by a colonial people could still result in a lot of controversy.

In order to understand why a particular state supported a claim to self-determination and pursued other human rights the thesis argues that one should investigate the interplay between international systemic conditions and characteristics of a state’s foreign policy making. This question could best be answered through use of a comparative research. The choice fell on the Netherlands and Australia, two states closely involved in disputes with Indonesia over application of self-determination in two colonial territories: West New Guinea and East Timor. Those two cases were selected because the time span separating them allows for an investigation into the implications of the further development of the concept of self-determination. Also they made an interesting comparison because important changes in inter-state relations occurred in the period separating the two cases.

The basic theoretical assumptions and hypotheses on which the comparative model of the thesis is built, were found to be correct. International conditions ultimately decided the
leeway for Australia and the Netherlands to pursue self-determination, but domestic institutions, procedures, and political alliances were also important factors in determining the emphasis put on self-determination. In the East Timor case international conditions remained as unfavourable for Australia and the Netherlands to pursue self-determination as in the West New Guinea case, even though application of self-determination in this case was not controversial. Human rights had assumed more importance in the foreign policy of both states, but a specific link between self-determination and human rights was not established.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been produced without the support of many people. Unfortunately I cannot mention all of them by name. I am forced to make a selection, but everyone who has contributed in any way to my work deserves my sincere gratitude.

I am indebted to Professor Michael Leigh, my first supervisor, for his suggestion to undertake a comparative research into Australian and Dutch politics. Talking with Michael was always a pleasure and most inspiring, especially in his beautiful garden or at the edge of his swimming pool.

Conversations with my second supervisor, Dr. Bob Howard, will stay with me as very pleasant. His suggestions were insightful.

My third, and last supervisor Professor Rod Tiffen, copped it badly. Under increasing pressure of my deadline I must have driven him mad, turning out new drafts like on an assembly line. Nevertheless he remained patient and, notwithstanding his arduous schedule, he read all my work and gave me valuable comments. Especially his knowledge of Australian party politics was of great use, and his methodological suggestions were most helpful. Although his rigorous criticism was not always immediately appreciated, in retrospect I think it much improved the quality of the thesis.

Dr. Peter King’s painstakingly accurate reading of most of my drafts, pointing out numerous smaller and larger mistakes and shortcomings, deserves my ‘eternal’ gratitude and I shall be glad to reciprocate.

The staff of the Department of Government was always very helpful and assisted me with many a problem. I should particularly name Sam. Without his assistance I would not have been able to find my way in the computer jungle. Sue has become very dear to me. She helped me out on numerous occasions and was always patient and in good spirits. Jennifer too solved many a financial problem, and Ian Bell gave me some noteworthy methodological comments. Finally I should add that I most enjoyed the company of the staff during our various famous Ph D parties.

Many people helped me, one way or another, to gather the huge amount of information needed to produce this thesis. My appreciation goes out to all of them, in particular to those people who trusted me enough to provide me with sensitive information. Very special were the conversations with Marga Scheepstra and former Minister Jan de Koning, both of whom have sadly died since.
The staff of the International Education Office of the University of Sydney was also most kind and assisted me with the various problems I had, including a suspension and an extension. The University of Sydney and the Australian Government granted me scholarships, without which I could not and would not have undertaken my research. I will always remember this, and maybe one day circumstances will allow me to show my gratitude.

Finally, there were my fellow Ph D students. Although we came from various parts of the world, with very different cultural and religious backgrounds, we formed a pleasant group, and many of the group have become close friends. Chusnul’s company and friendship meant a lot to me. She also helped me through a difficult period in my life for which I am very grateful. With Xue and Cathy I had a lot of fun. Habib and Achter also made excellent company, as did Chitra and many others. I am sure we’ll meet again.
# Table of Contents

**Abstract** .......................................................................................................................... ii

**Acknowledgements** ......................................................................................................... v

**CHAPTER I**  
SELF-DETERMINATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CASES OF WEST NEW GUINEA AND EAST TIMOR

1. **SELF-DETERMINATION: A CONCEPT BOTH CHEERED AND REVILED** .................. 1
2. **RESEARCH DESIGN** ...................................................................................................... 2
5. **HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION** .......................................................... 13
6. **WEST NEW GUINEA AND EAST TIMOR IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** ....... 24
7. **METHODS OF RESEARCH** .......................................................................................... 31

**CHAPTER II**  
FOREIGN POLICY THEORIES AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESSES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRALIA .......... 34

1. **INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................................. 34
2. **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND FOREIGN POLICY**: A STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION OF STATE BEHAVIOUR ................................................................. 35
3. **DOMESTIC EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY** ...................................................... 41
4. **A FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT** .................................................................................. 50
5. **A MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING** .................................................................. 54

**CHAPTER III**  
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRALIA: ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES ............. 66

1. **INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................................. 66
2. **THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE NETHERLANDS** ....................... 69
3. **THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN AUSTRALIA** ......................................... 72
4. **OTHER DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE NETHERLANDS** .................................................................................................................. 76
5. **OTHER DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN AUSTRALIA** .... 76
6. **CABINET IN THE NETHERLANDS** ................................................................................ 78
7. **CABINET IN AUSTRALIA** ............................................................................................... 81
8. **PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NETHERLANDS** ......................... 83
9. **PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN AUSTRALIA** ......................................... 88
10. **MEDIA AND INTEREST GROUPS IN THE NETHERLANDS** ............................................ 96
11. **MEDIA AND INTEREST GROUPS IN AUSTRALIA** ....................................................... 98
12. **CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY HYPOTHESES** ......................................................... 99
   12.1 **The Netherlands’ hypothetical policy in the West New Guinea case** .................... 99
   12.2 **Australia’s hypothetical policy in the West New Guinea case** .............................. 102
   12.3 **The Netherlands’ hypothetical policy in the East Timor case** ............................... 104
   12.4 **Australia’s hypothetical policy in the East Timor case** ....................................... 106
CHAPTER IV  DUTCH POLICY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE WEST NEW GUINEA CASE ........................................................................................................... 109

1. WEST NEW GUINEA BECOMES AN ISSUE ........................................................................................................... 109
2. THE GRAND COALITION: 1952-1959 ................................................................................................................ 117
3. DIMINISHING SUPPORT: 1959-1962 ................................................................................................................ 131
4. POLICY UNTIL THE 1962 AGREEMENT: CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... 184
5. AFTERMATH: THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE AND OBLIVION ........................................................................... 188

CHAPTER V  SELF-DETERMINATION AND AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WEST NEW GUINEA CASE ................................................................. 205

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 205
2. WEST NEW GUINEA ACQUIRES A SPECIAL POSITION: AUSTRALIA’S POLICY ................................................ 205
3. WEST NEW GUINEA IN COLD STORAGE ........................................................................................................ 209
4. POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NETHERLANDS AND THE DISCOVERY OF SELF-DETERMINATION .............................................................................. 213
5. MENZIES BACKS DOWN ............................................................................................................................... 261
6. THE POST 1962 PERIOD: AUSTRALIA’S CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN WEST NEW GUINEA ........... 277
7. AUSTRALIAN POLICY AFTER THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE ........................................................................... 283
8. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 287


1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 292
2. THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF CABINET DEN UYL: 1973-1977 ................................................................. 293
3. CABINET DEN UYL AND THE EAST TIMOR CASE .......................................................................................... 297
5. CABINET VAN AGT I AND THE EAST TIMOR CASE ......................................................................................... 317
6. CABINET VAN AGT II AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY: 1981-1982 ............................................. 325
7. CABINET VAN AGT II AND III AND THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION ................................................................. 329
8. CABINET LUBBERS I: HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY: 1982-1986 ......................................................... 330
9. CABINET LUBBERS I AND THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE ......................................................................................... 336
10. CABINET LUBBERS II AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 1986-1989 ............................................................................ 342
11. CABINET LUBBERS II AND EAST TIMOR ...................................................................................................... 346
13. CABINET LUBBERS III AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 1989-93 ................................................................................. 353
14. CABINET LUBBERS III AND EAST TIMOR: THE GRAND FINALE ................................................................. 358


1. WHITLAM AND THE TIMOR QUESTION ........................................................................................................... 380
2. THE FRASER GOVERNMENT AND INDONESIA’S INVASION AND INTEGRATION OF EAST TIMOR ......................... 397
5. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 465
   5.1 Whitlam’s diplomacy after September 1974 ......................................................................................... 465

viii
5.2 Gradual accommodation to Indonesia's authority during the Fraser years: 1976-1982

5.3 Defeat of the ALP grassroots challenge to acquiescence: 1983-1984

5.4 Acquiescence under Hawke and the international challenge: 1985-1991

5.5 Renewed acceptance of East Timor's political status

5.1 CHAPTER VIII Conclusions

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRALIA

3. SELF-DETERMINATION IN DUTCH AND AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES

4. FINAL COMMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS CONCERNING WEST NEW GUINEA (EXCERPTS)

APPENDIX II UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2504 (XXIV)

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES CITED

PRIMARY SOURCES

SECONDARY SOURCES

A. NEWSPAPERS AND BULLETINS

B. BOOKS

C. ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

D. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL, RESEARCH REPORTS AND THESES

ix
Chapter I

Self-determination, human rights and the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor

1. Self-determination: a concept both cheered and reviled

“Self-determination....a great principle once thought applicable to all of mankind” ¹

“Self-determination is the most prostituted and disastrous slogan of this century, the bastard orphan of Woodrow Wilson and Versailles.”²

These quotes reflect bitter disappointment over the application of a great principle, that was originally thought capable of realising the democratic ideal to have a government acting according to the demands of its people. This idealistic principle has certainly vastly contributed to bring about democracy and self-government in Europe and elsewhere. Many suppressed people could appeal to ‘self-determination’ to remove suppressive regimes. Unfortunately, however, the concept in many cases failed to bring democracy, and rather than contributing to peaceful and stable relations between democratic states, self-determination has resulted in numerous bitter conflicts within and between states. This thesis

testifies to the tragedy which an appeal to self-determination may bring, endorsing the first quote, but rejecting the second in the strongest possible terms.

The idealistic concept of self-determination has been highly controversial in its meaning and application and has therefore been the cause of much dispute between and within sovereign states. In the absence of a juridical and politically established meaning, self-determination is appealed to by a miscellaneous collection of groups all sharing an aspiration to change their political status and regime. Impinging directly on the survival of an existing state, these demands will be resisted by groups benefiting from the present order. Often the result is a spiral of further oppression and opposition. When other states in their foreign policy endorse the claim of a particular group to self-determination, they will face opposition from the state that feels that its sovereignty is being encroached upon. The ensuing political conflict with the offended adversary will damage the state’s interests, violating the fundamental notion that foreign policy should promote a state’s interests. However, a foreign policy need not be entirely framed for pursuit of material interests but may also be inspired by moral values and ideals.

An analysis of the contradiction between morality as embodied in the concept of self-determination and pursuit of more down to earth interests in foreign policy forms the focus of this study. Although the meaning and application of self-determination have in no other context become as clearly established and received as wide support from the international community as in processes of decolonisation, the current study will show that in spite of this, a foreign policy which adheres to the principle of self-determination is by no means
safeguarded from pitfalls. Tragically the principle of self-determination, acclaimed at the beginning of this century by an enlightened American President, has brought nothing but misery to the claimants in the two cases under review, West New Guinea and East Timor, and has caused havoc to the interests that Australia and the Netherlands pursued in their foreign policy with Indonesia. The present study hopes to make a modest contribution to the exposure of the state’s ineptitude to pursue a principle that in itself is most laudable, but which contradicts a principle that has entitled the state to express itself in the first place and upon which the whole world community rests: state sovereignty. Denying other like units the same entitlements must create a conflict between two basically noble principles, turning both into pernicious contradictions of morality.

2. Research design

Using a research design pre-eminently suitable to highlight changes in international and national opinion regarding the meaning and application of self-determination this study will show the difficulties of implementing a policy of self-determination and human rights for those territories that were denied the right to self-determination. Through a comparison of the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor -- similarities and differences in their aspiration to self-determination and the position of Indonesia, the Netherlands and Australia will be discussed in the next section -- international developments in the conceptual

3 In order to avoid being stigmatised to support either side in the conflict over West New Guinea’s sovereignty and self-determination for its indigenous population a geographic description is used in this thesis: West New Guinea. Other names under which the territory has been known at various stages during and after the conflict are: Dutch New Guinea, Netherlands New Guinea, West Irian, Irian Jaya and West Papua.
approach to self-determination will be set off against changes in other interests which major international actors perceived in the two cases and which had an impact on the opportunity for the Netherlands and Australia to pursue self-determination and observance of political and civil rights in their foreign policy. The time span between the two cases offers an excellent opportunity to study how tension between differences in interests and the international balance of power affected the application of self-determination and the behaviour of the Netherlands and Australia. At the level of foreign policy theories, this two by two research design allows for an investigation into the way perceptions of foreign policy interests and perceptions of opportunities to pursue these interests interacted with the policy in Australian and Dutch relations with Indonesia. Thus the research design has the merit to investigate and relate international and domestic changes regarding the feasibility for Australia and the Netherlands to pursue self-determination.

Given their similarities and contrasts Australia and the Netherlands are two states highly suitable and interesting for a comparative research into pursuit of self-determination. Both states are highly developed Western style democracies, whose military and political influence does not fully match their economic status. Because of their limited potential to influence international events and their dependency on allies Australia and the Netherlands can be classified as small or at best medium powers. To both states relations with Indonesia have been important. Although geographically distant, Indonesia has been close to the Netherlands as an economic and political bridge-head to Asia. As a consequence of the past, however, bilateral relations have also been sensitive ever since Indonesia became independent in 1949. To Australia, Indonesia has increasingly been of economic and
political importance. Indonesia’s geographic location and its political and economic alliances have vastly contributed to this. Indonesia’s geographic proximity has also made this country of major importance to Australia’s security, as events during World War II proved. Whereas Indonesia’s importance for the Netherlands seems to have diminished, Australia’s growing awareness of the political, military and economic implications of its geographic position have set in motion a process of reconciliation with Asia in which its close neighbour has increasingly been attributed a major role.

History on the side of the Netherlands, and a desire to enmesh with its environment on the Australian side make their respective relations with Indonesia very sensitive and any raising of contentious issues hazardous. Promotion of self-determination by the Netherlands and Australia in the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor had the potential to inflict major damage to their interests at stake in relations with Indonesia, given Indonesia’s rejection of the claims to self-determination. Thus a comparison between Australia and the Netherlands is highly interesting, particularly since their framework of foreign policy making is so different, probably with implications for their foreign policy.

Being concerned also with the consequences of a denial of self-determination for other human rights, notably political and civil rights, both cases are very relevant to the study of international relations and foreign policy as they provide insight into problems which states face when they pursue political, economic and strategic interests as well as human rights in their foreign policy. Many authors would argue that human rights cannot or should not be pursued by states because they endanger their economic and political interests. The two
case studies, however, will show that there need not be an intrinsic conflict between human rights and other interests, and even when there is a conflict, human rights will not be necessarily sacrificed easily. This thesis will therefore try to provide an answer to the question if human rights can be aspired to at all by a state in its foreign policy and, if so, under what conditions.

Having discussed the theoretical merits of the research design and the choice of the comparison, the next section will succinctly introduce the two cases, focussing on differences and similarities between the claims to self-determination by the people of West New Guinea and East Timor, the Indonesian reasons for rejecting those claims, and the position of Australia and the Netherlands.


Fate made the Western half of New Guinea a part of the Dutch East Indies, a Dutch colony. When the colony became independent Indonesian leaders claimed West New Guinea as an integral part of their post-colonial state. They also based their claim on treaties signed in 1660 and 1797 that acknowledged the rights of the sultan of Tidore to the Papuan island. At the beginning of this century, however, the sultan surrendered his rights to the islands for indemnification to the Dutch, who had established themselves on West New Guinea in 1898. The territory came under direct control of Dutch colonial administration but during the Second World War the Japanese occupied the territory. At the time of Sukarno's declaration of independence, 17 August 1945, allied forces were in control.
The Dutch government disputed Sukarno’s declaration of independence and tried to re-establish its authority after the war. The prolonged struggle for Indonesian independence lasted from 1945-1949. During this period, negotiations were held to work out a general settlement. West New Guinea became the ransom Indonesia had to pay for its independence. The territory was officially excluded from the transfer of sovereignty and its political status would be decided within one year after Indonesia’s independence. Since these negotiations failed sovereignty over West New Guinea became the source of a bitter dispute. Indonesia claimed that the Netherlands was illegally administering a territory that belonged to Indonesia as successor state of the colonial state. The Netherlands, however, argued that ethnic, cultural and historical differences between the indigenous people of the territory and the rest of Indonesia justified application of the principle of self-determination. In order to prepare the indigenous people for self-determination the Netherlands claimed to administer its colony as a non-self-governing territory in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the UN Charter. In 1954 and in 1955-1956, renewed efforts to reach a peaceful solution via talks failed. Between 1954 and 1957 Indonesia repeatedly brought its case before the United Nations General Assembly but failed to acquire the necessary two-thirds majority to have a resolution adopted.

After 1957 the conflict escalated further. Indonesia severed diplomatic relations and a military confrontation seemed more and more likely. Increasingly isolated internationally, the Dutch government, declared its willingness to relinquish its sovereignty and involve the United Nations in the administration. This attempt ultimately failed as there was not enough
support for the Dutch proposal. Eventually in August 1962 a negotiated agreement was reached, under much political and military duress, which transferred sovereignty to Indonesia after a brief period of UN interim administration. In 1969 the Papuans would get a chance to decide their political future. Although this ‘act of free choice’ could by no standards be described as a genuine expression of self-determination the Netherlands accepted without further demur the unanimous decision of the Papuans to remain a part of Indonesia.

The events described raise a number of questions. Although the economic value of West New Guinea was generally regarded as small and with the majority of its indigenous population still very primitive, the Netherlands pushed the conflict over self-determination and sovereignty to the brink of war. How could the Dutch government make the principle of self-determination the corner-stone of its policy? Why was the government prepared to do so at immense economic and political cost? And, finally, why did the Dutch government eventually agree to transfer its sovereignty, without having secured adequate provisions for a proper execution of the Papuans’ right to self-determination?

When the ‘act of free choice’ proved to offer the indigenous people a rather meagre opportunity to exert their right of self-determination, this did not affect bilateral relations at all. Without any more ado the Dutch government accepted the procedure as a proper implementation of the 1962 agreement. What does the stand of the Dutch government indicate in the light of the aforementioned questions?
The position of the Australian government is also interesting and highly relevant. From the early stages of the conflict Australia was a fervent ally of the Netherlands, advocating a continuation of Dutch rule as a means to prepare the indigenous people for ultimate self-government and self-determination. This position was in sharp contrast to the strong diplomatic support that the Australian government had given to the Indonesian Republic during its struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949. What reasons did the Australian government have to change sides and support the Netherlands and not Indonesia, a neighbour? Why did self-determination for the West Papuans become an objective in Australian foreign policy, particularly since 1957; and why did the Australian government accept the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands which transferred sovereignty to Indonesia, an outcome that Australia had fought against so vigorously between 1949 and 1962, and with highly inadequate provisions for self-determination? Although the ‘act of free choice’ in 1969 was indeed farcical, the Australian government, previously such an inspired public advocate of self-determination for the West Papuans, accepted the result. Why did the Australian government abandon the right of self-determination?


In April 1974 a revolution in Portugal brought to power a regime that favoured a policy of rapid decolonisation. Portuguese Timor, the eastern half of an island in the Indonesian archipelago was one of those colonial assets. However, due to Portuguese neglect this territory had remained backward. Political awareness amongst the Timorese was therefore only nascent. Without a political tradition, sufficient ideological knowledge and established
institutions, the political movement was only in its early stages in 1974 when three political parties were formed: Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT), Associacao Social Democratica Timor (ASDT), and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (Apodeti). UDT wanted a continued Portuguese presence. ASDT actively pursued independence from Portugal, but also favoured a policy of good neighbourliness and co-operation with states in its vicinity. Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, favoured integration.

Initially the Indonesian government did not oppose the idea of an independent East Timor, but it soon changed its position. Already apprehensive about the security of the region should Portuguese Timor gain independence, Indonesia became increasingly concerned about ASDT’s Marxist overtures. In September 1974 ASDT changed its name into Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste (FRETILIN). In October Indonesia started operation Komodo, a plan aimed at the annexation of Portuguese Timor.

A UDT-Fretilin coalition which pursued independence was formed in early 1975, temporarily stabilising the situation. The coalition fell apart in May when UDT joined Apodeti. Repeatedly talks aimed at reconciliation faltered. With the Portuguese administration in a state of disarray, UDT, allegedly encouraged by Indonesia, seized power in August 1975. Fretilin managed to strike back and fierce fighting erupted, from which

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Fretilin emerged victoriously in September. A wave of refugees sought shelter in West Timor, claiming to flee atrocities committed by Fretilin. Fighting continued in the border-area where remnants of UDT, with increasing assistance from Indonesian forces, did not cease to pose a threat to the Fretilin regime. Confronted with an ever graver security situation Fretilin unilaterally declared independence on 28 November 1975, a move immediately countered by an Apodeti-UDT appeal for integration. The political chaos, the continuation of fighting and the suffering of civilians provided the Indonesian government with ample excuse to launch its invasion on 7 December 1975: the crowning piece of operation Komodo.

The Indonesian invasion clearly violated the right of self-determination that applied in colonial situations (See Section 6). Therefore both the Security Council and the General Assembly demanded Indonesia’s withdrawal. Indonesia ignored these resolutions and orchestrated a process of integration, designed to meet the inter-national standards for a genuine process of self-determination. In June 1976 the People’s Assembly and Timor’s Provisional Government, set up by Indonesia, submitted a request for integration. Both the Indonesian parliament and the President accepted this request. Indonesia subsequently treated any UN interference with East Timor as violation of its sovereignty. Contrary to the case of West New Guinea, the UN has never accepted the procedure via which East Timor’s integration was established and has therefore continued to reject the outcome: a proper act of self-determination is still being demanded.

The Netherlands elected to abstain over resolutions reconfirming the right of the Timorese to self-determination submitted annually in the United Nations between 1976 and 1982.
Australia gradually shifted its position from support to abstention in November 1976 and to opposition from 1978 until the last resolution was put in 1982. In 1979 Australia officially recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Although neither the Netherlands nor Australia undertook to change the political status of East Timor, they have consistently been concerned about human rights. In the West New Guinea case fear for human rights violations and implementation of the principle of self-determination were clearly, albeit implicitly linked. The Timor case, however, is an example where concern over human rights was expressed after a denial of self-determination and without relating those concerns to the denial of self-determination.

When comparing how Australia and the Netherlands between 1974 and 1992 tried to balance their interests in their relations with Indonesia against their concern about denial of self-determination and violations of human rights one will find that the Australian policy was more careful, conciliatory, and diplomatic than the policy of the Netherlands, which contained stronger rhetoric and some punitive elements. How can one explain these differences; why did the Dutch government push the human rights element to the verge of a break-down in relations with Indonesia after the 1991 Dili massacre (see Chapter VI); and why was the reaction of the Australian government to those events so much more restrained? This last question is particularly relevant since both Australia and the Netherlands pay lip-service to the same internationally recognised human rights. Peculiarities of their relationships with Indonesia will partly explain those differences, but it will be argued in this thesis that differences in foreign policy making processes are important as well.
Having raised a number of questions the central problem of this thesis will be discussed in the next section.

5. Research focus

Having concluded that the relationship with Indonesia is important to Australia and the Netherlands, but that both countries also regard human rights as a major element in their foreign policy, and having noted the difference in emphasis on promotion of the principle of self-determination in the two cases described, the following questions will be central in this thesis:

What explains the importance attributed to pursuit of self-determination and human rights in Dutch and Australian foreign policy in the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor; what explains the differences between the Netherlands and Australia; and why did both states put more emphasis on pursuit of self-determination in the case of West New Guinea than in the case of East Timor?

In order to answer these questions the process of foreign policy making in both states in the two cases will be reconstructed. The differences found make up the first component of an explanation of differences in importance attributed to self-determination and human rights in Dutch and Australian foreign policy. The international environment constitutes the second variable in the equation of foreign policy and will therefore also be considered. The interplay between foreign policy making processes and the international environment as faced by
Australia and the Netherlands will comprehensively explain differences in foreign policy between the two states. An explanation for the difference in emphasis on self-determination between the two case studies will look for changes in the domestic side of foreign policy making and relate those to changes in the international environment. Thus the three central questions allow us to make a very interesting double comparison, hence a two by two research design.

Given the general similarities between Australia and the Netherlands, while also recognising certain differences, most notably Indonesia’s proximity to Australia, explaining self-determination as an element in the policies of the two states becomes an important task. Disclosing relations between the international environment and a state’s foreign policy making processes will help increase our understanding of foreign policy making, and particularly help to better comprehend why states pursue particular interests and goals. The time span separating the two case studies is particularly suitable in this respect, as it allows for an investigation into the effects of changes in the international and domestic attitudes towards the principle of self-determination and political and civil human rights. Also a study can be made of the impact of changes in the structural components of the international system on the pursuit of human rights in the foreign policy of Australia and the Netherlands.

The issue of West Papuan self-determination will be studied from the 1940s until 1992. The emphasis will be on the Dutch-Indonesian clash in the second half of the 1950s and 1962, and particularly on the period when Cabinet De Quay was in office in the Netherlands. This
political landmark formed a clear caesura in the perception and thus the pursuit of self-determination for the West Papuans in both Dutch and Australian foreign policy.

The Timor case will be studied from the revolution in Portugal in April 1974 until 1992. The termination of the aid relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia marks an end to an era and forms a proper conclusion to the discussion of self-determination and observance of political and civil rights as elements in Dutch and Australian foreign policy in the case of East Timor.

6. Human rights and self-determination

Having outlined the intention to explain differences in emphasis on self-determination and civil and political human rights in Dutch and Australian foreign policy in the two cases, the focus needs to be on the conceptual development of self-determination from principle to human right. But first the concept of human rights will be defined and the connection between civil and political human rights, self-determination and foreign policy explained.

The acceptance that "human rights are the rights that everyone should have by virtue of his or her very humanity," forms a proper starting point for this discussion on human rights. For this study it is relevant to classify human rights into civil and political, social, cultural, and economic rights. Although these five categories are interrelated, this study will concentrate on civil and political rights, because a government can directly prevent violations of human
rights in these categories and can therefore be held directly accountable. Using the definition of human rights, governments witnessing violations of civil and political rights carry a moral responsibility to intervene in a situation that can, in theory at least, be rapidly reversed, unlike the case of denial of social, economic and cultural human rights. This is no denial of the theoretical relation between the five categories, nor a rejection of a policy-theoretical perspective on the relationship between for example development aid and political preconditions required to achieve development. But this study focuses on political and civil rights only, these being a source of tension between states in the context of sovereignty and self-determination.

The civil and political rights under consideration are mentioned in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and include, *inter alia*: the right to life, liberty and security of the person; the right to a fair trial; freedom from slavery, torture and arbitrary arrest; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; and the right of free elections, universal suffrage and participation in public affairs.7

The Indonesian government has been accused of large scale and systematic violations of these civil and political human rights in West New Guinea and East Timor. In this study it is claimed that the population’s dissatisfaction over denial of the right to self-determination has

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been a continuing source of tension that resulted in a further Indonesian clamp down on any nationalist expressions and violations of civil and political rights. The Indonesian response set in motion a vicious circle of political discontent and further repression. Therefore it is argued that violations of civil and political human rights in West New Guinea and East Timor find their origin mainly in Indonesia’s denial of self-determination to the West Papuans and East Timorese. As will be shown, this causal relation has often been denied by policy makers in Australia and the Netherlands, with major implications for the way these problems have been dealt with in the foreign policy of these two states. Notwithstanding the denial of the cause of continuing human rights violations in West New Guinea and East Timor, these violations formed a main source of contestation in Dutch and Australian relations with Indonesia.

Since the origin of the human rights problems in West New Guinea and East Timor is hard to deny for any outsider, it is essential to study the denial of self-determination in both cases and see why the indigenous populations have remained unwilling to accept integration with Indonesia for so long. Linking the past to the present in a meaningful way in the two case studies requires a discussion of the development of the meaning given to the concept of self-determination by the international community at large and the implications of this meaning with respect to application of the principle of self-determination to West New Guinea and East Timor.
The principle of self-determination first became prominent when the American President Wilson promoted it during World War I.8 At that stage the principle -- only to be applied in Europe -- gave people the right to determine the sovereignty over the territory in which they lived. Right of conquest was incompatible with the right of people to choose their own rulers. By ‘people’ a nation was meant, since the latter was regarded as based internally upon the will of its members.9 Wilson intended to offer a solution to the political chaos in Europe, caused by instability of states composed of multiple ethnic minorities. Application of self-determination would remove a source of conflict, dissecting states which had come into being by means of war and conquest. Based upon a democratic will there was harmony between ethnicity and sovereignty of the state.

As Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant showed, the principle did not apply to the populations of colonies: “[These] peoples [are] not yet able to stand by them-selves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”10 The potentially disastrous implications for political stability if the concept was applied to multi-ethnic and multi-cultural colonies had not yet been understood. However, after World War II the principle would be applied pre-eminently to colonial territories. During the debates the anti-colonialist coalition changed the

9 Also see Gardiner’s ‘historical meaning’ of self-determination. The concept described the dissection of the European empires into linguistically and culturally homogenous nation states. L. Gardiner, East Timor: Self-Determination?, Master of International Studies thesis, Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Sydney, 1993, p.34.
meaning of the concept, with serious consequences for minorities in newly independent states.\textsuperscript{11}

After World War II the international community accepted the principle of self-determination. Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter stated that the purpose of the UN was “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples.” Article 55 of the Charter reasserted the principle. The third pillar to form the premises of a future legal concept of self-determination, Article 73 of the Charter, linked the colonial context and required, \textit{inter alia}:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation... to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions.\textsuperscript{12}

The term self-determination subsequently appeared in a number of important UN documents such as the Covenants on Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. These declarations and covenants further developed the concept. However, this process invoked much debate as

\textsuperscript{11} For a comprehensive discussion of this problem of meaning and application see L. Gardiner’s discussion of the two main interpretations of self-determination which vied for dominance. Self-determination in the colonial context, ‘territorial self-determination’, is the creation of new and independent states on the borders of the former colonial states, denying any relevance to cultural and linguistic boundaries. ‘Indigenous self-determination’ acknowledges the contradiction between independence of the former colonial states and the denial of the claims of indigenous people residing under their domination to determine their own political future. Gardiner, op. cit., p.35.
self-determination proved to be a confusing, and highly contested concept. Recurring questions in the debates were: what is meant by ‘determination’; who is ‘self’; under what conditions should ‘self’ be granted the right to ‘determine’; and, to what extent is the principle a right in the sense that it is enforceable? The following discussion will elaborate on the meaning given to the various elements of ‘self-determination’ during successive meetings of the United Nations.

The Third meeting of the General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing the need to devote an article to self-determination in the Covenants on human rights. The text should read: “All peoples shall have the right to self-determination.” Further the article should stipulate:

All States, including those having responsibility for non-self governing and Trust Territories, should promote the realisation of this right in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN, and the states having responsibility for the administration of non-self governing territories should promote realisation of that right in relation to the peoples of such territories.

It was further decided that the right of self-determination should be granted to the people of non-self governing territories on their demand for self-government, the popular will being

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14 Ibid. This draft resolution was adopted in February 1952. The final text of Article 1 of the covenant, passed at the Eighth session of the Third Committee, was an exact copy of the first article of the covenant adopted in 1966.
ascertained through a plebiscite held under the auspices of the UN.15 Australia and the Netherlands both voted against the resolution, which received Indonesia’s support.

The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in December 1960, was yet another milestone in the development of the concept of self-determination. The Declaration recommended that political power in all dependent territories be transferred to the people in accordance with their freely expressed will.16 Principle IX of UN General Resolution 1541 (XV) finally described the exact conditions that make an act of self-determination genuine:

A. the [integrating] Territory should have attained an advanced state of self-government with free political institutions so that its peoples have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes;
B. [the integration should be] the result of the freely expressed wishes of the Territory’s peoples acting with knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage.17

Thus gradually the principle of self-determination became an established right in the context of decolonisation. Preferably through a plebiscite should the people of the colony, or the non-self governing territory be given the opportunity to freely decide their future.

15 Johnson, op. cit., p.38. Resolution 637 (VII) also expressed the desire to ascertain the people’s wishes through a plebiscite or other recognised democratic means, preferably under UN auspices. Ibid., p.39.
16 Quoted from United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
In the 1950s and early 1960s the case of West New Guinea was far from clear, however, and allowed Indonesia and the Netherlands to assume diametrically opposed positions. Indonesia defined self-determination as the end of colonial rule and the founding of an independent sovereign state as the natural heir to the entire territory of the former colonial state: the declaration of independence was also the expression of self-determination. This view gave priority to the interests of the sovereign state and refused to acknowledge any potential contradiction and conflict between the state and its peoples. The Netherlands rejected Indonesia as successor to its colonial administration and demanded a separate act of self-determination for the racially and culturally distinct Papuans. Applying the conditions set out in Principle IX of UNGA resolution 1541 (XV) it could be argued, however, that the Papuans did not qualify for self-determination in the absence of firmly established free pre-existing political institutions.

Neither the UN Charter nor the Human Rights Covenants fully support the stand taken by any of the parties. In Article 1 (2) the term 'people' is used, but does this mean a nation only, or could the term also be used for an ethnic minority? If an ethnic minority or indigenous people\(^\text{18}\) can under certain conditions have a right to self-determination, how will this affect relations between states supporting this claim and the state denying this claim? Attributing this meaning to self-determination would create a contradiction with the principle of developing friendly relations between nations, which is also mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter.
Although in the covenants ‘principle’ has been replaced by ‘right’ suggesting that self-determination is enforceable, conditions under which a ‘people’ has an acknowledged claim to self-determination are not specified. Another problem concerned the meaning attributed to political status. The distinction was between internal and external self-determination. Internal self-determination, the concept supported by Indonesia, implied the right of authentic self-government, understood as freedom from totalitarian regimes. Internal self-determination and state sovereignty go together, resulting in a denial of interference by other states into the ‘domestic’ affairs of a state. External self-determination, as supported by the Netherlands, meant freedom from outside coercion or alien domination. Ethnicity played an important role in deciding over what was ‘alien’. Not surprisingly the Indonesian leaders, ruling a multi-ethnic state, did not endorse this idea. States were at liberty to choose the argumentation that best suited their interests. As will be shown, alliance considerations in particular explain much of the voting behaviour in the United Nations on this matter in the 1950s and in 1961.

Unlike the West New Guinea case, East Timor’s case of self-determination was incontestable. Resolution 1542, adopted by the 15th UNGA, recognised Portuguese Timor as a non-self-governing territory under UN Charter Article 73 and as such Portuguese Timor possessed the right of self-determination. From 1962 onwards the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions, starting with resolution 1807 (XVII) reaffirming this right. Indonesia never contested that Portuguese Timor was eligible for self-determination. The question was whether the Timorese had been given a proper chance to execute their right.

18 See L. Gardiner, who refers to indigenous self-determination also called the second
under Indonesian authority. Following a by Indonesia controlled process of self-determination Indonesian officials declared the matter closed for international scrutiny since this would be interference in Indonesia’s domestic affairs. However, since this ‘act of self-determination’ failed to meet any of the conditions mentioned in resolution 1541 (XV) the UN has not accepted Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor. Without a proper act of self-determination Indonesia’s presence and proclaimed annexation have remained illegal. In accordance with article 25 of the UN Charter, which declares Security Council Resolutions binding upon members, Indonesia should abide by UN Security Council Resolution 384 which demands a withdrawal.

7. West New Guinea and East Timor in international perspective

Given the comparative nature of this study it is essential to highlight the international context in which Australia and the Netherlands had to design their foreign policy. Not only is it important to emphasise similarities and differences in the impact of international conditions on the two states, it is also important to show how the international circumstances in the 1950s differed from those in the 1970s and later, so as to draw a comprehensive comparison between the two cases.

The world of the 1950s was strongly bipolarised, with two military superpowers dominating international politics. The United States and the Soviet Union had both formed strong political and military alliances in Europe, where a geopolitical stalemate was reached. Given
the extent of the ideological differences between the two opposing blocs security considerations assumed ascendancy in their foreign policy. The international behaviour of individual states was strongly influenced by the political and security interests of the respective alliances, and so it was not surprising that the Cold War conflict had spread outside Europe by the end of the 1940s, when a growing number of colonies in Asia secured independence. Although a movement of non-aligned countries slowly emerged in the 1950s, even before this Asian states could put to use the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to bargain for economic and political favours.

Anti-colonialism was another trend in the 1950s, and it allowed the Soviet Union to make considerable headway in its efforts to increase its influence in Asia. To the United States and especially its European allies the colonial past was a burden, forcing them to proceed with tact. Each local conflict over independence between a European power and its colony in Asia ran the risk of spinning out of control and becoming part of the all out competition between East and West, allowing the Soviet Union to make friends with the independence movement which would (in practice) sooner or later take over from the colonial administration. Thus decolonisation and the rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO strongly influenced political developments in Asia, but also debates in the United Nations where both Cold War parties were keen to ensure the support of the newly independent states. Voting in the UN was in accordance with alliance interests, often giving the newly independent states a decisive voice. Realist considerations (see Chapter II) prevailed over moralism in international politics, with security issues to the fore. How were Australia and the Netherlands affected by these international conditions when they approached the
problem of West New Guinea’s future? In order to answer this question it is important to
distinguish other international actors closely involved in the issue as well.

The Netherlands and Australia both belonged to the US camp, the former as a NATO ally
and a recipient of Marshall Plan aid and the latter as an ANZUS partner. For their security
they strongly depended on the United States. Although the core security interests of the
Netherlands were not at stake, any reinforcements sent in defence of West New Guinea had
to be withdrawn from Europe, weakening NATO’s defences. Being a NATO member the
Netherlands could count on political support from its allies as long as the interests of the
alliance itself were not put at risk. However in Southeast Asia, where anti-colonialist
sentiments were strong in the 1950s, notably in Vietnam where a major conflict was
developing, and with the chances of damage to the Western alliance very real should
Indonesia turn to the USSR for support, or worse become communist due to the conflict
with the Netherlands over the future of West New Guinea, Western interests were very
much at stake. The Netherlands could not ignore these strategic interests, which would
increasingly direct its policy.

The Second World War had shown Australia’s vulnerability as a Western outpost in a
hostile Asian environment. Great Britain had not been able to offer Australia adequate
support when the Japanese rapidly conquered all of Southeast Asia in 1941-2. Australia had
therefore turned to the United States for its defence, while after the war the presence of
European powers in Southeast Asia again diminished quickly, confronting Australia with an
unfamiliar environment that was going through a phase of rapid transition. As the war had
shown Australia was particularly vulnerable from the North. Being unable to defend its own huge territory a forward defence strategy was developed in which the support of Great Britain and especially the United States was critical. In its attempt to come to terms with its new environment Australia tried to build this forward defence through support for a continued presence of European powers in the region, while also trying to establish good relations with Indonesia, its new northern neighbour. This recent history, decolonisation and the Cold War brought an entirely new kind of insecurity to the forefront of Australia’s foreign policy and, as the discussion of the West New Guinea dispute will show, Australia had great difficulty in adapting to the challenge.

As indicated above the policy of the United States regarding Southeast Asia was very much affected by its military and political rivalry with the Soviet Union. Given hostile local feelings towards the colonial powers, who happened to be its allies, the United States had to proceed with tact so as not to alienate newly independent states of the region, especially Indonesia. Being strategically positioned in Southeast Asia, Indonesia had yet to come to terms with its new status and its internal political situation was volatile. Anti colonialist sentiment against the Netherlands ran high over the West New Guinea issue, which from the beginning constrained the United States from adopting a position in favour of the Netherlands given the risk of driving the Indonesian government closer to the Soviet Union. Thus the United States was not willing to give political, let alone military, support to the cause of self-determination in Eastern Indonesia as defended by Australia and the Netherlands. The position of the United Kingdom was similar to that of the US. Support for self-determination for the Papuans of West New Guinea threatened to damage Western
strategic interests and for this reason the two countries would not support the Netherlands in its dispute with Indonesia.

The Indonesian government skilfully exploited its strategic position. Playing the colonial card in the United Nations, Indonesia managed to secure the support of many newly independent states as well as the Soviet Union and its allies. Voting behaviour in the UN was not a result of the outcome of a debate on the meaning of self-determination in a colonial context, but of alliance interests. Linking its internal stability to the West New Guinea issue Indonesia attempted to isolate the Netherlands from its political supporters and to bring in the United States, whom it knew could not stand idle in a conflict from which communists were likely to benefit.

In the 1970s the world was still dominated by great power rivalry, expressed in political confrontation in international organisations, the arms race and military conflicts in Third World countries. Since the 1950s China had emerged as a third major power and was able to influence the balance of power in Asia. The search for unity among former colonial states in Africa and Asia had continued in the Non-Aligned Movement, but disagreement still prevailed partly due to difference in interests and the search for lucrative deals that could be closed with either the United States or the Soviet Union, both still caught up in their battle for supremacy and continuing their efforts to persuade governments to join their ranks. This search for allies was no longer fully dominated by a desire to exert control over strategically located areas, but was also influenced by the need to have access to raw materials, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis.
Southeast Asia was at the centre of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the war in Vietnam reached its climax. Faced with growing domestic opposition the US decided to pull out, knowing that the North Vietnamese communists would probably overrun its allies in the South. In 1975 the war indeed came to an end with the victory of North Vietnam. The American government believed that this turn of events threatened the security and stability of the entire region, as the other states could “fall” as well, like domino’s. Nevertheless the US did not want to be dragged into another military conflict as Nixon had declared in his policy speech in Guam, which became known as the Nixon Doctrine (1970). Basically this implied greater self-reliance for states, but the US would continue to offer economic support and supply military equipment.

One important potential ally of the United States was Indonesia, whose military government was thought to be pro-Western, although officially remaining neutral. Also Indonesia was an important member of the Non-Aligned Movement, very rich in raw materials and strategically located between the Indian Pacific Oceans. In America’s strategy for the region, which was still compellingly directed by Cold War motives, Indonesia played an important role. Ties with Jakarta were therefore carefully cultivated, which largely explains the position of the US in the debate over East Timorese self-determination.

Since the forced abandonment of West New Guinea in 1962, the Netherlands had turned its back on Asia preferring to concentrate on Europe and the Atlantic region, where its core
economic and security interests lay. The Netherlands had remained a loyal NATO ally in the 1960s, but in the later years of the Vietnam war public criticism of the US had mounted. Although the country had found a new equilibrium, it was left with a post-colonial syndrome: the decolonisation of both Indonesia and West New Guinea had gone badly wrong, humiliating a country that had regarded its colonial administration as enlightened. The Netherlands therefore immediately used the opportunity to improve its relation with Indonesia when Suharto came to power in 1964-5, offering political and large scale economic support. Hence the past strongly influenced Dutch policy, which coincided with the strategic interests of the NATO to support a potentially friendly regime.

As for Australia, it faced some major changes in the early 1970s which resulted in a period of reflection during Gough Whitlam’s term as Prime Minister, between 1972 and 1975. Until 1972 successive governments had identified Australia’s interests with the United States to such a degree Australia had even sent some troops to Vietnam. When the US indicated it was going to reduce its involvement in Southeast Asia, Australia had to reconsider its position as well. The country would for its defence be more self-reliant, and the previous “forward defence” strategy was all but abandoned. Australia had to become more enmeshed politically with the states in its proximity, notably Indonesia. Supporting Southeast Asia politically and economically could help stabilise the region’s security situation, hence serving Australia’s security interests, and more trade could make up for the loss of the British market to Australian products. Thus in the early 1970s a swift general reorientation in Australian policy occurred based on a reassessment of the country’s security, political and economic interests in Southeast Asia.
The conflict in East Timor, and the response to the Indonesian invasion, should be seen in the context of the overall security situation in Southeast Asia, which the US considered unstable, and the important role that Indonesia could play in the region. No Western power was interested in getting involved in another prolonged military conflict. Even though the case for application of the principle of self-determination to East Timor was clear, the assessment of its strategic interests alone guided the US.

When comparing the international conditions surrounding the East Timor case with those surrounding the West New Guinea case, it seems justifiable to argue that there was no fundamental difference: security interests dominated the foreign policy agenda of states. Even though the concept of self-determination had become more clearly established, and was obviously applicable to the case of East Timor, a state’s decision whether or not to support self-determination was still conditional on its security interests and on those of its major allies. When the Cold War came to an end in the 1980s, security interests had no longer such high priority in foreign policy, allowing states to pay attention to other interests as well.

By contrast to the West New Guinea case the Netherlands was no longer physically present in the region when the East Timorese demanded self-determination. The international security environment was therefore no longer to be as restricting as it had been in the previous case. But given Indonesia’s proximity, and the region’s unstable security situation, the international environment strongly influenced Australia’s foreign policy priorities, leaving it little room to consider other interests but its security. To this day Australia, unlike the
Netherlands, has to consider Indonesia’s proximity, when it tries to adopt a plausible position on self-determination for East Timor. As the discussion of the cases will show, Indonesia’s proximity is an important variable, which partly helps to explain why the Netherlands and Australia differed markedly in their approach to self-determination for East Timor.

8. Methods of research

In order to understand and explain the various elements in Australian and Dutch foreign policy in the two case studies, it is essential to reproduce both the policy making process and the foreign policy itself. The concepts of policy and policy making will be explained in Chapter II. Here it suffices to state that the so-called means-goals interpretation of a policy text,19 was used to uncover networks of means and goals which policy makers designed to pursue certain ultimate policy objectives.20

As much as possible primary sources were used for an accurate reconstruction of these foreign policy frameworks. In the Netherlands the Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the National Archives in The Hague helped to gain invaluable insight into policy making at departmental and cabinet level. In Australia the Australian Archives in Canberra provided many first class primary sources.

In order to increase insight into foreign policy making processes in Australia and the Netherlands it was essential to discover which individuals, organisations, and parts of the

19 See Van de Graaf, op. cit., p.63.
bureaucracy tried to influence the foreign policy in each phase of the foreign policy making process, and to disclose how institutional arrangements and decision making procedures helped or obstructed these actors in their efforts. Also it was essential to find out what views these participants advocated, what power resources they had at their disposal, and what coalitions were formed. A number of interviews with politicians, civil servants and representatives of human rights organisations helped to find the necessary information, as did a literature study of government statements, parliamentary documents, articles in serials and newspapers.

In Chapter II a model will be developed for understanding and comparing foreign policy making in Australia and the Netherlands. A succinct discussion of theories on foreign policy making will introduce the building of this model. Chapter III will further relate the theoretical findings of Chapter II to institutions and processes of foreign policy making in Australia and the Netherlands. In this chapter a number of hypotheses will be formulated regarding self-determination and human rights in Dutch and Australian foreign policy in the two case studies. The West New Guinea case, covering all major developments between 1946 and 1992 regarding the question of self-determination for the West Papuans, and Dutch and Australian policy forms the subject of Chapters IV and V respectively. In Chapters VI and VII Dutch and Australian policy regarding the East Timor case will be studied between 1974 and 1992. Chapter VIII will analyse and compare the findings.

20 For a comprehensive description of this method see G. Kuypers, *Beginselen van*
Chapter II

Foreign policy theories and foreign policy making processes in the Netherlands and Australia

1. Introduction

The theoretical framework to be constructed in this chapter should enable us to answer the central questions of the thesis formulated in Chapter I. This requires a succinct discussion of the main theories in the field of foreign policy and international relations used to explain foreign policy of states. In particular one must establish what room there is, according to those schools of thought, for human rights to become an element in a state’s foreign policy. It will be argued that the answer to this question partly depends on where one locates the sources of a state’s foreign policy, in other words a state’s degree of autonomic decision making power. Section 2 of this chapter will discuss the merits and weaknesses of theories that look for external ‘systemic’ or ‘structural’ explanations of foreign policy, where the behaviour of a state is predominantly determined by a set of international conditions. Section 3 will focus on foreign policy theories that share a focus on domestic or intra state variables as offering the best way to explain a state’s foreign policy. Section 4 will integrate elements of both international relations and foreign policy theories into one model suitable for comparative research into the process of foreign policy making. The model will depict the hypothetical causal relations between international-structural sources and domestic sources in foreign policy making of a state. It will be argued that a model which views foreign policy
making as a process with activities and participants distinctive in time offers the best chance
to encompass both external and internal influences in a comparative model of foreign policy.
The chapter will subsequently discuss the hypothetical input of certain functionally distinctive
categories of actors into foreign policy making in Australia and the Netherlands.

2. International relations theories and foreign policy: a structural explanation of state behaviour

Generic for systemic and structural foreign policy theories is the weight attributed to forces external to a state as explaining its behaviour. If these characteristics determine the foreign policy goals, domestic sources of foreign policy can be repudiated. It would therefore depend on the nature of the international system whether human rights issues could be of any concern to a state in its foreign policy. Theories of the nature of the international system, and also of the extent to which this international system shapes a state’s foreign policy agenda have changed over the years. Classical realism was succeeded by neorealism, with regime theories as refinements. Doubts about the nature of the international system as well as acknowledgment of a change or widening of the agenda resulted in the emergence of transnationalism and interdependence theories. A review of the main theoretical developments regarding the nature of the international system and the implications for a state's foreign policy will follow below.
Realists shared the view of an essentially anarchic international system where states were sovereign for lack of a central international authority.\(^1\) Domestic and inter-national politics were radically separated. Inter-state relations were characterised by a never ending struggle for survival. This international anarchy and conflicting desires and scarcity of resources stirred up rivalry. Thus the state of the international system dictates and explains the goals and behaviour of individual states. As survival was permanently at stake a purely realist framework would leave no room for any moral foreign policy according to Hoffmann.\(^2\) Hoffmann himself contested the idea that survival was permanently at stake and therefore argued that even a realist framework would leave states room to be concerned with moral issues, albeit to a limited extent.\(^3\)

Classical realism treated the state as a unitary and purposeful, and in this sense, rational actor in the pursuit of power. Realist analysis separated state and society and the behaviour of statesmen was seen as largely dictated by the conditions of the inter-national system.\(^4\) With the sources of behaviour of the state and its representatives externally located, realists

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\(^3\) Id.

\(^4\) Mastandano tries to overcome the gap between classical realism and structural realism, a variation to realism which explains state behaviour at a systemic level and particularly through structural differences, by relating structural determinants, ruling the foreign policy goals of a state, to the resources available to statesmen pursuing these goals. For a thorough discussion see Michael Mastandano, David D. Lake, and John G. Ikenberry, ‘Toward a Realist Theory of State Action’, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.33, no.4 (December1989), pp.457-475.
attributed very little significance to any internal characteristics of the state or idiosyncratic variations.

The traditional realist view of international politics became discredited in the 1970s. The transnationalist and interdependency approaches challenged the realist focus on the state as the only relevant subject of study. They also questioned the anarchic nature of the international system, and discerned changes in composition of the foreign policy agenda and emphasis put on achieving the various goals. Keohane and Nye conclude that systemic forces, albeit very important, do not completely determine state behaviour. A system offers both constraints and opportunities. With the emergence of multinational companies the state is no longer the only actor in international politics. Since those new actors have different interests and goals, a widening of the foreign policy agenda is the result.

Interdependence and regime theories also question the postulated anarchic nature of the international system: "The presence of effective rules...undermines the stereotype of international relations as defined by anarchy."\(^5\) Pointing to asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power Keohane and Nye tried to link the concept of interdependence to realism. While power remained a basic ordering principle, the meaning of the term was widened and could encompass economic factors as well.\(^6\) In his later work Keohane

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reverted to realism, albeit modified, when he concentrated again on international regimes and institutions as the principal sources of foreign policy.\(^7\)

Although less rigid than realism in attributing explaining power to the structure of the international system, thus leaving a state more leeway to pursue goals not directly related to its survival, and expanding the number of issues at stake in international relations, adherents of interdependence still bent to supranational explanations of foreign policy. Regarding supranational institutions as the result of well-considered interest maximising behaviour of state representatives, moral considerations played no role. Although sub-national interests were claimed to be considered, in fact they remained unimportant.

Kenneth Waltz swung the pendulum back towards structures as the determinants behind state behaviour. He rigorously separated systemic theories from reductionist theories, the latter being: "Theories of international politics that concentrate on causes at the individual or national level."\(^8\) Theories that conceived of causes operating at the international level as well were called systemic. According to Waltz a system consisted of a structure and its interacting parts. A systemic theory had to show what separated the structure from the level of the units. Anarchy was thought of as the prevailing principle responsible for the creation of the structure. Ubiquitous hostility and the desire to survive, forced states, viewed as unitary,

\(^7\) Although Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', *International Organization*, vol.41, no.4 (Autumn 1987), pp.725-753, concluded that a system left a state room to manoeuvre and that in explaining state behaviour perceptions of interests held by actors within states had to be considered, they refrained from doing so themselves. In his later work Keohane in fact solely concentrated on international arrangements to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states. See for example Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', pp.325-356; also see Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989.
rational actors, to give priority to maximising their security. A balance of power resulted in stability: "Power begets order."9

States were regarded as like units, meaning functionally similar. However, in their capacity to perform their tasks states differed. According to Waltz only changes in power configurations resulted in structural changes. He attributed everlasting, unquestioned importance to power as the ordering principle of structure. Structural realism or neorealism were terms often used to describe Waltz's creation, a most draconic and rigorous form of realism that gave total primacy to structural determinist explanations of state behaviour. As a consequence, there was no need to consider differences among the units, or persons representing these units.10

Given that the struggle for power was a structurally determined goal for all statesman, any consideration of human rights was only hypothetical if it would make a contribution to this power struggle.

Waltz’s creation has been severely criticised as being a positivist ossification of the present order, for Waltz attributed no relevance to agents shaping and changing the structure in which they operate. Thus he was accused of analysing the present order without any

8 Quoted from Waltz, op. cit., p.18.
10 See Lloyd Jensen, who extensively discusses a similar argument put forward by Evan Luard in his book, Types of International Society, New York, Free Press, 1976. Jensen claims that systemic structures will largely shape the character of participants so that they become very much alike in terms of motives, means, stratification, internal structure, roles, norms and institutions. Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1982, p.251; also see Emmanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress', in Emmanuel Adler
historical context.\footnote{Also see Richard K. Ashley, ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, vol.25, no.2 (June 1981), pp.204-237.} Waltz’s notion of power as the only variable shaping structures which in turn create order has also come under severe attack. Particularly the assumption that structure was something more than the amalgamation of the constituent parts, with holistic explanations as an epistemological consequence, has been a matter of intense ontological debate. Methodological individualists denied any ontological status to the aggregates and opted for the study of the composing elements. To them a system was no more than the sum of its elements. Ascribing an independent deterministic role to the whole over the parts was unacceptable. The initiative lay with agents as generators of structures.\footnote{See Richard Little, ‘Three Approaches to the International System: Some Ontological and Epistemological Considerations’, \textit{British Journal of International Studies}, vol.3, no.3 (October 1977), p.269-286.} This notion created explicit room for states, and their representatives, to have some input into the system to which they belong.

In his incisive criticism of the 'neorealists' Ashley joined the methodological individualists in his attack on the structuralist, statist, utilitarian and positivist foundations of Waltz's work.\footnote{See Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, pp.225-287.} As neorealism located the sources of behaviour in deep, all encompassing social structures, the study of everyday politics would become obsolete.\footnote{Ibid., p.235.} Ashley discarded the positivist reification of the national interest, treated as the efficient achievement of a set of given goals, and replaced it with a balancing act in which statesmen had to find a temporary equilibrium between the demands of their constituents and the constraints of the international system.
between all aspects of power.\textsuperscript{15} In Ashley's comment, preserving power as an explaining force coincided with the creation of policy leeway for the representatives of states, their agents, operating in ever changing structures. The dissection of neorealism led Ashley to a nostalgic return to reviled classical realism, granting representatives of states at least some role in deciding over the foreign policy agenda.

(Neo)realism and other structural theories have failed to offer a structural deterministic framework suitable for predicting state behaviour. Some of their assumptions regarding the agenda of foreign policy, with military and economic goals to be aimed at only, have been proven fallacious by the sheer fact that idealist goals such as human rights are being pursued, as Hoffmann has pointed out. However, by showing the impact of power and uncertainty in an international environment in which anarchy in many fields has not been superseded by institutional arrangements or regimes, structural theories do delineate limits and opportunities for states in their choice of goals and the means for their pursuit. States do have certain externally dictated interests, but in order to explain the foreign policy of a state domestic characteristics are supplementary.

Summarising the findings of the discussion, there is a need to study states as elements of a larger, mainly anarchic structure. This structure, almost devoid of rules, forces states to give primacy to pursuit of their economic and security interests. But even this rigid interest oriented structural argument leaves states with some room to pursue moral interests as well. Explaining why states pursue human rights thus requires a study of variables that influence foreign policy making within states. This effort will be undertaken in the next section.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.272.
3. Domestic explanations of foreign policy

Agreement may exist on the direction in which to search for explanations of foreign policy, namely inside the state, but the ultimate domestic sources of foreign policy are disputed. In this section a synthetic approach to the domestic sources of the foreign policy of the Netherlands and Australia is advocated; therefore the main models developed by theorists will be discussed on their merits and shortcomings.

Graham Allison’s pioneering study ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, which made him the progenitor of the school that stresses the role of the bureaucracy in foreign policy making, in which he distinguished the organisational process model and the governmental politics model as foreign policy paradigms, forms a suitable start to the construction of the domestic elements in this study’s comparative foreign policy model.16

Allison regarded the organisational process model of foreign policy as the outcome of standard operating procedures used by the organisations making up a government. As a

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16 The rational actor model, Allison’s third paradigm, closely resembles the realist approach to foreign policy. As the various realist approaches were discussed in the previous section, Allison’s rational actor model will not be elaborated. For a discussion of this model see Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1982, p.5. Allison’s and Morton Halperin’s work on decision making and bargaining show striking similarities. In their later work both authors have combined the organisational process and governmental politics model in the bureaucratic politics model. See for example Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1974.
large organisation, a government consisted of numerous smaller units, each functioning according to its own standard operating procedures. Many different units were involved in foreign policy questions, all with their own particular parochial views and priorities. Institutions were presumed to dominate individuals and roles were thought to shape policy preferences more than idiosyncratic variables. Explaining a policy decision entailed no more than identification of the relevant organisations and display of the patterns of organisational behaviour: "From what organisational context and pressures did a particular decision emerge?"\(^{18}\)

In Allison’s second paradigm, the governmental politics model, also known as the bureaucratic politics model, politics is seen as a bargaining game.\(^{19}\) The bargaining takes place along regularised, parochial circuits among players hierarchically positioned within the bureaucracy. A decision is the resultant of intra-bureaucratic bargaining processes: the outcome of compromise, conflict, and confusion between bureaucrats with diverse interests and unequal influence.\(^{20}\) Thus Allison’s paradigm dissected the national interest into a variety of domestic interests, their pursuit dependent upon intra-bureaucratic features. A researcher can explain a decision by identifying the game, the participants and their coalitions, and the compromises reached.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{19}\) Since Allison intends to take into account all members of the bureaucracy, the term bureaucratic politics model better covers the all encompassing meaning.

\(^{20}\) See Allison, op. cit., p.162.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p.145.
A case-study should disclose the players and their perceptions. Allison inclined to positional bureaucratic determinism as the explanation for an actor's perceptions. Halperin agreed but attributed more weight to organisational interests as shaping the stand of participants on matters relating to national interests; parochial interests presumably affected bureaucratic views regarding national interests.

A player's impact on the outcome was determined by his power, defined as: "Effective influence on governmental decisions." Power consisted of bargaining advantages, skill and will in applying these advantages, and other players' perception of the first two elements.

Finally, according to Allison’s theory one needed to understand how participants' views, power, and actions together yielded a policy decision. Allison used action channel, "a regularised means of taking government action on a specific kind of issue," as an explaining concept. Their position tied participants to these action channels, which were therefore seen as dictating the moment of entrance into the bargaining process, and distributing (dis)advantages for each bargaining process.

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22 Ibid., p.166. Contesting this structural-positional determinism, adherents of pluralism assert that a person's convictions continues to influence a person's view when this person takes on a position in the bureaucracy. It is the linkage between interests in society and representatives in the bureaucracy and government.

23 See Morton H. Halperin, op. cit., p.52; see also Barry B. Hughes who regards the organisational process model and the bureaucratic decision model as two of a kind. So, "where you stand depends on where you sit," is true for both models. Quoted from Barry B. Hughes, op. cit., p.11.

24 Allison, op. cit., p.168.

25 Ibid., p.169.
The bureaucratic politics model has been correctly criticised for its narrow focus on the executive, denying any significance to the role of the legislator. Society, and organisations representing societal interests, do not come into play either. The bureaucracy seems to drift in an ocean of societal and causal emptiness. Allison's preference to explain decisions in terms of causal determinants that are scientifically investigable further fortified this impression. This sadly prompts him to dismiss general notions of goals and plans coexisting with bureaucrats’ preferences, making consistency in foreign policy almost unachievable.26 All too often a foreign policy is in fact very consistent, and pursuing what seem to be clear national interests, thus undermining Allison’s simplistic view that parochial interests dominate the decision making process. Finally, his conceptions of parochialism and intra-bureaucratic squabbles as directing foreign policy have been challenged as mere shallow reflections of deeper structures that provide the main thrust.27

As for the present study, since the research by Allison and Halperin pertains to the United States it remains to be seen whether a model that focuses primarily on the bureaucracy is appropriate to Australia and the Netherlands.

Also queries remain about the conditions under which decision making is best characterised as bureaucratic bickering. Rosati, distinguishing structure and process as the two elements of


the bureaucratic politics model, pursues this matter and convincingly concludes that on the structural side predominance of any one participant rules out the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model.\textsuperscript{28} Also, when only a few participants are involved, the situation is not suitable for application of the bureaucratic politics model.\textsuperscript{29} According to Rosati its appropriateness is contingent upon a certain relation between decision structure and decision process, whereby structure presumably determines process. The process in turn determines the outcome.

Challenging Rosati’s claim about the relation between the number of actors involved and the level of conflict Margaret and Charles Hermann stressed the role of the ‘ultimate decision unit’ in deciding foreign policy, which they defined as: “An individual, group of individuals, or multiple actors who have both the ability to commit or withhold the resources of the government in foreign affairs and the power or authority to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position without significant costs.”\textsuperscript{30} They did not repeat Allison’s mistake of studying a central element in the decision making process in isolation from its environment; rather they used the ultimate decision unit’s internal dynamics as a means to bring in or exclude external societal or international influences in their analysis.

\textsuperscript{28} Jerel A. Rosati, op. cit., pp.234-253.
\textsuperscript{29} Based on predominance and level of involvement as variables on the structural side of the model, Rosati concludes -- writing about the US government -- that a decision structure is characterised by either bureaucratic dominance, local dominance, or presidential dominance. Ibid., pp.247-248.
According to Charles and Margaret Hermann explaining foreign policy decisions required identification of the ultimate decision unit, which was said to vary with the nature of the case, and one had to fathom its internal dynamics as this decided whether external factors would come into play. They recognised three different types of ultimate decision units of which the 'single group' and 'multiple autonomous actors' may prove useful concepts for this comparative study. The Hermanns defined the single group as: "A set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, [who] collectively select a course of action in face-to-face interaction and obtain compliance." The second type of ultimate decision unit, multiple autonomous actors, was defined as: "Separate individuals, groups, or coalitions which, if some or all concur, can act for the government, but no one of which by itself has the ability to force compliance on the others." When agreement exists within the ultimate decision unit its internal dynamics shape the decision. The decision making process is self-contained within the group. In case of disagreement external penetration occurs, and the centre’s environment becomes a relevant factor in the analysis of decision making. For this research it is important to locate the centre of decision making in both case studies, to establish its composition, and to show the relation between (dis)harmony of the centre and the impact of the environment on policy making. It is also relevant to disclose whether domestic or international pressure disturbed the harmony of the centre.

31 The 'predominant leader' is the third type. The 'multiple autonomous actors' are also referred to as 'multiple autonomous groups'. See Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, 'How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behaviour', in C.F. Hermann, C.W. Kegley, Jr., and J.N. Rosenau (eds), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1980, pp.309-336.

The degree of harmony of the ultimate decision unit may serve as a theoretical concept for assessing the extent to which society must be taken into account in a foreign policy model, but again this notion suggests the unrealistic possibility of a centre functioning in isolation from society. A top-down process, in case of harmony among the main actors, is conceivable, but so too is the pluralist bottom-up concept based on a diffused decision making centre composed of actors representing societal interests. Both views are too simplistic. The relationship between society and decision making centre should be described as reciprocal. However, the exact nature of the relationship deserves further elaboration: what ideas find adherence in society, and through what cobweb of institutional structures linking society and state are these ideas funnelled? By widening the scope from ultimate decision unit to bring back in other state institutions involved in the decision making process, this perspective allows for a comparative analysis of complete institutions in terms of centralisation or diffusion and penetrability.

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33 Ibid., p.364
34 See for example the idea of the power elite. C.Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1956.
35 The pluralist notion of the role of bureaucrats is to be differentiated from the bureaucratic politics model perspective. Adherents of pluralism see officials as representatives of societal interests, whereas in the bureaucratic politics model the behaviour of officials is institutionally defined. The pluralist notion may be more appropriate to the United States where along with a change of government a significant part of the bureaucracy is replaced as well. In Australia and the Netherlands this is not the case. Therefore behaviour may well result from a bureaucrat's identification with his/her agency's interests. See Barry B. Hughes, op. cit., p.15.
How these institutions are used by actors depends on the way these actors are organised in coalitions and positioned in what are often called policy networks or policy communities. Risse-Kappen defines policy network as "[a] mechanism and process of interest representation by political parties and interest groups that link societal environment to the political system."\(^{38}\) This definition is inappropriate as it fails to mention members, either individuals or agencies, of the government and bureaucracy.

A policy community is a concept comparable to a policy network, and also attempts to explain policy making through a description of relations between actors. A policy community has a centre, the real policy making body, and a periphery. Dependent on the centre’s penetrability groups in the periphery can have an impact on the policy as well. A strong centre is often called a sub-government or iron triangle. In a sub-government the main executive agencies, departmental committees and key interest groups work together on an ongoing basis and control policy making in a particular area.\(^{39}\) Bargaining passes off quietly and the policy is stable and predictable.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) Ibid., p.485. Also see Paul Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.98. He defines a policy community as: "That part of the political system that -- by virtue of its functional responsibilities, its vested interests, and its specialised knowledge -- acquires a dominant voice in determining government decisions in a specific field of public activity, and is generally permitted by society at large and the public authorities in particular to determine public policy in this field."


\(^{40}\) See Charles Kegley who, in his effort to apply the international regime concept to the analysis of norms that could structure the decision making among key actors in the foreign policy making of a state, regards regularity, repetitiveness and predictability, as indicators of the existence of consensus among the leadership about substance of the policy to be pursued and the procedures via which goals should be accomplished. In such a decision regime the participants settle for less than optimal goal achievement due to their shared
The total domain of national policy is likely to consist of a number of interest communities, creating room for competition. Conflicts may arise both within and between policy communities. Over time policy communities change, as a consequence of the amalgamation or splitting of departments, bureaucratic reshuffles, and the emergence of new and influential interest groups.

When applying these ideas on a national scale, countries can be classified as either (neo)corporatist or pluralist. A state is called corporatist when the government takes decisions in close liaison with a few institutionalised interest groups, comparable to the concept of iron triangles. Wilson gives a proper definition of neo-corporatism:

A system in which policy is made and implemented in a partnership between government and the major interests in a society represented by a limited number of interest groups licensed or recognised by the state which enjoy a monopoly on the effective representation of their interests.\textsuperscript{41}

On the other hand in a pluralist state there is a high level of competition among interest groups continually vying for attention. The interest groups are independent of, and not licensed or encouraged by, the state. Policy is the output of the interaction of more or less equally strong interest groups. As opposed to this generic classification of a whole state, this

study considers an issue-area specific classification better, since both institutional arrangements and interest communities will vary per issue-area.42

Resuming the discussion, institutional settings and processes, and the participation and role of the various actors involved, probably affect the goals pursued in foreign policy. For analysing foreign policy it is important to find the decision making centre, or ultimate decision unit, to establish its composition and to study its relations with its environment. However, as we shall see in the next section, these ‘structural’ components should be linked to the more dynamic aspects of policy making. In order to do this the policy concept itself should be explained first.

4. A foreign policy concept

In this section it will be argued that foreign policy should be regarded as a plan, the outcome of a process of deliberation on goals to be pursued and means to be used in order to achieve these goals, and its implementation through the application of the means approved in the process of deliberation. The successive phases of deliberation, plan, implementation, and (re-)evaluation will be referred to as the policy making process, which is regarded as cyclical. The advantages of this functional and chronological division of foreign policy making in terms of explaining the goals set out and the way they are pursued, will be discussed in this section.

42 See Wilson, who acknowledges the possibility of neocorporatism at meso level. Ibid., p.110. Admittedly, Dutch society in the 1950s very much reflected this corporatist model
Van de Graaf and Hoppe’s approach forms a proper introduction to the development of a foreign policy concept. They regard policy as a plan: "A system of elements which relate to each other as means to goals or goals to means." The plan is seen as distinct from what is called the 'policy process'. Implicit in their concept of a plan is the notion that policy is the outcome of a careful and thorough mental consideration by policy makers in which they have considered their preferred goals and appropriate means available to achieve these goals.

Useful though it may be to chronologically highlight the main activities involved in developing and implementing a policy, this view is bound to fall short of explaining foreign policy. The machine-like, systematic process in which demands and ideas are transformed into a plan neglects the nature of politics, the process of pulling and hauling in which various parties articulate their interests and preferred courses of action, in order to have these ideas considered. Therefore one cannot disconnect the plan from the previous phase of decision

and Chapter III shall discuss what this meant for foreign policy making in the case of West New Guinea.

43 H. van der Graaf and R. Hoppe, 'Syllabus Beleidskunde', Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit, 198ng [c. 1986], p.44; Also see G. Kuypers and J.F. Verhoog, Politics/Policy: The Dutch Context, Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit, 1983.

44 To Van de Graaf and Hoppe a policy process covers all those activities undertaken by the policy maker in order to formulate a policy plan and subsequently execute it-- a chronological-functional differentiation of the conduct of policy which particularly emphasises mental efforts. See Van de Graaf, op. cit., pp.52-54.

45 See Charles F. Hermann, 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly, vol.34, no.1 (March 1991), pp.3-23. Papadakis and Starr define policy as "purposeful state action with respect to its external environment." Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, 'Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, pp.409-433. As the action is dislocated from its origins this definition is inappropriate, certainly for comparative research. Papadakis and Starr seem to be aware of this shortcoming, since they recognise three concepts of foreign policy which should be
making. Their definition is nevertheless useful: at the end of the policy deliberating phase, in which various actors with interests at stake have attempted to influence the direction of policy, the plan reveals the assumptions of the policy makers about what goals should be aspired to and how these goals can be achieved through application of what means.\textsuperscript{46} Policy regarded as a plan is thus the outcome of this process.

The importance of the policy plan as a research tool is diminished by the fact that in foreign policy sets of goals and means are often only loosely formulated, thus preventing an accurate assessment of the contribution of the various actors during the policy deliberating phase. This shortcoming also makes the analysis of the impact of the international environment on the implementation problematic. Finally, the distinguishing of goals and means can be difficult, with an element in a plan serving both as a means and as a goal. In spite of these problems the distinction between deliberation and plan will be maintained for analytical reasons which are further explained below.

In the policy deliberating phase, a process of discussions and debates, goals and means are selected. Various participants, either individuals, interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, or political parties may contribute ideas and demands to the discussion. Some ideas may impinge upon other ideas. Whether or not an idea becomes an element in a policy plan depends on the advocate’s ability to find adequate support for the idea and on the nature of

\textsuperscript{46} Also see M. Clarke and B. White (eds), \textit{Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach}, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989, p.6.
the decision making process. The decision maker's perception of the environment and the chances of achieve the intended goals are also important.

A major advantage of the concept defended so far is that connecting time and activities in a process of foreign policy making will allow for a scrupulous and accurate causal analysis of domestic and also international sources of Australian and Dutch foreign policy.

Since both policy deliberation and implementation are regarded as important and distinguishable elements in the policy making process these concepts need to be specified. Policy deliberation is the phase of lobbying and debating over the identity of the goals-means relationship. Policy implementation is the process of applying and monitoring the means agreed to in the policy plan, that is, the identity of the goals-means relationship as laid down at the end of the policy deliberating phase, with the aim to reach the goals set out in the policy plan.47 However, one should not overrate the government’s means to exert control over implementation of a foreign policy plan. Besides, developments in the international environment are hard to predict and therefore, notwithstanding careful assessment of international factors in the foreign policy plan, a government will have to improvise reactions to many unexpected events during the implementation phase, denying it initiative and hence further restricting its control. These unforeseen developments can have an impact on both

47 In comparison, Van de Graaf and Hoppe describe the phase of policy execution as: "The implementation of the policy as a whole, the application of measures in individual cases, and the current monitoring of goal attainment in relation to means application." As this definition presents a picture of a well controlled process it does not apply to foreign policy where a government has little authority in the implementation phase. Van de Graaf, op. cit., p.54.
means and goals, setting in motion a process of (re-)evaluation in which many domestic actors may again try to raise their voice in order to influence the policy response.

Evaluation thus constitutes the fourth element in the process of foreign policy making distinguishable in time and as activity. It is defined as the recognition of new developments regarding elements of the policy plan, and assessment of the likely effects of these developments on the usefulness of the means attributed to achieve the goals, or alternatively, the need to reconsider certain goals altogether.

With the conclusion of the discussion on the concept of foreign policy all elements essential for construction of a comparative foreign policy making process model that encompasses both domestic and international variables have been provided. The next section will recapture the main theoretical conclusions and process these into a comprehensive model.

5. A model of foreign policy making

The realist claim that the international environment prescribes the foreign policy agenda of a state, dictating its position on a particular matter, is partly convincing: a state’s position on a particular subject should be weighed against the nature of the international system. The international system partly prescribes the issues of importance to states, circumscribing the goals possible and means available. Given that competition is an important feature of the international system, which lacks authoritative institutions regulating behaviour of states, states are generally forced to give priority to pursuing strategic and economic interests that
will enhance their position vis-a-vis other states. Notwithstanding this general inclination a state can still experience a variable leeway to pursue other interests as well. Therefore the impact of the international environment on the policy of a state should be studied on case basis.\(^{48}\)

Thus one needs to explore how the international environment set the general margins within which Australia and the Netherlands had to develop their policies. In particular the following case-specific questions should be answered: what international actors were especially relevant to the two cases; to what extend did these actors acknowledge application of the principle of self-determination in the two cases as a concern, and against what interests did they weigh application of the principle of self-determination in their policy; and how did their policy affect the policy making process in Australia and the Netherlands in the two case studies? This last question is of course pivotal since it provides the link between the international environment and policy making in Australia and the Netherlands.

In order to provide an answer to those questions it will be inquired what international actors policy makers in Australia and the Netherlands considered important, and how the perceived views of these international actors were processed and reflected in policy plans and policy implementation. The processing of international influences in Australian and Dutch foreign policy will therefore be compared.

\(^{48}\) Compare Everts who uses ‘degree of autonomy’ to indicate the external freedom of a state’s decision makers to choose among alternative courses of action. P. Everts (ed.),
For investigating the impact of the international environment on general premises of Australian and Dutch policy makers, records of meetings between Dutch and Australian members of interest groups, parliamentarians, civil servants, and members of the government with foreign actors relevant to the two cases will be used. These will provide insight into the way these contacts helped to shape Dutch and Australian actors’ views regarding the international opinion, and the impact of these views on the policy of the Netherlands and Australia. Press reports are also important in linking the international environment to the domestic side of the foreign policy making process, particularly for those actors who lack access to primary sources of information provided by the diplomatic service and intelligence organisations, but their impact on the opinion of domestic actors is much harder to gauge.49

Apart from the impact of the international environment and its processes, the autonomous impact of institutions in the process of foreign policy making in Australia and the Netherlands should be compared: through what procedures are what sections of the government involved in the process of foreign policy making and how; and when and how does society at large become involved? Studying procedures or institutional prerogatives will give an idea of the likely composition of the ultimate decision making centre, and its penetrability. Chapter III will deal exclusively with the policy implications of procedures and roles attributed to the various actors in the process of foreign policy making in Australia and the Netherlands.


49 Everts produces the following interesting ranking of sources of information considered important by top officials in the Netherlands: official reports 86%, internal press 77%, domestic press 75%, contacts with colleagues 73%, contacts with foreign diplomats 70%, television 27%, relatives and friends 22%, information from special interest groups 19%. He
These questions are highly important since each actor, categorised according to his/her function, is thought to hold certain general or ideological views which help to form an opinions regarding more specific goals and means. A comparative description of foreign policy making processes in Australia and the Netherlands, which will follow below, should provide an answer to question of the contribution and impact which can be expected from the various functionally distinctive actors, based on a deduction of their involvement and role as assured by the procedures used in foreign policy making. Hypotheses concerning views held by the various actors will also be set out below.

Integration of the findings of the above discussion with the foreign policy making concept, developed in section 3, will enable us to compare and explain better differences in foreign policy between states. Recapturing and expanding on the discussion of the policy concept, it is argued that a comparative foreign policy making model should be used which distinguishes four phases in the process of policy making: deliberation, plan, implementation, and evaluation. Participation of actors is thought to vary per phase, depending on procedures and specific roles attributed to actors. An actor's influence, defined in terms of control over the goals and means of policy, depends on his functional role in the foreign policy making process and also, or alternatively, on his ability to form coalitions. This ability will help an actor to compensate for his own functional-institutional weaknesses through co-operation with one or more actor(s), either functionally better positioned, that is more closely involved in the actual decision making and prepared to represent the actor's interests, or

concludes that “internal reports and contacts with colleagues are the most important sources of information.” Ibid., pp.82-83.

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similar functional deficiency but through coalition forming able to exert pressure on an actor who is more closely involved in the decision making.

Using function and alliances an issue specific policy making centre can be discerned. The centre’s cohesiveness, defined as its capacity to enforce a decision, will determine what chance actors not belonging to this centre have to exert influence. The smaller the centre and the higher the convergence of its members’ interests the less diffused the centre’s influence will be. Traditional stands regarding foreign policy issues will also partly determine the centre’s degree of cohesion. In this respect certain foreign policy traditions may be guiding a state’s foreign policy making.\(^{50}\)

Following a domestic processing of facts, demands, ideals and interests into what ideally can be identified as a comprehensive plan made up of a cohesive and logical set of goals and means, the phase of implementation will more strongly bring in the international environment. During the deliberation on policy goals and means actors were to varying degree subjected to a flux of international reactions, which probably influenced their opinion. As outlined before, implementation of the foreign policy plan or general policy guidelines will engender a new flurry of responses of foreign actors but policy makers must also respond to a stream of unexpected events in world politics. The international response and autonomous developments will affect the chances of achieving the foreign policy goals and may force policy makers to reconsider those. A reconsideration of some or even all of the goals of a foreign policy plan is considered a more radical step than an adaptation of its means: actors

\(^{50}\) For a detailed analysis on foreign policy traditions and their impact on the foreign policy outlook of the Netherlands see J.J.C. Voorhoeve, op. cit.
will in the first place try to save their goals. Within the margins set by the institutional framework and decision making procedures, the response perceived necessary to deal with the problem created by the international environment in turn decides on who will be involved in this process of re-evaluation.

Recapitulating the previous discussion, the importance attributed to human rights and self-determination as elements in a state’s foreign policy depends on the amount of support for human rights in a society in general and its distribution among the various functionally distinctive categories of participants in the foreign policy making process -- behavioural assumptions and classification of those groups will be further explained below. Pursuit of human rights in a particular case will depend on the importance attributed to other interests, and the perception of the risk that these will suffer from opposition by international actors.

For the two case studies these conclusions imply an investigation into:

1. The level of support in both the Netherlands and Australia for human rights and self-determination in general;

2. The level of support in society and in the policy making centre -- which must be traced and its composition monitored throughout the period under investigation -- for application of self-determination and prevention of human rights violations in West New Guinea and East Timor;

3. The perception in Dutch and Australian society and particularly in the decision making centre about the level of international support for or opposition against pursuit of self-determination and political and civil human rights;
4. The other interests at stake and the likelihood and extent of these being affected, given the (anticipated) level of international opposition;

5. The extent of damage that Dutch and Australian societies were prepared to accept as a sacrifice for a principled human rights policy in the two cases.

As will be explained below, the composition of a policy making centre is of significance in all distinctive phases of a foreign policy making process as functional bias of its constituents will tend to influence its opinion. Given this functional bias, the centre’s views regarding policy goals and means are likely to be at variance with its policy making environment. When attempting to explain Australian and Dutch foreign policy one needs to know whether to concentrate on a policy making centre, which is the case when the periphery has little opportunity of penetrating a centre, or whether the policy making environment should be included as well. Apart from the theoretical comments made earlier in this chapter regarding the composition of a centre this requires an institutional and procedural analysis, to be undertaken in Chapter III, which will disclose the means available to actors in the foreign policy making process to influence both goals and means of policy. The findings of Chapter III will be summarised as hypotheses on institutional impact on pursuit of self-determination in Netherlands’ and Australian policy respectively.

Having claimed that an actor's functional position and ability to build coalitions partly determine an actor's influence on policy, it should be explained why it makes a difference what actors are involved in foreign policy making. The following hypotheses -- all assuming that functional determinism will prevail over any personal values amongst the ranks of career
diplomats, civil servants and ministers -- regarding pursuit of human rights by the various types of actors possibly involved in foreign policy making will be put to the test in this thesis:

A. Cabinet and Prime Minister guard the unity of policy. Foreign policy should not hamper, but pursue national interests. When cabinet or the Prime Minister and an inner circle of advisers constitute a policy making centre, human rights will at best be included in a careful compromise that protects other interests as well. As will be shown, the case of West New Guinea was an anomaly for Dutch cabinets;

B. Department of Foreign Affairs (and Trade). Postulating that human rights and the principle of self-determination are objectives adhered to, their pursuit will depend on the perception of the international leeway in relation to an assessment of potential damage to other interests pursued. If the Department decides to pursue self-determination and human rights it will try not to endanger other interests at stake in a bilateral relationship through its application of means. A careful diplomatic approach of quiet diplomacy, restricting involvement of more outspoken 'outsiders', will be preferred as a means which pre-eminently serves damage control. With Foreign Affairs or a section of Foreign Affairs handling a case, no vehement pursuit of human rights issues is to be expected, unless the issue is linked as a means to another interest of importance. The case of West New Guinea in Dutch and Australian politics will prove to be a good example in this respect;

C. Other Departments. Serving parochial interests, other departments will be concerned about the impact of a human rights policy on their field of interests. If these departments are
part of the decision making centre they will obstruct, or at least moderate the means and
goals of a human rights policy. As we shall see the Australian Department of Defence made
an exception in 1974 and 1975 when, because of congruency in defence interests and
promotion of self-determination for East Timor, it was at loggerheads with Foreign Affairs;

D. Parliament. It is argued in this study that it matters whether parliament is elected on a
basis of proportional representation or, on the basis of a district system with
parliamentarians representing the interests of their local constituencies. In Australia, where
the district system is used to elect the members of the House of Representatives, members
will be inclined to concentrate on defending the interests of their constituencies in order to be
re-elected. This means that they will not spend much time on keeping up with international
events, and not use their time in the House to address these matters; only a few more
passionate members will. The improvement in the committee system has modified the picture
somewhat, but the general trend of disregard for foreign policy has not changed. The House
of Representatives will generally emphasise social and economic issues at the cost of human
rights.

The same cannot be said for the Senate in Australia. Being appointed, Senators have no
direct responsibility for a constituency and can freely explore the political spectrum. Lacking
any need to cultivate relations with foreign officials they will be a critical voice in the field of
foreign policy, but within the limits of party discipline.
In the Netherlands the system of proportional representation determines the political composition of the Second Chamber. Members tend to specialise on certain subjects, serving as party spokesman. With party discipline high, other members will follow their spokesman. It then depends on whether a party is in office or not, since party discipline makes criticism of party colleagues in cabinet an exception. In general the Second Chamber will at least be a critical voice. Should the Chamber be part of the policy making centre, tougher means are likely to be used to pursue human rights in foreign policy. The final stage of the policy to pursue self-determination for West New Guinea will prove an exception to this rule.

The Senate in the Netherlands is a part-time instrument of debate only. The Senate is mainly concerned with legislative issues, but Senators, being elected from the ranks of the Provincial States in the Netherlands, enjoy a position of independence that resembles the freedom of Australian Senators. Expectations regarding their input are therefore comparable to those appropriate to the Australian Senate;

E. Interest groups. This category can be divided into business groups on one side and human rights organisations and groups that occasionally deal with human rights on the other. Business groups, wary of the consequences of a policy that, in pursuit human rights or self-determination, implicitly or, worse, explicitly criticises another government, will oppose such a human rights policy. These groups, when in a position to influence human rights policy, will always mitigate it.
Human rights groups do not have to cultivate relations with other states and are free to express criticism. They will generally demand an active human rights policy, favouring the use of more radical means including punitive measures. When they are in a position to influence any policy, a radicalisation of the policy can be expected.

The third type of interest groups, which only occasionally becomes involved in human rights issues in other countries, includes churches and unions. These groups should be judged on an individual basis with their position depending on their respective field of interest;

F. The press. Although not often aspiring to direct involvement in foreign policy making, the press through its coverage will become involved indirectly: through its shaping of public opinion, the press serves as a link between the public and policy makers. An independent press can more objectively report on the need to pursue certain interests, including human rights and self-determination. When alignment or close identification with political parties is the rule, as was the case in the Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s, the press will tend to lose its critical voice when its party is in office. In general, however, the press in Australia and the Netherlands can be expected to reflect critically on the balance between strategic and economic interests, and human rights in foreign policy. When it comes to Indonesia, however, the Australian press has a reputation of being distinctly critical, as is fully reflected in the two case studies.

Having spelled out the hypothetical contribution of the various actors in the process of foreign policy making, the institutional framework in the next chapter will show how these
actors are 'structurally' involved in the foreign policy making processes of the Netherlands and Australia, thus recognising that structural differences may be partly accountable for differences in emphasis on human rights in the foreign policy of the two states towards Indonesia.
Chapter III

Foreign policy making in the Netherlands and Australia: actors, institutions and procedures

1. Introduction

As was argued in Chapter II, procedures will regulate participation of the various actors in the four phases of the foreign policy making process. Since these actors are thought to represent parochially, and functionally determined views, the next step in a comparative analysis of Dutch and Australian foreign policy is an assessment of how differences in procedural arrangements influenced the contribution of various actors in the two case studies. This task will be taken up in this chapter. The institutional-procedural analysis will shed light on the likelihood that there is a strong foreign policy making centre. The composition of the centre, a major factor in explaining goals and means pursued in Dutch and Australian foreign policy, can also be analysed. A series of hypotheses will compare the expected role and importance of actors in Dutch and Australian foreign policy making. The hypotheses will constitute a first and partial attempt to answer the following questions:

What were the main actors in Dutch and Australian foreign policy making in both cases given the institutions and procedures of foreign policy making? How did changes in institutions and procedures affect the role of and thus the relative weight carried by the various actors in the foreign policy making process of the Netherlands and Australia, and
what, given my assumptions on actors’ respective functional and parochial predispositions, would be the expected implications in terms of goals pursued?

With regard to the last question a number of hypotheses will be formulated at the end of this chapter stating the likely policy of Australia and the Netherlands in the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor. These final hypotheses will be tested in Chapters IV-VII. These chapters also study the effect of coalition making on the barriers of institutional power that support decision making centres since, apart from previous comments about the role of the international environment, any findings contradicting the hypotheses could be explained in terms of coalitions offsetting institutionally and functionally dominant actors, or alternatively as a prevalence of views at variance with functional expectations.

In foreign policy making the bureaucracy, cabinet, parliament, and media and pressure groups are distinguished as categories of actors. Regarding their respective roles and importance for foreign policy the following hypotheses are formulated:

Institutionally and functionally the Departments of Foreign Affairs in Australia and the Netherlands played pivotal roles in foreign policy making, although they increasingly, in the period under study, had to share their responsibility with other departments, defending their parochial interests, which gradually enforced more pluralism of views in the foreign policy of the two states.
Unlike in Australia the structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands has changed in such a way since the 1950s, that it has become more favourably disposed to accommodate views from outside the traditional foreign affairs perspective, creating in the Netherlands a relatively better opportunity for actors outside the Department to have their views considered.

The coalition structure of cabinet in the Netherlands leads to more bargaining over the direction of foreign policy which weakens the position of the foreign minister, especially when the coalition’s support groups in parliament disagree. In Australia the foreign minister is more dominant in cabinet, although he may face opposition from the Prime Minister whose institutional position is also very strong.

Both in Australia and the Netherlands, parliament is unlikely to substantially change the policy direction of the executive, but Dutch parliament has stronger instruments and is more likely to use these to ventilate human rights concerns because: Cabinet’s coalition nature creates a stronger tendency towards dualism between executive and legislature, party-discipline is weaker, parliament has a multi-party composition and finally, there is no need for members to concentrate on defending the interests of their constituency.

In Chapter II the concept of a policy making centre was explained, stressing the importance of its nature and relations with its environment for understanding and explaining foreign policy making. With respect to foreign policy making centres in Australia and the Netherlands the following hypotheses are formulated:
The policy making centre in both countries will usually comprise the Department of Foreign Affairs, possibly supplemented with other elements of the bureaucracy, and cabinet. Composition, institutions, and functions in Australia are conducive to the creation of an homogenous and very stable foreign policy making centre. In the Netherlands, the composition of the foreign policy making centre makes it more vulnerable to outside penetration. But in both countries, if the policy making centre is united, its views will normally prevail against outside critics.

The media and pressure groups constitute a final source of input into foreign policy making. Regarding their input the following hypothesis will be tested:

In the 1950s Australian pressure groups and media had far more scope for an independent and critical input into foreign policy issues than Dutch pressure groups and media, but in the 1970s this difference had disappeared, while in both countries the attention for human rights had vastly increased with the emergence of new pressure groups.

The following sections will describe the role of the various actors in Australia and the Netherlands, providing evidence in support of or against the hypotheses.

2. The Department of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands

Since 1965 the Department of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands has had a diarchic structure linking, but also separating, development co-operation from other aspects of
foreign policy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is officially in charge of the entire spectrum of foreign affairs, including human rights policy, but he runs the Department in close liaison with the Minister for Development Co-operation, a Minister without portfolio. In case of interface of responsibilities the ministers should consult together.1

The Department is divided into three Directorates-General: Political Affairs (DGPZ), European Co-operation, and International Co-operation (DGIS), the former two led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter by the Minister for Development Co-operation. Each directorate-general consists of divisions which prepare and formulate decisions. Below the level of divisions, specific country bureaus deal with bilateral relations and in this capacity they are jointly liable for human rights.

Bureau Indonesia, belonging to DGPZ, has been charged with the daily conduct of bilateral relations with Indonesia.2 Its tasks include maintaining contact with the embassy in Jakarta, and gathering information for use in recommendations to the upper echelons of the Department concerning implementation of policy. The Bureau itself is also involved in implementation of policy: “Actual policy is conducted here.”3 The Bureau further provides briefs for delegations intending to visit Indonesia, advises other Departments and is concerned with human rights aspects of relations with Indonesia.

2 The bureau is currently known as ‘Bureau Indonesia and South Asia.
3 Comment by Dr. J. de Jong, Head of Bureau Indonesia (and South Asia). Interview, The Hague, 20 July 1993
The Bureau’s terms of reference are in line with the advice of the Human Rights Bill of 1979 (see Chapter VI) which opposed the creation of a separate human rights office. Instead it advocated making each section responsible for taking into account human rights concerns in policy preparation, thus involving the whole Department with human rights in a bid to avoid intra-departmental quarrels. General guidelines for weighing national interests against human rights violations are not being used. Therefore it is up to the discretion of bureaus and directorates to decide on a response to human rights violations. More important political decisions are of course taken at a higher level.

Until 1992 Bureau Indonesia used to share its human rights responsibility with DGIS and its ‘Bureau Indonesia’, and also the Directorate International Organisations and its human rights co-ordinator. The DGIS ‘Bureau Indonesia’ handled the daily routine of the aid relationship, and depending on the policy pursued by its minister this task could also involve promotion and protection of political and civil human rights.

Although it is the task of Foreign Affairs to manage the political aspects of relations with Indonesia, other aspects including economic and military elements have not been part of the Department’s portfolio, forcing it to deliberate with other Departments. Since the introduction of a parallel structure separating development co-operation from other elements of foreign policy, there has been a risk of intra-departmental conflict over goals and means of foreign policy. With two ministers linked to the Department, a risk of internal conflict...
leading to external penetration was always present. This further undermined Foreign Affairs’ already weak institutional position in the process of foreign policy making.

3. The Department of Foreign Affairs in Australia

The Foreign Affairs Annual Report of 1975 described the Department’s task: “[To] advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and through him the government, on the formulation of Australian foreign policy and to assist him in its execution.”

As aims were mentioned *inter alia*: to give policy recommendations in order to maintain an harmonious interaction and accommodation between domestic and international policy, to maintain an understanding of the international environment within the Public Service, to facilitate inter-departmental co-ordination in order to make Australia’s foreign policy consistent and representative of Australia’s overall national interest and values, and to ensure, by negotiation, representation and other means, the execution of Australian foreign policy.

Responsibility for the overall conduct of Australia’s foreign relations is the Department’s explicitly declared realm. In practice, however, other Departments pursue their own interests. In 1976 the Department’s position was boosted when its purview of responsibility was widened with the administration of Australia’s aid program. Its institutional position was

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special task force was set up under the supervision of the Deputy director-general International Co-operation.


further strengthened through a merger with the Department of Trade and Promotion Australia in 1987, an acknowledgment of the important linkage between economic and political factors in the pursuit of Australia’s interests.

Until 1987 the Department’s organisation was very clear, not complicated by parallel hierarchical structures. The merger with the Department of Trade and Promotion and the appointment of a minister responsible for trade negotiations changed this situation. Trade, however, became fully integrated in the existing organisational framework, which reduced the risk of any confrontation at ministerial level. Overall responsibility rests with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Heading the Department is the Executive which comprises the Secretary and three Deputy Secretaries. The Executive advises the minister and gives policy direction and co-ordination to the Department, that is organised in geographical and functional divisions. Each division consists of branches which are divided into desks. Each political branch within the geographical divisions has, *inter alia*, the following comprehensive tasks: co-ordination of policy advice regarding relations between Australia and the states for which the Branch carries responsibility; preparing assessments, recommendations and information papers on Australian policies for cabinet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary; arranging instructions for diplomatic missions; liaison and negotiations with diplomatic representatives in Australia; and briefing politicians and officials prior to their overseas travels.

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9 Two divisions, accountable to different Deputy Secretaries, were entrusted with trade: the Economic and Trade Development Division, and the Multilateral Trade Division.
Officers at desk level carry out a number of tasks. They inform relevant members of the Department of the business of the mission abroad, maintain liaison and undertake initial consultations with other branches and Departments. They deal with routine matters directly, and see that non-routine matters are taken up by more senior officers or other appropriate desks. The desk and its officer are the department’s experts on an area.

The Indonesia Section is responsible for management of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia that encompasses political and economic, as well as human rights aspects, giving it wider responsibilities than its counterpart in the Netherlands.

Regarding human rights the Indonesia Section liaises with the human rights section of the Department, but its own view holds should no compromise be reached. There is also close liaison with the Indonesia and Malaysia Section of AIDAB (see below), but a political officer is in charge of human rights issues.

The connection between Australian aid and Australian foreign policy has been reflected in the administrative structure. In 1975 the Australian Development Assistance Agency (ADAA) administered civil aid in close consultation with Foreign Affairs. Since 1984 an autonomous bureau, the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) -- in 1987 renamed AIDAB -- has been responsible for development, planning and execution of Australia’s aid program. Its Bilateral Programs Division fulfils these tasks in a bilateral

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A Director-General is in charge of AIDAB. He reports directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thus carries economic and political affairs as well as Australian aid in his extensive portfolio.

Since 1984 the Department has had a separate human rights section, under the aegis of the International Organisations and Humanitarian Affairs Branch with the task of assisting in multilateral human rights activities. Its resources, however, have been very limited. Integration of human rights in foreign policy was insufficient, as was inter-departmental co-ordination. Along with this ‘structural recognition’ of human rights came a policy that charged diplomatic posts with the task of reporting more frequently on human rights and increased the use of diplomatic representations as an instrument. The Branch initiates and coordinates these representations and also liaises with human rights organisations, notably Amnesty International.

Compared with its Dutch counterpart, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs is in charge of a wider field of policy but, given that its structure is headed by a single minister, the risk of intra-departmental confrontation spilling into the public political arena is smaller, which should contribute to policy consistency.

12 Australian Parliament, A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights: Report from the Joint Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade, Canberra, AGPS, 1992, p.42. The Committee, using the study ‘On Equal Footing: Foreign Affairs and Human Rights’, by the Dutch Advisory Committee on Human Rights as a blueprint, also emphasised the importance of providing a similar training to desk officers to make them more acquainted with the problem of human rights.
4. Other departments involved in foreign policy making in the Netherlands

Traditionally the Department of Defence has been a major contributor to foreign policy making. The fields of security and foreign policy were strongly linked, and defence requirements gave direction to foreign policy. An expanding foreign policy agenda further eroded Foreign Affairs’ role as co-ordinator of foreign policy, resulting in more involvement by more departments, each of them defending its parochial interests. The Department of Economics in particular has become a key player due to increased European economic integration and co-operation.

Without a central bureaucratic institution in charge of all major Dutch interests in the field of foreign affairs, one may expect inter-departmental disputes, which cabinet must ultimately settle. Since ministers tend to identify themselves with their respective Departments, cabinet becomes part of the bureaucratic battleground. Given that cabinets in the Netherlands are coalitions, these bureaucratic disagreements may be drawn into the party-political sphere, vastly increasing the influence of actors in the policy periphery.

These findings substantiate the hypothesis about the role and importance of the bureaucracy and in particular the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dutch foreign policy making.
5. Other departments involved in foreign policy making in Australia

The Department of Defence shares some important sections of its organisation with Foreign Affairs, which further contributes to synchronisation of interests pursued in Australia’s foreign policy. Important defence sections and committees in which Foreign Affairs participates are: the Defence Committee; the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), which evaluates and coordinates external intelligence;15 the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint Planning Committee.

In 1969 Medianski could still point to the limited capacity of the Department of External Affairs: “Except for the Interdepartmental Committee on Aid, there are no formal arrangements below cabinet through which External Affairs can exercise its coordinating role.”16 But its amalgamation with the Department of Trade and Promotion Australia in 1987 invigorated Foreign Affairs’ position as a representative of economic interests significantly. However, Medianski’s comment that, “External Affairs has to share to some extent its coordinating role with Prime Minister’s Department,”17 has not lost its cogency.

Compared with the Netherlands, solving bureaucratic conflicts requires more often settlement of intra-departmental disputes. Also better arrangements exist for co-ordination of security interests at inter-departmental level. The Department of the Prime Minister forms the main dissonant voice in this respect. It has increasingly demanded a say in foreign policy

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16 Quoted from Medianski, op. cit., p.283.
issues since Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser expanded its role in the 1970s. With a view to policy regarding Indonesia, the Department of Foreign Affairs has strong informal links with other departments and co-operates with them in *ad hoc* committees. Given the level of co-ordination and centralisation of policy responsibilities, chances that conflicts will spill into the public political sphere are relatively small. Influence from actors outside the bureaucracy will therefore be correspondingly small.

These findings are in accordance with my hypothesis regarding the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs and other departments in foreign policy making.

### 6. Cabinet in the Netherlands

The system of proportional representation used to elect members of the Second Chamber makes coalition cabinets the rule in the Netherlands. Before committing itself to a coalition, parties will engage in extensive discussions on its policy. The King (or Queen), as head of state will ask a premier-designate to conduct talks and when (and if) these are successful, to form a government. The head of state will then swear in the ministers and Under-Secretaries. The first task of the new government will be to get the approval of parliament for its policy, but since the leaders of the parliamentary parties forming the new government will have been involved in the negotiations on the policy, they will probably also have advised their parties to support the outcome. The coalition parties will generally respect the policy that was agreed to, but statements outlining foreign policy tend to be rather abstract.

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17 Ibid.
Cabinet’s peculiar plural party composition begets a tendency to strive for compromises in its foreign policy, which is largely made *ad hoc*. This reduces the chances of an extremist or radical policy, and will therefore increase support in parliament. Once cabinet has reached a decision, party discipline in parliament will also contribute to its adoption and thus enhance cabinet’s position.\(^\text{18}\)

In order to keep the executive and legislative powers separate, ministers cannot be Members of Parliament. They serve as their party’s representatives in the coalition, resulting in a division of cabinet along party lines, but they also behave as representatives and exponents of their departmental interests. Particularism and parochialism are the result.\(^\text{19}\) The Prime Minister has to bring about compromise, a difficult task since he is only *primus inter pares*. The Prime Minister is not allowed to add any subjects to the agenda of a meeting of the Council of Ministers: this prerogative belongs to his fellow ministers. Also the Prime Minister cannot sack and replace a minister. Parliament alone can force a minister to resign through rejecting one of his budget proposals. Also if parliament introduces, and votes on, a motion that is unacceptable to a minister, he may regard this as a sign of no confidence and respond by resigning. If the minister has the support of his colleagues or his own party in parliament, a motion of no-confidence may bring down the government. However, only rarely do events take such a dramatic turn.

\(^{18}\) See Baehr who argues that as long as ministers remain within the broad outlines of their party’s political and electoral program they remain relatively free to conduct foreign policy as they see fit, p.50.

\(^{19}\) Everts, op. cit., pp.90-91.
Certain ministers are also favourably placed by their mandate, notably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As head of the Department of Foreign Affairs he is in charge of foreign policy. Baehr correctly claims: “The Foreign Minister is unquestionably *the* dominating figure in the field of Dutch external relations.” His access to information concerning foreign affairs is unmatched by any of his colleagues. However, the lack of an overarching Department of Foreign Affairs demands that he liaises with colleagues. Further he has to share the Department’s roof with a Minister for Development Co-operation, the implications of which were discussed already. Other ministers can also freely give their opinion on foreign affairs, and have done so in the past, thus interfering in the policy of the foreign minister.

Political responsibility for certain elements of foreign policy is usually delegated to an Undersecretary. During the West New Guinea dispute there was a special Under-secretary who dealt with domestic issues in the colony in particular. The Minister for Foreign Affairs remained ultimately in charge of the overall conduct of policy.

Although the coalition nature of cabinet classifies it as a decision unit composed of multiple autonomous actors, its members are less autonomous than expected since they are committed to the coalition and its survival. Ministers’ personalities and the party and bureaucratic interests they stand for will of course influence decision making in cabinet. In case party groups in parliament seriously disagree over foreign policy, this will divide cabinet

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21 Honig van den Bossche mentions Prime Minister Den Uyl, defence minister Stemerdink, and development co-operation minister Pronk as ‘jamming stations’. *Handelingen der*
and increase influence from actors outside the decision making centre. These findings are in agreement with my hypothesis.

7. Cabinet in Australia

General elections are held at least every three years, but the Prime Minister can call an election before his government has served its full term in office. The Prime Minister may be tempted to hold such an early election when the polls are favourable. Given that a single member district system is used in the lower house elections, only a few parties usually succeed in winning any seats there. Following general elections the Governor General, as representative of the head of state, will ask the leader of the party or coalition which gathered the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives to form a government. The Governor General also appoints the ministers, who keep their seats in the House or the Senate.

A coalition cabinet is a possibility in Australia, but not a rule. Only the Liberal Party usually co-operates with the National (Country) Party in cabinet, but the Liberal Party dominates to the extent that it often merely tolerates its partner. Australian cabinets therefore do not much reflect the peculiarities of coalition politics.

The Prime Minister’s institutional position is very strong. He has the power to dismiss ministers, and cabinet reshuffles occur frequently. A Labor Prime Minister, however, enjoys less freedom in this respect than his Liberal counterpart, since he is more likely to need the

_Tweede Kamer, 1976-1977, Behandeling Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 1977, pp.858-
consent of his caucus to major proposals. It is the Prime Minister’s prerogative to decide when there will be a cabinet meeting, and what subjects need to be discussed. The Prime Minister presides over the meetings and summarises cabinet decisions, but if he wishes to avoid ministerial interference he can often take a decision himself, simply bypassing cabinet.

Usually cabinet has a Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of which the PM, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Treasurer are members, but membership may be wider. The Committee’s role in decision making has been subject to change over time and its leverage depends on the way the Prime Minister uses the Committee, as well as cabinet. The Committee does not meet as frequently as cabinet, but it is first to consider matters demanding careful examination.

Fraser further institutionally enhanced the Prime Minister’s already strong functional position through establishment of an Office of National Assessments. This office provided the Prime Minister with analyses of defence and foreign affairs issues. Fraser also strengthened the foreign policy section of the Prime Minister’s Department. In particular the department protects and promotes the Prime Minister’s special fields of interest and tries to integrate foreign policy into the government’s overall policy. The Prime Minister’s Department is also a check on the Department of Foreign Affairs. It has direct access to consultations at the highest level, as the Prime Minister’s international visits often involve consultations with other

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22 The ALP’s caucus determines the size of cabinet and the ministry, elects their members and holds them accountable on policy matters. Walter Jones, The Leader: A Political Biography of Gough Whitlam, St. Lucia, University Press, 1980, p.34.

23 Medianski, ‘The Department of Foreign Affairs’, p.280.
heads of state. The Prime Minister can use the Foreign Affairs and Defence Branch of his Department as an alternative source of information to bolster his stand when he is in disagreement with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Prime Minister’s access to information and his prerogative to choose the agenda of cabinet put him in a strong position in cabinet.

Given cabinet’s single or ‘effectively single’ party composition, conflict is more likely to remain confined to its meetings, and unlikely to bring in parliament. Within cabinet the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence are key actors. Since the centre of policy making is homogenous, esoteric and small, policy is likely to be consistent. These findings support my hypothesis on cabinet’s role and position in foreign policy making.

8. Parliament and political parties in the Netherlands

Parliament consists of two houses: the First Chamber or Senate and the Second Chamber. The Second Chamber has 150 members, directly elected by universal suffrage, based on proportional representation. As was explained previously, elected members who take up positions in cabinet have to relinquish their seat in the Chamber, helping to maintain dualism between the executive and legislature. Provincial Councils elect the 75 members of the First Chamber.
With a motion of no confidence the Chamber can force the government to dissolve parliament and call an election. However, participation in the governing coalition may inhibit such an objective verdict.\textsuperscript{24}

Both Chambers debate the annual budget of foreign affairs, which is accompanied by a departmental explanatory memorandum (\textit{Memorie van Toelichting}) in which the minister outlines the main elements of policy. Not inhibited by membership, the minister can participate in debates in both Chambers. On his initiative or at parliament’s request the minister may prepare a formal bill on any aspect of his portfolio, which is subsequently debated in parliament. Debates often cover a lot of ground, going beyond the level of merely discussing policy. They may be about the minister’s use of executive power, the organisation of the Department, and the role and attitude of civil servants. Parliamentarians can put questions to the minister which may again lead to a debate. The Second Chamber clearly pays more attention to foreign policy than the First Chamber where debates take place more infrequently and concentrate on legal aspects of bills submitted by the government.

Everts offers a good analytical framework for discussing parliament’s role in foreign affairs. He discerns three instruments which parliament can use to influence foreign policy: legislative control, budgetary control and policy control.\textsuperscript{25} Legislative powers, however, are of relatively little use in foreign affairs. Individual members can initiate legislation, the last


\textsuperscript{25} Everts, op. cit., p.99.
element of legislative control. This right is hardly used, however. Budgetary control, the second instrument, is mainly exercised during the annual discussion of the budget of foreign affairs, which must be passed as a bill. Discipline amongst coalition parties will generally prevent parliament from using its right to amend legislation. An amendment is legally binding on the government. Usually parliament will only try to influence next year’s budget through adoption of motions, but the government can disregard these. Therefore Everts regards budgetary control as ineffective as well.26

Policy control entitles parliament to have an inquiry, but there has never been one to investigate foreign policy. Members also have the right of interpellation, in case of which the minister must reply directly to one or more questions. A short debate may follow and motions may be put forward. Oral questions to which the minister has to answer in person, but which are not followed by a debate or motions, offer another means of policy control. Yet another instrument of policy control is the motion. It is a weak instrument since the government does not have to carry out the motion. In that case a motion of no-confidence may follow.

Finally, there is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, established in 1919. The government can provide information requested by the Committee in confidence, but most meetings are open to outsiders. When the Committee convenes in special capacity (uitgebreide commissievergadering), motions may be introduced. The Committee may organise hearings at which people and NGOs are requested to give their opinions. From

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26 Ibid., p.101.
1953 until 1967 there were two Second Chamber committees for foreign affairs: one committee reported on the budget, with the minister only obliged to respond to budget-related questions, and a second committee was charged with the gathering of secret information on other subjects. This latter committee would exchange views with the minister on a range of subjects. Only the five major parties were represented and information provided had to be kept secret, which reduced the committee’s influence. The First Chamber established a Foreign Affairs Committee in 1951, but this Committee does not engage in discussions on policy with ministers.

Members of parliament have often complained about their lack of influence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his policy. Indeed their political tools and the coalition character of Dutch politics hamper their influence: “Although parliament has the constitutional right to force the resignation of any minister, it has been reluctant to do so for fear of upsetting the carefully balanced and often rather fragile government coalition.” The final stage of the West New Guinea conflict fully supports this assertion, as will be shown in Chapter IV. On the other hand Baehr’s rejection of Cohen’s conclusion, that “parliament and parliamentarian fractions have little impact on the foreign policy decisions of the

27 Antonio Cassese, _Control of Foreign Policies in Western Democracies: A Comparative Study of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees: Research Project_, Padova, CEDAMoceana, 1982, pp.140-141. Communistische Partij Nederland (CPN -- Netherlands Communist Party) was denied membership in the 1950s and 1960s because its ideological stand caused suspicion as to the party’s loyalty and other parties treated CPN as an outcast.

28 Everts, op. cit., p.104.

29 Quoted from Baehr, ‘Democracy and Foreign Policy in the Netherlands’, p.40.
government,” on the ground that Cohen underestimates the “considerable exchange of views that takes place beyond the public view,” seems also plausible.\(^3^0\)

These findings do support my hypothesis on parliament’s role and influence in foreign policy making, but although parliament has the means to influence foreign policy, peculiarities of Dutch politics prevent parliament from using these means frequently. Having discussed the role of the bureaucracy, cabinet, and parliament, we may also conclude that the above findings regarding their institutionally and functionally determined participation and influence support my hypothesis about the foreign policy making centre: this is potentially vulnerable, but views of the centre will normally prevail against outside critics if the policy making centre is united.

Political parties are of course linked to their constituencies, but their leaders remain dominant and rather autonomous from local branches. Parliamentarians are not bound to follow their party’s instructions on any issue.\(^3^1\) They have a responsibility of their own, as parliamentarians eagerly declare whenever they disagree with their party organs. Party conferences do not pay a great deal of attention to foreign policy issues, *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA -- Labor Party) being the exception. But even in the case of PvdA, the party has limited influence on its parliamentarians since they are not bound to follow party instructions. Often, however, there will not be any conflict since a party’s policy only sets out broad guide lines.

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\(^{30}\) Ibid, p.44.
In the case of \textit{Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie} (VVD -- People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), the influence of the party on its parliamentary group is restricted to foreign policy outlines drawn up in the party’s election program.\textsuperscript{32} This leaves the parliamentary group considerable leeway and therefore contacts of its foreign policy specialists with pressure groups may be important in shaping their opinion and stand. The Second Chamber group of VVD used to hold regular meetings with its representatives in cabinet, like PvdA, but contacts with civil servants at Foreign Affairs were very limited, unlike CDA.\textsuperscript{33}

The party structure of Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA -- Christian Democratic Appeal) encompasses a foreign affairs and a development co-operation committee in charge of the party’s policy in those two fields. A Party Council formulates the foreign affairs section in the election-program: “The Second Chamber group keeps its distance.”\textsuperscript{34} CDA foreign affairs experts used to have very frequent contact with their Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation. The floor leader used to have weekly discussions with CDA ministers.\textsuperscript{35}

Resuming the discussion, the Second Chamber in particular has a number of strong means at its disposal which in theory grant it a functionally significant role in the phases of deliberation and implementation. However, the shackles of coalition and party discipline will often

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.45.
\textsuperscript{32} Comment by Mr. Weisglas. Interview, The Hague, 14 June 1993.
\textsuperscript{33} Comment by Mrs. E. Terpstra. Interview, The Hague, July 1993.
\textsuperscript{34} Comment by Mr. Huibers, CDA foreign affairs specialist in the Second Chamber. Interview, The Hague, July 1993.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
prevent open and persistent use of those means. On the other hand, the coalition nature of government and frequent discussions with ministers representing their party, will at least allow a parliamentary group to convey its opinion, and have it considered in cabinet.

9. Parliament and political parties in Australia

The House’s relatively small size and low number of sitting days are structural and procedural factors notably limiting its participation in foreign policy making. Further, Members’ entitlement to retain their seat in parliament when also serving as ministers in the government curtails parliament’s independence from the government, essential to maintain dualism between executive and legislature. A related handicap is that a minister can only defend his policy personally in one chamber. This inability to debate directly with the minister responsible for and with knowledge of the portfolio restricts the contribution of the other chamber. Dual membership of government and parliament further ensures that ties between government and its parliamentary group become very tight, with only the non-cabinet Members of a government’s group operating as truly independent parliamentarians. Party discipline is therefore very high, both in the House and the Senate.

The fact that Members of the House retain their seat by grace of their constituencies is yet another structural factor explaining why there is so little debate on foreign policy issues. Maintaining the level of support from their large electorates imposes strains on members, leaving them little time for work not connected with electoral duties. Therefore Hocking
correctly concludes that Members are inclined to a local rather than a national focus, let alone an international focus. The Senate is in a better position in this respect as its members do not have a similar representative burden.

The district system used to elect Members of the House also functions as a threshold preventing minority views present in society, but scattered thinly, from being represented in the House. Thus, only a few parties compete in all seats, which, given their strong party discipline, further reduces the House as a critical voice in foreign policy. The Senate again makes an exception, where smaller parties such as the Australian Democrats and the Greens do become elected, allowing them a chance to raise their critical voice.

Given parliament’s structural deficiencies, procedures would have to guarantee it a say in foreign policy making. The most important and frequently used means available to guarantee Members, their party and parliament in general a say are -- apart from the committees on foreign affairs that will be dealt with later -- questions, adjournment debates, urgency and grievance debates, and motions. The following discussion, however, will show that parliamentary procedures are inadequate as well.

In order to increase knowledge about the government’s foreign policy, Members can ask questions, but, given that backbenchers have limited opportunities, foreign affairs issues will

often give way to matters of more importance to Members: their constituencies. Questions can be asked without notice, and serve as a means for the opposition to embarrass the government. Alternatively, the government uses this instrument to attack the opposition and to defend its own policy by having its own group ask favourable questions. Given the usual political intention behind questions without notice, serious and informative answers are unlikely. To get a serious answer a question must be put on notice, but even then a proper and informative answer is not guaranteed. The Chair of the House will be on the minister’s side and explain the rules for answering questions, which are found in the House’s Standing Orders (the formal procedures of parliament), in his favour. Thus when it comes to the instrument of questions a minister can deny Members what is fundamental for their involvement in policy making: knowledge. Off the record, however, Foreign Affairs and its minister will often be more forthcoming in providing information. Debates on foreign policy are infrequent, but one possibility for the opposition to force a discussion is through initiating an urgency debate on ‘a matter of public importance’ for which it chooses the subject. Although it offers an opportunity for discussion, it gives

37 Normally an opposition member is allowed to ask one question every three weeks only. David Solomon, *Inside the Australian Parliament*, Sydney, George Allen & Unwin, 1978, p.49.
38 It is a standing order that a minister’s answer to a question must be relevant, but it is left to the Speaker of the House to interpret this vague rule. For a discussion on the importance of the Standing Orders and the role of the Chair/Speaker of the House see Dean Jaensch, *Getting our House in Order: Australia’s Parliament: How it Works and the Need for Reform*, Ringwood, Vic., Penguin Books, 1986, pp.77-79.
39 See Solomon for a more thorough discussion of the difficulties involved in formulating a question and having it answered properly. Id.
40 Comment by Senator Vicky Bourne. Interview, Sydney, 4 August 1995.
parliament no means to force the government to change its policy as usually no voting takes place at the end of the debate.

Adjournment debates, held at the end of a normal sitting day of the House, provide Members with another opportunity to speak briefly on a subject of their own choice. Again no voting takes place and speeches tend to be unrelated, giving the ‘debate’ little cohesion. Thus its importance as a means to influence the government’s policy is again negligible.

The only other means for individual backbenchers to discuss subjects of their own choice are the Address-in-Reply, following a speech read by the Governor-General -- prepared for him by the government -- the annual budget debate and fortnightly grievance debates. The debate on the Estimates of Foreign Affairs is the best of these three opportunities, but even then the debate is often only a series of unrelated statements that do not provide a coherent and comprehensive overview of policy. A grievance debate offers merely an opportunity to express an opinion. Without a vote being taken there are no implications for the government’s policy.

Given that legislation regarding foreign policy, which requires extensive parliamentary involvement, is very infrequent, opportunities for debate in the legislative process are very limited as well. The Australian Constitution further denies parliament a role in the making of treaties.

This leaves parliament with Ministerial statements and motions as the only other means for debating foreign policy. Ministerial statements may be accompanied by debate, and usually
there is ample time available. A notice of motion must be submitted at least one day prior to a session. Traditionally a motion of notice resulted in at least a half an hour debate, but since the number of motions grew there was no longer enough time to debate all of them. Thus the motion of notice is now primarily an expression of discontent. When a debate does take place, limiting the amount of time available for it is one means to prevent overtly discrediting the government. This procedure is known as the guillotine. The government can further restrict time spent on an embarrassing discussion through use of the gag: ‘that the question be now put’.41 However, even when a motion is passed the minister can ignore it. Media attention is what one hopes to get out of a motion.42

Hocking’s conclusion that, “the value of debates and questions as a method of presenting an intelligible exchange of opinion on foreign policy is limited,” succinctly describes parliament’s procedural shortcomings which deny it a major role in any of the phases of the foreign policy making process. Improvements in the functioning of the committee system, however, modify the validity of this conclusion to some extent.

A Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence was first established in 1951.43 Its aim was to study ‘in depth’ the ‘great problems of the day’, ‘passing on to parliament’ this ‘expert knowledge’ and thus ‘giving a lead to the House in debates’. The mandate did not mention policy making, regarding this as a government prerogative. The Minister for External Affairs used to refer matters to the Committee and made available information “within such

41 See Jaensch, *Getting our House in Order*, p.88.
42 Id.
categories and on such conditions as he considered desirable."$^{44}$ Proceedings were secret and the Committee had to forward reports to the minister. The Committee had no authority to send for persons, papers or records without the minister’s concurrence and all evidence given was secret.

The mandate gradually became less tight and in 1964 the Committee gained authority to invite people to give evidence and, with the minister’s consent, to call for official papers and records. Minister Barwick agreed to allow for the expression of a dissenting opinion in any report. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), which had previously refused to join because of the Committee’s lack of autonomy and preponderance of government Members, finally joined the Committee in 1967.$^{45}$ In 1973 authority to call for witnesses and documents and the right to transact business in open sessions were added to the Committee’s arsenal. Since 1978 the government has been required to respond to committee reports within six months.

The Joint Committee’s relationship with the minister has been described as one of consultation. The Committee has served as a useful study group but “[it] has done little to analyse the great issues of the day and enlighten parliament...in the field of foreign relations.”$^{46}$

$^{43}$ Initially there were 12 members, later 20 -- 13 members from the House and 7 Senators-- and presently there are 28 members.
$^{45}$ Ibid., p.22.
$^{46}$ Quoted from Turner, op. cit., p.25.
In 1971 the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence was created. The Senate Committee has enjoyed greater authority than the Joint Committee, mainly because the Senate itself could refer matters to the Committee, for which a majority is required. By 1976, however, distinctive features of the two committees had largely disappeared: both sit in largely open sessions and engage in substantial inquiries on a wide range of subjects. Officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade appear regularly before the Committees to provide information. The Senate Committee can even demand provision of sensitive information. A special joint Sub-Committee on Human Rights was established to deal with human rights matters.

The widening of the mandate, giving the committees better access to information on foreign policy, has done little, however, to compensate for their lack of means to put to use this information and influence the government’s policy.

Having considered the whole range of means that parliament has at its disposal one cannot but fully support Hocking’s conclusion that, “parliament’s influence over foreign policy making [is] extremely limited.” The analysis of the functioning of the Australian Federal Parliament has shown that its structural and functional deficiencies deny it any significant role in deliberation, implementation, and evaluation of foreign policy. Parliament’s position vis-à-vis government and bureaucracy has remained fairly stable and very uneven, allowing parliament only a minor role in the foreign policy making process.

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47 Ibid., p.32.
These findings support the hypothesis on the role of parliament formulated in the introduction to this chapter, but in fact the discussion showed that parliament’s role is even more limited than was supposed. The hypothesis about the composition and importance of the foreign policy making centre vis-à-vis other participants in Australian foreign policy making is also confirmed by the discussion of the institutionally and functionally defined role of the various actors: the centre is strong and homogenous and its views will prevail over the views of its opponents.

Within the ALP, the biennial Federal Party Conference officially makes foreign policy and determines the party platform. In theory the platform is binding on a Labor government, but in practice the government can ignore it. The Liberal and Country Parties have no comparable formal structures. Their parliamentary groups are not bound by party platforms.

Party discipline is strictly imposed upon ALP representatives. As mentioned before, an ALP government can ignore its federal party conference, but the rule that members act in accordance with caucus is enforced, rendering any public expression of opposition in parliament impossible usually. This party rule further undermines parliament’s influence on foreign policy.

Liberal parliamentarians are not formally bound by a pledge of loyalty to the party or its parliamentary group, but in practice there will be strong pressure to conform with the party

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48 Quoted from Hocking, op. cit, p302.
49 Party discipline is secured through a pledge by which members promise “to be bound by the platform...and decisions of the conference...and to vote according to the majority decision of the Caucus (Labor’s parliamentary group).” Quoted from Jaensch, Getting our House in Order, p.33.
Thus there is little difference in party discipline between Liberals and Labor, although Liberal members may occasionally vote against their party’s official policy.

10. Media and interest groups in the Netherlands

Divisions in Dutch society have had a large impact on the way public life was organised. Political parties, unions and other interest groups, and media were all deeply affected. The policy of pacification and the responses of the various ‘pillars’ in Dutch society shaped the role and behaviour of all these actors regarding West New Guinea. With the end of pacification in the 1960s, traditional alliances and patterns of behaviour changed dramatically, the effects of which will be outlined below.

Society in the Netherlands used to be divided into four pillars -- the Roman Catholic and Protestant pillars were much more passionate about their identity than the Liberal and Socialist pillars -- each with its own social and political organisations. Until deconfessionalisation started in the late 1960s social organisations, including political parties, were strongly organised along these dividing religious and ideological lines. In order to prevent a conflict with the potential to tear apart the nation, an overarching coalition was formed at leaders' level. With their followers loyal and apathetic, latent tension at the basis of the pillars was pacified. For political life this meant a strong penetration of religious

50 See Jaensch for an extensive discussion on means that both the Liberal and National Party use to force their members to comply with party policy. Ibid., pp.34-36.
influences and hence a strong impact of church leaders and their organisations on the
political representatives of the pillars. PvdA, representing the Socialist pillar, and VVD,
representing the Liberal pillar, were relatively unaffected, their followers less loyal and less
apathetic than their counterparts in the confessional parties.

Newspapers in the Netherlands were also aligned with a pillar and a political party, whose
views they loyally propagated. The Roman Catholic daily *Volkskrant* formed one of the
clearest examples of avowed party affiliations. Protestant newspapers were also generally
loyal to their political parties. *Trouw* and *Het Parool* were close to PvdA. The Liberal
newspaper *NRC* was the most independent newspaper. In spite of being ideologically close
to VVD, it often was at loggerheads with the party’s policy on West New Guinea.

In the 1960s social unrest and deconfessionalisation ended a political era characterised by
pacification. Thus ordinary people became less docile and more politically active. The
influence of churches on political life dwindled, a process that is still continuing in
contemporary politics. The role of the media changed as well, from being heralds of party
views to more independent news coverage.

Given that the shackles of the pillars had been removed in the 1970s, one would expect a
more independent, less passive, more critical role for newspapers and also interest groups,
whose ranks were now swollen by newly emerged human rights and humanitarian
organisations. The hypothesis too carefully expressed the expectation that media and interest
groups had limited opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s to have a critical and independent
impact on foreign policy. The contrast between the 1950s and the 1970s appears even larger than expected.

11. Media and interest groups in Australia

Australian media and interest groups did not experience a similar process of increasing independence that media and interest groups in the Netherlands went through. Except for strong connections between unions and the ALP, major interest groups have always enjoyed relatively more liberty. With the international agenda changing in the 1960s, new groups representing different interests emerged in Australia, helping to put human rights as a subject on the political agenda. Given that the position and input of media and interest groups have changed little, this discussion, which supports the hypothesis, is very brief.

12. Conclusions and policy hypotheses

Who were the main actors in Dutch and Australian foreign policy making, given the respective institutions and procedures of foreign policy making? How did changes in institutions and procedures affect the role of and thus the relative weight carried by the various actors in the foreign policy making process of the Netherlands and Australia, and what, given my assumptions on actors’ functional and parochial predispositions, would be the expected implications in terms of goals pursued?
In Section 1 of this chapter a few questions and a number of hypotheses were formulated. A discussion of institutional and procedural involvement of various actors in Australian and Dutch foreign policy making confirmed the expectations formulated in these hypotheses. The results provide a first step towards a comprehensive answer to the central questions of this thesis. These initial answers will now in turn serve as hypotheses to be tested in the four chapters which discuss Dutch and Australian policy in the two cases.

12.1 The Netherlands’ hypothetical policy in the West New Guinea case

Clearly the Department of Foreign Affairs was in a strong position to determine West New Guinea policy, although it had to share responsibility with Home Affairs and Defence, which became increasingly involved when the conflict escalated. With Defence, Foreign Affairs shared its superior access to secret information. Being able to brief the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and having a leading role in planning and policy execution gave the Department overall a central position in policy making. The foreign minister’s position in cabinet would have been correspondingly strong.

Assuming that the Department of Foreign Affairs was responsible for defending Dutch foreign interests, and given that self-determination for West New Guinea became more and more of a burden in this respect, one would expect that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, attempting to protect those interests, would develop into a strong advocate of relinquishing West New Guinea, at the expense of self-determination.
The Department of Defence and its minister would have played an increasingly important role in the West New Guinea policy, with the security of the territory under growing threat of invasion. Avoiding a military conflict presumably became ever more a priority which in practice meant sacrificing self-determination.

The Department of Home Affairs played a major role in the implementation of the policy of rapid development in West New Guinea. Its assessment of the situation, reflected by its minister in cabinet, should have carried considerable weight as well. Home Affairs’ opinion does not immediately become clear from its interests, but given that it had some pride in developing the population, it would have been favourably disposed to continuation of Dutch administration.

With cabinet being a coalition, led by a Prime Minister with hardly any administrative and decision making powers, the input of these three departments is expected to be decisive, although the role of the Finance Department should not be underestimated. Foreign Affairs and Defence would have logically argued, and this with growing zeal, to relinquish West New Guinea and protect other Dutch interests. Given their strong institutional and procedural involvement, any other findings would have to be explained in terms of these departments proclaiming and defending different views.

The coalition type cabinet, in combination with the active role of parliament in debates on the budget of foreign affairs and hence the direction of foreign policy, should have given parliament at least an active role in deliberating and approving the policy plans. Cabinet
would have been forced to gain at least the support of the members who represented the coalition parties in parliament. These parliamentarians were therefore in a favourable position to influence the policy plans. Opposition parties, lacking adequate access to information and the decision making centre, which probably varied over the years but at least comprised officials of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs and cabinet, were left with weak instruments for direct influence on policy making. They would have been forced to attempt to influence public opinion via the media. A difficult task as the media were strongly aligned with political pillars. The opposition can be qualified as outsider. The same conclusion can be drawn regarding parties represented in cabinet. They would be strongly inclined to follow cabinet in its policy, given that cabinet policy is a comprise in any case.

Interest groups, including unions and employers' organisations, and NGOs, as far as they existed, were not attributed any significant institutional role. Lobbying and coalition forming would have been their alternative, given the strength of pacification of Dutch society a difficult task. They are therefore considered as outsiders. Only during the phases of deliberation and evaluation could they have had some impact.

Based on functional involvement, the role of the churches would have been limited as well, but as my comments about pillars in the Netherlands have made clear they had ample institutionalised contacts to make up for this weakness. Thus they probably influenced the conscience of the nation’s decision makers.
Resuming my conclusions on actor involvement and the views that actors are likely to have had, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs would have strongly influenced discussion in cabinet by means of their representatives. On the other hand, because cabinet was a coalition -- cabinet was a centre composed of multiple autonomous actors -- it would also have at least partly reflected the opinion of its parliamentary groups. Parliament in general would tend to follow cabinet, but in case of intra-cabinet disputes parliament’s influence could vastly increase. An assessment of interests by the government would have resulted in adoption of a flexible policy towards Indonesia’s claims. As Chapter IV will show, Dutch policy was bereft of any such realism until very late in the day.

12.2 Australia’s hypothetical policy in the West New Guinea case

What was said about Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands applies largely to the Department of External Affairs in Australia. The Department had access to all intelligence reports, and was in control of a network of diplomatic posts through which it communicated with international actors and collected information regarding their position. Policy making was very much an esoteric field in which External Affairs and its minister had an important role in all four stages of policy making. However, External Affairs shared intelligence sources and committee membership with the Department of Defence which was throughout the conflict involved by means of its assessments. With the threat of an escalation increasing it would only have become more frequently involved and its assessments would have carried more weight.
The institutional position of the Prime Minister was also strong. He was well informed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and firmly in charge of cabinet procedures and meetings. He also frequently exchanged views with other governments.

These three ministers together with the key players in the Departments of External Affairs and Defence made up a strong centre of decision making in Australia’s foreign policy. Given the inadequacies of parliament to have its voice heard, significant changes in means and goals of policy would have been forced upon them only by a change in the international situation.

Putting together an expectation of policy pursued based on a realistic assessment of the interests of the main actors is not as straight forward as was the case for the Netherlands. Their opinion would have been based on an assessment of Indonesia’s political situation and the role of West New Guinea in influencing Indonesia’s policy vis-à-vis Australia. Australia would have vastly benefited from a friendly and stable neighbour but, given Indonesia’s instability, with communism a growing force, the prospect of having to share a common border in an area that had proven its importance to Australia’s security during the Second World War cannot have been attractive. Defence and External Affairs would both have assessed the situation realistically along these lines. Keeping Indonesia friendly and out of West New Guinea would at some stage have allowed them to pursue self-determination as a realistic contribution to Australia’s security interests. With these goals no longer congruent, security
issues would have claimed priority, resulting in the sacrifice of Dutch administration and its ultimate objective, self-determination for the indigenous people.

The institutional position of the House of Representatives and the Senate was very weak vis-à-vis the government. Debates on foreign affairs could be avoided and means to put pressure on the government were limited. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs was very dependent upon the Minister for External Affairs, minimising its impact.

Given these findings it is hypothesised that institutions and procedures created a strong, unitary and stable foreign policy decision making centre, hard to penetrate for the periphery that included parliament, NGOs, churches and media. The role of the periphery in deliberation, implementation and evaluation of Australia’s policy regarding West New Guinea would have been limited, if not almost completely irrelevant.

12.3 The Netherlands’ hypothetical policy in the East Timor case

In order not to repeat the content of Section 6.1 only institutional changes relating to the function and importance of the various actors involved in foreign policy making will be highlighted.

Compared with the 1960s the Department of Foreign Affairs underwent a major structural reform. The position of ‘Minister for Development Co-operation’ created to be in control of a special directorate-general, effectively split the Department in two fairly autonomous halves. In liaison with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who remained in charge of the entire
foreign policy, the Minister for Development Co-operation managed the aid relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. As such his influence in all stages of foreign policy making was and is strong.

The churches’ domination over society and thus their means of influence weakened considerably, leaving CDA much more freedom to decide its stand. Churches also lost much ground to cascading NGOs, who contributed often radical views to policy making, successfully forming alliances with political parties and the press. Thus human rights groups became involved in regular talks with the Department of Foreign Affairs, and some even became institutionalised. Although classified as ‘institutional’ outsiders lobbying activities may well have given them a more prominent position in decision making.

The role of the media, released from their religious confinement, has developed into one of more independent reporting. Peripheral actors would have had easier access to the media, allowing them to play a more prominent role in the phases of foreign policy deliberation and evaluation.

These social and institutional-functional developments justify the hypothesis that the position of the decision making centre has weakened through its wider composition -- the centre was made up of cabinet and especially the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation and their advisers in the Department of Foreign Affairs -- its organisational division, and stronger penetration by a larger number of independent voices.
Regarding foreign policy pursued towards Indonesia, Foreign Affairs would have hypothetically promoted the more traditional interests of the Netherlands, but with human rights and development aid added to its field of interest, it would have been forced to apply diplomatic means to translate these interests as well. Given the fundamental changes in Dutch society, both in structure and in opinions, cabinet would have been pervaded with these views, resulting in a policy that at least formally paid attention to self-determination and human rights. Party discipline would have continued to secure cabinet’s position as ultimate decision unit, directing foreign policy in the phases of deliberating and evaluation. However, intra-cabinet conflict was more likely to occur in the post-pacification era, theoretically allowing parliament to penetrate the centre with its more idealistic interests. Thus self-determination and human rights are expected to have received mainly low-level attention in Dutch foreign policy, given that small parties had penetrated the political periphery and that human rights had become widely accepted as an issue of foreign policy. However, with Foreign Affairs still dominating policy implementation, political and economic interests are expected to have prevailed over pursuit of human rights interests.

12.4 Australia’s hypothetical policy in the East Timor case

The Department of Foreign Affairs as a main player in the foreign policy making process has both gained and lost institutional ground. Adding Trade to its portfolio its role in international economic policy has increased, but in cabinet the foreign minister has lost ground to the Prime Minister whose position has been invigorated through a significant expansion of his
Department. With the widening of the agenda, a larger number of departments have become involved in foreign policy, which has further weakened Foreign Affairs’ position.

In spite of an extension of the mandate of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and establishment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, parliament’s role in foreign policy making has improved only marginally, its contribution still being hampered by structural and procedural shortcomings. Although interest in foreign affairs has grown and human rights have developed into an established element of foreign policy, the number of parliamentarians participating in foreign policy matters has remained small.

Australian society at large is much more aware of the outside world, and especially Asia. The fairly independent media would have played an important role in shaping public opinion and through it the opinion of politicians. It would have been easy for NGOs to have access to the media and get their message across. The numerous East Timor support groups lacked proper institutional means but, could only have played an opinion shaping role. Nevertheless the difficulties in penetrating the strong decision making centre would have reduced them to institutional outsiders.

Fundamental changes in the institutional setting since the case of West New Guinea have not occurred, although society at large, represented by the media and NGOs, has become more involved. The conclusion that there is a strong foreign policy making centre, hard to penetrate for outsiders, still holds for the case of East Timor.
A realistic assessment of interests which Foreign Affairs, Defence and their political representatives should pursue, would see domination of the view that gives priority to cultivating political and economic relations with Indonesia at the expense of Timorese self-determination and human rights issues. Assuming that the coalition defending this policy has a unitary decision making centre one expects the policy to be stable, any challenge unlikely to come from within Australia.
Chapter IV

Dutch policy and self-determination in the West New Guinea case

As was explained in Chapter I, the Netherlands and Indonesia failed to reach an agreement about the future of West New Guinea. Initially the problem seemed not insurmountable, but when the Netherlands refused to relinquish its sovereignty and embarked on a policy that was likely to result in a permanent separation of the territory from Indonesia, the conflict deepened. This chapter will further describe and explain the policy pursued by the Netherlands in this conflict.

1. West New Guinea becomes an issue

In October 1946 during a conference in Pangkalpinang, a town on Bangka island off Sumatra, Netherlands negotiators launched the idea of a special status for West New Guinea. In November 1946 at Linggadjati, a town on Java, representatives of the Indonesian Republic, although opposed to the idea, agreed to an ambiguous compromise, that would be a source of much contention in the years to follow. Article 3 of the Linggadjati Treaty, asseverated that “the future United States of Indonesia will comprise the whole territory of the Netherlands Indies,”¹ but “the population of any territory, which so wishes,

can choose a special relationship with The United States of Indonesia or the Netherlands.”

In the Netherlands, in a climate of frustration over the impending loss of the Indies, determination to save at least part of the colony was growing, and politicians used the opportunity which Article 3 offered to fulfil this desire. A statement of 10 December 1946 showed how the government capitalised on the confusing Linggadjati formulation, using it to justify a policy that would give West New Guinea a special status:

The Netherlands Indies will become a sovereign democratic state on a federative basis...but the population of any territory, which so wishes, can choose a special relationship to the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands...[T]he government declares that it desires that in the spirit of the Articles 3 and 4 [of the Linggadjati agreement] New Guinea must be able to obtain its own status with respect to the Kingdom and the United States of Indonesia.  

With the decolonisation of Indonesia degenerating into a colonial war and the Netherlands suffering major diplomatic defeats in the United Nations which had forced it to accept a distasteful treaty of independence, the feeling that compensation for a blemished reputation and loss of political status was required united ever stronger social and political forces in the Netherlands. The colonial ship was lost but West New Guinea became a life boat to salvage Dutch pride. The ugly duckling of the former Dutch East Indies, with its uncivilised population and negligible economic value, became the ransom Indonesia had to pay for its independence.

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A major debate on the question of Indonesia’s independence in the Second Chamber of Dutch parliament on 17 August 1949 showed a high level of political support for excluding West New Guinea from a direct transfer of sovereignty. The main Christian coalition parties -- *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* (ARP -- Anti Revolutionary Party), *Christelijk Historische Unie* (CHU -- Christian Historical Union), and *Katholieke Volkspartij* (KVP -- Catholic People's Party) as well as fellow coalition party, *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD -- People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) were united in their opposition to include West New Guinea in a treaty of independence and in favour of continuing Dutch sovereignty. *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA -- Labor Party) was the only member of the government coalition willing to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia. Since approval of Indonesia’s independence required a two-thirds majority, PvdA gave in reluctantly.

The opposition of Christian parties to a transfer of sovereignty should be understood in terms of emotional and psychological motivations, as well as a desire to preserve some colonial and strategic presence in Southeast Asia. VVD was the first party to use self-determination as an argument to substantiate the claim to preservation of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea.\(^4\)

Given the amount of political opposition to relinquishing West New Guinea it came as no surprise that deliberations during the Round Table Conference (RTC) were difficult, and the compromise formulated in the RTC agreement only increased the obscurity. Article 1 stated:

Agreement, and declared that sovereignty over the whole of the Dutch East Indies would reside with the Netherlands until the actual transfer. Röling, op. cit., p.28.

“The Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia unconditionally and irrevocably to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.” Since the two parties had not been able to reconcile their views regarding West New Guinea, Article 2F excluded that territory from the transfer:

The status quo of the residency of [West] New Guinea will be maintained with the stipulation that, within one year after the date of the transfer of sovereignty...the question of its political future will be decided through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

In 1950, however, a firm majority in the Dutch parliament and cabinet remained vehemently opposed to relinquishing the territory. The difference with 1949 was that in 1950 preparation for ultimate self-determination became a more prominent argument to justify a recalcitrant position. Thus moralistic-altruistic rhetoric dominated the debate in the Second Chamber on 26 May 1950. VVD floor leader in the Second Chamber, Oud, stressed that the Netherlands had a duty to lead the Papuans to self-determination. KVP leader Romme, although using more moderate phrasing, also asserted a Dutch responsibility towards the Papuans. PvdA, which supported direct transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, could not but give in. In cabinet, Prime Minister Drees (PvdA) and Minister for Overseas Territories, Van Maarseveen (VVD), were implacably opposed to a transfer of sovereignty as such, but

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2 Quoted from Röling, op. cit., p32.
Drees’ consideration was also based on his anticipation of a united opposition against transfer of sovereignty in the Second Chamber.\(^8\)

In a bid to win the support of the US State Department, a Foreign Affairs aide memoire sent in 1950 emphasised concerns over the well being of West New Guinea’s indigenous population to justify a continuation of Dutch sovereignty. It was argued that the Papuans of West New Guinea had a distinct ethnological identity, and that a transfer to Indonesia would deny the Netherlands the opportunity to develop the Papuans to the stage of self-government. Thus a continuation of Dutch administration was in the best interest of the population. A transfer of sovereignty was claimed to violate Article 73 of the UN Charter and would be unacceptable to Australia. Finally the memo emphasised the strategic value of the territory.\(^9\) Given the feelings expressed in parliament and cabinet for holding on to sovereignty over West New Guinea, the aide memoire was largely propagandist. However, these ostensibly noble intentions failed to woo the US Administration, which remained neutral. This was quite an achievement, however, since interference by the United States in Indonesia’s decolonisation had resulted in an accelerating of the Netherlands’ departure. With the US remaining neutral, the Netherlands could hang on to its administration in West New Guinea.


A secret debate in the Second Chamber on 28 September 1950 finally decided the fate of West New Guinea. The debate proved that in reality a variety of grounds were in use for excluding West New Guinea from a transfer of sovereignty. Behind closed doors, the altruistic veil of Papuan self-determination was not so fashionable. Some politicians and political parties used self-determination as a facade to hide disgruntled and hurt feelings over the loss of the colonial empire, and as a means to get even with the reviled Indonesian President Sukarno. To the ARP Netherlands’ sovereignty was unquestionable, like CHU who regarded sovereignty as a means to protect the interests of Dutch citizens. Fear that communism would benefit from a transfer of sovereignty motivated VVD. PvdA spokesman Schermerhorn took a neutral stand, but KVP floor leader Romme remained opposed to a transfer of sovereignty under all circumstances.\(^{10}\) Romme’s opinion had been strongly influenced by his secret personal correspondence with Joseph Luns, a little known diplomat, but soon the man at the helm of Dutch foreign policy. Luns was against making any concessions to Indonesia regarding transfer of sovereignty.\(^{11}\) His knowledge of international politics and diplomacy would have strongly influenced Romme, who was far from an expert in international affairs.

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\(^{11}\) As Van Esterik discovered, Luns and KVP floor leader in the Second Chamber Romme secretly corresponded over the West New Guinea question between 1946 and 1961. Even KVP members and KVP parliamentarians were unaware of this correspondence, which went against the traditional separation of executive and legislature, to which someone like Drees carefully adhered. J.A.W. Burger, ‘Terugblik op Nieuw-Guinea’, boekbespreking [New Guinea in Retrospect, a book discussion], *Internationale Spectator*, vol.46, no.8 (August 1982), p.472.
Voting in the Second Chamber adequately reflected Dutch public views: an opinion poll held in October 1950 showed 62% in favour of continued Dutch presence.\textsuperscript{12} Thus a powerful political and social coalition denied the Dutch delegation that would negotiate with Indonesia any flexibility: the negotiations were doomed to fail. The final offer of the Dutch delegation -- transfer of sovereignty to a Netherlands-Indonesian Union -- was not acceptable to Indonesia.

Notwithstanding the damage inflicted on relations with Indonesia support for self-determination was on the increase. Early in 1951 CHU spokesman Tilanus too discovered moral grounds to justify a continuation of Dutch presence.\textsuperscript{13} Conservative colonial groups like Stichting door de Eeuwen Trouw (Centuries of Loyalty Foundation) and Stichting Rijksbehoud (Foundation for Preservation of the Empire) actively lobbied for preservation of Netherlands' sovereignty, and they found public opinion on their side. A poll indicated that 57% of the population considered the continuation of Dutch administration important.\textsuperscript{14} Prime Minister Drees finally settled the issue. Speaking on behalf of cabinet, he suggested to leave [West] New Guinea in cold storage for the time being, since no two-thirds majority could be found in parliament for any change in the status of the territory.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek (NIPO -- Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research) opinion poll 459, 4 October 1950.
\textsuperscript{13} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1950-1951, pp.1174-1176.
\textsuperscript{14} NIPO opinion poll 510, 17 July 1951, quoted from Meijer, p.408.
\textsuperscript{15} P.B.R. de Geus, De Nieuw Guinea kwestie: aspecten van buitenlands beleid en militaire macht [The New Guinea Problem; Aspects of Foreign Policy and Military Power], Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, p.68.
The previous discussion showed that confusion over the future status of West New Guinea arose at an early stage in the negotiations about Indonesia’s independence. Colonial and conservative groups with representatives strategically positioned in parliament and cabinet prevented a transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. A desire to preserve at least some remnant of the colonial empire was their main concern, but in an era where colonialism was increasingly reviled, these conservatives had to find other arguments to justify a continuation of Dutch administration. They found less conservative Christian groups on their side. Since the indigenous population was predominantly non-Muslim they too had reason to resist the territory’s incorporation into the future Indonesian state.

Thus a broad coalition emerged in support of self-determination, which was becoming popular in the UN when applied to colonial situations. Some groups probably self-consciously abused the principle of self-determination to get back at Sukarno or to preserve some colonial glory. Other groups it offered an opportunity to nurture and raise a ‘primitive population’ to a level of development where the people could decide for themselves on their political future. This was a long term goal, however. In the immediate future the Netherlands would maintain its administration. In order to have Indonesia’s independence approved, PvdA was forced to connive to conserve West New Guinea’s special status. In the absence of strong international pressure, the government could freely implement its policy of continued Dutch administration after the failure of bilateral talks. The government did not rule out future talks with Indonesia, but divided as it was, preferred to push this contentious issue into the background.
2. *The grand coalition: 1952-1959*

In January 1952 talks started between the Dutch and Indonesian government, but these were suspended in February with the fall of the Sukiman Cabinet in Indonesia. When the Drees Cabinet fell, a new coalition had to be formed in the Netherlands as well. The new cabinet, again led by Drees, assumed office in the summer of 1952. VVD and CHU were no longer part of the coalition government. ARP replaced them. Since ARP was more determined to retain the territory than VVD and CHU had been, the peculiar nature of the coalition system dictated that the new cabinet would pursue self-determination more vigorously than its predecessor.

The formation of the new cabinet had been very difficult, with parties disagreeing over its policy and personal composition. Party politics dictated a ludicrous compromise concerning the post of foreign minister. Without a single candidate being acceptable to all parties, two Ministers for Foreign Affairs were appointed. Drees opposed to having a Catholic in charge of Foreign Affairs, but in the end he agreed with the nomination of the hitherto virtually unknown Joseph Luns, a KVP-member. As minister without portfolio he would be in charge of the West New Guinea policy. A lucky hit as Luns turned out to be Drees’ major ally in cabinet on the issue of West New Guinea.

The talks between the would-be coalition partners also brought about a change in the West New Guinea policy itself. KVP and ARP had insisted that no more negotiations would be
held with Indonesia about a transfer of sovereignty. PvdA had to accept this condition.\textsuperscript{16} The agreed policy became predicated upon UN Charter Articles 73 and 74 for the administration of non-self-governing territories. This course by itself virtually ruled out any chance of successful negotiations with Indonesia. In parliament, Minister for Overseas Territories, Kernkamp, stated that the policy aimed at developing the indigenous population socially, culturally, and economically to self-government, in accordance with the obligations of Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{17} Using expressions made popular by the United Nations it was said: “The administration is like a sacred trust...Until some time later when the people of [West] New Guinea are capable to decide their own future.”\textsuperscript{18}

A parliamentary delegation visited West New Guinea in 1953 and submitted a highly sceptical report that demanded acceleration of the process leading towards self-government. The government, however, stuck to its opinion that the process of development would be gradual, taking many years.\textsuperscript{19} On the other hand the government did give a very clear idea of who would participate in the eventual decision on West New Guinea’s future: “All those

\textsuperscript{16} Paul van ’t Veer, ‘Nieuw-Guinea als wraakoeofening’ [New Guinea as Retaliation], \textit{Internationale Spectator}, vol.28, no.3 (8 February 1974), p.77. Van ’t Veer claims that KVP raised this demand during each round of cabinet formation talks with PvdA in the 1950s.


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Rijksbegroting, Memorie van Antwoord 1955, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1954-1955}, XIII, no.3700, p.4; The 1955 budget papers for New Guinea explicitly stated: “Social, cultural, economic, and political development cannot be but gradual, but within the margins of the potential everything will be done to speed up the process of development.”
people who are part of the population of [West] New Guinea should decide the future status of [West] New Guinea in due course.”

Thus the Papuans would have a free choice in a distant future. While trying to keep West New Guinea in cold storage the government used Dutch sovereignty and administration as means to bring about self-government. As to the meaning of self-determination the government was specific, but it remained silent on the time frame for application.

Without a chance to persuade the Netherlands to engage in another round of talks, Indonesia turned to the UN for the first time in 1954. In the years to come, Indonesia would repeatedly introduce moderate resolutions demanding that the Netherlands resume bilateral talks over the sovereignty issue. The Netherlands, however, remained unswerving and mustered enough support among its Western allies to prevent adoption of any pro-Indonesian resolution.

Characteristic of this period was the unwillingness of Dutch politicians to make any conciliatory moves towards Indonesia, an attitude supported by various conservative colonial groups opposed to a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. In 1955, however, under pressure from another Indonesian resolution in the UN and on the advice of

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Australian Minister for External Affairs, Casey, the government did engage in talks with the Indonesian government over West New Guinea, although still of the opinion that there was nothing to be discussed since the Netherlands had *de jure* sovereignty.\(^{23}\) The Dutch negotiators assumed a very recalcitrant position, but blamed the Indonesians for being unyielding. Any intention to come to a negotiated agreement was lacking, but Luns shrewdly managed to put the blame for the failure on the Indonesians, thus justifying his refusal to engage in any more bilateral talks with Indonesia. In doing so he managed to keep the home front united in its support for retention of West New Guinea, but he underestimated the growing concern over the deterioration of relations with Indonesia. Thus Luns hailed the stumbling of the talks as a diplomatic victory for Dutch policy in West New Guinea.

The impact of the failure of diplomatic means was felt immediately when the Indonesian cabinet led by Harahap unilaterally denounced the RTC Agreement.\(^{24}\) This was an important escalation of the conflict that now demanded material sacrifices from the Dutch. Following Indonesia’s decision not to pay off debts any longer that it had agreed to under the RTC Agreement Luns and Zijlstra reckoned with nationalisation of Dutch property as well: a

\(^{22}\) Front Nieuw-Guinea, Veteranen Legioen Nederland and Door de Eeuwen Trouw contacted the government and parliament in 1954 and 1955. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs, file no. 3009.

\(^{23}\) “The government is of the opinion that the Netherlands has *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty over [West] New Guinea. The Netherlands has taken on the obligations described in Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter, and thereby acknowledged the principle that the interests of the inhabitants are predominant, and accepted as a holy mission the obligation to work for the prosperity of the inhabitants.” *Rijksbegroting 1954, Memorie van Toelichting, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1953-1954*, pp.5-6, XIII, no.3200. Luns also raised the issue of sovereignty in a speech in the Second Chamber: “Starting-point of Dutch policy is that the Netherlands have *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty and this will not be negotiated with Indonesia.” *Rijksbegroting 1956, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer 1955-1956*, no.4100-III, p.568.
tangible threat that they were prepared to face. With the more nationalistic and assertive Sastroamidjojo Cabinet succeeding the Harahap Cabinet, anti-Dutch sentiment ran high and was translated into painful measures against Dutch assets and civilians. As another far reaching consequence of the denunciation of the RTC Agreement the Indonesian government, which had hitherto argued that the Netherlands had failed to comply with the stipulation in the RTC Agreement to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia, henceforth would proclaim its sovereignty with retrospective effect to 1945. The Netherlands was declared an illegal colonialist, occupying a part of Indonesia that had to be liberated in order to complete the process of decolonisation. With many colonies about to become independent, Indonesia would find ample support for this argument in the UN.

For the time being the Dutch government continued on the road of steady development of West New Guinea under Dutch administration. On 23 October 1956 West New Guinea became a constitutional part of the Netherlands. A move which clearly implied that self-determination was a long term goal, to be achieved under supervision of the Netherlands.

24 Records of the Council of Ministers, 13 August 1956, fiche no.100.
25 Emphasising the intention to continue the policy of cabinet ‘Drees II’, the ‘new’ Prime Minister Drees said in a government declaration: “With regard to [West] New Guinea, the Netherlands will promote such a development of this region, on the basis of the existing order, that the possibility of the application of the principle of self-determination will be accelerated.” Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1956-1957, Regeringsverklaring, p.23. However, seemingly contradicting the goal of accelerated development, it was also said that: “The government is of the opinion, that in compliance with Article 73 of the UN Charter the predominant interests of the population are best served when the Netherlands continues its task of developing political awareness. Thus we may not drop the right of self-determination since the task set out is focused upon its realisation.” Memorie van Antwoord, Handelingen der Eerste Kamer, 1956-1957, p.11. The government was opposed to declaring self-determination a constitutional guarantee, because self-determination was only a principle and not a right. Beel in the Second Chamber, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1955-1956, pp.755-756.
With PvdA too supporting sovereignty over West New Guinea until the day of self-determination for the Papuans, political support for the government’s policy was overwhelming. Never again would there be a similar degree of consent. Indonesia in turn established a separate province of West Irian, indicating that the struggle for control was not over.

Various groups which had so far not expressed their concern over the worsening of relations with Indonesia decided to raise their voice since the government’s policy did nothing to solve the conflict and would only result in more hostility. In particular the ‘call to reflection’ by the influential Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church rekindled discussion of a reconsideration of the Dutch stand. Coinciding with the debate of the West New Guinea dispute in the Eleventh General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) in December, concerned scholars joined the Dutch Reformed Church with a petition, presented to all political parties, pleading for a more sympathetic stand on Indonesia’s claim. In response to this petition Foreign Affairs suggested to formulate a plan for West New Guinea’s development, which for the first time would mention a date for reaching the stage of self-government, this to avoid erosion of international support.

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26 Communistische Partij Nederland (CPN -- Netherlands’ Communist Party) was the only party opposing the policy.
The Dutch business community, wary of Indonesian retaliation against Dutch business interests in Indonesia -- Dutch companies still dominated the scene and occupied very privileged positions -- also became concerned over the determination of politicians to hold on to West New Guinea at all costs. Unilever president Rijkens set up a lobby group of Dutch companies, which became known as the Rijkens group. The group consistently suffered from lack of influence due to its inability to find political support, its failure to consider the importance of public opinion and its unsuccessful attempt to marshal the support of Dutch business as a whole. Nevertheless its activities would embarrass the government and expose domestic discontent. It would undermine the government’s international position and in this way the group was a real nuisance to the policy making centre.

These various social pressures triggered a renewed debate in PvdA. In 1958 its Senate group declared itself in support of a new round of talks with Indonesia. The Second Chamber group, however, remained committed to the policy of the government. The coalition government was not immune to these social concerns and Prime Minister Drees declared: “The Netherlands will encourage such a development that the possibility of self-determination is accelerated.” But the ultimate goal of the policy remained unchanged.

28 See Lijphart, op. cit., p.147.
29 As followed from the words of foreign minister Luns: “I see that the Chamber...shares the view of the government that negotiations with the incumbent Indonesian leaders would be futile and therefore undesirable.” The government was not pressured to use negotiations as a means to pursue its policy goals. Quoted from foreign minister Luns, Rijksbegroting 1958, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1957-1958, III, no.4900, p.701.
With the opposition divided into two opposing camps its influence was diminished: a redirection of the policy was not required. Nevertheless the government’s coalition character made it a policy making centre penetrable to external pressure from parliament. Party discipline amongst the ranks of PvdA Second Chamber Members prevented cabinet from succumbing to this pressure.

Opposition from concerned groups continued to swell in 1957. Social action concentrated on the Department of Foreign Affairs, with conservative groups supporting, and business groups politely protesting, the policy to maintain Dutch sovereignty. The Indonesian announcement, that one last attempt would be made to solve the dispute by bringing the matter before the UNGA, caused a frenzy of lobbying activity on the part of Dutch business groups. Chairman of the Business Council Van Oldenborgh requested that the government make at least some gesture. Luns refused this and Foreign Affairs played down the Indonesian threats, although the Department knew that Dutch investment, worth an

31 Luns declared in the First Chamber: “The only course is to prove our obligations to the people of [West] New Guinea.” Quoted from *Handelingen der Eerste Kamer 1956-1957*, no.4500, p.265.

32 Opinion of the Deputy Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs, Van Boetzelaar, 14 June 1957. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs, no.2845. The only difference seems to have been a repetition of the promise to speed up the process of preparing the Papuans for self-determination. *Rijksbegroting 1958, Memorie van Antwoord, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1957-1958*, no.4900.

33 *Exempli gratia*, a letter in support was written by the board of ‘Groter Nederland Actie’ (Greater Netherlands Action) on 11 Nov.1957. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs, no.3009. The ‘Ondernemersraad’ (Council of Employers) expressed its concern in a letter to the Director of Indonesian Affairs, Blom, indicating concern over the consequences for Dutch business interests in Indonesia. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs, file no.3009.

34 Meijer, op. cit., p.578. Notwithstanding Luns’ public denials that the Indonesian threats of sanctions were serious, he did expect anti-Dutch actions by Indonesia. He was prepared to take these blows however. Records of the Council of Ministers, 15 November 1957,
estimated 5 billion Dutch guilders, and trade with Indonesia, which made up 3.3% of the national income, were under threat.\textsuperscript{35}

In cabinet, justice minister Samkalden (PvdA), finance minister Zijlstra (ARP), and Minister for Agriculture Mansholt (PvdA), proposed to talk to Indonesia, but Luns and Drees blocked any such initiative, accepting major damage to business interests.\textsuperscript{36} The Prime Minister’s leverage curbed the opposition of his party colleagues in cabinet, while the towering personality of Luns did the rest. Nevertheless the risk of Indonesian threats had triggered off social concerns over the cost of the West New Guinea policy which in turn caused dissent in cabinet.

The Netherlands secured a narrow diplomatic victory in the 12th UNGA in late 1957, but Indonesia only embarked on a more confrontational course, involving not just the anticipated nationalisation of Dutch companies in December 1957, but also the expulsion of approximately fifty thousand Dutch citizens living in Indonesia. The Indonesian actions were widely condemned in the Netherlands but also caused more doubts about the West New Guinea policy.\textsuperscript{37} In a conversation with Zijlstra, Oldenborgh called the Indonesian measures

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National Archives in The Hague, fiche 114. Drees too spoke with Van Oldenborgh and other business representatives, but refused to meet their demand to make a gesture to Indonesia as a sign of goodwill. Ibid., 7 November 1957,\textsuperscript{38} Meijer, op. cit., p.579.  
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\textsuperscript{38} In order to avert the danger of Indonesian sanctions Luns lobbied Dulles to exert diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. Records of the Council of Ministers, 25 November 1957, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 115.  
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\textsuperscript{37} Leading newspapers used abrasive rhetoric in their comments and showed unswerving determination with respect to keeping the promise to the Papuans. See Meijer, op. cit., p.586.  
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disastrous.\textsuperscript{38} Although it is difficult to assess the impact of this single conversation, Zijlstra would become an ardent supporter of a more realistic policy in later years.

In response to the dramatic anti-Dutch measures, parliament was almost unanimous in its support of the government’s policy. However, the impact of the international environment caused the tide to continue to turn slowly. Growing fear of a further escalation of the conflict made political and even military support of the United States a pivotal element in the analysis of the feasibility of West New Guinea policy. In order to continue his policy Luns had to convince politicians that the Netherlands, should the worst happen, was not without support. Foreign Affairs’ diplomatic crusade would therefore have to be increased and focus on Australia and the US, which had so far remained in a strictly neutral position.

Luns became aware of these growing feelings of uneasiness when the PvdA Senate group -- under the impression that American support was wavering out of fear for increased communist influence in Indonesia -- pleaded for talks with Indonesia with the aim to normalise relations. By means of these talks PvdA wanted to safeguard the interests of the Papuans.\textsuperscript{39} There was no Senate support for this policy somersault. PvdA nevertheless did not drop the idea of negotiations with Indonesia and raised the issue again in May 1958,

\textsuperscript{38} Having anticipated and accepted economic sanctions as a sacrifice to be made for Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea, cabinet paid little attention to the damage suffered by Dutch companies. Instead it concentrated its attention on the evacuation of Dutch civilians. In February 1958 cabinet even decided not to discuss again the dispute with Indonesia with representatives of Dutch trade and industry. The Council of Ministers, 23 December 1957, 17 January 1958 and 21 February 1958, National Archives in The Hague, fiches 116 and 118.

invigorated by support from some leading academics. The foreign minister replied that Indonesia was insisting on unconditional recognition of its sovereignty and only willing to talk about the details regarding transfer of administration. These were conditions which neither Luns nor any party in the Senate accepted.

Warnings about the American position came from the Netherlands’ Ambassador in Washington, Van Roijen, as well. He felt obliged to urge Luns to use West New Guinea as a trump-card to gain as much compensation as possible for the nationalised Dutch assets. Luns ignored the advice and so did cabinet. Instead, Luns approached Dulles with the request to make it clear to Indonesia that the Netherlands would not be without friends, in case of an attack on West New Guinea. His efforts failed to produce any result.

Concern over Indonesia’s growing military potential spread to PvdA’s Second Chamber group in the second half of 1958. Its floor leader Burger wanted to explore the idea of a trusteeship to guide the Papuans to self-determination, thus leaving the ultimate official goal of the policy unchanged but altering the means with which this goal was to be achieved. In adopting this opinion Burger was encouraged by a motion of the PvdA Congress in 1957.

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40 Professor Röling, a member of the Netherlands’ delegation at the UN declared, that the Indonesian claims to West New Guinea were more convincing than the claims of the Netherlands. Dr. Jansen Schoonhoven too supported an open discussion about West New Guinea with Indonesia.


42 Meijer, op. cit., p.601.

43 PvdA ministers were not immune to the opinion of their colleagues in parliament. Samkalden feared a continuation of disquiet amongst the population, while Suurhoff no longer rejected outright the idea of a trusteeship. Records of the Council of Ministers, 3 and 18 April 1958, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 119.

44 Ibid., 9 May 1958, fiche 120.
The motion endorsed development of the peoples of [West] New Guinea to self-determination but also accepted an international legal settlement. Burger explained that the time was right to have the matter resolved by the UN, given that international pressure was absent following Indonesia’s failed attempt to have a resolution carried by the UNGA.45

The other parties stuck to their positions. Prime Minister Drees also discarded the idea to negotiate with Indonesia over a transfer of sovereignty, and reconfirmed the obligation of the Netherlands to develop [West] New Guinea, preferably in co-operation with Australia.46 Luns indignantly rejected the idea of internationalisation: under the given international circumstances that was not a viable solution. Cabinet presented Dutch sovereignty as an appropriate means to develop the people of West New Guinea to self-determination. Protection pledged by the US and Australia was sufficient to fulfil this task in his opinion.47

The combined effort of Luns and Drees silenced the opposition in the Second Chamber.

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46 Ibid., p.72.
47 Excluding, PvdA, CPN, and PSP, the minister struck a chord with all parties. In his reply Luns emphasised the amount of political support he received from Australian foreign minister Casey. Begroting van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1959, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 9-11 December 1958. Luns had also received more solid support from Dulles, who had authorised Luns to declare publicly that the US would regard an attack on [West] New Guinea as similar to an attack on Formosa. Ben Koster, Een verloren land: De regering Kennedy en de Nieuw-Guinea kwestie 1961-1962 [A Lost Country: The Kennedy Administration and the New Guinea Problem 1961-1962], Baarn, Anthos, 1991, p.31.
In the Senate PvdA also raised the idea of talks with Indonesia, motivated by concern over diminishing support from the United States, but remained a lonely voice.\(^{48}\) For the time being PvdA’s dissenting view was muzzled by its commitment to the coalition cabinet. Cabinet’s fall in December 1958 removed the shackles, releasing centrifugal powers with grave consequences for the level of domestic support for the West New Guinea policy.

The period covered in this section showed a turning-point in domestic support for Dutch sovereignty as a means -- to some groups it may have been the real goal of the policy -- to prepare the Papuans to self-determination, to be executed at some future stage. From 1952 until 1958 the main political parties with the capacity to change the policy were locked into a coalition-cabinet led by PvdA Prime Minister Drees, a fervent supporter of the policy. With the authoritative Minister for Foreign Affairs Luns also totally committed to the policy and reluctant to enter into negotiations with Indonesia, harmony in cabinet was assured.\(^{49}\) When bilateral negotiations failed to yield any results, virtually all parties in parliament supported cabinet in its policy. The few dissenting voices of corporate interests remained unheard.

Internationally the Dutch position was strong enough to continue with the preparation of the Papuans for ultimate self-government and self-determination under Dutch supervision. Indonesia repeatedly failed to gather enough support in the UN, where the neutrality of the US benefited the Netherlands. Australia gave sufficient political support to prevent


\(^{49}\) The personal relationship between Drees and Luns was excellent according to the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Van der Beugel. J. Bank, ‘Drees en de Indonesische
internationalisation of the West New Guinea issue. Thus until 1956 cabinet had ample leeway to conduct its policy, with the firm backing of a united home front and in the absence of strong international pressure.

A more determined Indonesian stand, following the breakdown of talks in 1956, slowly but steadily changed this situation. When the Indonesian government suited the action to the word with the nationalisation of Dutch business interests in Indonesia and the expulsion of Dutch citizens, concern in the Netherlands, particularly about the means used to achieve self-determination, increased rapidly. Church leaders, academics, and the Senate group of PvdA urged the government to adopt a more flexible policy towards Indonesia. Indonesian threats and the doubts about international support became key elements in the political debate in the Netherlands. The influence of the international environment on policy making was growing. It triggered off a process of increased social, media, and parliamentary involvement, which challenged the government to justify its policy in moral terms and to defend it through a show of international support. Thus, in the face of an increasingly internecine conflict, mustering international support, in particular from the US, became a major element in the policy of the foreign minister. His promises persuaded a parliamentary majority to continue to support cabinet, but when the Catholic-Red coalition finally collapsed, unity was gone.

Critical voices in PvdA gained the upper hand with Drees retiring and its cabinet members no longer committed to a common policy. Its *volte face* would result in much stronger...
opposition, disclosing to the outside world that a significant number of parliamentarians was worried about a campaign of economic retaliation and military threats and disagreed with a continuation of the government’s policy. It was the beginning of a vicious circle of reciprocal pressure: fuelled by a perception of international isolation in an increasingly dangerous conflict, peripheral domestic forces became more active, gradually undermining the government’s international credibility. This in turn tended to diminish its allies’ willingness to offer support and formed an incentive for Indonesia to step-up its pressure. As the events in the next section will show, the Netherlands’ coalition character of government contributed to the vulnerability of the decision making centre to external pressure, bringing about a radical change of policy means and goals.

3. Diminishing support: 1959-1962

After a period during which an interim cabinet led by Beel handled affairs, the De Quay Cabinet was inaugurated in May 1959.\textsuperscript{50} KVP and ARP remained part of the coalition. PvdA joined the ranks of the opposition. VVD and CHU replaced PvdA in cabinet.

\textit{Drees}, Houten, Unieboek, 1988, p.156.

\textsuperscript{50} The members of Cabinet De Quay and their respective functions and party affiliations were: De Quay, Prime Minister (KVP); Korthals, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport and Waterways (VVD); Luns, Minister for Foreign Affairs (KVP); Cals, Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences (KVP); Marijnen, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (KVP); Veldkamp, Minister for Social Security (KVP); Klompé, Minister of Social Work (KVP); Beerman, Minister of Justice (CHU); De Pous, Minister of Economic Affairs (CHU); Zijlstra, Minister of Finance (ARP); Van Aartsen, Minister of Housing and Building (ARP); Visser, Minister for Defence (VVD); Toxopeus, Minister of Home Affairs (VVD). Although not belonging to the Council, but frequently participating in its discussions: Bot, Undersecretary of Home Affairs Dutch New Guinea (KVP); and Calmeyer (CHU), and De Jong (KVP), both Undersecretaries of Defence, in charge of land forces and navy respectively.
From the outset the new Prime Minister confirmed the government's commitment to self-determination for the Papuans: "The policy...will remain aimed at assurance of the possibility for the population of the territory to decide for itself on its future political status through application of the principle of self-determination." In order to accelerate the process of preparation the government intended to continue its efforts to promote international co-operation. Negotiations with Indonesia over the status of Dutch New Guinea remained taboo. These initial statements showed that the new cabinet wanted to continue the policy of its predecessor, convinced that it had the opportunity to do so, domestically and internationally.

During its first months in office the West New Guinea policy was a regular item in the weekly meetings of cabinet, but no important decisions were taken that suggested any change in policy goals or means. A matter of discussion was the support to be expected from the US. Luns assured cabinet that the promise made by Dulles in October 1958 that "in case of aggression this would not leave the United States unmoved," still stood. Even though cabinet was not fully convinced of American support should Indonesia resort to the use of force, the matter did not need to be taken any further at that stage.

51 Quoted Prime Minister De Quay, 26 May 1959, Special Assembly of the Second Chamber at the occasion of the government declaration, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1958-1959, p.39.
52 Ibid., pp.89-90.
53 Prime Minister De Quay expected the United States to decide on the spot whether to give any military support or not, but apparently that was good enough for him at that stage.
Then there was a prolonged hiatus after July 1959. Cabinet only discussed the West New Guinea policy again during a meeting on 8 January 1960. Luns as usual dominated the debate. He persuaded his colleagues not to change the policy since the Dutch position was sufficiently strong, with American backing, to withstand Indonesian pressure.\textsuperscript{54} Without much discussion the Council followed Luns’ advice.

The Second Chamber group of PvdA was not so impressed by Luns’ guarantees of American support. Therefore PvdA once again, and this time not bound by coalition commitments, embraced the idea of a Dutch initiative in the UN. Since the international climate was turning more and more unfavourable to the Netherlands PvdA feared that soon there could be a situation of \textit{force majeure}. PvdA favoured a UN interim-administration, but ultimately the Papuans would be allowed to decide over their future. The coalition parties rejected internationalisation and supported cabinet’s policy of preparing the Papuans for self-determination under Dutch guidance and at maximum speed.\textsuperscript{55} Consequently the policy remained unchanged.

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\textsuperscript{54} The debate on the budget for Foreign Affairs also showed the reluctance on the minister’s part to set a date. \textit{Begroting van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1960, Memorie van Antwoord, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1959-1960}, III, no.5700, p.41.

\textsuperscript{55} Some members, such as De Graaf (KVP), only half-heartedly supported cabinet’s policy, but with the rejection of internationalisation, they were left with no alternative. Also see T.H.M.J. de Graaf, ‘Te voeren beleid’ [Policy to be pursued], in Paul van ‘t Veer (ed.), \textit{Nieuw-Guinea tegen wil en dank} [New Guinea for Better and for Worse], Amsterdam, Querido, 1960, pp.100-114.
Not until late February was West New Guinea a topic of serious discussion in cabinet. Once again the territory’s security was debated. Undersecretary for Dutch New Guinea, Bot, advocated military co-operation with Australian New Guinea, since this territory was covered by the ANZUS Treaty and therefore under protection of the US Seventh Fleet.\(^{56}\) Relying on more conventional means to neutralise Indonesia’s threats to use force, Luns informed the Council of Ministers that diplomatic action had been undertaken in Washington, London, and Canberra.\(^{57}\) The discussion showed that concern over the area’s security was growing among ministers, including Luns.

In the absence of water-tight guarantees from any of the allies, the defence of West New Guinea was now under constant consideration of cabinet. Since no proper US guarantees were forthcoming defence minister Visser was given permission in April 1960 to increase the defence budget. The possibility of a ten year schedule to prepare the Papuans for self-determination was also discussed, but the outcome of the discussion remained inconclusive.\(^{58}\)

Characteristic for this period of cabinet discussions was a growing concern regarding The Netherlands’ capability to lead the Papuans to self-determination in the absence of support from allies, and a lack of any alternatives. International circumstances thus forced cabinet to continue its policy to raise the Papuans as fast as possible to the point where they could decide their political future. Acknowledging that its attempts to involve the US in the defence

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\(^{56}\) Records of the Council of Ministers, 26 February 1960, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 140.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 4 March 1960, Fiche 141.
of West New Guinea were desperate, cabinet decided to strengthen Dutch military presence in the area. Although in parliament the coalition factions supported these reinforcements, this signal of the weakness of the international position was not missed in the Netherlands, especially since Luns refused to disclose details about the military assurances of the allies, in spite of requests from various parliamentarians. In the time ahead concern would only mount as a result of the decision to reinforce, undermining cabinet’s policy leeway and international stand.

On 7 June 1960, more than a year after cabinet had assumed office, the Council of Ministers finally scrutinised its policy goals. Bot presented a plan that aimed to speed up the educational process for the Papuans and accelerate Papuan involvement in the administration and economic life. Referring to the difficult international situation, and with the road to internationalisation closed and rejected, De Quay and finance minister Zijlstra wanted to set a date for self-determination. Minister for Social Welfare Klompé, however, warned that this would not be enough to acquire a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, should the issue be put on its agenda. Then the suggestion was born to give the prospective New Guinea Council the prerogative to set a date. Luns was opposed to mentioning a date, since this would not boost the Netherlands’ position in the UN and it was irrevocable. He preferred to rely on American deterrence to bide time. In the end Luns got his way: no term was mentioned for the transfer of the administration to the Papuans, but in due course and in co-operation with the New Guinea Council a date would be chosen to

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58 Ibid., 1 April 1960, Fiche 142.
realise self-determination. Zijlstra’s suggestion to give an additional signal was postponed indefinitely.\textsuperscript{60}

The outcome of the discussion showed that the ominous signs of a change in the international climate were ignored, and the foreign minister was very much to blame for this. A similar myopic view prevailed in the First Chamber where Minister of Home Affairs, Toxopeus, was almost unopposed when he declared cabinet’s reluctance to mention a final date. The coalition parties were tied to the apron-strings of cabinet policy, and there was nothing the opposition could do about it.\textsuperscript{61} Only the international situation could. But even when Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in August 1960 the reactions of cabinet and the press were more low key than the gravity of this event would lead one to expect.

By September the seriousness of the deteriorating security situation and lack of international support seemed to have pervaded the Council of Ministers, as it explored the possibility of involving the UN in the administration of West New Guinea. If this plan to relinquish sovereignty was adopted, it would mean a serious shift in means to achieve the goal of self-determination. Cabinet was split over the idea: moralism and realism clashed. Toxopeus, among others, regarded the education of the Papuans as a Dutch responsibility. Visser agreed, but the Netherlands’ isolated position concerned him. Zijlstra wanted a policy that considered the interests of the Dutch population as well, and he warned of the far reaching

\textsuperscript{60} Records of the Council of Ministers, 7 June 1960, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche144/145.
implications which an attempt to internationalise entailed. De Quay nevertheless wanted to explore this approach. Zijlstra then pointed out that any idea to internationalise the matter would bring the policy very close to the motion of Burger, rejected by Romme in the Second Chamber. Bot seemed in favour of abandoning any steps to internationalisation. He opted for setting a date for the execution of self-determination as a means to persuade states to back the Netherlands.

Profound as the issues discussed might have been, the internal division resulted in indecisiveness. The upshot was to delay any decision until the outcome of Luns’ talks in New York with the UN Secretary-General was known.\textsuperscript{62} This indicated the degree of authority foreign minister Luns possessed: Luns carried the day in a hung cabinet despite his absence.

The discussion about internationalisation was finally put to rest in late September, when cabinet chose in favour of a continuation of its policy.\textsuperscript{63} Cabinet had no other choice since Luns had received a negative response from UN Secretary-General Hammerskjöld who anticipated a lack of support for the initiative to internationalise the administration of West New Guinea. Therefore he had advised Luns not to put the issue on the agenda of the Fourth Commission of the UNGA. The international environment thus dictated a continuation of both policy goals and means, and helped to overcome cabinet’s divisiveness. Luns, however, had not completely given up. On 4 October 1960 when he declared that the

\textsuperscript{62} Records of the Council of Ministers, 9 September 1960, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 148.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 23 September 1960, Fiche 149.
“policy and actions [of the government were] aimed at the speediest possible attainment of
self-determination by the Papuan people,” he did not disclose his ongoing efforts to seek
international involvement in the administration of West New Guinea. At least officially kept
unaware, the coalition parties had no alternative but to endorse this policy.

In the Council of Ministers Luns continued to advocate a policy, albeit watered-down,
leading to UN involvement, with a view to increasing the legitimacy of Dutch administration
and thus strengthening the Netherlands’ international position. Forced to fall back on Dutch
presence during the pre-self-determination phase, Luns proposed the sending of a UN
mission to verify the Netherlands’ sincerity in guiding the Papuans to self-determination as
swiftly as possible. The Council approved the suggestion. In contradiction to his effort to
increase international political support Luns reiterated his confidence in the political
deterrent, but expressed some reservations regarding US military support should Indonesia
attack. The United Kingdom however would come to the Netherlands assistance
immediately, he said.

While cabinet was struggling to find a way out of the impasse, the international situation
continued to deteriorate, which would prove fatal for the government’s home front. In

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64 Algemene Politieke beraadslagingen Rijksbegroting 1961, Handelingen der Tweede
Kamer, 4 and 5 October 1960, p.86.
65 Records of the Council of Ministers, 28 October 1960, National Archives in The Hague,
Fiche 150. The records did not make clear why Luns was convinced of the firmness of
British support. He might have used it to distract the sceptics among his colleagues from the
fact that support from the ally that really mattered, the US, was not forthcoming. Ensuring
British support would have taken away an eerie feeling of isolation. In any case, British
promises of support were never more than a means in Luns’ policy to bring the US on side
politically and militarily.
November 1960 some armed Indonesians landed on the coast off West New Guinea. In the same month the Indonesian Minister for Defence and Chief of Staff, Nasution, visited Moscow where he signed an agreement on the supply of Soviet weapons to Indonesia. The debate in the General Assembly had also run against cabinet’s policy. Therefore Luns suggested to abandon any further attempts to find approval for the idea to send a UN mission to West New Guinea. De Quay, however, wanted to undertake one last attempt and Luns gave in.\textsuperscript{66} The idea was crushed, however, when the UN Secretary-General refused to send a proxy without Indonesian support. Luns estimated the chance of an Indonesian invasion in the near future unlikely, but also assessed a Dutch initiative to bring the issue before the UN Security Council as too hazardous.

The Council discussion brought to an end the first aborted attempt to internationalise the administration of West New Guinea.\textsuperscript{67} Unknown to Luns, Herter, who replaced Dulles as Secretary of State, had embraced the idea of a trusteeship, was of the opinion that current US policy would bring Indonesia closer to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{68} The attempt to internationalise the matter might thus have been successful in 1960.

The new year did not bring any better news from the international front. Ambassador in Canberra De Beus warned that should the dispute escalate no military support was to be expected from Australia. He pointed out that Australia was pursuing contradictory goals, trying to maintain good relations with Indonesia while also attempting to prevent Indonesia

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 9 December 1960.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 27 January 1961, Fiche 153.
\textsuperscript{68} Koster, op. cit., p.43.
from taking over [West] New Guinea. De Beus interpreted the 1959 declaration by Subandrio and Casey, which stated that Australia would accept an agreement reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia free of any threat or duress, as a sign of Australia’s neutrality (also see Chapter V). According to De Beus it was therefore “unfeasible to get any guarantees on forehand from this or any other Australian government.” With great emphasis he added that “the answer to the question whether Australia is prepared to risk a war with Indonesia over [West] New Guinea is negative.”

Luns did not mention this secret report in the Council, leaving his colleagues ignorant.

De Quay reported after a meeting with the editors of leading newspapers that the gravity of the international isolation had started to affect the press. The editors regarded the Dutch position as weak and therefore preferred talks with Indonesia. The changing mood was also reflected in the Second Chamber, where KVP and VVD wanted to know what support the allies would give in case of an escalation of the conflict. Cabinet was urged to prepare the Papuans for self-determination at maximum pace. In the face of the Netherlands’ delicate international position PvdA repeated its plea for a transfer of sovereignty to the UN to lead the Papuans to self-determination. PvdA was unaware of cabinet’s failed attempt to involve the UN. Luns tactfully declared that, although he was not opposed in principle, he did not believe in a viable UN-trusteeship under present

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69 Memo sent by De Beus, 3 February 1962. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs, file no. 2878. As early as 17 January 1959 the Netherlands’ Ambassador to Australia, Lovink -- De Beus replaced him in September 1960, had warned Luns that the chance of Australia accepting any military obligations could be ruled out in the absence of US pledges of support. This Menzies had told him personally.

international conditions. The promises of the allies still stood, he assured. The debate reconfirmed the coalition parties’ continuing support for both means and goals of the government’s policy, although concern over feasibility was now clearly on the increase, in the face of a possibly violent escalation of the dispute.\footnote{Begroting van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1961, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1960-1961, 23 February 1961, pp.586-610.}

Ambassador De Beus once more presented a dissenting realist view to Luns, giving priority to preventing Indonesia from falling into communist hands over forestalling Indonesian rule over West New Guinea.\footnote{Report sent by De Beus to the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, 23 February 1961. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2878.} Again Luns did not inform the Council of Ministers of this advice, nor did he mention that in a secret meeting Australian Prime Minister Menzies had expressed concern about the attitude of the US should violence erupt.\footnote{Records of the Council of Ministers, 3 March 1961, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 154.} Ambassador Van Roijen also sent a serious warning. He reported that the Kennedy Administration would put less emphasis on the issue of self-determination, and therefore change its policy.\footnote{The analysis of Van Roijen was correct, as Rusk advised Kennedy that a UN trusteeship would provide a solution. Koster, pp.46-47; see De Beus, p.294.}

Unaware of the real situation the Council discussed the position of the new US government. Luns stated that the position of the Kennedy Administration was as yet unclear, but he also declared that Stikker, the Netherlands’ NATO-representative, had been told that the US government would “continue to support the Dutch policy.”\footnote{Records of the Council of Ministers, 24 March 1961, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 155.} Luns denied the Council any
knowledge of Van Roijen’s warning that the Americans could, with the best intentions, look for a solution that might not be acceptable to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{76}

Luns’ monopoly on information provided by the diplomatic service gave him a huge advantage over his cabinet colleagues, who did not suspect that they were being kept ignorant of adverse developments. Through his handling of the issue Luns had an exceptional impact on the policy of cabinet since he could strongly influence the perception amongst key decision makers of the international situation, creating unrealistic expectations regarding the opportunity to implement the West New Guinea policy. Although the American absence at the installation ceremony of the New Guinea Council worried Luns, a personal interview with Kennedy in April took away his doubt. Optimistically he reported that Kennedy would continue the policy of the Eisenhower administration.\textsuperscript{77}

Cabinet was thus ill informed about the Netherlands’ international isolation when it tried to implement its policy to speed up the process leading to self-determination, through a ten year plan that accelerated political, cultural, and economic development needed to create optimal conditions for self-determination in West New Guinea. The plan implied a prolonged involvement of the Netherlands, an idea with which a growing number of people disagreed. April 1961 therefore brought a wave of domestic protest by artists and intellectuals who issued a manifesto declaring the policy unrealistic in the face of mounting international


\textsuperscript{77} De Geus, op. cit., p.139.
opposition. In an attempt to turn the tide, De Quay met with Rijkens, but no agreement was reached. Among the supporters of the government’s policy, the recently instated New Guinea Council declared its opposition to any changes in the existing status of West New Guinea without its prior approval. The New Guinea Council also demanded unequivocal adherence to the guarantee of self-determination. Cabinet responded by declaring its sincere intention to fulfil its task. Thus cabinet was caught in cross-fire. Although these outbursts of social discontent had, for the time being at least, no direct impact on the policy, they weakened cabinet’s public position.

Form the international scene there was some positive news for Luns. During the visit by Indonesian defence minister Nasution to Australia in April 1961 both the Australian government and a virtually unanimous parliament had expressed their continued commitment to the cause of self-determination.

Australian political support, however, did not alter the precarious security situation of West New Guinea. Therefore Luns continued to concentrate on the position of the US in his

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78 Lijphart, p.213; Dr. J.A. van Hamel wrote a critical letter to Prime Minister De Quay (27 April 1961). Other leading intellectuals uttering concern included Professor Röling, who defended Indonesia’s claims (27 February 1961), and Professor De Vogel who, out of concern about the threat of war, advocated in a letter to the Prime Minister returning [West] New Guinea to Indonesia (14 April 1961). Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.02850, 912.13.
81 Report by De Beus, 28 April 1961. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2878; also see a report sent on 10 May 1961 in which De Beus concluded
Luns addressed the problem of growing uneasiness in the Netherlands when he briefed the First Chamber on his meeting with Kennedy, in which, according to Luns, the President had expressed his support for self-determination. Luns assured the Chamber that international support for the Netherlands was growing. But at the same time he did not categorically exclude internationalisation as a means to achieve the goal of self-determination. Luns’ mixture of optimism and a seemingly flexible attitude regarding the means to realise self-determination put new heart into concerned supporters and silenced many critics.

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that Nasution’s meeting had been a failure. Archive of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2878.

82 Records of the Council of Ministers, 10 May, 1961, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 156; Koster, op. cit., p.49.

In a further attempt to accommodate critical voices, De Quay and Luns repeatedly met with representatives of Dutch companies in May and June, but the result of these talks was inconclusive. Attempts by the Rijkens group to mediate in the dispute via direct talks with members of the Indonesian government were condemned by cabinet and parliament alike. Minister Toxopeus feared that activities by the Rijkens group and highly critical open letters by influential academics would undermine the government's policy. Therefore he wanted no further contact with those groups. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs supported his view.84

In the face of growing dissent at home, and uncertainty over the final position of the Kennedy Administration, cabinet belatedly discussed the goals and means of its policy in July 1961. For the first time the concept of self-determination came under scrutiny as being opaque. Disagreement also erupted over the question whether bilateral or multilateral talks would yield a better chance of successfully attaining ‘self-determination’. Although no agreement was reached, internationalisation as a means of policy was again on the agenda, while the first doubts about the goal of self-determination for the Papuans, were expressed.85 The home front, steadily collapsing under the pressure of the Netherlands’ deteriorating international position, started to erode the fragile consensus in cabinet. It was imperative for Luns to provide a way out of the impasse. Therefore he agreed to take the

84 Ibid., 23 June and 7 July 1961, National Archives in The Hague, Fiche 158.
85 Ibid, 7 July 1961, Fiche 159.
matter to the UN again and set out the steps of the policy he favoured, although secret talks with the US on the topic had failed to bring an understanding.\textsuperscript{86}

Expressing their concern about the government’s policy in an open letter to KVP, 21 Professors advocated a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{87} A public opinion poll, however -- the result of the poll became known only months later -- showed that 56\% of the Dutch people still supported a solution that implied a continuation of Dutch presence in West New Guinea. A similar percentage endorsed the idea of self-determination for the Papuans. 48\% favoured Dutch presence until the moment of self-determination. 8\% regarded UN supervision as the appropriate means to this goal. Only 4\% of those interviewed wanted to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} With the order to Van Roijen in June to discuss the possibility of turning West New Guinea into a trust territory, Luns fundamentally changed the policy, which had hitherto favoured Dutch sovereignty until the moment of self-determination. De Beus claims that Van Roijen’s advice in March and the American refusal to attend the installation ceremony of the New Guinea Council, in combination with alarming reports about Indonesia’s preparations for an attack, caused the minister to change his policy. Although these reasons seem strong enough to justify such a conclusion, these events occurred well before Luns took the steps which changed the policy. For several months he continued to express confidence in American promises of support, upon which he continued to predicate his policy, both publicly and in the Council. See De Beus, op. cit., p.303. Unfortunately Luns’ speech in the Council of Ministers has not been included in the records of the Council meeting of 28 July 1961. The discussion on West New Guinea in the Council on 4 August 1961 has not been included in the records either.

\textsuperscript{87} De Volkskrant, 3 August 1961.

\textsuperscript{88} A. Lijphart, ‘De Nederlandse publieke opinie in het Nieuw-Guinea-vraagstuk medio 1961’ [Dutch Public Opinion and the New Guinea Problem around 1961], Internationale Spectator, vol.16, no.13 (1962), p.315. The result indicated that a firm majority of the Dutch people was still supporting the policy of the government to prepare the Papuans under Dutch supervision for self-determination. Taking party preferences into account results in the following figures in favour of a continuation of the Netherlands’ presence until such time as the Papuans would be ready to decide freely on their future: KVP 29\%, VVD 33\%, ARP 53\%, CHU 50\% and PvdA 30\%. Especially supporters of the Protestant parties represented in the coalition government stressed the importance of Dutch presence, more so than KVP and VVD voters. Supporters of those two parties were more inclined to
Cabinet was unaware of this public approval of its policy when it entered into another laborious discussion on the policy goals on 11 August. Knowledge of these figures would certainly have bolstered those ministers emphasising self-determination, among them the Prime Minister. De Quay reconfirmed self-determination as the gist of the policy, but he faced opposition from Beerman who claimed that the concept was politically and legally too vague. De Quay outlined the idea that comprised a visit by a UN mission to West New Guinea and a proposal for a trusteeship in the General Assembly. This solution should provide ample time for creating the conditions necessary to allow the Papuans to decide the issue of administration. Undersecretary Bot added that self-determination should be seen as a means to develop the Papuans. UN involvement should safeguard execution. Therefore a diplomatic offensive would be launched. All members of the Council eventually agreed with this proposal, which formed a fundamentally new departure regarding the means to implement self-determination, and even raised some doubt as to the policy goals.\(^{89}\)

On 25 August Bot reported to the Council on his talks with a group of Papuans visiting the Netherlands. They had expressed their objections against any form of internationalisation. Since cabinet had already decided to proceed on the road to internationalisation their influence would have been negligible. The subsequent discussion disclosed the Council’s diminishing confidence in the feasibility of the policy, with various participants raising concerns ranging from an ever more unfavourable press to lack of international support, accept UN supervision to prepare the Papuans for self-determination, thus favouring internationalisation.
especially from the US, for an initiative to internationalise West New Guinea. In the absence of Luns the Council lacked the confidence to take any decisions.\(^9\)

On 1 September Luns concluded secret talks with the United States on internationalisation and he proposed to go ahead with the plan.\(^9\) As was to be expected, Luns received permission from cabinet to develop an initiative accordingly in the UN. The Second Chamber Committee on Foreign Affairs would be briefed, but the press was to be left out. Luns blamed a lack of domestic support for having to embark on an uncertain course, but he failed to acknowledge that this concern had its origin in Indonesia’s increasingly ominous steps and Luns’ own inability to allay concern by providing evidence of adequate international support should the dispute erupt in violence.

Analysing the chances of successful implementation Luns reported that so far the international response to the initiative had been far from enthusiastic; Australia and the United Kingdom in particular were most critical. The UN Secretary-General, however, endorsed the plan. Luns expected wide support in parliament. Internationally Luns would focus his efforts on bringing the United States on the Netherlands’ side.

De Quay contemplated the situation and concluded that a two-thirds majority in the UN was unlikely, but that nothing would change in case a majority was not found. Self-determination remained sacrosanct to him. Luns and Zijlstra, the latter supported by Cals, clashed over the

\(^8\) Ibid., 25 August, fiche 160.
idea to hold unconditional talks with Indonesia, an idea unacceptable to Luns. In the end the multilateral approach prevailed over the bilateral.\textsuperscript{92} Ironically the international situation which had undermined cabinet’s home front was now entrusted with its salvation. Cabinet took a huge risk, although not every member of cabinet seemed aware of the fact that internationalisation was a road of no return. The home front would be satisfied by cabinet’s concession in policy means, but should support in the UN be inadequate then domestic support would be shattered again, forcing cabinet to soft-pedal on its fundamental policy goal as well.

The concept of self-determination was again a matter of dispute in the Council meeting on 4 September. According to De Quay self-determination would allow the Papuans to freely decide their future. He was not prepared to settle for any restrictions regarding freedom of choice. Characteristically the discussion did not reach a conclusion.\textsuperscript{93}

The strategy to attain the vaguely defined goal of the policy was discussed on several occasions. Each time disagreement prevailed, with Zijlstra defending a double approach -- that is bi- and multilateral -- and Toxopeus rejecting any bilateral initiative as undermining the multilateral steps. Zijlstra feared that the debate in the UN would weaken the position of the Netherlands. Therefore efforts to come to talks with Indonesia should be taken prior to the

\textsuperscript{91} De Geus, op. cit., p.145.
\textsuperscript{92} Records of the Council of Ministers, 1 September 1961, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 160.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 4 September 1961, fiche 161.
debate. In the end he gave way and a majority of the Council was prepared to take West New Guinea to the UN without having talks with Indonesia first.\textsuperscript{94}

Luns introduced the plan that would carry his name in the United Nations on 26 September 1961:

\begin{quote}
The Netherlands declare their willingness to give up their sovereignty as soon as the right of self-determination of the people of [West] New Guinea is sufficiently guaranteed; the territory will be needing technical assistance and education for quite some time; therefore resolution 1514 (XV) should be executed with respect to [West] New Guinea as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

The Luns plan met with domestic and international opposition for failing to include Indonesia in its proposed solution; the plan did not even refer to Indonesia. Undermining unity in the Netherlands once more, various political, religious, and social groups advised to start negotiations with Indonesia over transfer of sovereignty. They unexpectedly struck a chord with ARP, hitherto a staunch supporter of the government’s policy. During a debate in the Second Chamber on 3 October 1961, the speaker of ARP declared himself in favour of direct talks with Indonesia, although ARP would not block the initiative to internationalise the issue. According to ARP leader Biesheuvel self-determination was not an absolute and unalterable principle, but merely a means to an end, which was desirable only if it served the

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, 8 September 1961.
\textsuperscript{95} Begroting van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Memorie van Toelichting 1962, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1961-1962, 6500-V, no.10.
purpose of promoting the interests of the people. With a few exceptions all parties, including ARP, supported the government in the end.

The New Guinea Council fully ranged on the side of the Luns Plan as introduced in the UN on 9 October. The campaign in support of self-determination picked up more steam when 240 prominent Dutchmen signed a manifesto stressing the moral duty to keep the promise of self-determination. Also an anti-Rijkens committee was formed. The opposition was never silenced completely, however. Rijkens, on behalf of business groups, again declared his intention to continue to urge Netherlands-Indonesian talks. Prominent academics signed a manifesto against the Luns Plan and a strict interpretation of self-determination. It constituted yet another powerful sign of dissatisfaction with the West New Guinea policy of the government, without any proven direct impact on the major policy makers, however. Until the outcome of the debate in the UN these critical voices carried little weight.

Luns reported to the Council that Rusk was enthusiastic about the Luns Plan. Although there was opposition in the State Department, both Luns and Van Roijen expected that the United States would back the plan in the end. Luns blamed the Rijkens group for the damaged

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96 *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1961-1962*, p.526. Earlier in 1961, on the advice of Van Roijen, Biesheuvel had had a conversation with Averell Harriman of the US State Department. Harriman pointed out that the US would not offer any military support should Indonesia attack West New Guinea. This revelation probably prompted Biesheuvel, and with him ARP, to moderate his stand. Koster, op. cit., p.79.
97 CPN and PSP were opposed.
100 Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.02850, 912.13
101 NRC, 7 November 1961.
image of Dutch policy in the United States. A secret meeting with Indonesian representatives, Luns reported, had failed to show any basis for negotiations. Therefore he suggested not to pursue the bilateral approach any further.\textsuperscript{102} Parliament, however, prevented Luns from succeeding to remove bilateral talks with Indonesia from the Council’s agenda. On 3 November the issue was again discussed, following a debate with the Foreign Affairs Committees of both Chambers. In the First Chamber, Luns’ own party colleague Berghuis (KVP) had raised the issue of bilateral talks. Luns managed to defuse the issue for the moment and keep cabinet’s ranks closed, but Zijlstra and Van Aartsen reserved their final judgement until the UN had had its say. Luns declared that a resolution or decision concerning bilateral talks with Indonesia about the sovereignty over West New Guinea would be unacceptable as long as Indonesia remained committed to the precondition of transfer of sovereignty. A judgement on whether to pursue the West New Guinea question by means of bilateral negotiations was linked to the assessment of the situation should the Netherlands’ proposal in the UN fail to acquire the necessary two-thirds majority. Luns was optimistic that, whatever the outcome, the Dutch position would be enhanced, inferring that bilateral negotiations would not be essential. Notwithstanding this optimism a significant minority of ARP and CHU ministers accepted the policy only to avoid a cabinet crisis.\textsuperscript{103} A negative UN verdict would justify the start of bilateral talks with Indonesia, which could optimally achieve a watered-down application of self-determination.

\textsuperscript{102} The Indonesians concerned were Minister Yamin and Ambassador in the US Zain. Records of the Council of Ministers, 27 October 1961, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 162.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 3 November 1961, fiche 163.
The issue of bilateral talks was soon back on the Council’s plate since the attempt to have the Luns plan adopted by the General Assembly had failed abysmally: in the face of insufficient support the resolution was quietly withdrawn without being put to a vote. A compromise, known as the Brazzaville resolution, recognised the right of self-determination for the Papuans as a basis for Dutch-Indonesian talks to be held under the supervision of the UN. Should these talks fail to produce an agreement before 1 March 1962 a UN mission of inquiry would be sent to West New Guinea. This resolution too was unlikely to secure the required two-thirds majority, although at least an absolute majority could be gained, as well as the backing of the United States.

Surprisingly the Council of Ministers hailed the result of the UN debate so far as a diplomatic victory, since the United States was “clearly and plainly on the side of The Netherlands and has spoken in favour of self-determination.”\(^{104}\) The road to direct talks with Indonesia was declared open, if Indonesia was prepared to allow the Papuans to decide freely over their own future. The Council decided to support the Brazzaville resolution, regarding it as a suitable means to internationalise the West New Guinea question.\(^ {105}\) Thus prior to the voting on the Brazzaville resolution the UNGA debate had already forced cabinet to accept bilateral talks as a means to salvage self-determination.

\(^{104}\) Quoted from a letter sent by either foreign minister Luns or Prime Minister De Quay to the Second Chamber, November 1961, Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file nos.2847/912.13.

When the Brazzaville resolution failed to acquire the necessary majority in the UNGA, social and political unity in the Netherlands were irrevocably broken. Strong pressure from virtually all sides forced cabinet to engage in unconditional talks with Indonesia, thus sacrificing self-determination. Both the influential Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Church concluded that the defeat demanded a different Dutch policy.\(^{106}\) In the First Chamber ARP and CHU, among others, also acknowledged the importance of the changes in international circumstances for the policy, and pleaded for open talks with Indonesia.\(^{107}\) Luns tried put on a brave face, evaluating the outcome of the debate in the General Assembly as “not unfavourable.”\(^{108}\)

Under this severe parliamentary criticism the Council of Ministers was forced to reconsider its policy. Luns blamed the poor result in the UN on strong Indonesian lobbying and a tarnished image of Dutch policy, due to a divided home front. He ignored the fact that many newly independent states in the UN had a tendency to anti-colonialism, which explained their support for Indonesia.\(^{109}\) Since Luns’ analysis was not very helpful in redirecting policy, De Quay raised the question where to go from here. He preferred a period of reorientation, but the domestic scene was demanding a new initiative quickly; voices in parliament and the media suggested bilateral talks. In order to gain additional information De Quay wanted to

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\(^{106}\) Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, pp.211-212.


\(^{108}\) As encouraging signs Luns mentioned: lack of support for the pro-Indonesian resolution put forward by India, majority support for the Brazzaville resolution, the United States endorsement of the two starting-points of Dutch policy, the State Department’s view that the outcome invigorated the Dutch position, a positive assessment by the press in the United States, and the Netherlands’ representative at the UN Schürmann’s belief that the Netherlands had gained in prestige. Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Luns specifically referred to a letter written by Oltmans, a journalist, and Professor Van Hamel to US representative Stevenson with a recommendation not to support the
postpone debate with parliament until January. Zijlstra, who had previously suggested bilateral talks but had been forced to put up with majority opposition, seized the opportunity and declared that the outcome of the debate had made him change his mind. However, he did not want to give up self-determination as the starting-point of talks.

Starting the discussion on the core of the policy, Klompé, a typical moralist hardliner regarding the promise of self-determination, drew the battle lines stating that self-determination must have priority. Beerman, speaking on behalf of those ministers prepared to assume a more flexible position, saw the outcome of the UN debate as an indication of support for bilateral talks. Given crumbling support from the home front, he warned against too rigid an interpretation of self-determination: “When interpreting this concept one should look at the chances of the country in question of being economically, and politically independent.” The wishes of the people should be considered, Beerman said, but linking self-determination to a decision by the Papuans meant postponing any decision on West New Guinea’s future for a long time. Using a broader interpretation of self-determination, he advocated talks with Indonesia. Luns, no longer so dominant in discussions, since his diplomatic efforts had failed to provide an escape route, pointed out that the hands of the government were tied. Although the Netherlands had previously hinted at its willingness to engage in talks with Indonesia, self-determination as a conditio sine qua non formed an

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110 Quoted from ibid.
obstacle. Showing signs of escapism Luns played down the grave security situation in West New Guinea, thus trying to create room to adhere to the policy of self-determination.\textsuperscript{111}

With cabinet divided over the meaning of self-determination, no agreement was reached about how to proceed. Cabinet agreed that the domestic situation was not conducive to conducting a sound policy. Postponement of a debate with parliament served as a means to buy time and restore harmony and create leeway to manoeuvre. However the attempt of the divided policy making centre to restore unity, by temporarily denying external forces to enter into decision making before cabinet itself had reached conclusions with respect to new goals and means, would falter as international events continued to tumble around it, causing increasingly hostile press reports. A divided coalition cabinet proved to be a centre vulnerable to outside pressure.

International and domestic pressure on cabinet continued to mount in the second half of December 1961. Inspired by India’s armed intervention in Goa, Sukarno issued his ‘Last Order’. In this statement he warned the Netherlands not to found a Papuan state. He also called on Indonesians to prepare for mobilisation and predicted the raising of the Indonesian flag over [West] New Guinea. Van Roijen correctly warned the Department of Foreign Affairs that the United States would not give military support in case of Indonesian aggression. The US would not even be prepared to put diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. The Kennedy Administration favoured talks without preconditions, according to Van

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
Roijen.\textsuperscript{112} PvdA floor leader in the Second Chamber Burger wrote to De Quay asking him to negotiate with Indonesia, as this was the best way to embody the right of self-determination.\textsuperscript{113} On 19 December the bishops in the Netherlands too called on the government to come to an open and confidential dialogue with the Indonesian government. The General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church formulated a similar appeal on 16 December 1961.\textsuperscript{114}

De Quay was not insensitive to these outside pressures and mentioned in the Council that both the UN and the US exerted strong pressure to come to bilateral talks.\textsuperscript{115} Luns, however, still tried to obstruct direct talks with Indonesia, but De Quay said that in the First Chamber too talks were being urged from all sides. Luns once more stressed that for self-determination it was essential that the Papuans would be given an opportunity to express themselves over their political future before a decision was taken. Defence minister Visser agreed and even claimed that the situation had not really changed. Zijlstra, Korthals and De Quay took issue with him and argued that the Netherlands position had weakened. Luns nevertheless remained opposed to bilateral talks, believing that through US involvement in negotiations self-determination could be upheld. Beerman wanted to give priority to the interests of the Papuans, and they would not benefit from an Indonesian attack. Therefore he was in favour of unconditional talks with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} De Geus, op. cit., p.156.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2850, 912.13.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1961-1962, 33rd meeting, 2 January 1962, p.524.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Records of the Council of Ministers, 22 December 1961, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 164.
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Implicitly accepting the need to start talks with Indonesia the discussion shifted to the question if the Netherlands should engage in unconditional talks, sacrificing self-determination as a precondition. Luns formulated an acceptable compromise suggesting:

[To] agree to open talks by dropping self-determination as a precondition, understanding that self-determination would be the starting point for the Netherlands and that an agreement regarding transfer of administration could not be signed without the approval of the people of [West] New Guinea.117

In a speech to the Second Chamber on 2 January 1962 Prime Minister De Quay could therefore declare cabinet’s willingness to engage in talks with Indonesia without preconditions, but with self-determination as the starting point. In the important debate ensuing from this letter, KVP spokesman Blaisse underlined that pre-eminence ought to be given to the interests of the Papuans in talks with Indonesia. These talks, however, should be unconditional and held as soon as possible. The talks should assure the Papuans with a *bona fide* opportunity to express themselves.118

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116 Ibid.
117 Quoted from ibid. A more watered down interpretation is given by Luns in a telex to the embassy in Addis Ababa. The policy goal had been modified. No longer was the Netherlands prepared to talk with Indonesia only when that state accepted the precondition of self-determination for the Papuans. Self-determination was reduced to a matter of prime concern. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2848. This did not mean that either Luns or Blom was prepared to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia, as a secret letter from Blom to Luns dated 5 January 1962 proved: “Transfer to Indonesia after a few years is unacceptable, but this cannot be declared publicly since the Netherlands has declared its willingness to start negotiations without any preconditions.” Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no. 02850, 912.13.
Biesheuvel (ARP) criticised cabinet for its lack of action and its naive and optimistic interpretation of the UNGA-meeting. In spite of its criticism, ARP, left with no other option, supported the policy to come to open talks with Indonesia; the well being of the Papuans should guide the Netherlands in these talks.\textsuperscript{119} ARP, however, now regarded self-determination as no more than a means to serve the well being of the Papuans. Biesheuvel did agree with cabinet that self-determination implied that no decision could be taken about the future of West New Guinea that would exclude the opinion of the Papuans.\textsuperscript{120}

Stoffels-van Haaften (VVD) also expressed the opinion that the government should do its utmost to come to unconditional talks with Indonesia. Likewise the interests of the Papuans should guide the delegation during the talks.\textsuperscript{121} Lankhorst, representing Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP -- Pacifist Socialist Party), called self-determination a fiction since realisation was impossible. The main policy aim should be to prevent a war.\textsuperscript{122} PvdA floor leader Burger claimed that awareness of the Dutch interest in a pro-Indonesia choice by the Papuans, and acknowledgment that Indonesia already had sovereignty over West New Guinea, formed no impediment to declaring the accomplishment of reasonable forms of self-determination the basis of negotiations.\textsuperscript{123}

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\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p.530.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp.526 and 558.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., pp.546-547.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p.535.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p.516.
\end{flushleft}
Prime Minister De Quay tried to reassure the Second Chamber of cabinet’s intention to come to unconditional talks with Indonesia. In the debate he had found the coalition parties on his side, notwithstanding their criticism and proclivity to regard self-determination as a means and no longer as a goal. However they did not prescribe for cabinet how to come to talks, nor what cabinet should accept in these talks. Partly in anticipation of parliament’s position, cabinet had already decided to proceed on the road of unconditional talks with Indonesia: the debate had not further restricted the goals to be pursued or the Indonesian demands to be accepted. In accepting the need for secrecy, parliament gave cabinet maximum freedom to manoeuvre. With its own hands parliament had, for some time to come, reduced its influence to that of an interested but uninformed bystander. Knowing that any alternative course would not have brought a better result, but could topple the coalition, the majority prescribed a policy of limited interference as optimum solution to the international circumstances. Parliament’s involvement in this critical phase of policy evaluation was thus only marginal. In order to explain the changes in policy one must again concentrate on discussions in the Council of Ministers. In this forum, however, parliament’s discord was almost fully mirrored along party lines. Thus the coalition nature of government now impacted forcefully on the process of policy making: even without direct peripheral involvement a divided decision making centre will reflect the views of its peripheral composition.

Outwardly united, cabinet was deeply divided in fact over how to handle the parliamentary mandate. On 6 January 1962 the Council discussed what the policy would be, should Indonesia take up arms. Subject of debate was also the question of how to persuade
Indonesia to start talks, and the instructions to be given to Dutch negotiators. Zijlstra, Van Aartsen, Veldkamp and Beerman were prepared to fight only with international support and if fighting served the interests of the Papuans. De Pous, Toxopeus and Korthals wanted to try to prevent a further escalation of the conflict through diplomatic pressure on the United States. Visser would rather strengthen the defence of West New Guinea as much as possible. Klompé spoke fiercely for self-determination: even without US and Australian support she was prepared to take up arms and fight a limited war. Van Houten blamed the activities of Duynstee and Rijkens for the weakened international position of the Netherlands. With the ever increasing governmental and parliamentary disharmony he predicted that the situation would only become more precarious and diminish the chance of international support. De Quay supported Klompé but was also in favour of increasing diplomatic pressure, an approach suggested by Luns. Even after this discussion cabinet remained deeply divided.\textsuperscript{124} The coalition-government had reached a deadlock and a crisis was looming. Since no one wanted the government to fall, indecisiveness was the outcome.

Following an alarming naval battle between Dutch and Indonesian vessels on 15 January near Vlakke Hoek, just off the coast of West New Guinea, 54 concerned theologians sent a letter to cabinet urging it to discuss a transfer of sovereignty with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{125} Luns reported to the Council on his meetings with the Committees of Foreign Affairs in the Second and First Chamber, which had convened to debate the naval encounter. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the event, the government’s reluctance to negotiate with Indonesia should the conditions of transfer of administration formed the only topic and met no opposition: the

\textsuperscript{124} Records of the Council of Ministers, 6 January 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 166.
mandate still stood. Toxopeus, however, reported a further erosion of support for the
government: several Provincial Governors had taken the highly unusual step of signing a
petition critical of the government’s policy. Domestic support was dwindling.126

Luns reported in the council that Schürmann, the Netherlands’ permanent representative at
the UN, had warned that Sukarno was still only prepared work on a solution that went no
further than a promise to have an act of self-determination some time after the transfer of
administration to Indonesia.127

Luns also reported that Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant had offered to hold bilateral
talks with Indonesia in his presence. The Council responded positive to this idea.
Subsequently a debate arose about the instructions to be given to the delegation. Beerman
suggested an execution of self-determination after a spell of ten years, with UN guarantees.
Cals wanted to know if this meant that a priori approval of a transfer of administration by
the Papuans was dropped as a precondition. De Quay was against a transfer of sovereignty
if the people were opposed to it, but within the limits of what was possible. Political and

125 This naval encounter took place on 15 January 1962. The letter was sent on the 18th of
the same month. Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.3010.
126 Records of the Council of Ministers, 19 January 1962, National Archives in The Hague,
fiche 166. Cabinet was probably unaware of an opinion poll which showed clear support for
its policy. Respondents were asked to say whether they agreed with the government’s
intention to let the Papuans decide themselves over their own future, and enter in
negotiations with Indonesia without preconditions. 63% of the respondents agreed. Only
15% disagreed. Nederlands Instituut voor Vredesvraag-stukken, Buitenlandse politiek in
de Nederlandse publieke opinie: inventaris van in Nederland in de periode 1 januari
1960 tot 1 januari 1975 gehouden onderzoek naar meningen en attituden ten aanzien
van de buitenlandse politiek [Foreign Policy and Dutch Public Opinion: Inventory of
Research into Opinions and Attitudes regarding Foreign Policy conducted between 1
January 1960 and 1 January 1975].
127 Records of the Council of Ministers, 26 January 1962, National Archives in The Hague,
fiche 166.
military *force majeure* made up these limits. De Quay acknowledged that political *force majeure* could occur both at the national and international stage. The Council supported the Prime Minister’s policy of refusing to commence talks with Indonesia, if it continued to insist that only specific arrangements concerning a transfer of sovereignty could make up the agenda of talks.\(^{128}\)

Public opinion seemed to swing even more against the policy of cabinet, with leading newspapers demanding a solution to the prolonged conflict. More and more editorials were prepared to sacrifice self-determination in order to prevent any further escalation of the conflict. Sukarno’s policy of threats in combination with small armed incursions, mainly aimed at undermining public support in the Netherlands, was starting to pay off. *Algemeen Handelsblad*, for example, suggested holding a referendum after a number of years of Indonesian control.\(^{129}\)

Concern over the Netherlands’ international position continued to dominate the Council’s discussion on the tactics and goals to be pursued during the negotiations with Indonesia. Ambassador Van Roijen was invited to elucidate the policy intentions of the United States, denying Luns the opportunity to mislead his colleagues, as he had done in the past. Van Roijen explained that the US wanted to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia and prevent that country from becoming communist. Conditions were still favourable though as a “transfer of the administration without the permission of the people would violate the

\(^{128}\) Ibid.

\(^{129}\) Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization, p.236.
national dignity of the United States.\(^{130}\) Van Roijen did not expect any military support from the US. Luns nevertheless said that he expected that Rusk would honour Dulles’ promise of 1959 that in case of an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea the United States would respond as it would in case of an attack on Taiwan or China. Luns added that since the US would be most unhappy with a military conflict it would exert a lot of pressure on the Netherlands to compromise.\(^{131}\) The kindest explanation for Luns’ argumentation, was that it constituted a desperate attempt to restore the Council’s confidence in the feasibility of bringing the policy to a happy ending.

All hopes to bring the United States on the side of the Netherlands were set on the visit by Special Presidential Envoy Robert Kennedy to The Hague in late February 1962. Having concluded talks with Indonesian leaders, Kennedy travelled to the Netherlands. But expectations were shattered during talks in which the Attorney General showed little sympathy with cabinet’s policy.\(^{132}\) Kennedy’s visit took away the last remaining confidence of various ministers, notably Zijlstra, in the optimistic expositions of Luns, ending his masquerade.

\(^{130}\) Quoted from Records of the Council of Ministers, 2 February 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 166.  
\(^{131}\) Ibid., 10 February 1962, fiche 167.  
\(^{132}\) As Luns regarded Robert Kennedy as the most influential adviser to the American President, he saw the failed attempt by the Dutch government to persuade him to a more sympathetic stand towards the Netherlands as a turning-point in the policy of the United States. Michel van der Plas, \textit{Luns: “Ik herinner mij...,” Vrijmoedige herinneringen van Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns zoals verteld aan Michel van der Plas}, Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1971 [Luns: “I Remember...,” Free Recollections of Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns as told to Michel van der Plas], p.103.
In the meantime West New Guinea’s defence was in urgent need of reinforcements since Sukarno had ordered general mobilisation. The Council, however, could not agree on a compromise. On 2 March De Quay and Visser insisted on an immediate decision in the face of a continuing Indonesian build-up. It was an intractable policy problem: a strong defence was a prerequisite for a solid bargaining position, which in turn was essential to secure maximum guarantees for self-determination. Urgently required reinforcements on the other hand would prevent any negotiations -- the only way now to safeguard self-determination for the Papuans -- from taking place at all. The dilemma once more divided cabinet and paralysed it.133

The following day the Council discussed Luns’ report on his talks with Kennedy, Rusk, and Harriman. De Quay concluded that Luns was advising to start secret preliminary talks on an agenda for the real negotiations and not to send any military reinforcements. Visser read into Luns’ advice a lack of commitment from the United States; therefore he wanted to strengthen the defences of West New Guinea. Cals feared political pressure from the US once the negotiations started. Therefore military reinforcements should be sent. De Quay, however, still expected some assistance from the US in case of real danger. Zijlstra disagreed with De Quay, as he did regarding the sending of reinforcements. These should not be sent as it was politically unwise.

Still deeply divided, the absence of Luns provided the Council with an excuse to postpone a decision.134 The record of the discussion showed, however, that not only the means of the policy, but the goal itself -- maximum guarantees for self-determination of the indigenous

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133 Ibid., 2 March 1962.
people of West New Guinea -- came under fire as a result of ailing confidence in US support.

Upon returning Luns reported to the Council that the United States would give limited support in case of an Indonesian offensive. He advocated not to send any reinforcements yet.\textsuperscript{135} Although a military necessity, reinforcements were politically unwelcome now that negotiations with Indonesia seemed imminent.

Starting a discussion on the goals of policy Zijlstra thought that the choice was between sacrificing the promise of self-determination or keeping one’s word even when this would mean war with Indonesia. Cals and Beerman added that the military situation would only deteriorate further. Therefore a wider interpretation should be given to self-determination. According to them the Netherlands would achieve maximum results for the Papuans by adopting a flexible position. Luns, however, replied that he would not accept transfer of administration as an agenda item. Klompé was opposed to showing flexibility during negotiations as this would only yield vague promises. Only when there was total force majeure would she be prepared to accept such a facade for self-determination. No final decision on the instructions to the negotiators was taken. In a bid to strengthen the Netherlands’ position in the coming negotiations, while avoiding to put the start of

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 3 March 1962, fiche 168.

\textsuperscript{135} All that Kennedy promised was to protect women and children.
negotiations at risk, the Council decided to send a few naval vessels through the Panama Canal.\footnote{136}

On 16 March the Council of Ministers finally discussed the points for the agenda-setting talks. Luns suggested as points, \textit{inter alia}: Dutch promises concerning the development and future of West New Guinea, the wishes of the Papuans concerning their political future, a people’s consultation before an ultimate decision over the future, and administration for the interim period.\footnote{137} Anticipating a transfer of sovereignty, Cals and Beerman wanted to get as favourable conditions for the Papuans as possible under the given circumstances. But flexibility was required since any more delay would only further weaken the domestic front. Zijlstra was still struggling with his conscience; he would like to consider the wishes of the Papuans but these should not be binding. For the umpteenth time the debate ended without a conclusion, but Luns got his way as far as the agenda was concerned.\footnote{138} Without clear instructions regarding concessions and the fall-back position, cabinet had only a temporary respite. When Indonesia made known its demands, the squabbling over what could be and ought to be achieved would resume.

On 20 March the secret preliminary talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands finally started in the presence of UN mediator Ellsworth Bunker. The Dutch delegation led by Van Roijen put forward self-determination as agenda item, but on behalf of Indonesia Adam

\footnote{136}{Records of the Council of Ministers, 12 March 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 168.}

\footnote{137}{In his proposal Luns seemed to respond to the plea of a group of Papuan representatives to keep his promise of self-determination.}
Malik brushed this suggestion aside. His mandate only allowed him to discuss transfer of administration and normalisation of relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Since both parties continued to disagree over the agenda, the Indonesian delegation suspended the talks on 22 March.

Three days earlier the board of KVP welcomed the preliminary talks with Indonesia, but a motion was introduced suggesting that the government’s policy should aim at achieving good relations with Indonesia. The motion received unanimous support, but failed to become party policy because of personal intervention by the floor leader of the Second Chamber, De Kort. The meeting proved how volatile traditionally reliable support had become: the basis of support for the government’s policy was eroding. It also indicated that the parliamentary aloofness of the January debate was no longer acceptable to the leadership of KVP. The time during which the decision making centre had been free of parliamentary scrutiny was coming to an end. With disagreement prevailing, cabinet would be exposed directly to factional pressure, probably forcing it to abandon a tough stand on self-determination in the negotiations. Thus pressure on cabinet to assume a flexible position in the talks continued to increase.

The shortcomings in cabinet’s decision making regarding the tactics for the negotiations were exposed in yet another heated discussion which arose over the need to send reinforcements. Van Roijen had dissuaded cabinet against the sending of any troops now that talks with

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139 Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2848.
Indonesia had started. Keeping this advice in mind Zijlstra, Marijnen and De Pous also wanted deferment, the last one because of the adverse public response he expected. The Council again decided to delay a decision.\footnote{Ibid., 20 March 1962.}

A telex covering a speech by Australian external affairs minister Barwick in the House of Representatives in Canberra on 23 March 1962 was sent to The Hague. The sender concluded that Australia would not go beyond diplomatic support for The Netherlands’ case.\footnote{The telex quoted Barwick as declaring: “Australians must not lose sight of our major interests in reducing the spread of communism to our northwest, in preventing hostilities in an area so proximate to our shore, and in promoting and extending our friendship with the people of Indonesia...” With regard to self-determination he said: “Australia wants to see self-determination in [West] New Guinea and to press on both parties, whatever the outcome as to the immediate administration of the territory, that the course which has already been commenced towards self-government and free choice of their future for the} Now a decision on reinforcements could no longer be put off. Cabinet remained deeply divided but Luns insisted on a decision. Cals, Veldkamp, Van Aartsen, Beerman and De Pous all disagreed with reinforcements, although to various extents and for different reasons. Visser, Klompé and Toxopeus were among the ministers in favour of sending reinforcements. A compromise was reached whereby a relatively small number of reinforcements would be sent to West New Guinea.

The various cabinet discussions showed that reinforcements were a means to reassure the home front and the people in West New Guinea and also a means to strengthen the Dutch position in the talks with Indonesia. The troops were not intended to fight a real war with Indonesia. That ultimate consequence of the old policy no one in cabinet was prepared to
accept without military guarantees from the US. The reinforcements should also not make Indonesia reluctant to continue the process of negotiations, the only means available to achieve a peaceful solution, or make the self-determination hardliners more stubborn. When the decision was finally taken the Foreign Affairs Committees of the First and Second Chamber were sent a letter explaining the decision.¹⁴²

With the issue of reinforcements temporarily solved, cabinet resumed the discussion on tactics and goals. For Zijlstra, making the best of it for the Papuans in the negotiations and preventing war were the only things that mattered. De Quay complained that cabinet could seemingly not close its ranks on the dilemma of transfer of sovereignty and the promise of self-determination, which appeared to contradict the former option. Zijlstra and Beerman said they did not like any transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia but the point of military force majeure was approaching rapidly without domestic support for reinforcements.¹⁴³

As it turned out, the international developments would help cabinet to overcome its indecisiveness. On 2 April the US Ambassador to the Netherlands read a letter from President Kennedy to De Quay and Luns which highly recommended a plan introduced by mediator Bunker during the negotiations. This ‘Bunker Plan’ suggested a 1-2 year UN interim-administration for West New Guinea, followed by a complete transfer of administration to Indonesia. At a later stage the Papuans would be given an opportunity to

¹⁴³ Ibid., 30 March 1962, fiche 169.
exert their right of self-determination. Cabinet had always opposed a transfer of administration prior to an act of self-determination, but Kennedy was advocating just that. Luns called the plan appeasement, but the government was confronted with a *fait accompli*. A debate in the Australian House of Representatives also failed to provide any hope of Australia joining the Netherlands. However the international situation still had to become a lot graver before Luns would concede defeat. He asked for time to explore every diplomatic means that could nullify the detrimental swing of US policy against the Netherlands. In order not to be prevented from undertaking his diplomatic efforts Luns decided not disclose the real state of affairs in the upcoming debate with the Second Chamber where, in his view, too many Representatives were already too concerned about the feasibility of the West New Guinea policy given the international situation.

When the Second Chamber at last agreed to have a debate on the government’s policy, PvdA spokesman De Kadt, supported by Lankhorst (PSP), called an independent Papuan state a dead-end street. He introduced a motion demanding that the government should show its willingness to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia, safeguarding the best possible guarantees for future development of the Papuans. In his opinion there was no inherent contradiction between Indonesian sovereignty and administration, and the interests of the Papuans. De Kadt also introduced a motion that demanded an end to the sending of military reinforcements.

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144 A similar conclusion is drawn by Van Galen, op. cit., p.188.
145 Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2879.
De Kort (KVP) mentioned the fact that the Second Chamber had no knowledge of the developments in the preliminary talks. KVP was receptive to all solutions, as long as these served the real interests of the Papuans. KVP expected that the government would accept a broad agenda for negotiations with Indonesia. KVP supported the decision of cabinet to send reinforcements.\footnote{Ibid., p.850.} Tilanus (CHU) understood that the government could not disclose information about the preliminary talks. He did not even want to give an indication of the solution which CHU preferred to the conflict: that was entirely a matter of negotiations.\footnote{Ibid., pp.850-851.} Bruins Slot (ARP) endorsed the sending of troops to West New Guinea. He also agreed with the government's goal to come to a reasonable solution of the problem with Indonesia, taking into account the interests of the Papuans. He was not prepared, however, to engage in a war without knowledge of the position of the United States.\footnote{Ibid., p.853.} Oud (VVD) supported the policy of the government. The starting-point for him were the interests of the Papuans, which he linked to an ultimate choice. He wanted to reconsider the policy, should Indonesia continue to reinforce its troops without US military support for the Netherlands.\footnote{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1961-1962, debate on a letter sent by the Prime Minister on 27 March, no.6581, 3 and 4 April 1962, pp.843 and 868.} During the first round of the debate the coalition parties thus gave tacit approval to cabinet’s policy, but there was a growing distinction between serving the interests of the Papuans and self-determination: the two were no longer synonymous.

Luns in reply, briefed the Chamber on the preliminary talks but, bound by secrecy, he conveniently could not disclose the most significant development, the tabling of the Bunker
Plan with Kennedy's approval. Luns emphasised that the Indonesian delegation’s limited mandate, had restricted it to talk only about the conditions surrounding the impending transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia and restoration of relations with the Netherlands. As long as the Netherlands refused to accept transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as a precondition, and to declare so publicly, the Indonesian delegation would not resume the negotiations. Cabinet, according to Luns, remained determined not to hand over West New Guinea against the will of the Papuans.

Luns had clearly missed the point made by various speakers, who had demanded a flexible approach. During the second round of debate both KVP and ARP expressed their doubts concerning Luns’ speech. Their representatives pointed out that the Netherlands itself should not set any preconditions, although the interests of the Papuans deserved consideration. The Prime Minister himself had to reassure KVP and ARP that the Papuans could not make the ultimate decision alone, nor could the Netherlands. Luns too denied that self-determination had once more emerged as a precondition. Luns declared that the government was not a priori opposed to transfer of administration to Indonesia, as long as the interests of the Papuans were safeguarded. Self-determination was part of the interests of the Papuans.

The motion introduced by De Kadt was rejected by 90 votes to 47. The Second Chamber again gave the government, and especially Luns, room to pursue its policy, but emphasised once more that self-determination should not be a precondition. The intervention

150 Ibid., p.855-857.
151 Ibid., p.877.
152 Ibid., p.879.
by two of the coalition parties would have left cabinet in no doubt just how narrow its margin of support had become. In reality, however, not parliament but the international environment dictated events. Unaware of the Bunker Plan the assumptions of parliamentarians as to what could be achieved, were outdated. Through its monopoly on information the decision making centre had manipulated the debate, temporarily maintaining its room to manoeuvre.

On 9 April Van Roijen informed the Council on the results of the preliminary talks. He advised to continue to raise objections to both content and procedure suggested in the Bunker Plan in order to persuade the United States towards a more moderate stand. Luns had his doubts about a procedure that allowed for a transfer of administration prior to a popular consultation. Beerman, De Pous, Korthals and Zijlstra agreed and wanted to amend this third point of the Bunker Plan so that a referendum would be held before the transfer of administration to Indonesia. Visser and Van Houten wanted to reject the Bunker Plan altogether. The Prime Minister was indecisive but Luns was unwilling to accept the Bunker Plan as a starting point for negotiations. Instead he suggested to give the US a shaded answer and to await the result. Luns threatened to resign, should cabinet accept the Bunker Plan as the only road. No compromise was reached and the discussion ended inconclusively.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{155} PvdA, PSP, and CPN supported the motion.
\textsuperscript{154} Records of the Council of Ministers, 9 April 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 169.
\textsuperscript{155} Id.
Cabinet’s monopoly on information was annulled after only a few days when the content of the Bunker Plan was leaked to the press. Immediately cabinet came in the firing-line of PvdA-spokesman De Kadt, who supported the Bunker Plan.\textsuperscript{156}

As the following detailed summary of the discussion in the Council on 13 April 1962 will show the Council remained deeply divided over the Bunker Plan: should it be accepted as a case of \textit{force majeure}, relieving the Netherlands’ of the duty to keep its promise of self-determination? Was there any room left to amend the plan or could it be rejected altogether?

Luns would have liked to reject the Bunker Plan, but domestic and American pressure had rendered this impossible. Therefore he advised the Council neither to accept nor to reject the plan. One could not speak of any kind of \textit{force majeure} yet, and since principles were at stake he argued that a firm stand was justified.\textsuperscript{157} Cals remarked that the phase of military \textit{force majeure} had been almost reached and he wanted to know what the policy of the Council would be. From Luns’ words he concluded that a transfer to Indonesia could not be prevented, however, only after talks with US officials, who were unlikely to accept major changes to the Bunker Plan, would the foreign minister accept this reality. Cals seemed to find some truth in Luns’ words when he wanted to assume a firm stand and utilise the alleged internal division of the Indonesian government. Luns in reply pointed out that the Australian government, too, had difficulties in accepting many aspects of the Bunker Plan, but the Australians would not be capable of mounting pressure on the United States.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Het Parool, 11 April 1962.
\textsuperscript{157} Council of Ministers, 13 April 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 169.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
De Pous seemed prepared to give in when he wondered if the government could achieve a free choice for the Papuans under Indonesian rule. Toxopeus saw a reciprocal relation between the internal division in the Netherlands and the effect of international pressure, but there was neither political nor military *force majeure*. A firm and united stand of the Council would make external pressure less effective in his opinion.\(^{159}\)

Zijlstra rejected a firm stand towards the United States. Although he would have liked to see the Papuans remain under the Netherlands’ supervision, international conditions prevented this. He preferred to resolve the difference of opinion that had existed for months and paralysed decision making by the Council. Zijlstra suggested a greater UN involvement and, in the face of declining support in parliament he opted to accept the Bunker Plan.\(^{160}\)

Visser was prepared to take the utmost risk in an attempt to keep the promise to the Papuans. The political situation was grave, but the military situation was secure. He wanted proper guarantees for the execution of self-determination. Van Aartsen thought it was too big a risk to reject the Bunker Plan. He agreed to try to improve the guarantees for self-determination. Marijnen concluded that a situation of *force majeure* already existed, given the position of the US and the domestic pressures on cabinet. Beerman too wanted an adjustment of the policy to meet the political reality: an overwhelming concern on the part of the United States with a communist takeover of Indonesia. Bot, however, did not want to

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\(^{159}\) Ibid.  
\(^{160}\) Ibid.
give in to international blackmail that easily. Like Van Aartsen, Klompé was not yet convinced that there was *force majeure* and therefore she wanted more information.161

With another deadlock impending the Prime Minister finally entered the discussion expressing as his opinion that a plebiscite under Indonesian rule did not constitute a real execution of the right to self-determination. Capitalising on this support Luns declared to see opportunities to manoeuvre; no immediate cabinet decision was required. He managed to convince Zijlstra that a conclusion on *force majeure* could not yet be drawn.162 A weak consensus emerged around an attempt to acquire more guarantees from the United States for a proper execution of a plebiscite: Cabinet opted for an amendment of the Bunker Plan. Disagreement over the perception of the international situation had nearly paralysed the Council, but the foreign minister’s authority was once again the deciding factor.

The Council was given little time as opposition in parliament forced it to take a stand. In the First Chamber not only PvdA but also ARP and a significant number of KVP Senators, not prepared to risk large scale hostilities because of the Netherlands’ adherence to self-determination, wanted the government to accept the Bunker Plan as starting-point for negotiations. Only VVD and CHU supported cabinet’s policy, including the sending of reinforcements. The government narrowly prevented this parliamentary view from being imposed on it when in the end KVP approved the budget of Foreign Affairs. But support for

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161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
cabinet was diminishing and further delays in reaching a decision as to whether the Bunker Plan could be accepted as a basis for negotiations with Indonesia would not be tolerated.\textsuperscript{163}

Notwithstanding this warning Luns developed a formula which did not directly accept the Bunker Plan as starting point for negotiations. He informed cabinet that he would give the American administration the following formulation of the policy: “The Netherlands is prepared to engage in discussions with the Bunker Plan on the agenda without mutual preconditions and on condition that nothing has been accepted yet and with the Dutch delegation free to add other issues to the agenda.”\textsuperscript{164} Although the formulation was cumbersome and confusing cabinet gave Luns the green light.

A Papuan delegation visiting the Netherlands rejected the Bunker Plan, putting cabinet in an awkward position. Faced with mounting opposition it could not possibly give in to this strong a demand, but the Papuan show of discontent was painful. More likely opponents of the policy harassed cabinet too. PvdA offered the Prime Minister a petition signed by more than half a million people demanding transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia and an end to the sending of military reinforcements. The effect was not immediately demonstrable.\textsuperscript{165}


\textsuperscript{164} Quoted from Records of the Council of Ministers, 27 April 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 170.

\textsuperscript{165} In the Council De Quay did mention the petition, and informed his colleagues that on accepting the petition he had told Suurhoff that cabinet had a different opinion. The Council paid no further attention to those half a million signatures. Records of the Council of Ministers, 11 May 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 170.
On 1 May Luns could announce the more encouraging news that Secretary of State Rusk had reacted favourably to the suggestion of the Dutch government, although Kennedy and ‘strong voices’ within the State Department had different views. The First Chamber approved the sending of reinforcements to West New Guinea, with all coalition parties backing the measure.166 This let-up was only temporary, though, as Secretary-General U Thant rejected the formula Luns and Rusk had agreed upon in Athens. The defence of the formula in the Second Chamber would also have a disappointing outcome, forcing cabinet to accept the Bunker Plan as the starting-point for talks.

In preparation for the debate with the Second Chamber, demanded by ARP, cabinet had discussed the pros and cons of the Athens formula. Luns saw no need to drop the Athens formula but he feared that the Second Chamber would force upon cabinet a policy it did not want. De Quay wanted to know if a motion demanding negotiations with the Bunker Plan as starting-point would be acceptable, since he expected a motion couched in similar words. De Quay was not prepared to accept such a motion if it meant accepting transfer of sovereignty as a precondition. The answer would be affirmative if it meant that all aspects would be discussed. Beerman argued to accept the Bunker Plan as time was working against the Netherlands and for this case one could not ask payments in blood from the Dutch people. Cals agreed. De Quay announced that he would say that cabinet accepted

the Bunker Plan as a basis on the understanding that transfer of sovereignty had not been accepted as a precondition.  

During the Second Chamber debate on 24 May De Kadt (PvdA) pleaded for acceptance of the Bunker Plan, the content of which had still not been officially revealed. De Kadt said that conditions were more and more unfavourable for the Netherlands, with the US refusing to come to its aid. While accepting a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, the Netherlands should try to get the best possible guarantees for the Papuans. Blaisse (KVP) too advocated acceptance of the Bunker Plan as a starting-point for the negotiations. He wanted to know what the position of the United States was. Stoffels-van Haaften (VVD), Biesheuvel (ARP) and Van de Wetering (CHU) also wanted to know the content of the Bunker Plan. The government responded to the request by finally publishing the Bunker Plan.

Using the phrasing of the Luns-Rusk formula, De Quay reconfirmed the government's willingness to discuss all aspects of the Bunker Plan, on condition that all subjects relating to the West New Guinea problem that any of the parties considered of importance could be part of the talks. The ensuing debate showed that a parliamentary majority rejected such a vague and evasive formulation. Aware of the content of the Bunker Plan, and given the precarious diplomatic and military situation in combination with strong demands from the

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169 Ibid., p.1009.
170 Ibid., p.1020.
media, parliament decided to force cabinet to accept the Bunker Plan as a starting-point for talks.

The coalition nature of government at last allowed the periphery, itself divided, to penetrate the drifting decision making centre and, based on a realistic evaluation of the situation, to impose on it the means with which to pursue the policy goals. Following this defeat the council could not but agree to inform the US that the Netherlands was prepared to start negotiations on the basis of the Bunker Plan, this gesture not implying acceptance of transfer as a precondition.171

Luns expressed his doubts about the talks: “What is presently being drafted is not worth signing. The negotiations are only a facade.”172 With the Second Chamber blocking off his attempt to moderate the Bunker Plan, and without support from the United States, he expected the results to be meagre. The military situation was worsening as well. De Quay warned that as early as July the Indonesians could be ready to launch a major strike and Visser added that the Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their opinion that time was running out. Cals and Zijlstra concluded that a situation of force majeure had been reached. At any cost the negotiations should therefore result in an agreement. Even Klompé gave in, admitting that a different policy approach was required.173

172 Quoted Luns, Records of Council of Ministers, 1 June 1962, National Archives in The Hague, fiche 171.
Cabinet instructed Van Roijen to ensure adequate guarantees for the interests of the Papuans. These interests included the right of self-determination, but prevention of bloodshed became priority number one, to which the interests of the Papuans were made subordinate. By giving in to outside pressure the centre’s unity was restored but both the goals and means of the old policy had been sacrificed to achieve this result.

In the following weeks the Chiefs of Staff became increasingly concerned about the worsening security situation and urged a speedy agreement. As Sukarno remained reluctant to return to the negotiating table, cabinet seemed at a loss in its attempts to persuade Indonesia to resume talks. In a desperate attempt to stave off the Indonesian strike expected before 17 August, cabinet considered a curtailment of the two year interim period of UN administration proposed in the Bunker Plan. Klompé and Visser wanted to stick to the Bunker Plan. De Quay on the other hand warned for an Indonesian attack should the Netherlands adopt such a position without the backing of the US. Cals mentioned that he would not even be opposed to a direct transfer of sovereignty, but Visser replied that this was an unacceptable sacrifice of self-determination. Zijlstra in turn said that a direct transfer could well serve the interests of the Papuans best. Cals agreed, and therefore a direct transfer was no case of treason, as Bot had argued. Toxopeus regarded a UN interim period as of the utmost importance for the plebiscite and therefore he favoured holding on to the Bunker Plan.

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De Quay concluded that the Council was divided over how to proceed in case of a major shortening or the omission of the UN interim rule altogether. For the moment cabinet decided to support the Bunker Plan and to uphold a two year period of transition under UN rule. At the end of UN rule a neutral police force should remain present to assure a proper execution of the plebiscite. The Council decided not to inform the Foreign Affairs Committees yet.\footnote{Ibid, 21 July 1962, fiche 173.}

When Sukarno was at last prepared to resume talks with the Netherlands in the second half of July 1962, his delegation had a very strict mandate, which did not leave much room for negotiating. The first reports of Indonesian demands put forward in the negotiations were alarming: the leader of the Indonesian delegation, Subandrio, demanded a shortening of the UN interim regime from one year to just three months. The Dutch proposals regarding self-determination for the Papuans were an unacceptable insult to Indonesia. The Americans were also putting pressure on the Dutch delegation pushing it to be flexible. To make matters even worse, Subandrio, who assumed a more hardline position on 26 July, disputing each element of the Bunker Plan, threatened to return to Indonesia within two days.

De Quay was aware of the urgency of successful talks as Van Roijen had reported to him of Subandrio’s intended to return to Indonesia, which would make war inevitable.\footnote{Ibid, 21 July 1962, fiche 173.}
Events at the negotiating table left cabinet with very little room to manoeuvre. De Quay angrily called the demand for a shorter UN interim regime a ‘serious matter’ and an ‘unacceptable infringement to self-determination’, but he saw no escape from the Indonesian strangle-hold.\(^{178}\) The Council could only hope for some American support. Therefore cabinet decided to wait for the result of Kennedy’s talks with Subandrio, to be held later that day.\(^{179}\)

However Kennedy’s talk with Subandrio on 26 July was another disappointment. Although Kennedy had persuaded Subandrio to stay longer the United States would only assist in an evacuation of civilians should Indonesia attack.\(^{180}\)

With the Indonesian threats to break off talks and the chance of an attack considered very real, the Dutch delegation advised cabinet to give in on the duration of the UN regime in exchange for an acceptable settlement on self-determination. The Council then settled for a one year period of UN rule. Regarding provisions on self-determination Luns suggested to give the delegation the following suggestions: achieve external self-determination; assure adequate UN presence until the moment of voting; and make sure that the organisation, supervision and execution will be carried out by the UN. Although Zijlstra, Van Aartsen and De Pous disagreed, they respected the will of the majority which endorsed Luns’ proposal.\(^{181}\)

\(^{177}\) Van Roijen had informed De Quay that he took Subandrio’s warning seriously and expected an attack soon after the latter’s return to Indonesia. See Van Galen, op. cit., p.260.


\(^{179}\) Ibid.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., 27 July 1962.
However events at the negotiating table overtook cabinet’s intentions, and the Dutch delegation accepted, *inter alia*, an UN interim rule of only seven months. In the Council meeting on 3 August Luns complained bitterly over those concessions, although he acknowledged that these had been forced upon the delegation by military threat and US pressure. Van Roijen was given the opportunity to brief cabinet on the talks. He advised cabinet to accept the outcome, as poor as it was. Neither Luns nor De Quay had any faith in the agreement.\(^{182}\) Klompé summed up the things that mattered to cabinet: how could an optimum result be achieved for the Papuans under the given situation, how could unnecessary loss of lives be prevented and how could justice be fought for against power? Acceptance of the agreement would mean a repudiation of the third principle. She blamed the UN, the US and parliament for causing the failure of policy. Nevertheless cabinet authorised Van Roijen to start the final round of negotiations on the basis of the tentative agreement.\(^{183}\) This last round of talks did not substantially alter the results of the tentative agreement. On 15 August 1962 the final Agreement was signed between the Netherlands and Indonesia. (See Appendix I)

### 4. Policy until the 1962 Agreement: conclusions

Events and their implications for the West New Guinea policy can be analysed by discerning four phases in the development of means used and goals pursued in the West New Guinea policy of the De Quay Cabinet:

\(^{181}\) Ibid.
\(^{182}\) Ibid., 3 August 1962, fiche 174.
\(^{183}\) Ibid., 6 August 1962.
May 1959 - August 1960: continuation of its predecessor’s policy;

August 1960 - December 1961: attempts to internationalise the administration of West New Guinea;

December 1961 - April 1962: direct talks with Indonesia as means to assure self-determination;


Each of these phases will be discussed briefly.

During its first year in office, the De Quay Cabinet virtually ignored the issue in an attempt to continue the policy of its predecessor. The only minor change in the official policy plan was an acceleration of the process leading to self-determination, entailing inter alia the establishment of a New Guinea Council and an all-out effort to increase Papuan involvement in the administration.

Concerns about the security of the territory and the level of international support eventually forced cabinet to put the issue on its agenda. Although some ministers expressed their concern about the policy’s prospects, the authority of the foreign minister and his assurance of American support in case of violence were easily decisive and the decision making centre remained united. In parliament the coalition parties firmly backed the policy of cabinet. PvdA failed to persuade a parliamentary majority of the necessity to involve the UN in the administration as a means to achieve the goal of self-determination. Although certain groups, notably academics and business groups, continued to oppose the policy, their impact was negligible.
Indonesia’s decision to end diplomatic relations in August 1960 started the second phase in the policy. Cabinet contemplated internationalisation through UN involvement. It was divided over the issue, but since the UN Secretary-General predicted insufficient support in the General Assembly, the attempt was abandoned. It was the first time that international factors seriously hampered cabinet’s policy. When cabinet put out its feelers it kept parliament in the dark.

With Indonesia showing more and more signs of aggression parliament wanted to know what military support could be expected from the United States. Luns managed to silence these concerned voices, presenting vague American promises as evidence of support. Domestic concern increased nevertheless, forcing cabinet to speed up the process of Papuan development. The tide could not be turned, however, and the uneasiness affected cabinet’s consensus. Some doubts were expressed about the concept of self-determination, but the official goal of the policy survived these scuffles. Faced with growing domestic concern and an increasingly militant Indonesia, internationalisation came to be regarded as an inevitable means to safeguard this goal. Cabinet united behind an attempt to involve the United Nations in the administration and preparation of the Papuans for self-determination. Dutch sovereignty was sacrificed as a means. A broad majority of parliament gave this policy its blessing but the second attempt at internationalisation was, like the first, thwarted by the international environment, with grave consequences for parliamentary support.
During the third phase cabinet, confronted with defeat in the United Nations, was forced on a road it had refused to go previously: direct talks with Indonesia without being able to claim self-determination as a precondition. International and domestic pressure on cabinet increased in December 1961. There was widespread concern in the Netherlands about Sukarno’s ominous ‘last order’ speech, and in parliament the outcome of voting in the UN was explained as a defeat. Luns could no longer prevent direct talks with Indonesia, since various ministers no longer believed in American military support for the defence of West New Guinea. Cabinet’s decision not to fight Indonesia without support of the Americans further limited the policy means and, eventually, goals, as Indonesia continued to reinforce its troops. Immediate military force majeure could be parried, although cabinet was deeply divided over the issue. In parliament there was still enough support for some military reinforcements, but negotiations with Indonesia had a disappointing outcome. UN representative Bunker came up with a compromise that virtually meant the defeat of the policy of self-determination.

The fourth phase started when Bunker introduced his plan, which had the backing of the Kennedy Administration. Luns nevertheless continued his frantic efforts to make the best of it. With a hostile press, an opposition no longer believing in self-determination, and the coalition parties not prepared to risk a war without the backing of the United States, cabinet was on the brink of a crisis. In May the Bunker Plan was forced upon it by a very concerned parliament. Informed by the military that an Indonesian offensive was imminent, cabinet hardliners gave in and accepted that there was no longer a real chance to save self-determination in the face of military and political force majeure. A face-saving agreement
and prevention of a slaughter of Dutch soldiers became the only policy goals. During the
days of the negotiations cabinet lost whatever control it had left. It could not even be
regarded as the decision making centre at this stage.

An effective campaign by Sukarno to make public opinion in the Netherlands aware of its
precarious international position, had eroded the basis of support on which the coalition
cabinet rested and destroyed its unity. In disarray, cabinet lost its advantage of initiative. It
became almost totally indecisive, and formed an easy victim to the belligerent Indonesian
President, who had found an ally in the Kennedy administration, keen as it was to prevent a
war with the risk of communism engulfing Indonesia. The final agreement testified of the
total defeat of the government’s policy, basically caused by a wrongful interpretation of
international circumstances by key policy makers.

For a long time a broad coalition had endorsed the policy. Support of particularly Foreign
Affairs and its minister was not in accordance with expectations formulated in Chapter III.
The colonial history, and particularly the painful memory of Indonesia’s decolonisation had
aroused strong sentiments, at the expense of a rational pursuit of interests. These strong
feelings Foreign Affairs shared with many politicians. In cabinet, Prime Minister Drees had
strongly endorsed the policy while De Quay was a weak leader, who, even though he
seemed to have his doubts, did not overrule the foreign minister, who was very dominant. In
1961 and 1962 the role of other ministers increased, and the coalition became divided
mainly along party-political lines. Although cabinet was able to retain the support of its
parliamentary groups it only achieved this by making concessions it anticipated essential for
support. Resuming these findings, only the pursuit of interests was not in accordance with the hypotheses formulated in Chapter III, the importance of actors and the position of the decision making centre were as expected.

The policy that tenaciously pursued continuation of Dutch sovereignty culminating in self-determination for the West Papuans had brought with it tremendous economic and political costs. The result was a humiliating diplomatic defeat. Guarantees for Papuan self-determination in the 1962 Agreement were vague and served mainly as face saving formula for the Netherlands. The period covered in the next section will discuss the response of the Netherlands to the implementation of the New York Agreement and discuss political interest taken in the subject following the Act of Free Choice.

5. Aftermath: The Act of Free Choice and oblivion

In accordance with the Agreement of New York the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority officially transferred authority to Indonesia, after just seven months, on 1 May 1963. Indonesian control started on the condition that within six years there would be an Act of Free Choice. After the takeover, however, symbols of Papuan nationalism such as the flag and the anthem were forbidden. All political parties and meetings in West New Guinea were banned. The New Guinea Council was disbanded and replaced by an Assembly dominated by Indonesian appointees. When Indonesia left the United Nations in 1964 Sukarno felt no longer obliged to keep the promise to have an act of free choice.
Suharto, who came to power in October 1965, reversed this decision. At the same time, however, transmigration began, and Indonesia launched its first counter insurgency operation codenamed Sadar, followed by operation Bratayudha. After the completion of these security operations in August 1967 Suharto declared that his government would help the Papuans to understand that West New Guinea had become an inseparable part of Indonesia.

Given its insistence on a proper formulation of the requirements for an act of self-determination in 1962, one would have expected the Netherlands’ government to follow these developments, which formed an outright threat to the implementation of the conditions regarding an act of self-determination for the Papuans, with the eyes of an eagle. The more so since the architect of the Dutch policy on self-determination, Luns, was still foreign minister. As the discussion will show, it did not.

Reports mentioning a pattern of human rights violations, including violation of freedom of opinion, press, and assembly, drew attention from small Christian parties in the Second Chamber in the lead up to the Act of Free Choice. Addressing these fears Prime Minister De Jong (KVP) guaranteed the Second Chamber that the government would see to it that

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185 According to Lagerberg more than 3700 Papuans were killed during operation Bratayudha. Lagerberg, K., *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, London, C. Hust and Company, 1979, p.111.
186 The parties concerned were SGP and Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV -- Reformed Political Alliance).
the Act of Free Choice would be executed as intended in the 1962 agreement. Schmelzer (KVP), however, wanted to give development aid to Indonesia in 1967 in support of Suharto’s pro-Western regime that was contributing to stability in Southeast Asia. With an act of self-determination scheduled he saw no impediments for his proposal.

The government again faced criticism in parliament in February 1968. PSP, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP -- Politically Reformed Party), and GPV had no faith in the plebiscite to be held under the existing circumstances and demanded punitive steps against the Indonesian government. The dilemma was created by the seemingly contradictory goals of the government’s policy: a loyal execution of the 1962 agreement and good relations with Indonesia. Luns replied that the government believed that the agreement would be executed, and to this end “the government [would] do everything it possibly [could].” Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Van der Stoel, minimised the importance of the plebiscite, stating that there were hardly any opportunities for West New Guinea as an independent state. A large group in parliament, notably Democraten ‘66 (D’66 -- Democrats’66), ARP and Communistische Partij Nederland (the Netherlands’ Communist Party -- CPN) insisted on Netherlands’ responsibility for a proper execution of the right to self-determination.

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188 Ibid., p.151.
189 It was suggested to reconsider development aid.
ARP introduced a motion,\(^{192}\) which Luns managed to have it withdrawn after he had committed himself to do whatever he could, especially with regard to the issue of the presence of international observers during the Act of Free Choice. Luns warned that the motion might confuse Indonesia, putting relations at risk. His concessions were only small, since a parliamentary majority agreed with the government that a proper implementation of the conditions regarding self-determination should not endanger the more important goal of rebuilding the shattered relationship with Indonesia. A repeat of the traumatic events was not warranted.

Having secured the backing of the coalition parties, cabinet soon after assumed a less flexible position when small Christian parties again threatened to put the relationship with Indonesia at risk through submission of a motion that demanded a reduction of development aid to Indonesia.\(^{193}\) Van der Stoel opposed the motion on the pretext that it would not serve the interests of the Papuans. Luns played down reports about insurgencies as exaggerations.\(^{194}\) In June 1969 Luns claimed that he was convinced that there were ample guarantees for a genuine act of free choice. Therefore he would not take any further

\(^{192}\) The motion stated: “Considering that the Netherlands and Indonesia share involvement in the development of [West] New Guinea; [and also] considering that the Netherlands ought to be prepared to promote the interests of the people of West Irian to capacity; invites the government to start negotiations with the Indonesian government soon to establish how the Netherlands can contribute to the further development of West Irian after the plebiscite.” Quoted from *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1968-1969*, p.1970.

\(^{193}\) Motion Jongeling, *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1968-1969*, 9800-V, no.47. The motion was supported by SGP, GPV, and BP only.

\(^{194}\) *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, Aanhangsel, 1968-1969*, p.1597. The insurgencies referred to have been described by Lagerberg. He reported a Dani revolt in the Baliem Valley and the start of Operation Wibara, in which allegedly 400 people were killed by the Indonesian army, Lagerberg, op. cit., p.111.
measures. The Chamber remained silent, giving cabinet the opportunity to virtually drop the issue of a proper execution of the Papuan right of self-determination for the sake of good relations with Indonesia.

Between 14 July and 2 August the Act of Free Choice was indeed conducted, using the Indonesian *musjawarah* procedure, a procedure based on decision making by consensus. In West New Guinea 1025 people were selected to represent the entire population. The representatives were divided in eight regency councils, which all had to arrive at a uniform decision. UN Representative to the Act of Free Choice, Ortiz Sanz, reported to UNGA, that international supervision was inadequate.

Since only legally recognised political groups were represented in the local councils, all Papuan organisations that had been disbanded and outlawed in 1963, including those advocating Papuan nationalism, were excluded from participation. With only groups supporting incorporation in Indonesia allowed to vote, the outcome of the musjawarah was never in doubt.

In November 1969 the UNGA took notice of the unanimous vote of the local councils to remain with Indonesia. Ortiz Sanz reported that article XXII of the 1962 Agreement regarding the inhabitants’ rights of free speech, freedom of movement and assembly had not been fully implemented. Nevertheless Resolution 2504 (XXIV), which concluded that the

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tasks entrusted to the UN Secretary-General under the agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia had been fulfilled, was carried on 19 November 1969 with 84 in favour, 30 abstentions and no votes against (See Appendix II). Ghana wanted to amend the resolution to give the Papuans a ‘real’ opportunity to vote freely on their future by the end of 1975. The amendment received the support of only 15 states, sixty members, including Australia voted against it, while 39 abstained, including The Netherlands. The Netherlands’ government accepted the outcome of the Act of Free Choice, taking issue with press reports calling the plebiscite a farce. The 1962 treaty had proven to be a Dutch Judas kiss.

Following the acceptance of the result of the Act of Free Choice, West New Guinea disappeared as a major political issue. The position of any Dutch government was comparable with that of any Australian government regarding East Timor: having accepted *de jure* sovereignty, self-determination could not be advocated any more. Human rights violations therefore had to be treated as isolated incidents, devoid of any links with the political status of the territory.

Indonesia’s policy of transmigration, however, would prove a serious obstruction to this argumentation, and activities of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM -- Free Papua Organisation), a guerilla organisation founded in 1965, helped to keep the flame of

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196 Article XVIIIId of the 1962 Agreement stated that the election must be in accordance with international practice.(See Appendix A) It is highly doubtful whether the *musjawarah* procedure, as used by Indonesia, came anywhere near to meeting international standards.  
197 Ibid., p.3528.
resistance alive.\textsuperscript{198} In the Netherlands, \textit{Komitee Indonesië} (Committee Indonesia) proved to be a valuable ally in the distribution of information regarding West Papua as well as in lobbying.\textsuperscript{199} As the following chronological discussion of events and policy since 1969 will show, West New Guinea, in spite of its sensitive nature, remained a contentious issue in Dutch politics.

The issue of human rights in West New Guinea remained dormant in the Netherlands until large scale retaliatory operations to quash local revolts were reported in 1976 and 1977, as a consequence of which 3000 Papuans fled to neighbouring PNG.\textsuperscript{200} However no political party raised the issue as yet. To the Den Uyl Cabinet the human rights situation in Irian Jaya was of minor importance.\textsuperscript{201}

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\textsuperscript{198} On 1 July 1971 OPM established a government of West Papua and independence was proclaimed.
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\textsuperscript{199} Komitee Indonesië, with its headquarters in Amsterdam, has several local divisions which organise activities, such as protest meetings, picket lines, petitions and forums. Kommitee Indonesië also engages in lobbying the political parties. ‘Indonesië Feiten en Meningen’ (IFM), Kommitee’s own journal is published regularly. Although over the years the group has been engaged in many activities criticising the Indonesian government and Dutch foreign policy towards Indonesia, its membership is small, and its main political contacts were, until the late 1980s, with extreme left wing parties. This serious handicap has prevented Komitee from exercising more influence on the policy of the government.
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\textsuperscript{200} \textit{IFM}, vol.3, no.2 (May 1976) on military operations in November and December 1975; see Lagerberg, op. cit., p.112, who accuses the Indonesian army of killing 8000 people during counter-insurgency operations in 1977.
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\textsuperscript{201} Annual Reports of the Department of Foreign Affairs for the period 1973-1978 never mentioned the human rights situation in West Irian/Irian Jaya.
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Not until 1979 did parliamentarians raise concerns over human rights violations against the Papuans. PvdA claimed that the government should have taken more interest in their fate.\textsuperscript{202} Expressing concern over transmigration and Islamisation, GPV asked the government to use development aid as a means to exert pressure on the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{203} Foreign minister Van der Klaauw refused, arguing that a lack of reliable information inhibited him from taking any punitive steps.\textsuperscript{204} His argumentation allowed him to circumvent the conditions set out in his own bill on human rights policy (see Chapter VI). Instead the government intended to contribute to stability by means of economic development and education. Parliament allowed the minister this subterfuge and did not pursue the issue any further.

Following more alarming reports on mass killings, a majority in the Second Chamber carried a motion that requested the sending of a delegation to gather additional information at source.\textsuperscript{205} The government complied with the motion and a member of the embassy travelled to Irian Jaya. His report was submitted in February 1981, but even though it presented a


\textsuperscript{203} Verburgh (GPV), drew on Lagerberg’s book to build a case.

\textsuperscript{204} Van der Klaauw had not read Lagerberg’s book; he preferred to rely on information provided by the embassy in Jakarta. Debate on the budget of Foreign Affairs for 1980, \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980}, 15800-V, p.1209. The government was also reluctant to put pressure on Indonesia in the face of the recent release of large numbers of political prisoners, an issue the government had pursued actively. Foreign minister Van der Klaauw in the Second Chamber, 8 February 1979, \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979}, 15300-V, p.3187. During a visit to Indonesia Prime Minister Van Agt even expressed his appreciation of the progress thus far achieved in Irian Jaya, and declared the willingness of the Dutch government to contribute by means of development aid to the social and economic development of the population of Irian Jaya. Annual Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs 1979-1980, appendix 32, pp.77B and 78B.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1980-1981}, 16400, no.9821, February 1981. The motion was introduced by Verburgh (GPV) and Van Rossum (SGP).
gloomy picture of neglect, exploitation, and destruction of culture, none of the political
parties except for GPV expressed their concern. Consequently Van der Klaauw ignored
the report as well. In time the report’s content would even be turned against proponents of
an active human rights policy: with no action taken on its submission, and with the situation
well known, cabinet could brush aside any demands for further investigations or diplomatic
action. Thus when the Minister for Development Co-operation visited Irian Jaya in 1982,
the human rights situation was hardly mentioned at all in his report, for which a large majority
of the Committee on Development Co-operation of the Second Chamber criticised him.

In June 1982 the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs wanted to know what
developments had taken place since 1981, and whether the government still acknowledged
a special responsibility for the well-being of the Papuans. Foreign minister Van Agt
claimed not to have received any new information but he assured that the available
information did not suggest that there was a case of genocide. He acknowledged the
special responsibility of the Netherlands. This implied developing more activities than
normally would have been the case in Jakarta. Van Agt’s promise was merely rhetoric on
his part, but a parliamentary majority accepted it.

\footnote{PvdA, D66, VVD, and Reformatorische Partij Federatie (RPF -- Political Reformed
Party) all criticised the minister, \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer 1981-1982}, 17100-V,
no.90.}
\footnote{A broad majority including the coalition parties -- VVD and CDA -- and the main
opposition parties -- PvdA and D66 -- raised its concern.}
The first cabinet of Prime Minister Lubbers assumed a similar aloofness, if not worse, claiming to monitor the situation and to take steps when required. Throughout its term cabinet systematically denied the existence of any pattern of systematic and gross violations of human rights in Irian Jaya. Concerns over the human rights situation of the Papuans were expressed during the debate on the budget for Foreign Affairs in December 1983. Foreign minister Van den Broek (CDA) denied any deterioration in the situation since 1981. He came up with an alternative explanation to allay CDA concerns. He successfully put the blame for local unrest on a clash of cultures against a background of processes of modernisation. Neither Indonesia’s regime nor trans-migration were mentioned as sources of the unrest. This diagnosis of the problem did not require the government to do anything.

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209 Van der Goes van Naters, Acting Head of the Directorate of Asia and Oceania, informed the Commission that the government did not maintain any contacts with the OPM. *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1981-1982*, 17100-V, no.139.

210 Foreign minister Van den Broek in reply to concerns brought forward by Schutte (GPV). *Debate on the Budget of the Department of Foreign Affairs for 1983, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1982-1983*, 17600, 18-20 January 1983. The ‘Memorie van Toelichting’ for 1984 stated as the government’s policy on Irian Jaya: the Government will monitor the situation in Indonesia carefully, and will use proper means to inquire into reports on West Irian with the Indonesian government. *Begroting van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1984, Memorie van Toelichting, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 18100-V*, no.2. This was in line with the government’s declared policy to “pursue an active policy based on incoming information on alleged violations of human rights. West Irian is an area of special concern.” *Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1984*, p.108.

211 See for example the October 13th and 23rd replies to questions by the Committee for Development Co-operation and Foreign Affairs respectively. The government claimed to possess information leading it to conclude that human rights were not being violated systematically and fundamentally in West Irian. *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1983-1984*, 18100-V, nos.15 and 18.


Without expert knowledge of the problems, or a vocal lobbying network demanding that the government take steps, the issue was of marginal importance to political parties. To most of them it was an issue that needed to be buried. Development aid served well as an innocuous means to achieve that: it would contribute to political stability and inflict no harm to relations with Indonesia.

Minister for Development Co-operation, Schoo, refused to link development aid to political and civil human rights conditions in a state. Marginal groups had been lobbying for years to put political and civil human rights on the agenda of the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), establishing a link between aid and human rights; but successive governments have consistently refused to take this step.\textsuperscript{214}

The large scale OPM activity and unrest in 1984, resulting in an exodus of refugees from West New Guinea to Papua New Guinea, forced the government to give in to parliament and recognise transmigration as a source of tension.\textsuperscript{215} The government therefore offered to supply extra aid. The direct cause of the unrest, a large influx of transmigrants, was not

\textsuperscript{214} Indirectly the minister showed her concern for human rights when she accepted a petition from Papuans outside the building where the IGGI was convening.

\textsuperscript{215} Not the number of transmigrants already present in Irian Jaya formed the cause of the unrest, but the announced figure in Repelita 4 of one million transmigrants in the coming five year period. Up until 1984, 60,000 people had been transmigrated to Irian Jaya. The number of spontaneous migrants for the same period was 400,000. Stichting Hasmin, *Harmonie of Dictatuur? Nederland, Indonesië en de PvdA; een overzicht met beleidsaanbevelingen*, Amsterdam, 1984, pp.34-35.
regarded as a problem that the Netherlands should try to solve since transmigration was
seen as an internal affair.\textsuperscript{216}

In the absence of consistent pressure from human rights groups with strong links to
discuss the matter any further.\textsuperscript{219}

In 1986 VVD expressed renewed doubts about the effects of transmigration on the identity
of the Papuans, but the minister again ignored the concerns.\textsuperscript{220} The Second International
Non-Governmental Group on Indonesia Conference (INGI) too asserted the oppressive
effects of transmigration, and sent a full report to the minister.\textsuperscript{221} Small left wing and Christian

\textsuperscript{216} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1984-1985, 18600-V, no.46. Answers were given
on 13 December 1984.
\textsuperscript{217} A motion demanding termination of development aid because human rights were
systematically violated in Indonesia was only supported by PSP, PPR, CPN, EVP. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1984-1985, 18600-V, no.131, 6 June 1985.
\textsuperscript{218} PvdA wanted transmigration put on the agenda of the IGGI. The minister was not
prepared to do so, although she was concerned about tension between autochthonous
\textsuperscript{219} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1985-1986, 19200-V, no.9.
\textsuperscript{220} Terpstra in the Second Chamber, 11 June 1986, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer,
\textsuperscript{221} NRC, 21 June 1986.
parties brought the plight of the Papuans to the attention of the foreign minister in December 1986. Van den Broek refused to pursue the matter since there was no need to. Responding to concerns expressed by VVD and PvdA, Bukman (CDA), the new Minister for Development Co-operation, recognised the importance of protection of Papuan identity. However, he said that it should never be an autonomous goal to which all other goals became subordinated. Apparently this justified the minister’s lack of initiative.

Defending the Foreign Affairs budget for 1988, Van den Broek explicitly denied the existence of any legitimate political demands by Papuans, since the government fully recognised Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian. According to his argument self-determination could never be an issue for the government. With CDA and VVD firmly backing their cabinet, 1988 and 1989 were characterised by minimal attention to human rights issues in Irian Jaya, in spite of Operasi Rajawali, which started in February 1989.

223 A rather uninspired phrase in the annual report on Development Co-operation declared: “The Netherlands has observed the human rights situation in Indonesia critically and attentively. The human rights situation in West Irian remain[ed] an issue of constant attention.” Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1987, p.142. The 1988-report used similar terms to describe the policy. See Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1988, pp.164-165. The Annual Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs, somewhat more inspiring, stated: “[T]he situation in West Irian, where the consequences of the transmigration-policy and related problems between autochthonous people and transmigrants resulted in tension...remained a reason for concern.”
A more critical position towards human rights violations in Indonesia is reflected in a rephrasing of the standard sentence of the Annual Report of Development Co-operation: “[A]s far as civil and political rights are concerned, Indonesia has a mixed reputation. The situation on West Irian deteriorated last year.” Quoted from Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1990, p.182.
Cabinet’s fall and the formation of a PvdA-CDA cabinet disrupted parliamentary unity, allowing the West New Guinea issue a revival. In May 1990 Van Gijzel, PvdA spokesman on development co-operation in the Second Chamber, adopted a more critical stand in the Second Chamber arguing that the continuing violation of human rights in West Papua should persuade the government to consider further steps. With quiet diplomacy failing to yield results, he advocated the use of other instruments. Citing Amnesty International he judged the human rights violations as structural and fundamental. Although no immediate action followed, Pronk (PvdA), who had made a come back as Minister for Development Co-operation, confirmed that the situation in Irian Jaya had deteriorated. Tension between the indigenous people and transmigrants continued. OPM remained active in the border region, prompting Indonesia to a retaliatory policy. Whereas Pronk seemed prepared to assume a more active human rights policy, Van den Broek remained opposed. Since Pronk was not passionate about the issue and did not publicly question the validity of Indonesia’s sovereignty, Van den Broek could prevent the use of more drastic means to improve the human rights situation of the Papuans.

The discussion of the post-1969 policy disclosed that with Papuans in exile continually divided, no concerted lobby-effort towards the Second Chamber was organised. Thus

226 Van Gijzel received support from Groen Links, and SGP. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, 21300-V, no.123, 10 May 1990.
228 Van den Broek was not prepared to investigate reports on the obliteration of the Papuan people in the face of transmigration. Debate on the Department of Foreign Affairs for 1991, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1990-1991, 21800-V, p.2326.
parliamentary involvement was erratic. Contacts with ministers were virtually non-existent. In the absence of NGOs consistently providing reliable information, ministers found easy escape routes, denying the validity of reports mentioning human rights violations. Alternatively the government used its own intelligence to produce facts that served to justify a policy of inactivity. Thus although the government had a well-defined set of policy instruments to deal with human rights violations, these were not used. (The reader is referred to Chapter VI, pages 305-314 and 340-344 for a full description of the government’s human rights policy)

Since 1962 Foreign Affairs has given priority to promoting good relations with Indonesia. Self-determination became fully subordinated to this goal. Hard feelings over the loss of the East Indies were set aside, even when the implementation of the 1962 Agreement proved farcical. A broad political coalition, notably involving Luns, supported this policy and was very careful to avoid another confrontation with Indonesia over self-determination for the West Papuans. Although political and civil human rights were pursued, this was done in a most careful way so as not to offend Indonesia.

Cabinet and parliament alike failed to publicly admit the relation between the reported human rights violations and the Indonesian regime. Only when Indonesia’s policy of large scale transmigration caused serious social and political upheaval did a parliamentary majority urge cabinet to assume a more active policy. Cabinet responded reluctantly, mainly through an intensification of its aid program. Using a development co-operation theory that regarded

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{229} When asked if he had ever had contact with OPM De Koning answered: “I kept my} \]
aid as an essential element to bring about improvement in the social and economic human rights situation, any stronger action to put pressure on Indonesia was inconceivable.

On no account did the two ministers directly involved in development co-operation and foreign policy disagree over the goals and means of the policy towards Indonesia and the role of West New Guinea in that policy. Given Pronk’s policy theory on development aid and political and civil human rights, a conflict with Van den Broek would have been conceivable, but a similar disagreement over East Timor brought an end to Dutch aid and thus Pronk’s involvement with Indonesia (see Chapter VI). If the fate of Papuan self-determination depends on the Netherlands it is sealed.

distance from them.” De Koning, conversation by phone, 18 July 1993.
Chapter V

Self-determination and Australian Foreign Policy in the West New Guinea Case

1. Introduction

The previous chapter showed that the Netherlands’ desire to hold on to sovereignty and lead the West Papuans to self-determination brought it in conflict with Indonesia. This chapter will describe how Australia became deeply involved in the dispute, with serious consequences for its relations with Indonesia. The description of Australian policy will particularly focus on the period 1957-1962, and explain what part self-determination for the West Papuans played in the policy. For an account of the main political events the reader is referred to the general introduction to this thesis and the introductory section of the previous chapter.

2. West New Guinea acquires a special position: Australia’s policy

Australia was involved in the West New Guinea conflict from the outset, being a member of the Good Offices Commission, established by the UN Security Council in 1947 for dealing with the decolonisation dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Representing the Republic’s interests in this Commission Australia tried to reach an early settlement on terms favourable to...
the Republic’s case.¹ When the future political status of the territory became a stumbling block preventing a settlement of the issue of Indonesia’s independence, Thomas Critchley, Australia’s representative, devised the troublesome formula under which the question regarding sovereignty over West New Guinea was left a matter of future talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia.²

In December 1949 the Labor government was replaced by a more European oriented Liberal Party and Country Party coalition led by Robert Menzies. The incoming government abandoned its predecessor’s policy of diplomatic and political support for the Indonesians and endorsed the idea to leave the matter of West New Guinea undecided for the time being. In practice this meant an indefinite continuation of the presence of a friendly European state in control. Regarding West New Guinea as vital to Australia’s strategic interests, Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender felt that Australia, as a party principal, was entitled to have those interests considered, therefore he demanded participation in any talks about the future of the territory.³ The Australian government ruled out a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia.⁴

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² The Dutch government requested Australian support for such a formula. Minister for External Affairs Evatt, mainly motivated by the consequences for Australia’s defence should Indonesia gain control over West New Guinea, instructed Critchley to exclude West New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty. See Critchley, Susan, Australian Relations with Indonesia: What went Wrong?, PhD thesis, University of Sydney, Nov. 1992, pp.68 and 73.
Spender, viewing Indonesia with suspicion and fearing that it would only be a matter of time before it would extend its claim to include Australian New Guinea, an area that had proven its importance to Australia’s defence during World War II, had profound misgivings about a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, that country being perceived as politically unstable. He specifically disputed geographic contingency as a valid argument for Indonesia to justify inheriting sovereignty from the colonial state. In his argumentation the interests of Australia and the indigenous people were both invoked in an attempt to justify a policy aimed at keeping Indonesia out. A purchase of the area on grounds of ethnic and geographic similarity was considered a possible course. In order to achieve his goal, Spender encouraged the seemingly wavering Dutch government in its opposition to any transfer of sovereignty, pledging Australian support.

Spender received bipartisan support for his policy, as the ALP had also returned to the search for a safety screen with Asia. Herbert Evatt (ALP) wanted friendly relations with Indonesia but

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5 Spender’s anti-Indonesian mood was partly fuelled by the communists making headway in Asia. An Indonesian takeover could thus bring communism, and with it the Cold War, to Australia’s northern shores. E.G. Whitlam, ‘Indonesia and Australia: Political Aspects’, in J.J. Fox, R.G. Garnaut, McCawley, and J.A.C. Mackie (eds.), *Indonesia: Australian Perspectives*, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1980, p.756.

6 In parliament Spender declared: “Quite apart from Australia’s interests.... -- the mainland of New Guinea [is] of vital importance to our security --.... It would be both unreal and unreasonable that any change of status for the territory should occur which disregards the interests of the indigenous population and those of Australia.” *Current Notes*, Vol.21 (1950), pp.416-417.

he opposed a change in West New Guinea's status. Like Spender, he stressed the separate and distinct nature of [West] New Guinea. Australian public opinion also firmly supported solutions entailing either Australian or Dutch control; few people supported an Indonesian takeover.

The future battlelines were thus drawn at an early stage, with the Australian government rejecting Indonesia’s legal claims. Diplomatic entanglements explain the Australian government’s use of legal and ethnic considerations, rather than avowing fear of Indonesian expansionism. Traumatic experiences during the World War II had shown Australia’s vulnerability to an assault from the North and explain the strategic importance attributed to the island of New Guinea. At this stage of the conflict Papuan self-determination played no real role in the decision making process, although it did appear in public rhetoric.

3. West New Guinea in cold storage

8 Critchley, op. cit., pp.i. and 87.
12 ‘Cold storage’ was a term used by the Dutch government and adopted by Casey which implied the need to keep the issue out of the (international) political limelight and preserve the political status quo of West New Guinea, hoping that with the time go by Indonesia would drop its claim to sovereignty.
When negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands failed in 1950, the Department of External Affairs advised its new Minister, Richard Casey, to aim for a continuation of the quiescent status quo, and an extension of administrative co-operation with the Dutch as a means to achieve this goal.\textsuperscript{13} However, as the other part of a twin-track policy, Indonesia should not be alienated; therefore every other opportunity had to be seized to build a cordial relationship with the fledgling neighbour.\textsuperscript{14} The ambiguity in the government’s policy, characteristic of its management of relations with Indonesia and the issue of West New Guinea’s status throughout the dispute, was visible already.

Relying on the support of a great and powerful friend, the position of the United States was of utmost importance to Australian decision makers, but according to Casey the US government itself was not sure how to deal with the problem. It was apparently inclined to support Indonesia’s claim since Indonesian control was essential for its political stability. Casey, however, was told that the US did not want to offend the Dutch and Australian governments.\textsuperscript{15} Realising that American neutrality was the best he could expect, Casey pursued the political...

\textsuperscript{13} Susan Critchley claimed that even in the early 1950s some External Affairs officials preferred to concentrate exclusively on preserving friendly relations with Indonesia. Although she fails to provide any evidence for her claim, the presence of supporters of such a doctrine would explain the future prominence of the ‘Indonesia Lobby’, whose role will be discussed in Chapter VII. Critchley, op. cit., p.143. However, since Critchley took her quote from the index of Percy Spender’s book, \textit{Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan}, p.298, her claim is not very convincing.

\textsuperscript{14} At an early stage of his term as minister, Casey had become aware of the pivotal importance of Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular to Australia. However, Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty played havoc with Casey’s intention to build a solid relationship. T.B. Millar (ed.), \textit{Australian Foreign Minister - The Diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951-1960}, London, Collins, 1972, p.37.
status quo. Unlike the Americans, the British government -- Australia’s other great and powerful friend -- with whom he discussed the issue several times, was sympathetic towards his cold storage policy.\textsuperscript{16} Casey preferred a continuation of Dutch sovereignty but was prepared to enter into a joint trusteeship.\textsuperscript{17} In February 1952 Casey publicly recognised Dutch sovereignty, declaring it a goal to have it continued.\textsuperscript{18}

Casey was at a much earlier stage in the conflict than the Netherlands guided by a strong awareness of the limitations of his policy due to Australia’s dependence on allies. Therefore Casey persevered with great zeal to keep the issue in cold storage. This aim he hoped to achieve through combined pressure by Australia and the United Kingdom on Indonesia, the Netherlands and the US, which he knew was still wavering in its support.\textsuperscript{19} During talks with Sukarno and foreign minister Subardjo in April 1952, Casey put his tactics into practice. He tried to impress his hosts of Australia’s determination, rather misleadingly advancing public opinion in Australia as the driving force behind the policy.\textsuperscript{20} Australian public opinion opposed an Indonesian take over of West New Guinea, but to claim that public opinion forced the government to its policy course was incorrect. As the discussion will show, the opportunity for Australian public opinion to be included in the foreign policy making process and hence to affect

\textsuperscript{15} Millar, op. cit., pp.56-57.
\textsuperscript{16} Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
\textsuperscript{17} Casey brought up the idea of a joint trusteeship in a conversation with Anthony Eden on 19 January 1952. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
\textsuperscript{18} Statement made by Casey on 6 February 1952. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
\textsuperscript{19} Some officials inside the State Department wanted the policy to revert to support for Indonesia. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
the foreign policy making centre was very limited, given the lack of public discussion in parliament. Sukarno probably assessed the origins of Australia’s anxiety correctly as originating in the External Affairs and Defence Departments, and cabinet.

In the second half of 1952 signs from the Netherlands were reassuring, with its new government more firmly committed to holding on to sovereignty. In order to bolster the Dutch, Casey suggested to offer administrative co-operation, an idea cabinet approved. In the years to come administrative co-operation would develop into a major element in the policy to keep the Netherlands in West New Guinea and to synchronise the development of the two halves of the island, allowing for a possible future unification under Australian administration.

External Affairs rejected any defence co-operation, as suggested by the Netherlands’ foreign minister Luns. With such commitments Australia would have embarked on a course independent of its powerful allies and this would have been an unacceptable violation of Australia’s traditional security doctrine. Thus prevailing perceptions regarding Australia’s vulnerability in a hostile world required it to stay within the boundaries provided by the safe haven of the alliances with Britain and the US. These perceptions and commitments constituted the margins within which Australian foreign policy makers could select goals and means.

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20 Millar, op. cit., pp.57 and 80.
21 Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
22 Luns told the Australian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Stirling, that the Dutch government was anxious to co-ordinate the defence of West New Guinea with other countries; in June 1953, however, External Affairs found overriding reasons why the Netherlands could not be
Reassured by signs that both the American and Netherlands’ governments wanted to keep the issue in cold storage, Casey agreed with Luns during the latter’s visit to Australia in 1953 that self-government was no more than a long term goal. Casey continued his policy, as advised by his department, of support for the Netherlands’ stand while aiming at cordial relations with Indonesia and assisting in its political, administrative, and economic stabilisation. For the time being these two goals were not yet incongruent, allowing the government to postpone a hard decision on priority among the policy goals.

When Indonesia decided to refer the question of sovereignty to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1954, disappointed over the failure to reach an agreement with the Netherlands, the period of cold storage ended, requiring the Australian government to re-assess its priorities. Casey reconfirmed support for Dutch sovereignty as well as his desire to keep the issue in calm waters. However, the failure of the policy to keep the issue out of the spotlight of international politics, forced the Australian government to find a more appropriate answer to reject Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty, while also minimising damage to its relations with

23 Inward cablegram I.4705, 9 April 1953, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 5.
24 Luns declared himself in favour of the integration of West New Guinea with Australia’s half of the island, an idea not rejected by Casey. 1 July 1953, Australian Archives, file no. TS45/1/3/15/1/2TS.
25 Aide memoir, 2 July 1953, Australian Archives, file no. TS45/1/3/15/1/2TS. Just how carefully the Australian government manoeuvred is shown by the refusal to grant the Netherlands observer status at SEATO. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
26 Ibid.
Indonesia. Thus the real motives -- fear of having to share a land-border with a potentially unstable Asian neighbour, which could turn communist and bring the cold war to Australia’s doorstep -- had to be covered by a facade of moral concerns over the well-being of the West Papuans.

4. Political support for the Netherlands and the discovery of self-determination

Since the US had remained neutral Indonesia had been unable to put sufficient pressure on the Netherlands in negotiations over West New Guinea’s future political status, which had therefore repeatedly failed. Hoping to capitalise on anti-colonial sentiments amongst the growing number of newly independent states as well as the socialist bloc, Indonesia ushered in a new phase of the conflict by bringing the issue before UNGA in 1954.

Notwithstanding this internationalisation of the conflict, the Australian government remained vehemently opposed to any transfer of sovereignty. As Casey declared in the House: “The Australian government will....oppose not only a transfer of sovereignty but will also vote against any resolution which has transfer of sovereignty as its ultimate objective.”\(^{27}\) Although the importance of security motivations for Australia’s policy had been admitted publicly,\(^{28}\) Casey also expressed his desire to wait until the West Papuans had reached a stage of development

\(^{27}\) Quoted from House of Representatives, 2 November 1954. Australian Archives, file 3036/6/2/1 part 1.
where they could decide their political future.\textsuperscript{29} Casey concluded his statement with the wish that the West New Guinea issue would not disturb relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{30} The Leader of the Opposition, Evatt, recognised Dutch sovereignty and supported the government. His concerns were similar to Casey’s.\textsuperscript{31} Without any significant opposition the government could thus proceed with its policy.

With security considerations prevailing over good relations with Indonesia -- the wider implications of Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s demands were still not understood -- Australia had to give unequivocal support to the Netherlands in its efforts to block a UN resolution demanding a resumption of talks over West New Guinea. Predicated upon the concept of cold storage, continuation of the \textit{status quo} was the best conceivable outcome for Australia. Since the Australian government could not disclose its Asiaphobic and concomitant security fears as reason for its stand, predominantly legalistic considerations would be devised to defend its position in the UN.

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\textsuperscript{28} Casey said to the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} (SMH) that the security of both halves of New Guinea was vitally important to Australia. \textit{SMH}, 23 November 1954.

\textsuperscript{29} House of Representatives, 2 November 1954, pp.2502-2503. In August 1954, in reply to a question by ALP Representative Clyde Cameron, Casey had declared his opposition to a transfer of sovereignty since the Dutch made better administrators. He failed to mention self-determination on that occasion. House of Representatives, 18 August 1954, pp.352-353.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp.2503-2504.

\textsuperscript{31} House of Representatives, 2 November 1954, p.2511. Evatt wanted a better circumscribed plan for the future of West New Guinea, but otherwise endorsed the government’s policy.
\end{flushleft}
Thus when Indonesia introduced a tentative resolution in the Political Committee of UNGA, calling on the Netherlands and Indonesia to resume negotiations, Australia’s representative, Percy Spender, having prepared his counter offensive in close liaison with the Netherlands, rejected Indonesia’s legal, ethnological, and historical claims. Grounded on historical and legal arguments Spender claimed that sovereignty should remain with the Netherlands. Spender also adduced concern over the Papuans’ primitive state as an argument for continuation of Netherlands’ administration: “The indigenous people must not be handed over to any nation....within the terms and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall be permitted to determine their own ultimate destiny.”32 The phrasing showed that an ultimate choice would not be made in the near future.

In the face of failing support, the Indonesian delegation withdrew the draft resolution and replaced it with a more moderate resolution that aimed at bringing the parties together in order to reach a peaceful solution. Even this was unacceptable to the Dutch and Australian governments, given the cold storage and status quo concepts. Casey rejected negotiations as pointless since the Netherlands was holding on to sovereignty, which was the only thing Indonesia wanted. Absorption of Dutch New Guinea into Indonesia would also deny the inhabitants of ever having a chance to determine their future.33

32 Percy Spender, in the First Committee of the 9th UNGA, 24 November 1954, quoted from a speech by Calwell in the House of Representatives, 24 February 1959, p.204.
33 Department of Foreign Affairs, press release 87, 3 December 1954, Australian Archives, file no. 3036/6/1 part 14.
The resolution failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the plenary, and the intense lobbying by the Dutch and Australian delegations seemed to have paid off. Victory proved pyrrhic, however, as the issue refused to go away in Indonesian and international politics. At the 1955 Bandung conference Sukarno managed to get a resolution adopted by the non-aligned nations: “The conference supports the position of Indonesia...[and] urges the Netherlands government to reopen negotiations.” The resolution in turn aroused the anxiety of Luns over the need to come to more definite security arrangements, as he informed Menzies in The Hague in February 1955.

Menzies, although acknowledging the security vacuum, wanted to adopt a stand of wait-and-see, while concentrating on securing US co-operation in the defence of Southeast Asia. Security goals and considerations were thus still on top of his policy agenda. The means to achieve them, namely through a stalemate, had not changed either, in spite of the stronger pro-Indonesian coalition. Prevalent Asiaphobic views would time and again prevent the Australian government from a realistic evaluation of its policy means and goals, making its policy increasingly obsolescent, in the face of growing international support for Indonesia.

During this important phase of policy making, when the means to achieve the goals changed from diplomatic support for the Netherlands behind closed doors, to outright diplomatic

34 Australian Archives, file no. 3036/6/1 part 15.
35 Report on a three day visit by Menzies to the Netherlands in February 1955, Australian Archives, file no. 3036/6/2/1 part 1.
36 Id.
lobbying in the United Nations, parliament, and thus the opposition, was denied a voice in the evaluation and subsequent deliberation of policy goals and means. Menzies, in a major speech on foreign affairs in May 1955, did not raise the issue, to the annoyance of the opposition in the House. On behalf of the ALP O’Connor expressed his frustration, but he was unable to force Menzies and Casey to engage in a debate.\(^\text{37}\) The House’s own procedures, in combination with party discipline, prevented it from becoming involved in policy evaluation and deliberation. In order to explain changes in policy means and goals one must study the direct decision making environment, that is, advisory bodies and their reports, and decision making processes of cabinet.

Cabinet debated the West New Guinea issue in June 1955, following a submission by Casey in which he had explained that the reason for supporting the Netherlands was that, legally, sovereignty was clearly established. Also the Dutch made good neighbours, and Australia had an interest in having a non-communist government in control in West New Guinea.\(^\text{38}\) In its discussion cabinet did not follow Casey’s recommendation to try to persuade the Netherlands to place the territory under trusteeship. Instead cabinet decided to make the Netherlands more determined by giving it every possible diplomatic backing. In order to stand a better chance in the next UNGA, the UK and US needed to be brought into the Australian-Dutch camp. The legal argument pertaining to the formal question of sovereignty would again be used in the

\(^{37}\) House of Representatives, 3 May 1955, p.349.

\(^{38}\) Submission to cabinet no.412, 27 June 1955, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 2.
UNGA to justify a continuation of Dutch administration. Unfortunately cabinet minutes never reproduce the actual discussion precipitating any decision, and therefore one can only speculate who opposed Casey’s idea of a trusteeship. The Minister for Defence was a likely candidate, but given the Prime Minister’s domination of cabinet in other decisions regarding West New Guinea, Menzies must have been against the idea as well.

Fearing majority support for Indonesia in the UN, the Australian government was somewhat relieved with West New Guinea’s removal from the agenda of the UNGA in December 1955, when the two opponents settled for talks on terms that made a discussion of the West New Guinea issue possible. With radical and communist forces in Indonesia as the champions of the West Irian cause, Casey hoped that the talks between the moderate Harahap Government and the Netherlands would not be an outright failure.

The Defence Committee, an important advisory body of cabinet, reached similar conclusions: “The Indonesian government lacks both means and experience for firm control and effective administration, and cannot be regarded as a friendly and stable regime yet...it is likely that communist influence will make considerable progress.” The report therefore insisted that [West] New Guinea would remain in the hands of a friendly power. For security reasons Indonesia had to be denied control, but in the interests of moderate forces in Jakarta and the

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39 Cabinet decision no. 482, 28 June 1955, Australian Archives, file no. C508 part 1.
40 Quoted from an unmarked defence paper, December 1955, Australian Archives, file no. 3036/6/1 part 5.
Harahap Government (see Chapter IV), talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands should not result in outright failure.\textsuperscript{41}

When the talks ended in failure the Defence Committee concluded that a communist Indonesia would be a real possibility after 1959, with grave consequences for the security of the whole Southeast Asian region.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore Casey did not share Luns’ delight over the outcome of the talks; events proved him right. In February 1956 the Harahap Government unilaterally abrogated the 1949 Round Table Conference Agreement, a move that further strained relations with the Netherlands. When Sastroamidjojo replaced the moderate Harahap Government, Indonesia veered round to a more anti-Dutch stand. With radical elements and PKI gaining ground in Indonesian politics, a non-peaceful solution with grave consequences for Australia’s security situation became more conceivable, making Australia’s position all the more difficult: how could it remain on friendly terms with an increasingly assertive and radical Indonesia while denying it sovereignty over West New Guinea?

The anti-Dutch measures taken by the Indonesian government in 1956 caused concern in the Netherlands and made Luns more determined than ever to involve Australia in the security of West New Guinea.\textsuperscript{43} Ambassador Winkelman even offered the Secretary of External Affairs, \textsuperscript{43}Luns asked McClure Smith, Australian Ambassador to the Netherlands, that he formally ask to consult Australia prior to taking any significant decision concerning Netherlands New Guinea. Conversation Luns - McClure Smith, 22 June 1956, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}Defence Committee-meeting, 23 February 1956, Australian Archives, file no. 666(57)/5.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
Arthur Tange, a secret treaty under which the Netherlands committed itself not to change West New Guinea's status, offering Australia a reliable forward defence shield. On each occasion, however, Australian officials played a waiting game, in line with the idea to keep the Dutch committed while not offending the Indonesians by becoming directly involved. On many occasions Indonesian officials tried to convince the Australians of their peaceful intentions and gave assurances that no violence would be used. However inflammatory speeches, especially by President Sukarno, aroused growing suspicion about Indonesia’s future policy.

Australian parliament paid little attention to the West New Guinea issue in 1956. The opposition generally agreed with the government’s policy, as Arthur Calwell’s (ALP) request that the government confirm that it would remain firm in the UN showed. In April 1957 Casey gave the briefest of policy outlines in the House, merely stating that the policy had not changed. On behalf of the ALP group in the Senate, Donald Willesee criticised not the content of the government’s policy, but the way it had over-emphasised its case in the UN. In the House Gough Whitlam (ALP) attacked the government for not promoting the idea of a trusteeship in the UN. As yet self-determination played no role in the considerations of both the government and the opposition, but this was about to change.

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44 Conversation Winkelman - Tange, 15 October 1956, Australian Archives, file no. 3036/6/2/1 part 1.
45 House of Representatives, 19 September 1956, p.635.
46 Ibid., 2 April 1957, p.417.
47 “The government has over-emphasised the problem [but] has been correct in its diagnosis...” Quoted from Senate, 4 April 1957, p.355.
In 1957 a special External Affairs study identified Australia’s contemporary interests in West New Guinea; security issues dominated. Concluding that the territory should not fall into the hands of a potentially hostile country, Indonesia was ruled out as an acceptable power since it might become communist, which would turn West New Guinea into a part of Australia’s forward defence problem. The territory was also said to serve Australia’s political interests as a buffer with an unstable Indonesia, although the issue admittedly strained relations with that state. Australian control over East New Guinea brought with it special interests in developments in the western half of the island. In this respect communism, nationalism, anti-white feelings, and Asian migration were feared.

As possible courses to safeguard aforementioned interests the study suggested:

[To] continue to give full support to the Netherlands in its present policy, while avoiding any unnecessary provocation of Indonesia...; [to] continue to emphasise that [Australia] has direct and essential interests in Netherlands New Guinea; to take account of Australia’s objectives in New Guinea as a whole in examining Australia’s future policies towards West New Guinea -- eventual unification would serve these interests best; [to] continue to oppose UN intervention or mediation; in order to be successful [Australia should] emphasise that the principle of self-determination has been accepted by the Netherlands; [to] expand administrative co-operation with the Netherlands; [that] Australian policy over the longer term should aim at development of eastern and western New Guinea along similar lines.

48 House of Representatives, 11 April 1957, p.810.
49 The unmarked study, most likely conducted by a group of External Affairs officers under the chairmanship of W.D. Forsyth, was submitted in August 1957. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 5.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
The text shows that Australia’s public support for self-determination in reality served as a means to muster enough international support to prevent Indonesia from acquiring a two-thirds majority in the UN. The authors still believed that continuation of Dutch presence would ultimately allow for a unification of the two halves under Australian administration.

Ambassadors directly involved in Australia’s policy were requested to comment on the study, giving them an opportunity for direct impact on the development of the policy plan. Ambassador to the Netherlands McClure Smith agreed on the strategic importance attributed to the area and hence the need to keep the Netherlands in place. He suggested to intensify administrative cooperation on that account. 52 Laurence McIntyre, Ambassador to Indonesia, disagreed with the long term solutions proposed, and wanted to know how strong the desire was to keep Indonesia out. 53 Both Ambassadors accepted the objective of a united New Guinea in the long run. Percy Spender, however, expressed concern about pursuing this course since it could provoke Indonesia to claim all of New Guinea. 54

Thus diplomatic posts gave contradictory advice. A continuation of the present policy served best to keep the centrifugal forces at bay. Like the Dutch cabinet, the Australian policy making centre was close to indecisiveness. The easy way out was a continuation of muddling through, in an attempt to postpone hard choices regarding long term goals and means. The same

52 Memo no.627, The Hague, 15 August 1957, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 25.
53 Memo no.1494, Jakarta, 22 August 1957, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 25.
54 Record of a meeting on the future of Australia’s policy, 7 November 1957. Ibid.
international environment that was eroding the government’s unity would ultimately force it to make a choice. For the time being the Australian government would continue to give the Netherlands diplomatic support in the UN and intensify administrative co-operation, but even a diplomatic victory was unlikely to silence Indonesia, nor would closer administrative co-operation. How to achieve that result no one seemed to know.

A secret report for the cabinet prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) -- a principal assessment authority regarding intelligence, chaired by a Deputy Secretary of External Affairs with a mixed interdepartmental civilian and Service Intelligence membership\(^{55}\) -- estimated as unlikely the chance of Indonesia gaining control over Netherlands New Guinea by the end of 1962. Even with large scale communist assistance Indonesia would probably not launch an attack.\(^{56}\) The report played down the military threat, and makes the government’s careful continuation of policy understandable.

The administrative agreement signed between the Netherlands and Australia on 6 November 1957, just prior to the next UNGA, was a smart compromise intended to satisfy the Netherlands’ desire for Australian support while not overtly offending Indonesia. The agreement was tactfully phrased so as to impress the UNGA with the laudable intention of the shared administrative policies of the Netherlands and Australia. The press statement announcing the

\(^{55}\) Jeffrey T. Richelson & Desmond Ball, *The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Co-operation between the UKUSA Countries -- the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp.52-53.
agreement said that the two countries based their policies “on the interests and inalienable rights of [the] inhabitants in conformity with the provisions and spirit of the UN Charter.” The statement went on to mention the ethnological similarities between West and East New Guinea and indicated the intention to increase administrative co-operation: “[We are] determined to promote an uninterrupted development of this process until such time as the inhabitants of the territories concerned will be in a position to determine their own future.”

In the UNGA, Australia subsequently lobbied vehemently against a resolution which invited “both parties to pursue their endeavours to find a solution of the dispute in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter,” and requested the Secretary-General “to assist the parties concerned as he deems it appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.” Using the administrative agreement to convince UN members of their sincerity to prepare the people for self-government in conformity with Article 73 of the UN Charter regarding non-self-governing territories, Australia and the Netherlands scrambled through with just enough votes to defeat the resolution.

The administrative agreement had not changed the Australian government’s policy itself, rather had self-determination been promoted to the forefront as a public relations instrument. The

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56 Minute by the Defence Committee in Canberra based on JIC report no.13/1957, 19 September 1957, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 25.
57 Department of External Affairs, press release 108, 6 November 1957, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1/1.
58 Ibid.
59 Australian Archives, file no. 915/9 part 46.
predominance of the executive over the legislature in the West New Guinea policy had not altered either. The policy making centre could thus conceal its growing concerns and divisions over policy. In the House, Casey once more denied Evatt the opportunity of a debate on the issue, on the pretext that the case had just been brought before the First Committee of the UN. In December, Casey’s statement in the House, finally offered an opportunity for discussion. The minister covered familiar ground, stressing the importance of good relations with Indonesia, and the government’s opposition to Indonesia’s claims. Speaking about the recently signed joint Australian-Dutch declaration on administrative co-operation, he pointed out that the co-operation should benefit the interests of the natives in the first place until they would be in a position to determine their own future, but a united New Guinea was a possibility. In official documents it was actually the preferred outcome, but Casey did not share this secret with parliament.

On behalf of the opposition, Evatt mentioned his desire for good relations with both the Netherlands and Indonesia. His suggestion to negotiate an economic and security agreement with both countries showed just how ill informed the opposition, as an outsider to policy making and its constraints, had become. Evatt admitted that it would not solve the question of sovereignty, but it should at least improve the climate. Representatives on the government’s side immediately declared the idea impractical. Labor’s internal disagreement over a solution to

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60 House of Representatives, 20 November 1957, p.2319.
61 The ALP Conference of 1957 had in fact suggested a security pact between Australia, the Netherlands and Indonesia as a solution. Evatt was merely implementing the party’s policy. House of Representatives, 27 April 1959, p.1254.
the conflict -- Jim Cairns preferred a UN mandate to the solution offered by Evatt -- further weakened the opposition in the debate and probably contributed to its failure to present a realistic alternative to the government’s policy.63

In the face of diminishing support in the UN, William Wentworth (LP) advised the government not to use the legal argument any longer, but to stress the interests of the people of West New Guinea instead. They would benefit from a UN trusteeship, which Australia should advocate.64 Doug Anthony (Country Party), fearing Indonesian numbers and communism, suggested an Australian-Indonesian trusteeship as a solution65 The result of the debate was inconclusive.

With the opposition divided and its own ranks closed through party discipline, the government’s policy survived the debate unharmed. The government continued its efforts to obtain more support from the United States,66 and also continued its administrative co-operation in conformity with the agreement signed in November 1957. However the hard fought diplomatic victory in the UN was not long lived. In early December 1957 the Indonesian government nationalised Dutch assets, and all Dutch citizens were expelled. Preventing Indonesia from

62 Ibid., 5 December 1957, p.2930.
63 Ibid., pp.2949-2950.
64 Ibid., p.2956.
65 Ibid., p.2982.
66 During the ANZUS Council meeting, the Australian delegation raised the issue without any success. Casey too undertook in vain to persuade Secretary of State Dulles to change his neutral stand. Critchley, op. cit., pp.187-188. Dulles did reaffirm that a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia was against US security interests, but that a change of policy towards unqualified support would deny the US the chance to maintain its relations with those Indonesian leaders who might influence other Asian states. Millar, op. cit., pp.278-279.
taking over West New Guinea while also aiming at friendly relations, became increasingly irreconcilable goals.

In April 1958 Casey restated in the House that the administrative agreement between Australia and the Netherlands served to offer the indigenous people the chance to decide their own future. Explaining the benefits of the agreement in terms of a synchronisation of development plans he hinted that unification was a goal.  

67 Evatt replied by reconfirming his desire to see Australia co-operate in the administration of West New Guinea with both the Netherlands and Indonesia.  

68 The outcome of the UN debate had apparently not brought about any development in the ALP’s thinking on the matter. His alternative was weak given the irreconcilable positions of the Netherlands and Indonesia. Evatt’s suggestion implied that he was not aware of the real state of affairs, which comes as no surprise since Chapter III already found that the House had inadequate means to obtain information from the government. The institutional means available to the opposition to influence foreign policy were weak in the first place but, as this example proves, a lack of access to inside information even further reduced the opposition’s impact on foreign policy. The ALP thus remained an outsider to policy making regarding West New Guinea.

67 House of Representatives, 15 April 1958, p.875.
68 Ibid., p.876. The ALP Conference of 1957 had suggested a security pact between Australia, the Netherlands and Indonesia as a solution. See also Calwell in the House of Representatives, 27 April 1959, p.1254.
In July 1958 the JIC produced another study on the case. The objective was still to have the Netherlands stay in West New Guinea “until such a change would occur in the political status...as was compatible with Australian interests.” 69 Ultimate self-determination was the only such change the committee foresaw. Australia should influence and support the Netherlands’ administration to promote ultimate self-determination compatible with Australia’s interests. The political deterrent against an Indonesian attack was to be increased. JIC favoured a contribution to the defence of the territory, but only if the United States would participate. 70 Action proposed to implement these ideas encompassed measures to influence the Dutch administration, continuation of the political deterrent, and an attempt to persuade the United States to contribute to the defence of West New Guinea. 71

Casey managed to get two papers, ‘Indonesia and the Netherlands’ 72 and ‘Notes for a talk with the Netherlands Ambassador’, accepted by cabinet. None of the ministers made any significant contribution. Cabinet supported the idea of putting maximum pressure on the US government in order to make it adopt a firm stand against any armed attack by Indonesia, 73 but in its decision cabinet adhered to Menzies’ policy maxim not to become directly involved in any military conflict, unless in the company of powerful friends. 74

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Submission no.1281, 8 July 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
73 Conversation Casey - Tange, 9 July 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 25.
74 Menzies in the House of Representatives, 20 April 1955, p.50.
The Netherlands’ Ambassador to Australia, Lovink, strongly pressed Casey regarding an Australian assurance of military assistance, claiming that this was a *conditio sine qua non* for the Netherlands. Casey, bound by cabinet’s decision, did not budge, since the US had not given a similar guarantee.\(^{75}\)

In yet another report,\(^{76}\) which considered the implications of the conclusions of the July 1958 JIC/JIP report, JIC revised its opinion regarding Indonesia’s capability to launch an attack on West New Guinea. By mid-1959 Indonesia would have significantly increased its capacity for an attack and, the report warned, the advocates of extreme action were in the ascendancy. Indonesia had also become more susceptible to communist pressure. For these reasons JIC predicted a more provocative policy.\(^{77}\) Thus the international security situation was perceived as more dangerous, demanding a reconsideration of policy.

In response to the JIC agendum Casey took a submission to cabinet informing it of the JIC’s prediction that Indonesia’s military capacity and willingness to risk a military confrontation would grow.\(^{78}\) The submission also mentioned Dutch requests for Australian military assistance. Subsequently it summarised the policy goals that the government had hitherto pursued and declared that Indonesia did not make a reliable neighbour since its future political course was

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\(^{75}\) Outward cablegram, O.8860, 14 July 1958, Australian Archives, file no.915/9 part 46.

\(^{76}\) JIC, Agendum no.53/1958 supplement no.3, is undated, but must have been produced somewhere between August and Casey’s visit to the Netherlands on 28 and 29 September 1958. Australian Archives, file no. TS666/42.

\(^{77}\) Ibid. Australian Archives, file no. TS666/42.
much in doubt with communism threatening to become the dominant force. Further the submission noted the benefits to the development of the Australian half of the island if West New Guinea was in the hands of a friendly power with a comparable policy. Finally the report mentioned the interest of the indigenous people in a continuation of Dutch presence. Casey repeated that the policy had intended to stiffen Dutch resolve without alienating Indonesia, which might otherwise assume a hostile position or fall into the hands of the communists. A solution to the conflict was claimed not to be readily available.

In their contribution to the submission the Defence Committee and Chiefs of Staff Committee had jointly concluded that retention of Australian New Guinea was a primary defence objective and as long as Indonesia might fall under communist influence a grave security threat would ensue from its possession of Netherlands New Guinea. However, Australia’s support for the Netherlands’ administration was an important factor in the political attitudes and development of Indonesia. Keeping Indonesia neutral or friendly was of great importance to Australian defence. Considering this delicate balance the Defence Committee advised that Australia should only enter into military commitments when the US did so.  

Still reflecting conflicting interests, the recommendations offered in Casey’s submission disappointingly, but not surprisingly, provided no new direction to Australian policy. Efforts to keep the Netherlands in West New Guinea were to be continued, since a trusteeship would not

78 Submission no.1312 Netherlands New Guinea - Indonesia, Australian Archives, file no. C508 part 1.
be feasible with a two-thirds majority in the UN out of reach. To this end administrative cooperation had to be intensified once again. Casey advocated that Australia should also continue and intensify the policy of deterrence. Australia should be ready to enter into military agreements when the US was.\(^8^0\) Defence minister Philip McBride stressed the importance that defence authorities placed upon the island of New Guinea, and warned against Indonesia’s growing military strength.\(^8^1\) Public opinion also played some role in the discussion, with several ministers claiming that the Australian public demanded military support to the Netherlands in case of Indonesian aggression.\(^8^2\) Other ministers felt a moral obligation to fight an aggressor, whatever the position of the United States.

Prime Minister Menzies as usual summed up the discussion in cabinet. He stressed the strategic importance of Australian New Guinea to Australia’s defence, and in turn the importance of Dutch New Guinea to the defence of Australian New Guinea. This led to the conclusion that for strategic reasons the Netherlands had to stay. This goal, however, could require the formation of a strategic alliance with the Netherlands. A final response to the Netherlands’ request for military support was made dependent on the position of the US, since Australia could not commit itself militarily unless its great friend did. Given that state’s unwillingness, Australia’s policy would be to bring about a change in US policy. Thus cabinet optimistically assumed that Australia’s diplomacy carried so much weight that it could change US strategic thinking.

\(^7^9\) Ibid.
\(^8^0\) Cabinet minute, decision no.1518, submission no.1312, 12 August 1958, Australian Archives, file no. C508 part 1.
\(^8^1\) Ibid.
While awaiting the results, Menzies suggested to concentrate on efforts that would make a violent escalation of the dispute unlikely. Cabinet agreed with Menzies.\textsuperscript{83} Thus cabinet set about lobbying the US and forming a political deterrent. The discussion showed the total domination of security considerations, and the acceptance of the JIC as an authoritative source of analysis and framer of cabinet’s policy theory. The whole policy concept rested on US political and especially military support. In order to achieve its goals the Australian government was dependent on its major ally, whose support was at least questionable, but this thought did not unduly bother cabinet in 1958.

Cabinet followed the advice as advocated by Casey and McBride, much to the satisfaction of the former.\textsuperscript{84} Concerns over the application of the principle of self-determination were notably absent in this small group of decision makers. Members of the House generally supported the government’s policy, albeit for different reasons. Coalition Representatives endorsed the policy fully, while ALP members advocated UN involvement, much like the social democratic party PvdA in the Netherlands.

Well equipped with this cabinet decision Casey entered the Dutch lion’s den on 28 September 1958 for what was likely to be a determined Dutch effort to secure Australia’s military support.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Cabinet Minute decision no.1526, 13 August 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
Casey’s offer of increased administrative co-operation and continuing diplomatic support fell far short of Dutch demands. He therefore would have to convince the Netherlands that this was the best Australia could do, in the absence of US military commitments. On his arrival, Casey issued a positive statement claiming that the Joint Agreement between Australia and the Netherlands, served the concept of self-determination:

The Australian and Dutch government are maintaining and extending very close co-operation in the administration of their respective territories to see that they are developed in the interests of their inhabitants....Both governments are dedicated to preparing the peoples of New Guinea for self-government.  

During talks with Luns, Casey set about his task of informing the Netherlands of the revised strategic outlook and its implications for Australian policy: the Australian government would be lobbying to persuade the US to enter into a security arrangement and step up its political deterrent. Luns was left in no doubt that Australia by itself would not offer any military support. The Dutch government showed some understanding and did not make Casey run the gauntlet publicly, but Casey realised the volatility of the Netherlands' position. He also knew that his coming diplomatic attempt had to be convincing in order to bolster Dutch morale.

Although Casey knew that the US wanted to appease the Indonesian army because of its capacity to stop a communist takeover, Casey’s experience in the Netherlands forced him to defy the odds in his attempt to commit the US militarily. At the ANZUS Council meeting in late

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84 Unmarked note by Casey to his staff, 15 August 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
85 Quoted from Millar, op. cit., p.299.
86 Unmarked document, 29 August 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 31.
1958 he tried to convince his American and New Zealand partners of the need to keep West New Guinea out of Indonesian hands. To this end he developed an argument on the interests of the indigenous people of West New Guinea, who, according to Casey, benefited from Dutch efforts to develop them.\(^8^8\) Pressed hard over military support by Casey, Dulles offered diplomatic advice and promised to take the matter to the UN Security Council in case of violence.\(^8^9\) Confronted with the refusal of military support, Casey settled for building an alliance for political deterrence. Since US participation was decisive to success of the alliance, Casey would continue to lobby the American government.

During this important phase of policy implementation the House’s input had again been negligible, in large measure due to the reluctance of members on the government side to debate the issue and disclose information. Acting Minister for External Affairs, McBride, for example claimed to have inadequate information to supply an answer to a question by Evatt,\(^9^0\) while Menzies blatantly refused to answer a question on Australian policy put forward by Charles

\(^8^7\) Outward cablegram, O.11201, 5 September 1958. Ibid., file no. 3036/6/1 part 31.
\(^8^8\) Unmarked document, 29 September 1958. Ibid., file no.3036/6/1 part 33.
\(^8^9\) Norman Harper, *Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian - American Relations 1900-1975*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1987, p.300. Dulles also informed Casey of his promise to Luns that should Indonesia attack Dutch New Guinea this would involve breaking a basic principle the United States regarded as very important, in the same way as would a Chinese attack on Taiwan’s off-shore islands. Millar, op. cit., p.307. Although not fully satisfied, Casey settled for this promise, not expecting the US to give any clearer assurance. Casey in a letter to McClure Smith, 26 November 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 33.
\(^9^0\) House of Representatives, 27 August 1958, p.773.
Morgan (ALP). Parliament’s institutional role and its procedures again prevented the opposition, to play any significant role in evaluating the policy.

On 30 December 1958 cabinet again discussed its West New Guinea policy in the face of recent disturbing developments. The new submission, no.12, that Casey took to cabinet mentioned that Indonesia was continuing to acquire considerable quantities of arms. Provocative statements had also continued unabated from Jakarta. It could not be ruled out that the domestic political situation in Indonesia would deteriorate even more, benefiting the communists. A further cause of concern was the fall of the Drees Cabinet in the Netherlands. The new Dutch cabinet could assume a more forthcoming and therefore weaker policy. With the prospect of an Indonesian military campaign increasing, it was certain that the Netherlands would not fight if left unsupported. On 22 December the Dutch government had asked Australia and the US to engage in military consultations. Cabinet had to consider its policy in the light of all these international developments.

The submission advocated a policy that rested upon the assumption that Indonesia was not lost to communism yet, but whoever was in power would pursue the policy to acquire West New Guinea, possibly with the use of force. The PKI would benefit greatly from a major military

91 Ibid., 11 September 1958, p.1121.
92 Unfortunately the submission mentions neither the country where Indonesia was purchasing these arms nor the start of this reinforcement. The purchase, however, can be dated between August and December 1958, since it was mentioned under the heading ‘recent developments’, a section which covered all developments since cabinet decision no.1526 of August 1958. Submission no.12, 30 December 1958, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1
conflict. Stressing the military importance of Indonesia, the submission also referred to Indonesia’s political importance as a touchstone by which Australia’s relations with Asia would be judged. Subsequently the report went on to explain the importance of Netherlands New Guinea to Australia’s security and the uninterrupted development of Australian New Guinea, but here it covered no new ground.

Discussing the political implications of Drees’ resignation the report pointed out correctly that without the weight of his towering personality, PvdA, if relegated to the opposition benches, could well become a subversive force in the Netherlands’ West New Guinea policy, resulting in a collapse of the Netherlands’ home front. Therefore Australian policy needed to reckon with a modified Dutch policy also because there were no international guarantees regarding military assistance. The Netherlands’ Ambassador had already indicated that the American assurances of assistance in case of an Indonesian attack were inadequate. This came as no surprise to the authors of the report: the US government, wary of the strength of communist forces in Indonesia and determined to rebuild its relationship with the Indonesian government after the Indonesians had discovered CIA involvement in the failed 1958 uprising in Sumatra, had informed the Australian government in September of its intention to support moderate forces in Indonesia. These were predominantly located in the army, and therefore the US was prepared to supply some military equipment to Indonesia. However the US remained opposed to force being used, as Dulles had told Casey. Dulles had further expressed his desire to have the Netherlands stay,
preferably until the moment had come to transfer Netherlands New Guinea to Australian control.  

A few days later, on 5 January 1959 cabinet decided, on the basis of submissions 11 and 12 by the JIC, on its policy. Knowing that the UK and the US had refused to commit themselves militarily in advance of an Indonesian attack, and judging Indonesia of greater strategic importance to Australia than [West] New Guinea, cabinet saw it as a major goal to keep Indonesia friendly, or at least out of the hands of communism. Cabinet also noted that Australia would not commit itself militarily and the Netherlands ought to be informed accordingly. Australia would once again step up its diplomatic activity aimed at persuading the Netherlands to stay on and to deter Indonesia from aggression. To this end the UK and the US had to become involved more closely. The International Court of Justice was regarded as a solution to the deadlock. Cabinet ignored the fact that Indonesia did not accept the Court’s jurisdiction.

Although the reports had stressed the changing circumstances, cabinet was unable to adapt its policy accordingly. The approved policy was a recipe of more of the same. Cabinet’s constancy was losing touch with the shifting situation. It was unable to overcome the contradictory policy goals of keeping the Netherlands in West New Guinea while not offending Indonesia, since any offence from Australia was thought likely to benefit the PKI in Indonesia. The subject of Papuan

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94 Cabinet Minute, decision no.17, submissions nos. 11 and 12, 5 January 1959, Australian Archives, file no. C508 part 1.
self-determination played no part in any discussion. This was in sharp contrast to the government’s public expressions of concern, but these served to justify internationally Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s bid to takeover the territory.

Talks with Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Subandrio, who was due to arrive in Australia on 11 February 1959, offered the government an opportunity to repair the damaged relations with Indonesia, but at the risk of driving a wedge between Australia and the Netherlands. According to Casey such an outcome should be prevented, but the visit had to contribute to better relations with Indonesia.95 Casey advocated in cabinet to use legal arguments and the principle of self-determination to defend Australia’s case.96 Once again self-determination would serve as a suitable instrument to hide Australia’s apprehension about sharing a border with Indonesia.

Prior to Subandrio’s visit Casey received information revealing the deep divisions inside the US State Department. Strong voices were apparently prepared to hand over West New Guinea if this would help to create a friendly, non-communist Indonesia. Since Dulles himself did not share this opinion, the US was likely to remain neutral and the idea of a trusteeship became more attractive.97 It is difficult to assess what impact this confirmation of the failure of Australian lobbying to the US had, but Subandrio’s visit ushered in a phase of Australian disassociation

95 Submission no.30, prepared by Casey, 30 January 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
96 Note for cabinet, 9 February 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/2/1 part 1.
from the West New Guinea issue. Given Menzies’ and Casey’s maxim to follow the United States closely in issues relating to Australia’s security, it is likely that this cable contributed to the government’s agreement with the phrasing of the joint communiqué issued after the talks with Subandrio, which will be discussed below.

During the talks Subandrio left Menzies in no doubt that West New Guinea formed an obstacle to good bilateral relations. In order to improve the climate he suggested, in line with Menzies’ comment to the effect that the Australian government believed that the matter was one for the Netherlands and Indonesia to work out, that the Prime Minister would not oppose a bilaterally agreed settlement of the sovereignty question, with a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as a possible outcome. Subandrio also proposed that a joint communiqué should state that Australia was very glad to see the two countries reach a peaceful settlement of their dispute. Although cabinet did not immediately accept this formulation, Casey made the concession to declare Australia not a party principal to the dispute. In conformity with the cabinet decision on strategy, Casey and Menzies developed the argument of self-determination as ultimate objective and justification for supporting the Netherlands. Since Australia adhered to self-determination for the indigenous people it was unwilling to urge the Netherlands to reach an accommodation.

98 Cabinet minute, decision no.36, 11 February 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1/1
99 Ibid. Although Subandrio met with the whole cabinet, only Menzies and Casey took the floor.
100 “[Australia’s] great ambition is to have West New Guinea developed in the same way [as Australian New Guinea]. It is for this reason that Australia recently made an administrative agreement with the Netherlands, designed for the advancement of the native people.” Quoted from cabinet minute, decision no.37, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1/1.
The joint communiqué issued after the talks indeed renounced Australia as a party principal, and for the first time the government publicly declared its willingness to accept a Dutch-Indonesian agreement reached by peaceful processes and in accordance with internationally accepted principles, which meant absence of duress. The principle of self-determination suffered badly from this diplomatic compromise, which aimed to salvage Australian-Indonesian relations, since an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia would not necessarily produce adequate guarantees for West Papuan self-determination. Casey might have judged such an agreement as hypothetical, but by renouncing any role for Australia as a party principal he contributed to bringing about the unthinkable. Menzies and Casey denied that the communiqué was a departure from the previous policy, but the Dutch government did not miss the obvious shift in the Australian stand and its implications for Netherlands’ sovereignty and self-determination.

The Australian press was on balance mostly favourable to the phrasing of the communiqué. The Returned Service League (RSL) denounced the statement. Both in the House and the

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101 On the Australian side, only a few people were involved in the drafting, namely Menzies, Casey, Tange, McIntyre and James Plimsoll.

102 In a letter to Casey on 19 February 1959, Dutch Ambassador Lovink explained that the Netherlands had always argued that its presence in West New Guinea was not only to the benefit of the Papuans but also of importance to Australia. The Australian government had been opposed to a transfer of sovereignty since such a course would create great unrest in the region. This argument seemed no longer valid. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1/1. Newspapers in the Netherlands widely regarded the joint communiqué as a change in the Australian position, which undermined the Dutch stand. Inward cablegram 3241 from the Australian embassy in The Hague, 20 February 1959.

103 Collection of press statements, 17 February 1959, Australian Archives, file no. 3034/10/10/2.
Senate there was criticism, mainly expressed by the ALP,\textsuperscript{104} although the Liberal Party counted some defectors in its ranks as well.\textsuperscript{105} Coalition members generally supported the government’s approach and also endorsed the idea of secrecy in negotiations, which effectively denied parliament any input.

In the House, Evatt again brought up the idea of a tri-partite agreement as a means serving both the interests of the indigenous people and Australia’s defence. Calwell regarded the joint statement as a reversal of policy, with which he disagreed. He continued to adhere to the inalienable right of self-determination for the natives of West New Guinea. For security reasons too he wanted the agreement scrapped.\textsuperscript{106} Both Calwell and Evatt denied that Indonesia had any entitlement to the territory. They underlined their desire to see the principle of self-determination applied, and wanted to keep the option of a merger of the two New Guineas open. Evatt favoured Australian administration of the whole island under supervision of the Trusteeship Council as a solution. The government’s policy remained in tact since the debate ended with the House divided.

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\textsuperscript{104} In the Senate Willesee and Nicholas McKenna perceived a contradiction in accepting a peacefully negotiated solution between the Netherlands and Indonesia, and Australia’s proclaimed adherence to self-determination. Senate, 25 February 1959, pp. 170 and 183. McKenna preferred to accelerate the educational process of the peoples of New Guinea and development of their country as an entity. Secondly he wanted to protect Australia’s security. Australia should become the trustee since this would unite New Guinea under an experienced administrator. Ibid, 18 February, p.35.
\textsuperscript{105} Notably Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes (LP), but also David Drummond (LP/NC). They particularly disputed Casey’s claim (House of Representatives, 18 February 1959, p.69) that the policy had not changed. House of Representatives, 24 February 1959, p.204.
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The debate showed most strikingly how availability of up-to-date information of inter-national conditions affected the choice of policy means and goals. The government, although it refused to admit this, had changed its policy in the face of recent international developments. The opposition on the other hand still advocated a seemingly less realistic policy in which self-determination continued to play a central role. Parliamentary procedures and parliament’s functioning as an institution further explain Labor’s stand. Parliamentary procedures denied the ALP a serious and regular involvement in foreign policy making, while the institutional role of parliament defined the part of the government group and the opposition. This latter factor prevented the ALP from exercising any influence on policy in the phases of deliberation and evaluation and forced the party to use the rare opportunity of debate to offer an alternative to the government’s policy. In formulating this alternative lack of access to the secret information meant havoc for the party, making it even easier for the government to discard ALP’s unrealistic alternatives. ALP members who did try to follow international developments closely, such as Whitlam, had a more ‘realistic’ view that came closer to the government’s perception.

Formally the Menzies government maintained that its policy had not changed, but the upshot of the talks had been a further isolation of the Netherlands, bringing an Indonesian takeover closer and making an act of self-determination more unlikely. In response to Dutch pressure, Menzies reiterated in parliament support for Dutch sovereignty and stressed that the interests of the indigenous people remained paramount. In Menzies’ view recognition of Dutch sovereignty and

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106 Ibid., pp.205-207.
self-government were fully consistent goals. He tried to silence the resounding voice of concern, by stating that in case of negotiations Australia expected its voice to be heard on matters that affected New Guinea’s future. However the fact remained that as a result of the declaration Australia was known to be no longer opposed to bilateral talks, the outcome of which would most likely be a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. The shallowness of Australia’s concern for self-determination was exposed publicly this time.

In April 1959 during a SEATO meeting Casey continued his unsuccessful quest for international support to deter Indonesia from military action, claiming that with all its new arms Indonesia might strike within 12 to 18 months, and aware of the US refusal to joint military consultation. With a military deterrent increasingly unlikely, the emphasis of his diplomacy would be more on the construction of a political deterrent.

In another assessment of the situation, External Affairs figured that Indonesia was unlikely to contemplate the use of force. Instead efforts would probably continue to isolate the Netherlands politically. Economic threats would also go on. The De Quay Government, however, was unlikely to budge, and would try instead to continue Dutch rule until self-determination had been attained. Without any military support from the US and UK, and with declining political backing

107 Ibid., 21 February 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1/1.
108 Ibid., 24 February 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 41.
109 Unmarked External Affairs report about the SEATO meeting, 10 April 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 37.
110 Inward cablegram, I.5347 from the Australian embassy in Washington, 25 March 1959, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 37.
in the UN, the position of the Netherlands was regarded as vulnerable. The Australian position was said to be:

Vigorous political support for the Netherlands in the UN, claiming a special interest in the future of West New Guinea on grounds of strategic interests and a position in East New Guinea,....a persistently advanced view publicly that acceptance of the Indonesian claim would deprive the people of West New Guinea of the right to determine their future.... [and] an agreement reached by Indonesia and the Netherlands by peaceful means must be in accord with the principle of self-determination.

The report reconfirmed Australia’s commitment to the cause of self-determination as administering power of the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Association of the two halves of the island was not regarded as a political objective, but a decision confirming that the policy intended to work towards facilitating an ultimate fusion was highly desirable.

The report went on to discuss the position of the United States in depth. It concluded that, in the face of overwhelming importance attributed to support for moderate groups in Indonesia in the fight against communism, the general anti-colonial attitude prevailing in the US, and the possible election of a Democratic Administration, the US was likely to remain neutral.

The paper reconfirmed once more that the main policy objective had been to keep Indonesia out of West New Guinea in the interest of regional stability and Australian security. Those

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111 Unmarked document, May 1959, Australian Archives, file no.59/57 no.3.
112 Quoted from ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
reasons remained valid; Indonesia should not gain control over the territory.115 Not surprisingly, given the conclusions of the analysis of the international situation and Australian interests, the report offered no new policy means. The Australian government should continue to encourage the Netherlands to stay and give them all assistance, short of military support, while also trying to minimise damage to the relationship with Indonesia.116 This left the Australian government with a familiar dilemma. During a visit to The Hague in June 1959 Menzies fully followed the advice given in the report.117

Following his overseas talks Menzies explained in the House that both the Netherlands and Australia would continue their policy of developing the native population to ultimate self-government. Seemingly nothing had changed. Awareness that a merger of the two halves of the island was not viable had already changed the government’s ultimate policy goal and would influence the policy means as well. Ignorant of this development in government thinking, Evatt mentioned Australia’s defence interests and stressed the paramount duty of supporting the indigenous people to achieve self-government. Calwell continued to promote a tri-partite

115 The reasons given in favour of a continuation of Dutch presence were: with the Netherlands in control, Asian influence could automatically be minimised; departure of the Dutch would enable Indonesia to proceed with sovereignty claims to the Australian part of the island; Dutch presence partly prevented a direct conflict with Indonesia; Australian New Guinea benefited from administrative co-operation with the Netherlands; and finally if Australia were to let down the Netherlands that country would see no obligation to consider Australian interests. A desire to see the principle of self-determination applied was not listed as a reason. Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Critchley, op. cit., p.223.
agreement as solution to preserve the *status quo* until the native people could make up their mind.¹¹⁸ The opposition’s contribution to the policy was again negligible.

During a visit to Indonesia in early December 1959 Menzies warned Prime Minister Djuanda and foreign minister A.H. Nasution of the adverse effects of military threats on the prospects of a solution.¹¹⁹ When Sukarno guaranteed that he would not use violence, Menzies’ visit seemed successful.

In February 1960 Casey took another submission to cabinet, prepared by Tange and Lambert (Department of Territories), which argued that the need to prevent Indonesia from taking over West New Guinea still existed. The Netherlands should be encouraged to stay by continuing to give it maximum political and diplomatic support. The policy should still envisage, facilitate and encourage a voluntary political association of the two halves of the island. So far the submission had offered no new policy departure but the comments regarding self-determination are worth mentioning for they disclosed more clearly than previous submissions the government’s real purpose of its public support for self-determination. It was argued that the policy had to be disguised and would therefore be presented in terms of elimination of obstacles to self-determination.¹²⁰ The submission proves beyond doubt that self-determination only served as public camouflage for Australia’s strategic interests: altruist or moral concerns were absent.

¹¹⁸ House of Representatives, 13 August 1959, pp.190-201.
¹¹⁹ Undated Inward cablegram, I. 22528, Australian Archives, file no.45/1/3/17 part 1.
In April 1960 Menzies again travelled to The Hague, where the pace of the Dutch crash program to prepare the Papuans for self-determination took him by surprise: the Netherlands seemed to envisage a preparation of ten years only. Disappointed over the lack of international support and in the face of growing Indonesian pressure, Luns warned that the Netherlands could also divest itself of its duties before the ten year period would have expired. The Netherlands’ Charge d’Affaires, Insinger, added that the international climate was changing, with colonies all over the world rapidly being replaced by new and independent states. Further the Dutch government would leave it to the future New Guinea Council to decide a target date for self-determination.  

In the months to follow, and much to its dislike, the Australian government continued to receive reports indicating that the Netherlands was accelerating the pace of development towards self-rule, making achievement of Australia’s newly formulated policy unlikely. But caught up in its own web of deceit, the government would have to continue to pay lip-service to self-determination.

Much of 1960 was uneventful, but the incident with the flag-showing trip by a Dutch aircraft carrier to the Pacific -- the ship briefly bunkered in Australia on its way to West New Guinea where it delivered a number of fighter planes as part of a reinforcement program -- formed an exception, which was exploited by Indonesia as evidence of the hostile and aggressive intentions of the Netherlands, and as excuse to strengthen its own defences.

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121 Unmarked report of a conversation between Insinger and Blakeney, 11 April 1960, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 40.
Shortly before Indonesia decided to terminate diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in August, External Affairs repeated the basis of its policy in a special report. However, the old contradiction -- to have the Netherlands stay in West New Guinea if possible until the moment of self-determination, while also desiring friendly relations with Indonesia -- still existed. An explicit recognition of the right of self-determination further complicated the task of meeting the second goal. As conditioning factors External Affairs further mentioned: the Australian promise to pursue in co-operation with the Netherlands policies taking account of the affinity between the two territories, a private pledge by Canberra to Indonesian government officials not to exercise any influence to establish any new arrangements with the Netherlands, the Prime Minister’s statement in the House on 24 February 1959 that in the event of negotiations Australia would expect to have its voice heard on matters pertaining to the future of West New Guinea, the joint communiqué issued at the end of Subandrio’s visit and finally, the Indonesian pledge not to use force. Domestic factors were not considered to restrain the policy. Since no implications of these conditioning factors for goal attainment were discussed the analysis was inchoate and inadequate.

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122 The unmarked report is dated August 9, 1960. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 41.
123 Unmarked External Affairs report, 9 August 1960, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 41.
124 Ibid.
Although the conflicting policy goals were maintained, Tange became convinced of the disastrous implications of any armed resistance to Indonesia on relations with that country.\textsuperscript{125} The view of such an influential adviser made it ever more unlikely that Australia would take a tough stand in defence of a principle.

In parliament the opposition was again snubbed. In a reply to Menzies’ repeated commitment that the future of West New Guinea should be one satisfying its inhabitants and be in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, Calwell repeated his preference for a tri-partite agreement to secure peace in the entire archipelago, and allow the indigenous people, in the distant future, to determine their own way.\textsuperscript{126} His argumentation once again showed the distance between the Leader of the Opposition and international reality. His attempt was to no avail in any case, since party discipline prevailed.

By the end of 1960 the military situation became graver. The Netherlands announced to make available an additional amount of money to West New Guinea’s defence and Indonesian decided to purchase large quantities of Soviet arms. Diplomatic posts informed External Affairs that the Netherlands’ government was no longer ruling out a trusteeship as a means to achieve

\textsuperscript{125} In order not to alarm the United Kingdom and the United States, Tange gave instructions not to disclose these intelligence findings. Note by Tange, 29 September 1960, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 45.
\textsuperscript{126} House of Representatives, 6 December 1960, p.3571 and p.3580.
self-determination.¹²⁷ This implied that the Dutch government was considering to pull out and rid itself of its torment. Although such a new approach would gravely threaten the framework of Australian policy, no immediate action was required since the Netherlands failed to submit a resolution to the UN, and efforts by Tunku Abdul Rachman of Malaysia to find a way out of the deadlock seemed to falter. But in 1961 events would catch up and prove Australia’s policy of indecisiveness completely obsolescent. With Indonesia taking delivery of large amounts of arms from the USSR and staging landings of troops on the shores of West New Guinea, parliament would at last become involved in the issue.

Another major event in 1961 with implications for Australia’s policy was the change of administration in the United States and a concomitant shift in that state’s policy towards Indonesia and the West New Guinea issue. Menzies received a foretaste during a visit to the United States in his dual capacity as Prime Minister and external affairs minister. President Kennedy tried to down play the security risk that a common border with Indonesia would pose to Australia. Menzies, however, stuck to his guns.¹²⁸ Still ignoring the signs of imminent change, Tange reported in March 1961 that cabinet saw no virtue in altering the status quo.¹²⁹

April brought the important visit to Canberra by Indonesian defence minister Nasution. Prior to this visit cabinet had reconsidered its policy and decided to maintain the position that Menzies

¹²⁷ Both the Australian High Commissioner in London and the Australian mission to the United Nations sent reports containing this message to Canberra. See Inward cablegram, I.27872 and Inward cablegram, I.30571/572 respectively, Australian Archives, file no.1/150.
¹²⁸ Critchley, op. cit., p.246.
had expressed after Subandrio’s visit in 1959. This meant a continuation of support for Netherlands’ sovereignty and the objective of self-determination, but did not exclude recognition of an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia reached by peaceful means, by now no longer a strictly hypothetical scenario. The government would declare that there was no military agreement with the Netherlands, but that a military confrontation would face it with grave problems. When Menzies met with Nasution he stuck to this approach. Nasution for his part was very keen to get confirmation that Australia would assume a strictly neutral position, no longer supporting or encouraging the Netherlands. Menzies refused to make such a commitment, but the assurance that no military pact existed must have been of comfort to Nasution.\textsuperscript{130}

Following the talks Menzies, who had been criticised by the opposition for avoiding a debate on his government’s West New Guinea policy, initiated a debate in the House with a statement that accurately covered the points made by both the Indonesian and Australian delegations. He particularly emphasised the discussion on self-determination. The Australians had stressed their desire to see this principle implemented, whereas Nasution had rejected it outright. Nasution had declared that an interim trusteeship with the purpose of returning the area to Indonesia would be acceptable. Menzies claimed to have replied that this plan abandoned the right of self-determination. Therefore it was unacceptable to the Australian government and hence no

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Unmarked note, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 45.
\item Outward cablegram, O.6613, 27 April 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 46.
\end{enumerate}
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pressure would be put on the Netherlands to start negotiations.\textsuperscript{131} Netherlands’ sovereignty and ultimate self-determination were thus made congruent principles in the government’s policy.

Menzies’ reasoning confused Calwell who wondered if it meant a renunciation of the 1959 joint declaration. He claimed that his support for the Prime Minister's effort to give the people a chance to freely choose their future was in line with his policy record,\textsuperscript{132} but Calwell also emphasised that all peoples of New Guinea should be regarded as one. This allowed him to opt for a unified Melanesian federation, preferably becoming a part of the British Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{133} Calwell disagreed with the government’s willingness to accept an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia, since the Netherlands had no moral right to hand over the Papuans to another colonial power.\textsuperscript{134} Whitlam supported Dutch rule in West New Guinea since it resided in the principle of self-determination of non-self-governing people, and the validity and morality of Australia’s case could only be based on self-determination. However the Australian government had hardly played this card in the UN. The Prime Minister's statement was much more satisfying to Whitlam, although like Calwell, he was still puzzled by the contradiction between acceptance of a Dutch-Indonesian agreement and self-determination. Whitlam nevertheless supported Menzies' statement that the Netherlands’ claim to rule over West New

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\textsuperscript{131} House of Representatives, 27 April 1961, pp.1247-1250.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p.1255.
\textsuperscript{133} The biennial ALP Conference had stressed the party’s adherence to self-determination for the inhabitants of the island of New Guinea. Co-operation with the UN should help to solve the conflict over West New Guinea, the inhabitants of which were said not to be ready for self-government. House of Representatives, 27 April 1961, p.1254.
\textsuperscript{134} ALP Representative Eddie Ward, suggested taking the matter to the UN as soon as possible. House of Representatives, 27 April 1961, p.1261.
\end{flushleft}
Guinea was based upon Chapter XI of the UN Charter. As long as the peoples of New Guinea were not yet ready to govern themselves, Australia and the Netherlands should continue their rule.  

In the face of Indonesia’s increased diplomatic and military pressure on the Netherlands, the conclusion that “nothing came out of Nasution’s visit” is unwarranted. The visit contributed to a further isolation of the Netherlands. Self-determination had again been used as an argument to keep West New Guinea out of the hands of Indonesia. Finally the government had given the opposition the opportunity to debate the issue in depth. The debate was a rare show of bipartisan support for the government. The gap between the two parties had narrowed significantly, with the ALP putting a stronger emphasis on the moral issue of self-determination, to be achieved through UN involvement, something the government regarded as impossible. As the speeches of Calwell and Whitlam show, Labor’s ranks had closed.

In an effort to rid themselves of the burden of West New Guinea, the Netherlands’ government decided to undertake to internationalise its administration. This step threatened to remove the safety buffer of Dutch sovereignty, considered a fundamental element in the protection of Australia’s security. Not surprisingly, cabinet was unhappy with the Netherlands’ gamble of taking the issue to the United Nations.

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135 Ibid., p.1272.
Cabinet was forced to debate its policy in August 1961, following a Dutch request for advice on its UN resolution. Cabinet noted Indonesia’s uncompromising ambition to gain control over West New Guinea, allowing only transfer of sovereignty as solution. Cabinet discussed this course purely in terms of economic and strategic implications, and concluded that there was no room for a modification of its policy so as to accommodate Indonesia. The fate of the Papuans and their entitlement to self-determination was again of no importance to cabinet.\footnote{\textsuperscript{137}}

Confronted with a flurry of diplomatic activity by the Netherlands and Indonesia, Tange at last advised Menzies to abort the position of passive opposition in an attempt to quash any unwanted developments.\footnote{\textsuperscript{138}} Australia resented the Netherlands’ idea of taking the issue to the UN because it involved too great a risk that ‘irresponsible forces’ could play havoc with the idea of granting self-determination to the Papuans.\footnote{\textsuperscript{139}} However, recognising the Netherlands’ desire to make the best of it in the UN, the government was left with no choice but to give its comments on the resolution the Netherlands intended to submit. All it could do was to strengthen the resolution’s formulation in an effort to improve its chances of being carried by a UN majority, however unlikely that was. Expressing the wish to relinquish sovereignty to an international body before any act of self-determination, the Netherlands’ proposal confronted Australia with a new situation altogether. Having failed to take any initiatives, or grant adequate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Quoted P.R. Heydon, acting Secretary of External Affairs, file no.233/10/3/3, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 46.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Cabinet minutes, submission no.1305, 12 August 1961, Australian Archives TS3036/6/1 part 13.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Unmarked note, 15 August 1961, Australian Archives, file no. TS3036/6/1 part 13.
\end{itemize}
political or military support to the Netherlands in the past the government had to support the resolution\textsuperscript{140} and its successor, the Brazzaville resolution,\textsuperscript{141} in which direct negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were foreseen. Having declared its willingness to accept a solution between both parties reached without duress, Australia could not oppose this resolution, although it would play no role itself. The Australian government had relegated itself to a mere bystander with events tumbling around its superseded policy.

\textsuperscript{139} Heydon in conversation with Dutch Ambassador De Beus, 28 August 1961, Australian Archives, file no. TS3036/6/1 part 13.
\textsuperscript{140} The Netherlands’ resolution demanded that, “The General Assembly...1. Decides to set up a United Nations Commission for Netherlands New Guinea...2. Requests the Commission to investigate the possibilities of an early implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of Netherlands New Guinea and more specifically to this end to inquire into: (b) The opinion amongst the population as to its present situation and its future; (c) The possibility of organizing a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations in order to register the wishes of the population concerning their future, and the timing of the plebiscite; (d) The desirability and possibility of bringing the Territory, during the interim period, partially or wholly under the administration of an International Development Authority, established by and operating under the United Nations.”

\textsuperscript{141} This resolution read: “The General Assembly...Recalling the principles set forth in its resolution 1514 (XV)...[c]onvinced..., that any solution which affects the final destiny of a Non-Self-Governing Territory must be based on the principle of self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Urges the governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to resume negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future of the territory of West New Guinea, without prejudice to respect for the will and self-determination of the peoples; 3. Decides to establish a commission composed of five members appointed by the General Assembly on the proposal of its President; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to inform that Commission of the result of the negotiations by 1 March, 1962; 5. Instructs the Commission, if the parties have not reached a negotiated agreement by 1 March 1962;
(a) To carry out an investigation into the conditions prevailing in the territory; (b) To examine the possibilities of establishing, for an interim period, an international system for the administration and supervision of the territory; (c) To report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.”
During the debate in the UN, External Affairs received an alarming report that there was now a firm conviction amongst officials in the State Department’s Far Eastern Bureau that the West New Guinea problem must be settled in the interest of US-Indonesian relations. According to embassy staff in Washington the higher ranks, including President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk had a better understanding of Australian interests. Australian lobbying activities would therefore target the higher ranks in the State Department.\(^{142}\)

Ambassador Shaw warned from Jakarta that the situation was deteriorating. The Indonesian government saw Australia as the main obstacle to the achievement of its goals and regarded Australia’s opposition as a signal of hostility. The argument about self-determination was seen as a facade. The Ambassador warned for the consequences of a deterioration in relations that seemed “far more important than the issue of self-determination for West New Guinea.”\(^{143}\)

Nevertheless the Australian delegation to the UN was instructed that the Australian concern was:

To ensure that the future of the Papuans...should be of their free choosing....negotiations between Papuans and Indonesians on the restricted question of a preferred autonomy within Indonesia would not...[be] in accord with the principle of self-determination unless the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia had itself first freely received Papuan approval as the result of the self-determination process.\(^{144}\)

\(^{142}\) Inward cablegram, I.23303, from Beale, Australian embassy in Washington, 28 September 1961, Australian Archives 3036/6/1 part 50.

\(^{143}\) Quoted from dispatch no.15, 3 October 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 51.

\(^{144}\) Quoted form Outward cablegram, O.15081 by Menzies/McEwen/Townley/Hasluck/Hicks/Lambert/Bunting, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 51. The cablegram explained that the Australian position derived from Australia’s acceptance of the UN Charter provisions.
The Netherlands’ determination to internationalise West New Guinea’s administration as a means to protect the right of self-determination, forced the Australian government to go beyond the level of rhetorical support for the principle of self-determination. At last self-determination really became the prime goal of policy.

In the House Menzies strongly defended the element of self-determination in the Netherlands’ resolution: “From first to last we have said self-determination for those people.”\(^{145}\) But in preparation of a cabinet meeting, Tange warned -- even though the UNGA had not yet voted on the Dutch resolution -- that the *status quo* in West New Guinea was bound to change soon, putting more pressure on Australia at least to speed up its development policies for East New Guinea and possibly to change the status of its territories. Tange was adamant not to let a conflict over East New Guinea develop with Indonesia, and also to avoid a confrontation with Asian-African opinion in respect of Australia’s administrative policies in Papua New Guinea. He further insisted on preventing Indonesia from gaining West New Guinea, but wanted to avoid an Indonesian military attack. Although hard to realise, the formation of a single Papuan state might best serve those interests, according to Tange.\(^{146}\)

\(^{145}\) Quoted from House of Representatives, 28 September 1961, p.1444.

\(^{146}\) Unmarked document, 10 October 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 51.
Tange feared that as a result of the Netherlands' initiative Indonesia would gain West New Guinea within ten years, and probably less, and that Australia was likely to get into conflict with its neighbour over East New Guinea. A forced abandonment of East New Guinea would allow Indonesia the opportunity to gain control, or at least achieve strong influence. Tange acknowledged that the whole basis of Australian policy -- the assumption that Dutch presence until the moment of execution of self-determination would preclude Indonesia from gaining control -- was under threat. In spite of these changed circumstances he argued that Australia’s interests had not changed, which allowed him to uphold his previously expressed policy advice to cabinet.¹⁴⁷ Without an adjustment to changes in the international situation the policy became increasingly obsolescent.

Notwithstanding ominous reports that Indonesia would resort to military means should the Netherlands’ resolution be adopted,¹⁴⁸ Menzies continued to support the resolution arguing that it was solidly based in international law and equity. The Prime Minister still expected a two-thirds majority in favour of the resolution in the UN as well as US support.¹⁴⁹ He was rudely awoken from his dream by the news that a compromise resolution should be tabled in the face of a likely defeat of the Dutch resolution.¹⁵⁰ The United States seemed prepared to float a draft for a resolution that would safeguard the principle of self-determination. Beale warned Menzies:

¹⁴⁷ File 852/10/43, 17 October 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 51.
¹⁴⁸ Inward cablegram, I.27707 from Ambassador Shaw in Jakarta, 15 November 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
¹⁴⁹ Outward cablegram, O.17320 by Menzies, 15 November 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
“If we lose this one, we may well have lost our last chance of preventing West New Guinea from going to Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{151}

External Affairs decided that an amended resolution could still meet the basic goals of the Netherlands and Australia, as long as it clearly endorsed the principle of self-determination and provided for a UN commission to report to the General Assembly as a basis for talks.\textsuperscript{152} The Department reiterated its objections to forced negotiations that would exclude self-determination and thus be inconsistent with the Charter principles. A few days later India tabled a resolution in favour of the Indonesian stand which ignored the principle of self-determination and only demanded a resumption of negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. This reduced the chance of the Brazzaville resolution being carried.

The General Assembly became divided into a group of predominantly western states that defined the case in terms of application of the principle of self-determination, and an alliance viewing the problem as a case of denial of sovereignty to an already independent former colonial state. The anti-colonial coalition had been reinforced over the past years by a number of former colonies now independent. This anti-colonial group capitalised on East-West rivalry. Anti-colonialism was therefore a popular issue, allowing Indonesia to find a blocking one third vote.

\textsuperscript{150} Unmarked report by the Australian delegation to the United Nations, 16 November 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
\textsuperscript{151} Quoted from Inward cablegram, I.27860, 17 November 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
\textsuperscript{152} External Affairs, file no.3036/1/4, 20 November 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
With the defeat of both the Brazzaville resolution and the Indian resolution on 27 November the international tide turned decisively, and the conflict entered its final stage.\textsuperscript{153}

Indonesia’s diplomatic offensive in the 1950s had demanded that, in order to safeguard its security interests, Australia publicly embrace self-determination to stem anti-colonialist sentiment in the UN. In 1961 the failed attempt by the Netherlands to involve the UN in West New Guinea’s administration and lack of any military commitments from Australia’s allies, in turn forced the Menzies government to abandon self-determination to salvage its security interests. The international situation had both dictated that Australia support and abandon the principle of self-determination as a means to safeguard its security interest.

5. Menzies backs down

A series of events immediately following the voting on the Brazzaville resolution ushered in a period of re-evaluation and redirection of Australia’s policy. Until the voting in the UNGA the government had received optimistic telexes from The Hague, confirming that the Netherlands would adhere unswervingly to its policy of unconditional application of self-determination.\textsuperscript{154} As

\textsuperscript{153} The voting on the Brazzaville resolution resulted in 53 in favour, 41 against and 9 abstentions. The Indian resolution received 41 votes in favour, 40 votes against and 21 abstentions.

\textsuperscript{154} See for example a report by the Australian embassy in The Hague, 29 November 1961, Australian Archives file no.45/1/3/17 part 4.
discussed in Chapter IV the defeat of the Brazzaville resolution caused a collapse of the home front in the Netherlands, forcing its government to accept direct talks with Indonesia.

Another most important factor explaining the impending change in policy was a report by the Chiefs of Staff to the Menzies’ government which for the first time played down the strategic significance of West New Guinea to Australia’s defence. Since strategic interests had largely motivated the government’s opposition to an Indonesian takeover the reassessment of West New Guinea’s military significance made a major contribution to the redirection of policy. Reports from the Australian embassies in Washington and Jakarta put further pressure on cabinet to reconsider its views. Increasingly strong forces inside the State Department seemed determined to settle the dispute before it could develop into a major crisis.

The successful attack by India on the Portuguese enclave of Goa on 18 December 1961, which evoked no significant international criticism, came as a shock to the Australian government and was a morale boost for Indonesia. On 19 December 1961 Sukarno issued his tri-command,

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155 Hanno Weisbrod, ‘Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea’, *Australian Quarterly*, vol.39, no.2 (June 1967), pp.24-36. European control over West New Guinea was no longer considered vital since Indonesia’s capacity to launch an attack against Australian New Guinea was limited and the territory was covered by the ANZUS treaty. David Marr, *Barwick*, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1980, p.170.

156 Harriman, Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Affairs, and his deputy, Steeves, made it clear to Beale that the United States believed that Sukarno would get Netherlands New Guinea by force or pressure. They saw no opportunity to implement self-determination in a way not farcical, since they considered the population still very primitive. Their main goal was to appease Indonesia, and so prevent Communism from getting a foothold. Inward cablegram, I.30542, Australian embassy in Washington, 19 December 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 56.
calling on the Indonesian people to prepare for general mobilisation, for the unfurling of the Indonesian flag in West Irian, and for the defeat of the formation of a Papuan puppet state.

Although all these international developments seemed to make a change of policy inevitable, Menzies’ personal views and direct involvement as Minister for External Affairs continued to form a stumbling block. On December 21 a cablegram was sent to a number of embassies which still stated: “Any negotiations...[should have] as [their] objective an agreement on how the principle of self-determination is to be applied.”¹⁵⁷ On the same day, however, External Affairs and Menzies received confirmation that the State Department rejected self-determination as a precondition in negotiations.¹⁵⁸ The Kennedy Government was only prepared to concoct a face-saving formula, but then Australia would have to comply.¹⁵⁹

The policy was delivered a final blow when Garfield Barwick replaced Menzies as Minister for External Affairs on 22 December. Lacking Menzies’ sympathy towards the Netherlands’ stand Barwick would quickly the bring Australia’s policy in line with the views of its great and powerful friends. Tange now declared that the government had not realised that, given new intent of the Netherlands to leave West New Guinea as soon as possible, there would be

¹⁵⁷ Quoted from outward cablegram, O.17685, 21 December 1961, Australian Archives file no.3036/6/1 part 54.
¹⁵⁸ Inward cablegram, I.30734, 21 December 1961, from the Australian embassy in Washington, Australian Archives, file no.45/1/3/17 part 4. The British High Commissioner to Australia also warned Menzies of the ‘disastrous effects’ of a military adventure by Sukarno. Therefore the United Kingdom’s main goal was to prevent fighting. Negotiations were the only option, but not with self-determination as a precondition. Unmarked letter by the British High Commissioner to Australia, 22 December 1961, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 56.
created a weak and unstable state: not an alluring prospect for Australia’s security.\textsuperscript{160} Thus External Affairs’ leading senior civil servant supported Barwick who could now take on the Prime Minister.

In late December External Affairs received final confirmation that the Netherlands had accepted unconditional talks with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{161} The Australian government quickly followed suit when Barwick issued a statement on 30 December 1961 which declared: “Both governments should start negotiations without any preconditions but with neither party unmindful of the Charter principle that the indigenous people should ultimately be afforded an opportunity of choosing for themselves their future government.”\textsuperscript{162} The statement proved that as far as the Australian government was concerned, self-determination no longer served as precondition to negotiations. The term self-determination was even avoided so as not to annoy Indonesia.\textsuperscript{163} The government denied that the expression implied a change in policy, claiming instead that it merely reflected a change of emphasis put on certain policy elements in response to changing international circumstances. The government tried to camouflage its abandonment of the application of self-determination as policy goal by arguing that its was inappropriate for Australia to insist on the

\textsuperscript{159} Marr, op. cit., p.169.
\textsuperscript{160} David Jenkins, ‘How Australia changed tack over West New Guinea’, \textit{West Papua Update}, no.15, June 1993, pp.5-7. The article was originally published in \textit{SMH}, 1 January 1993.
\textsuperscript{161} Inward cablegram, I.31093 from The Hague, 28 December 1961, Australian Archives, file no.45/1/3/17 part 4.
\textsuperscript{162} Archive of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2878, press statement no.15/10, 30 December 1961.
\textsuperscript{163} File 586/2 Barwick’s meeting with the press, 3 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 58.
right of self-determination while the Netherlands, as a party principal, had agreed to negotiate without any preconditions.\textsuperscript{164} The government thus refused to accept any responsibility for the sacrifice of its principled policy, presumably afraid of a hostile press and considering its narrow majority in the House.

The new policy brought Australia into line with its allies and the Netherlands. It was also a reasonable measure to keep Australian public opinion abreast of international developments beyond Australian control and prepare it for some contingencies likely to result from the international situation. The main motivation behind the government’s attitude had been the knowledge of American attitudes, particularly in case of an escalation of the conflict by Indonesian aggression.\textsuperscript{165}

Subandrio’s reaction to Barwick’s speech was negative since he considered Australia’s policy as insufficiently conciliatory. Since the press was also confused over the phrasing,\textsuperscript{166} Barwick again had to explain the policy. Before he could issue this statement he had to face Menzies. During a long talk on 4 January 1962 Barwick admonished Menzies to change his position concerning support for the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{167} For a short transitional period the policy making centre had been divided, but Menzies, having suffered a near election defeat in December 1961,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Unmarked savinggram sent to all diplomatic posts, 17 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 61.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Unmarked report of a conversation between A.D. Campbell and US Charge d’Affaires Belton, 3 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 58.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Meeting De Beus - Campbell, 10 January 1962. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Marr, op. cit., pp.170-171; Jenkins, op. cit., p.6.
\end{itemize}
could no longer rule the foreign policy roost, going against the views of the newly appointed Minister for External Affairs.

Thus on the same day Barwick issued a statement, that he and the Secretary of External Affairs, had drafted with Menzies’ approval,\textsuperscript{168} which did not even refer to self-determination. Barwick played down the strategic importance of [West] New Guinea to Australia, creating room to disassociate Australia from the conflict.\textsuperscript{169} He explicitly referred to the communist threat which the crisis had brought about, and expressed the need for a solution by peaceful means. The Dutch government correctly read the speech as a policy turn-about.\textsuperscript{170}

Australian press reports spoke of appeasement, and the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} was particularly critical, and although Barwick would go to some length later to convince the press of the necessity to respond to international developments, Barwick had already made up his mind. In talks with the Netherlands’ Ambassador De Beus he went even further in his sacrifice of Papuan self-determination, advocating a formula in which the Netherlands would hand the area

\textsuperscript{168} Informal External Affairs note, 5 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59.
\textsuperscript{169} According to the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} of 27 December 1961 Barwick had conceded to a demand by the Indonesian government that the Australian government restate its position. Harper, op. cit., p.302.
\textsuperscript{170} Meeting between Netherlands Embassy Counsellor, Ketel, and F.J. Blakeney (Department of External Affairs), 5 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 58. Ambassador De Beus regarded Barwick’s speech of 4 January 1962 as a retreat from the statement of 30 December 1961, with the emphasis now fully on maintaining friendly relations with Indonesia and achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict. Meeting De Beus - Campbell, 10 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59.
to an international authority which in turn would transfer it to Indonesia. Only after establishment of Indonesian control would an act of self-determination follow.\textsuperscript{171}

To cover his retreat, Barwick put the blame for the implicit, though not publicly admitted, sacrifice of self-determination on the Netherlands, which in his opinion, had wrongfully taken the risk to introduce a motion in the UN with the intention to have its own administration replaced by a UN regime. Given the failure in the UN and lack of American and British pledges of military support, Australia could not possibly be expected to come to the aid of the Netherlands, especially since Australia’s future was lying with Indonesia. Talks were therefore the only solution.\textsuperscript{172}

The final stage of redirecting the policy began when Barwick faced cabinet on 11 January. His position was strong, having the support of his department and Menzies. In cabinet, Barwick presented a detailed submission prepared by External Affairs which argued that the two goals of Australia’s West New Guinea policy had become untenable, almost mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{173} Explaining why the government had been averse to an Indonesian takeover, the report discussed the strategic importance of West New Guinea in relation to Indonesia’s political instability and the risk of Indonesia becoming communist. Further, there was the belief that Australia would benefit from a future independent and united New Guinea. Attributing value to

\textsuperscript{171} Marr, op. cit., p.172.
\textsuperscript{172} Text of a press release, 10 January 1962. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59.
\textsuperscript{173} Jenkins, \textit{West Papua Update}, p.6.
ethnicity, the Papuans of both East and West New Guinea ought to be given the chance of self-determination. The submission then discussed the disadvantages of support for the Netherlands. The most striking, although obvious, conclusion drawn in the submission was that instead of contributing to stability, support for a continuation of Dutch presence had only resulted in increasing tension in the region, and Australia’s relations with Indonesia had suffered. Since the Netherlands would pull out in the near future, it would leave behind a politically and economically not viable and militarily indefensible state. Finally, and very remarkably, the report mentioned that an early implementation of self-determination in Dutch New Guinea would be a major embarrassment to Australia’s own development efforts in the Eastern half of the island.  

Barwick informed cabinet of the international situation that Australia was facing. He argued that one had to realise that Dutch attempts to internationalise its administration were inevitable, since neither the UK nor the US was prepared to assist the Netherlands militarily. Just prior to the meeting Barwick had been informed that the US would not beforehand give any assurances of logistical or any other military support to the Netherlands, should Indonesia attack. The US would only strongly denounce the use of force and support diplomatic moves in the UN. Indonesia on the other hand could count on Soviet support for its campaign.

174 Id.
175 Ibid., p. 7.
176 Conversation between the Secretary of External Affairs and US Charge d’Affaires, William Belton, 10 January. Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59. A conversation between Beale and Harriman on 8 January 1962 had provided similar conclusions regarding American support. Inward cablegram from Washington, 8 January 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 59.
Barwick judged the Netherlands’ position as hopeless, hence its departure imminent. Since Australia could not prevent an Indonesian takeover it should give priority to the relationship with Indonesia: after all Australia had much to gain from a friendly and non-communist neighbour. A continuation of support for the Netherlands could cause irreparable damage to the relationship with Indonesia. A good relationship would make Indonesia a stronger bulwark against a southward expansion of communism than an independent Papuan state. Thus Barwick concluded that development of a friendly relationship with Indonesia was both the long term and immediate goal of Australia’s policy. Apparently cabinet agreed without much discussion. 177

The decision to remain on the sidelines had already been taken when Menzies made a statement to the House. He outlined Australia’s obligation to act in close consultation with the UK and US, implying that their lack of support caused Australia to act as it did. 178 Interfering with Barwick’s hardline realist policy, Menzies stated that the government still hoped that the Papuans would be given a right of self-determination in due course.

Although Calwell correctly pointed out that the government had appeased Indonesia by dropping the right of self-determination as a policy goal for the sake of a peaceful settlement, his pugnacious accusation offered no alternative. 179 His sabre rattling in parliament -- “this is a moment in our history when bold and decisive action is not only the proper course but the safe

177 Jenkins, op. cit., pp.6-7.
179 SMH, 10 February 1962.
course [and] Indonesia will retreat quickly enough if we stand firm\textsuperscript{180}, made matters worse and would haunt and split the ALP, something that did not go unnoticed by government representatives in parliament. Harold Holt for example immediately capitalised on it, making ALP’s opposition ineffective.\textsuperscript{181}

Barwick’s attempts and efforts by senior officials of External Affairs to appease the press by means of special briefings partly failed to produce the aspired pacification immediately.\textsuperscript{182} Barwick’s explanation of Australia’s policy and denial that any changes had taken place since January 12, did not convince some Melbourne based newspapers which reported that Australia had been pressed by the US to abandon its policy.\textsuperscript{183} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} in particular remained a critical opponent to the government’s policy, while other newspapers after the initial shocks came to terms with the fact that Australia had become an outsider to the negotiations over West New Guinea’s future. When the vibrations of the fundamental change of policy, implying the final defeat of Australia’s West New Guinea policy, had died away, the press had been effectively removed as an obstacle to Australia’s acceptance of an Indonesian takeover. The final move towards acceptance of the new policy was made by opposition leader Calwell. With the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} still loyal to both the ALP and the former policy on West

\textsuperscript{180} Quoted from House of Representatives, 28 February 1962, p.305.
\textsuperscript{181} House of Representatives, 27 February 1962, p.257. In the Senate too the ALP came under heavy attack by the government over Calwell’s remarks.
\textsuperscript{182} According to Freudenberg External Affairs travelled especially to Melbourne and Sydney to explain the change in policy. Graham Freudenberg, \textit{A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam}, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1978, p.16.
Guinea, Calwell had a seemingly belligerent threat published with the intention to shore up public and political support. The article stated: “If Indonesia seeks to use force to create a potential threat to Australia’s security, then I say, with all due regard to the gravity of the situation, that threat must be faced.”\textsuperscript{184} Since the prospect of a war was not very attractive his move backfired, splitting the ALP and securing the government of the support of its entire group in the House: with a majority of just one vote, essential to get approval of its policies.

Thus with the aid of the emotional Calwell, the last potential domestic obstacle to the new policy was effectively removed. Calwell’s outburst would have a long echo, affecting Whitlam’s attitude as Prime Minister at the time of the Timor crisis when he was not prepared to cross swords with Indonesia for the sake of self-determination.

Another debate on the matter was not initiated until Barwick declared in the House in March that the government wanted to bring the two parties to the negotiating table without violence erupting.\textsuperscript{185} In his speech, which was well received by most newspapers in Australia as being ‘sensible and realistic’,\textsuperscript{186} he declared that the major aim of the government’s policy remained the promotion of friendship with Indonesia and prevention of the spread of communism to the


\textsuperscript{184} Quoted from Freudenberg, p.17.

\textsuperscript{185} His speech was tabled in the Senate on 15 March, but the debate was delayed until 4 April.

\textsuperscript{186} With the exception of the Sydney Morning Herald, other newspapers such as the Melbourne Herald, the Daily Mirror, and the West Australian had reconciled to the new emphasis in the policy.
area northwest of Australia. As his last point Barwick said that the right of self-determination should be exercised in West New Guinea. He stressed that the anti-colonial mood in the United Nations and the views of Australia’s great and powerful allies had needed to be taken into account.  

Menzies nevertheless added that the principle of self-determination was upheld above all others.  

Calwell, being denied the opportunity of a debate in this instance as well as on 29 March 1962, responded grimly, and accused the government of defeatism. Again, however, he failed to deliver any serious alternative other than UN involvement.

The Netherlands and Indonesia finally started talks without preconditions on 20 March 1962, to the delight of the Australian government, which had been commending negotiations to both parties for months. After only a few days talks were broken off. Following this break down Bunker introduced a compromise solution, main elements of the plan (also see Chapter IV) involved a transfer of administrative authority to a temporary executive under the Secretary-General for not more than 2 years. In the first year UN personnel would replace the Dutch administration. Indonesian officials would in turn replace the UN administration during the second year. By the end of the two year period Indonesia would have full administrative authority. In Bunker’s proposal Indonesia would agree to make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the Secretary-General and the UN, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice within an unspecified number of years. A

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188 Critchley, op. cit., p.270.
transfer of administration to Indonesia thus preceded an act of self-determination, the terms of which were very vague.

The Australian government correctly regarded the Plan as going a long way to meet Indonesia’s demands and therefore difficult for the Netherlands to accept. The government’s diplomacy was the typical farrago with which it had approached the matter for many years. Australia’s diplomatic efforts concentrated on preventing a stalling of the negotiations. To this end External Affairs conducted a balancing act, carefully sublimating pressures exerted by the United States, Indonesia, and the Netherlands.

Fearing the risk of war the government was not prepared to give in to a Dutch request to ask the US to abandon the Bunker Plan altogether but during the ANZUS meeting it made an attempt to persuade the United States to assume a more supportive position, which failed. Not being a party principal, the government decided not to do any more lobbying in favour of the Netherlands. Barwick secretly advised De Beus that the Netherlands should accept the Bunker Plan as a working paper and an opportunity for further negotiations.

Remaining neutral, the Australian government refused to put any pressure on the Netherlands as the United States was suggesting. Rather, External Affairs informed the Americans that it considered the extent and nature of international participation in the suggested process of self-

190 Conversation Barwick-De Beus, 11 April 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 70.
determination quite insufficient. The main conclusion remains, however, that with the acceptance of the timetable of the Bunker Plan -- a transfer of administration some time prior to an act of self-determination -- protecting peace, and hence prevention of an advance of communist forces in the region, prevailed over safeguarding proper guarantees for self-determination. Since the government was in broad agreement with the terms of the Bunker Plan, it supported application of the principle of self-determination in West New Guinea, but this goal should not be a precondition to talks, nor did it exclude an Indonesian takeover. Officially the government held firm to its principles, but in practice it used a new policy theory and surrendered to the international situation.

In parliament, in reply to a speech by Calwell, Barwick declared that the government wanted to maintain three principles in the settlement of the West New Guinea dispute. The minister endorsed a peaceful settlement which recognised sovereignty and self-determination, meaning the right of people to choose their own future. Notably, however, he did not disclose the content of the Bunker Plan, which was little concerned with self-determination. Unaware of the existence of the Bunker Plan, Whitlam upbraided the government for failing to emphasise the principle of self-determination in the early UN debates, and even when Subandrio visited Australia: “[The government] always relied on matters of defence or on the

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191 Ibid.
192 Outward cablegram for Beale in Washington, O.5875, 10 April 1962, Australian Archives, file no.3036/6/1 part 70.
194 House of Representatives, 10 April 1962, pp.1508-1509.
fact that West New Guinea was alien to Indonesia in race, language, history and religion. Self-
determination was never to the forefront of [the government’s] arguments.  

This stinging attack was frighteningly accurate in exposing the government’s hypocrisy on the principle of self-determination. Whitlam suggested that Australian diplomacy should endeavour, through the UN, to make Indonesia accept its obligations to the inhabitants of West New Guinea.  

Other ALP representatives also vented their gall on the government and its half-hearted policy. Ward (ALP) accused the government of denying parliament the opportunity to debate the issue and keeping it uninformed. Norman Makin (ALP) attacked the government for having sovereignty as its first concern instead of self-determination. Unaware of the Bunker Plan, Makin advocated a trusteeship until the people could express their opinion. Again the government’s monopoly on information impeded the opposition from making any relevant contribution in the phases of re-evaluation and deliberation. The ALP’s division into a determined pro-self-determination group led by Calwell and involving the trade unions, and a group of intellectuals including Whitlam who only half-heartedly supported self-determination, posed a further obstruction to an effective opposition.  


195 Ibid., p.1510.
196 Whitlam drew on a decision taken by the Federal ALP Conference in April 1961.
197 House of Representatives, 10 April 1962, pp.1515-1516.
198 Ibid., p.1522.
199 Calwell divulged ALP’s internal division of opinion to De Beus on 11 April 1962. Archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, file no.2879, document no.1182/389.
In the Senate, McKenna (ALP) suggested that the question of West New Guinea should be committed once more to the UN in the face of recent developments. He too accused the government of betraying its principles of self-determination and non-aggression. Senator Gorton (LP), as Minister assisting the Minister for External Affairs, replied that negotiations under UN supervision were being conducted, and that debates in the General Assembly had proved futile. Senator Cole (ALP) advocated a stand on the principle of self-determination, if only to serve Australia’s defence interests, with which he was most concerned. Senator Vincent (LP) pointed out the international realities of the case, notably Indonesia’s military capacity and its powerful friends, including communist states who wanted a war. Negotiations were the right remedy to the problem, he insisted. The debate did not offer a way out: party discipline prevailed. Besides, few Senators possessed up to date information on how the international realities had changed.

In June 1962 External Affairs again assessed Australia’s interests. Avoiding an Indonesian attack had assumed priority, but preventing Indonesia from gaining control over West New Guinea, if this could be achieved without direct conflict, was still ranked second. Also External Affairs wanted to preclude any conflict with Asian and African opinion concerning Australian

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200 Senate, 4 April 1962, p.789.
201 Ibid., pp.801-803.
202 How poorly some Senators participating in the debate, which continued in May when the content of the Bunker plan had become known at last, were informed, is shown by Senator Archibald Benn’s comment: “We are dealing with a question relating to West New Guinea,
administrative policies in East New Guinea. Further the Department wished to establish close
and friendly relations with Indonesia, which had to be prevented from becoming dominated by
communists.\footnote{Self-determination had outlived its usefulness and could not serve Australia’s
interests any longer. Therefore no mention was made of it.} During the second round of talks in July (see Chapter IV) Australia had become a real outsider
to the conflict, with neither the Netherlands nor Indonesia paying much attention to its opinion.
In August 1962 cabinet could only take note of the Dutch-Indonesian intention to start official
negotiations. Barwick’s policy goals had been to grant self-determination to the people of West
New Guinea, and to maintain friendship with the Netherlands and Indonesia. In the end the
policy resulted in a sham formula for self-determination (see Appendix I). The Netherlands was
unhappy over Australia’s lack of support, and Indonesia rode rough-shod over Australia’s
objectives. The policy had resulted in complete failure, as it was the Americans who ultimately
secured a peaceful solution.\footnote{\textit{6. The Post 1962 Period: Australia’s concern about human rights in West
New Guinea}}

6. The Post 1962 Period: Australia’s concern about human rights in West
New Guinea

\footnote{[but] I am unable to say precisely what that question is.” Quoted from Senate, 1 May 1962,
p.1002.}
\footnote{Unmarked report, June 1962, Australian Archives, file no.45/1/3/17 part 4.}
\footnote{Renouf supports this judgement. Renouf, op. cit., p.430.}
Following the signing of the agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia in New York on 15 August 1962 (see Chapter IV and Appendix I) Barwick addressed the House in an attempt to explain and justify the government’s policy:

The stands taken by the parties principal to the problem, the attitudes of our friends and allies, and the situation at the United Nations...were key elements...in determination of what Australia itself could and should do...The government has an interest in the ultimate ability of the indigenous people to choose their own future. Accordingly, the government has maintained constant and vigorous diplomatic encouragement to the parties to settle...peacefully and in doing so to ensure that ability of Papuan population to make that choice.  

Barwick added that the agreement was “a part of history with which Australia must live. In a real sense that result was beyond our control.” He offered the lack of military support as a major explanation for the government’s policy.

Labor and even some Liberals expressed their regret over the content of the agreement, not believing that Indonesia would keep its promises. Leader of the Opposition, Calwell, declared: “I would have been much better pleased if the indigenous people...had been given the right of self-determination before occupation of their country by Indo-nesia....because I am not so sure that they will have the right of self-determination given to them in 1970 [sic.].” In the end, however, parliament had to accept that there was some truth in Barwick’s words: “The result

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205 Quoted from House of Representatives, 21 August 1962, pp.512-517.
206 Ibid., p.517.
207 Calwell wrongly mentions 1970 as the date for self-determination. House of Representatives, 3 October 1962, p.1128. The Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia in fact declared that the act of self-determination had to be completed before the end of 1969.
which the agreement produced....was beyond our control....[The agreement is] a part of history with which we must live.” 208

The result of the Agreement was felt soon after the Indonesian takeover of administration in May 1963 when the Australian government received information of widespread repression and a clamp down on parties and supporters of Papuan nationalism: the Act of Free Choice, if one would be organised at all, was going to be a farce. Nevertheless, in the House both Barwick and his successor Paul Hasluck initially tried to play down the importance of signs that the Indonesian government had no intention to hold a referendum in the first place and that, should one be held after all, it would only be about internal self-determination. Once Indonesia’s intentions and violations of human rights could no longer be denied, both the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs claimed that Australia was not a party principal to the agreement and that hence its capacity to exert influence was limited. 209

Concern was expressed mainly by the ALP opposition and skilfully dealt with by the government, making optimal use of parliamentary procedures, which allowed it to avoid dealing with the issue, and its advantage of having access to information provided by the diplomatic service and intelligence organisations. However, the ALP kept the issue of Papuan self-

208 Quoted from House of Representatives, 21 August 1962, p.517.
determination alive and in 1968 parliamentary concern again forced the government to address the matter.

In the lead up to the Act of Free Choice, external affairs minister Hasluck expressed his preference for a form of plebiscite or direct consultation with the people, but he admitted with regret that the Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia was rather vague in this respect. Again Hasluck was keen to declare that under the terms of the 1962 Agreement, Indonesia was responsible for the execution of the Act of Free Choice, with the UN in the role of observer. Hasluck declared that he believed that Indonesia would carry out its responsibilities.

Hasluck’s successor, Gordon Freeth, repeatedly showed similar confidence in Indonesia’s sincerity to have a procedure allowing for a real expression of the people’s will, by means of the Indonesian musjawarah method. According to Freeth there was no need for a representation to the Indonesian government regarding the use of the musjawarah procedure since Ortiz Sanz, the UN Secretary-General’s representative at the act of self-determination, had expressed his satisfaction with the way Indonesia was meeting its obligations under the agreement. When Kim Beazley Senior (ALP) showed Freeth that Sanz’s discontent with the musjawarah procedure was on the record -- Sanz did make several representations to the Indonesian

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211 House of Representatives, 20 November 1968, p.3022.
government advocating to use the one-man one-vote system at least in developed urban areas -- the minister tried to deny that Sanz and the Indonesian government were at loggerheads. But when Sanz did publish a critical report regarding insufficient assistance to carry out his supervisory task, Freeth had to admit defeat. This nevertheless had no consequences for the government’s policy as Freeth could reject the need for an Australian representation to the UN using the excuse that complaints were a matter for discussion between the signatories of the 1962 Agreement: the Netherlands and Indonesia, and the UN Secretary-General.

During a debate in late May 1969, the government was finally forced to outline a policy. Charles Jones (ALP) and Dr. Wylie Gibbs (LP/NC) had shown concern about the restrictions on the act of self-determination and demanded that the government take steps to guarantee a loyal execution of the 1962 Agreement. In his reply Freeth’s once again used the argument that Australia was not a party to the New York Agreement, but he also stated that there was no reason for Australia to make a representation since:

Indonesia has given every indication that it proposes to carry out the act of self-determination within the terms of the 1962 Agreement...There is not enough evidence of a breach of the agreement....Indonesia is genuinely trying to carry out an act of self-
Most of the reports [about suppression of the Papuans] are inaccurate. Is Indonesia not to maintain law and order?216

Freeth must have been motivated by the consequences for relations with Indonesia, which were ‘very important.’ Although Freeth declared that he would reserve his judgement pending the final report by Ortiz Sanz to the UN Secretary-General, this debate made it clear that the policy of the government was to accept the outcome of the Act without demur and to concentrate on building relations with its neighbour.

Although, given the doubtful translation of self-determination for the West Papuans into Indonesian style musjawarah, the omnipresence of the Indonesian army and the exclusion of pro-nationalist Papuan groups from participation, the Act of Free Choice could not possibly be regarded as a genuine attempt to establish the people’s preference, the Australian government accepted the outcome, and focused on building a strong relationship with its politically and strategically important neighbour: realist motives prevailed over considerations of self-determination and other human rights.217

Given Australia’s overriding emphasis on the importance of its relationship with Indonesia, it was no surprise that Australia supported UN resolution 2504 (See Appendix II) which acknowledged the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to the Secretary-General under the 1962

216 Quoted from House of Representatives, 30 May 1969, pp.2554-2555.
agreement, ignoring the reservations made by Ortiz Sanz with respect to the implementation of Article XXII which granted the people the basic rights to freedom of speech, movement and assembly (also see Chapter IV). Having failed in its attempt to keep Indonesia out of the territory, the cause of the West Papuans had obviously outlived its usefulness and their plight fell into oblivion. External Affairs even discouraged the PNG government from showing solidarity with the West Papuans, to keep Indonesia on friendly terms. Former opposition leader Calwell scarified the Bunker Plan. He was still hoping that one day a Melanesian Union could be formed. However with the UN taking note of Resolution 2504 (XXIV) in November 1969, Indonesian control had been finally vindicated.

7. Australian policy after the Act of Free Choice

The foundation for Australia’s policy towards Indonesia which had been laid back in 1962 by Barwick had lost none of its power political merits; on the contrary. Barwick had intended to give priority to building solid relations with a friendly Indonesia serving as a bulwark against southbound communism. Australia was offered a golden opportunity when, following the failed coup in the October 1965, a strongly anti-communist military regime came to power in Indonesia. The new Suharto Government was thought to deserve Australia’s diplomatic and economic support rather than undermining criticism over its human rights record. Supporters of

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this view thought that Australia had too much to benefit from a stable Indonesia. Fear of a
repeat of the 1965 unrest, continued to dominate Australian strategic thinking in the 1970s.
Therefore, like the Whitlam Government, the Fraser Government supported the Suharto
regime. More economic aid was supplied since this could contribute to economic growth,
which in turn would reduce poverty and inequality, potential sources of discontent and
instability.

This new post-1962 analytical framework for Australian policy making towards Indonesia,
based on strategic considerations, did not allow the government and the main political parties to
deal seriously with reports of human rights violations in West New Guinea. Occasionally a
backbencher would raise the issue of self-determination, but the government would send such a
member about his business or fail to address the expressed concern at all. As the discussion
on Australian political involvement with human rights violations in West New Guinea will reveal,
the government consistently refused to be drawn into a fundamental discussion on the
relationship between these violations and self-determination. This would have required a
fundamental change in Australian policy, with damaging consequences for the bilateral
relationship with Indonesia. Moreover, such questioning of the unitary state edifice of Indonesia,

221 See question upon notice no.704, 3 November 1983, by Dr. Douglas Everingham (ALP),
and Hayden’s reply on 30 November 1983. House of Representatives,
30 November 1983, p.3129. Everingham did receive a proper answer to a similar question put
on notice on 5 June 1984, no.1541, in which Hayden emphasised that Australia recognised
Irian Jaya as an integral part of Indonesia, accepting the outcome of the Act of Free Choice.
House of Representatives, 4 September 1984, pp.562-563.
which justified its existence mainly by pointing to the former colonial state, could have gravely endangered Indonesia’s internal stability and hence regional stability.

In 1976-1977 the first refugee crisis in West New Guinea (see Chapter IV) attracted little attention from Australian politicians. Senator Withers, representing the foreign minister, responded to ALP concerns that human rights violations had led to the displacement of a large number of Papuans. He stated the government’s awareness of those reports, but failed to inform the Senate about the government intentions. The matter was not taken any further, and parliamentary concern dissipated.

The 1984 refugee crisis in Irian Jaya was picked up by the House in a notice of motion by Hodgman (LP). Most strikingly, however, the motion, which did not become subject of debate, failed to acknowledge that the political status of West New Guinea and Indonesia’s continuing efforts to integrate the territory by means of transmigration were causing the unrest. Efforts to promote Papuan human rights were not completely fruitless, however. Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Bill Morrison, went to West New Guinea to investigate the situation. His findings, inter alia, provided the Hawke Government with accurate figures to judge the size of transmigration, but instead of being alarmed foreign minister Hayden accepted Indonesia’s stated reasons for the transfer of people to West New Guinea, these being a reduction of

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222 Senate, 11 October 1977, pp.1278-1279.
223 House of Representatives, 21 August 1984, p.35.
population pressure in Java and economic development of the territory. By means of development aid Hayden hoped to remove tensions relating to West New Guinea’s development. The government treated the border crossers problem as a matter with important humanitarian implications, but left the solution to Indonesia and PNG. Displaying the aloofness that had characterised Australia’s policy since 1959, the government declared its non-involvement, Australia not being a party principal.

Lewis Kent (ALP) was the first Representative to admit publicly that there was a causal relation between transmigration and the wave of people fleeing to PNG. He wanted the government to take up the issue of ‘cultural genocide’ with the Indonesian government, and to take steps in international fora as well. Also among the left wing of the ALP in Victoria there was support for the cause of the Papuans in general and the refugees in particular. The Australian West Papua Association provided the Victorian ALP with information. In spite of these social and political concerns the government took no steps. After 1986 those few concerned voices in parliament fell silent as well, although the problem of West Papuan refugees in PNG remained

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224 Ibid., 21 November 1985, p.2608.
225 Up to 1984 approximately 82,000 people had been transmigrated to West New Guinea. Ibid., 26 November 1985, p.3662.
227 House of Representatives, 4 April 1984, p.1350.
228 Australia West Papua Association Newsletter, vol.1, no.1, November 1985, p.4.
229 Ibid., 30 April 1986, p.2798. Also see Kent’s even more straight forward speech on 27 November 1986. House of representatives, p.3905.
unsolved. In 1990 Laurie Ferguson (ALP) drew attention to small scale ongoing military operations in the border area of Irian Jaya and PNG, but again the government was unwilling to intervene in bilateral matters between Indonesia and PNG.

The visit by representatives of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM -- Free Papua Movement) to Australia in 1986 forms a good example of the government’s reluctance to be drawn into the continuing struggle for self-determination: no government official was prepared to see any of the representatives. Left wing organisations, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Australian Democrats, as well as ALP State parliamentarians, did have meetings, but core policy makers refused to meet the delegation. The OPM group requested, *inter alia*, that the Australian government would discuss the OPM claims of human rights violations with Indonesia and also put these claims to the UN Human Rights Commission while seeking at the UN a thorough re-examination of the 1969 Act of Free Choice. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Richard Woolcott, was opposed to any encouragement to the OPM since this group would raise false expectations among dissidents and cause inflammation of relations with Indonesia. The government’s refusal to talk to the OPM group indicated how much consideration it would have for the group’s requests.

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8. Conclusions

A broad coalition consisting of External Affairs and Defence officials, as well as key ministers in the Menzies Government, consistently opposed an Indonesian takeover of West New Guinea. Australia’s security interests were believed to benefit from the stability that a continuation of Dutch administration would bring to the region. The Dutch, as a Western ally, politically unstable. Initially self-determination did not come to the forefront as an issue in Australia’s policy.

formed a buffer between Australia and Indonesia, a part of the alien Asian world and considered

This policy intended to persuade Indonesia to remove the issue from its foreign policy agenda, and therefore encouraged the Netherlands not to engage in negotiations. When these attempts failed and Indonesia tried to internationalise the issue, the government publicly embraced self-determination as a long term goal, but in reality self-determination served as a means to justify Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty and as a means to find more international support to stop Indonesia. In Australian politics there was no significant opposition to this policy.

Continuation of Dutch administration and self-determination no longer automatically served security interests when Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s claims resulted in a deterioration of bilateral relations. Indonesia moved closer to the Soviet Union and radical forces in Indonesia
seemed to benefit from the conflict. The United States and the United Kingdom offered no military assistance should the conflict turn violent. Without those guarantees Australia felt unable to continue its opposition to Indonesia. Thus the government gradually abandoned the principle of self-determination that it had embraced in 1957 and distanced itself from the dispute. Subandrio’s visit in 1959 formed a landmark in this respect, since the government gave up its demand to be heard in discussions on the territory’s future status and declared its willingness to accept the outcome of negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, even if these would not result in self-determination for the West Papuans. In a heated debate the government had to modify its desertion of self-determination, but the dice had been cast and the policy centre and periphery were in agreement over the change in policy.

The dilemma of how best to serve Australia’s security interests became more urgent in 1960 and 1961. Until after the crucial UNGA debate the view that gave priority to obstructing Indonesia and promoting self-determination as best serving Australia’s security prevailed. The eventual fundamental shift in policy was in the first place caused by changes in the international situation. In December 1961 and January 1962 first the policy making centre’s composition changed, and subsequently and without much public discussion also its goals. When Barwick became Minister for External Affairs in December 1961 he was convinced that Australia’s security interests were no longer served by promotion of self-determination, but rather by a speedy transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. He found supporters inside his department and persuaded Prime Minister Menzies of the need to change the goals of policy. In January 1962 self-determination was downgraded to an issue of secondary importance at best. Preventing
Indonesia from turning communist, a likely course should negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia fail, had priority. Negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia should therefore succeed and Barwick tried to persuade the Netherlands to adopt a flexible position.

The press response to the change in policy was generally hostile, as was the opposition’s response, but cabinet and its parliamentary group were in broad agreement. Opportunities for an extensive debate were also limited. Public opinion was not on the side of the coalition which in January 1962 counted amongst its ranks the same actors that had supported the previous policy, and the previous policy theory. Disputes over the change in policy had largely been contained within the policy making centre, which had never been under any threat of having its policy prescribed by external actors such as parliamentarians, interest groups and the media. Changes in the international situation had forced actors located in the decision making centre to reconsider their policy theory. They concluded that self-determination had outlived its usefulness. Therefore they privately dropped it as a foreign policy goal. Institutional and functional characteristics of the foreign policy making process, which had contributed to the creation of a very strong policy making centre in the first place, prevented formation of an alliance strong enough to make the transformation of policy a difficult one.

The post-1962 period was characterised by continuing efforts to rebuild the relationship with Indonesia and, after the Indonesian army had seized control in 1965, to strengthen the position of Indonesia's anti-communist government. Papuan self-determination was sacrificed to his overarching policy goal, as was shown by the government’s acceptance of the outcome of the
unfair Act of Free Choice in 1969. After that ‘plebiscite’ the government considered the matter of self-determination closed. Reports of human rights violations in West New Guinea were largely ignored and not seen as the result of the denial of self-determination. Development aid was supplied as a means to overcome tension between natives and transmigrants. Papuan self-determination, once instrumental in Australia’s security policy, had become an outright nuisance in the new relations with Indonesia, particularly since it caused border tensions between Indonesia and PNG. Therefore successive Australian governments have distanced themselves as far as possible from the topic, and from those few groups advocating West Papuan self-determination.

In Chapter III it was hypothesised that the Departments of External Affairs and Defence and their representatives in cabinet would, together with the Prime Minister, dominate foreign policy making in the case of West New Guinea, given their institutional and functional domination of the foreign policy making process. The findings in this chapter fully support the hypothesis. Any changes in either policy goals or means were brought about by international conditions, and funnelled through the bureaucratic and procedural machine of foreign policy making. The internal dynamics of Australia’s foreign policy making centre shaped and adapted the policy; the input of parliament, interest groups and the media was very limited. Parliament's involvement in the phases of foreign policy deliberation and evaluation is weak in the first place, but with confrontation between opposition and government dominating parliament’s functioning, the minority is very unlikely to have any impact on foreign policy. With party discipline almost absolute, the majority has no other option but to be obedient to the wishes of the government.
Chapter VI

Dutch foreign policy and the East Timor case: 1974-1992

1. Introduction

Since the 1960s human rights have developed into an established element in the foreign policy of the Netherlands. This chapter will explore key developments in the conceptual relation between human rights and foreign and development co-operation policy. The formation of this comprehensive policy framework and institutional mechanism to deal with human rights violations coincided with Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of East Timor, making this case most suitable for investigating and explaining the implementation of human rights policy. In its design this chapter will therefore differ from the chapters which discussed the policy of Australia and the Netherlands in the West New Guinea case. Each section of this chapter will compendiously summarise the policy-theoretical framework used by the government concerning the relation between human rights and foreign policy. This summary of policy-theoretical principles will be followed by a succinct analysis of their implementation. For an account of events in East Timor, the reader is referred to Chapter I and Chapter VII.

During the years of the Den Uyl Cabinet, a coalition of PvdA, KVP, CHU, ARP and PPR, human rights became a prominent issue in foreign and development co-operation policy. Both the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Van der Stoel (PvdA), and the Minister for Development Co-operation, Pronk (PvdA), were committed to the cause of human rights and tried to promote respect for human rights accordingly in their policy. Establishing a theoretical connection with other foreign policy objectives, cabinet used an integral approach to the promotion of peace, security, a world legal order, a just distribution of prosperity, and respect for fundamental human rights.\(^1\) Human rights were thus given prominence as a functionally related element, the realisation of which was a condition for the achievement of the other goals.\(^2\)

The policy theory of the Den Uyl Cabinet saw human rights violations as reflections of unjust political and economic structures. Since the government intended to contribute to remove tensions that endangered peace and unjust international relations,\(^3\) promotion of human rights was made an important element in both foreign policy and development co-operation policy:

> In case human rights are violated seriously on a large scale, the cause is to be looked for in a system of political and social injustice and inequality, in which

\(^3\) Quoted Prime Minister Den Uyl (PvdA), Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1974-1975, part 3, p.402, 10 October 1974.
repression and intimidation dominate. A policy aimed at peace and economic and social well-being may not ignore these serious violations of human rights.\(^4\)

Thus the government set about concentrating on the development of an international legal order that would revere democracy, respect for human rights and social justice.\(^5\)

Concentrating on fundamental violations of human rights cabinet stressed its determination to do what was reasonably possible to protest against such violations, irrespective of the nature of the regime.\(^6\) Since the use of standard procedures of response to human rights violations was rejected only vague and general instructions for response were given, ranging from a public expression of concern to the use of conventional diplomatic channels.\(^7\) The government stuck to a case-by-case approach, with the choice of means depending on the nature and magnitude of the violations and the type of regime.\(^8\)

A reluctance to be pinned down on a clear script of response was characteristic for all governments in the period under concern. Without such a script the government had considerable leeway to take into account specific factors of the case, but it also caused arbitrariness and reduced parliamentary control. Officially though the government rejected

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\(^4\) Ibid., pp.38-39.  
\(^6\) Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 1974, Memorie van Toelichting, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1974-1975, 13100-V, no.2, pp.41, 55, and 76.  
\(^7\) Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1974-1975, p.1318.  
selective indignation, declaring that it would appeal whenever human rights were being violated.9

Cabinet intended to promote human rights, which were claimed not to play second fiddle to the interests of the state, using established bilateral diplomatic channels and international fora, notably the UN.10 Van der Stoel cautioned against overrating the possibility to exert pressure bilaterally, and spoke with appreciation of quiet diplomacy, to be applied non-selectively and not restrictively. Practice according to the minister required choices, to which maximum effectiveness served as a motive.11 As much as possible the Netherlands would work together with other countries. A further starting-point of Van der Stoel’s policy was to effectively achieve something without being guided by emotions.12

The complementary effort of human rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was appreciated, but their role not further specified.13 The government promised to support

attempts to charge NGOs with the protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{14} This recognition gave these groups access to key decision makers, at least in theory.

Cabinet’s development co-operation policy became elementary in the effort to improve human rights conditions in Third World countries. The policy theory linked a recipient state’s social-political structure to deprivation and poverty. Development co-operation should contribute to a more just social-economic and social-political structure in developing countries, but not facilitate repression. The theory was most notably applied as a criterion to select the so-called ‘concentration countries’, states specially chosen to receive extra attention in Dutch development aid efforts. Application of this criterion in the selection process meant assessing the extent to which a state had a social-political structure that offered a chance to a policy that truly focused on improvement of the situation and assured that aid would come to the benefit of society as a whole.\textsuperscript{15}

The policy theory indissolubly linked economic and cultural rights to civil and political rights. Although development aid could serve as a means to put pressure on a regime this measure should not harm the poorest people.\textsuperscript{16} Regarding a development aid relationship as a most effective instrument to achieve results Pronk was opposed to its termination as ultimate remedy.

\textsuperscript{14} Quoted Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Kooijmans, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1975-1976, part 8, p.105012, November 1975.
\textsuperscript{15} Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 1974, Memorie van Toelichting, 12600-V, no.2, pp.2 and 4.
Although the foreign policy plan seemed to set out clearly what the policy objectives were, implementation of these general principles was problematic nevertheless. A definition of fundamental human rights was never given, making any judgement of a situation arbitrary. The case-by-case approach and general lack of clear guidelines, showed that the human rights policy framework was inchoate and in need of fine tuning.

Personal relations also proved an obstacle to consistency in implementation. Although both Pronk and Van der Stoel belonged to PvdA, their function and personal style brought them into conflict. While Van der Stoel was a typical careful and experienced diplomat, Pronk’s personality reflected the prototype of a young idealist. Inconsistency was the result of these disagreements. Being aware of these brewing conflicts the opposition, notably VVD wondered who was in charge of foreign policy and human rights, often hearing different sounds from the Prime Minister, the foreign minister, the Minister for Development Co-operation, and also the Congress of PvdA.\textsuperscript{17} This parliamentary comment was typical during the Cabinet Den Uyl years.

With PvdA dedicated to human rights, its representation in cabinet guaranteed human rights an established place in the government’s policy. However, without a set of well-defined criteria for implementation of human rights concerns, clashes within cabinet and between individual ministers and the PvdA Congress occurred frequently, hampering application of the criteria. This opened the inner circle of policy makers to outsiders in favour of a more


\textsuperscript{17} Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 1976, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1975-1976, 11 and 12 November 1975, 13600, pp.981 and 1011; see comments by VVD and BP
radical approach. The discussion of the East Timor case will illustrate the shortcomings in the government’s policy framework.

3. Cabinet Den Uyl and the East Timor case

In order to comprehend the handling of the Indonesian invasion by the Dutch government the matter should be seen in the wider context of more urgent matters that were compromising Dutch-Indonesian relations in 1975. In that year South Moluccan activism in the Netherlands reached new heights. It took on such proportions that the plight of the South Moluccans, who were still in exile in the Netherlands, became a major issue in relations with Indonesia. Young South Moluccans, increasingly desperate and frustrated with the lack of initiative from the Dutch government to pursue an independent South Moluccan Republic in negotiations with Indonesia, were using ever more radical means of terrorism. The Netherlands wanted to rid itself of this plague, but depended on Indonesia’s cooperation. In 1975 the Indonesian government sent a delegation to the Netherlands in an effort to find a solution to the problem.\(^{18}\) To the relief of the Dutch government an agreement was reached with Indonesia, which, although it denied the political claims of the Moluccans, helped to take pressure of the issue, and in time pacified the South Moluccan community in the Netherlands.\(^{19}\)

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Indonesia's invasion of Timor coincided with the violent occupation of the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam by South Moluccans. Since this event dominated the news, it would have distracted politicians, the media, and hence the public from events on a small and little known island in the Indonesian archipelago. The brutality of the hostage takers contributed to the felt urgency to find a political solution, for which Indonesian co-operation was essential. This matter effectively denied the government the opportunity to oppose Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor.

East Timor’s violent decolonisation, preceding Indonesia’s invasion, had not drawn much public and political attention in the Netherlands in the first place. Komitee Indonesië, a small outsider human rights group, declared its opposition to any intention President Suharto might have to intervene in East Timor, and urged like-minded people to take a similar stand.20 After the first major attack by Indonesian forces on East Timor in October,21 Politieke Partij Radicalen (PPR -- Political Party Radicals), a small left wing political party, did indeed pose questions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

East Timor was also on the agenda of the debate on the budget of Foreign Affairs for 1976. On that occasion PSP and ARP wanted to know if the minister was prepared to support the right of self-determination for East Timor, particularly via pressure on Indonesia.22 The foreign minister assured that the government supported the right of self-determination, which should not be interrupted by external interference. A claim which Van der Stoel tried to

21 *Traill*, p.10.
substantiate by cryptically declaring that in contacts with various governments who were
directly involved in the matter the government had given evidence of this. 23 No real proof of
this concern was provided, however.

On 2 December the previously mentioned occupation and hostage taking of the Indonesian
consulate in Amsterdam by a group of South Moluccans took place. The news regarding
these terrorist acts, conducted with brutal force, dominated the headlines of the Dutch press
for the next three weeks, overshadowing events on Timor. 24

Following Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor on 5 December 1975 both the UN General
Assembly and the Security Council adopted resolutions 25 demanding Indonesia to withdraw
its forces without delay and calling upon “all states to respect the inalienable right of the
people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence and to
determine their future political status.” 26 The Netherlands acted in concert with its partners in
the European Economic Community and abstained on these resolutions. At the request of

23 Ibid., p.1042.
24 The action against the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam preceded the hijacking of a
train in 1976, during which a number of people was kept hostage for several weeks. In
1977 another train was hijacked and a primary school taken over, teachers and children
being taken hostage. The people in the train were liberated after a bloody rescue operation.
In 1978 a final South Moluccan act involving hostage taking followed when the Provincial
Council of Drenthe was occupied. Compare J.J.P. de Jong, ‘De Nederlands-Indonesische
pp.129-139.
26 Quoted from Jack Bizot, Timor: The Forgotten Cause of East Timor's Right to self-
determination, London, Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 198ng [c. 1985], p.9;
Quoted from General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975.
Portugal the Netherlands made a conciliatory move, accepting to represent Portuguese interests in Indonesia.

The invasion did not captivate Dutch public at large, so there was no public outcry. Small protests did occur; for example at the occasion of the IGGI meeting in January 1976. Several hundred people protested against the Indonesian campaign in East Timor, insisting on a termination of all aid to Indonesia and demanding that the government should speak out clearly against the Indonesian action. The protest had no noticeable impact on the government’s policy. In April minister Pronk travelled to Indonesia to attend a meeting of the Asian Development Bank, but it is not known if he discussed East Timor.

In May more small scale protest meetings were organised in several towns, a joint effort by Komitee Indonesië and student, youth and women-groups. They again demanded an end to the supply of development aid in the face of Indonesia’s reluctance to withdraw from East Timor. On this occasion Pronk did respond, repeating his previously expressed threat that in case he remained discontented over the human rights situation in Indonesia, he would not hesitate to suspend development aid as a means to put pressure on the Indonesian government. Later Pronk indeed suited the act to the word, reducing the amount of aid for 1976 by 25%. This step, however, was inspired by the bad human rights situation in Indonesia at large and not particularly by Indonesia's continued presence in East Timor.

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27 *IFM*, vol.2, no.7 (January 1976), p.5.
29 Peter van Tuijl, ‘Van kolonie tot konsentratieland’ [From Colony to Concentration-State], in a special report by Evert Vermeer Stichting, ‘*Verstrikt in verbondenheid:*
In June 1976 Fretilin representative Ramos Horta held talks with human rights groups in the Netherlands. His trip was organised by a number of leftist human rights NGOs including Komitee Indonesië, Mondlane Stichting, Angola Komité and ‘X-Y-beweging’. At the same time Komitee Indonesië and Indonesië Werkgroep Leiden organised another small scale protest-meeting against IGGI.

In the Second Chamber PSP wanted to know if the government had known anything about Indonesia’s meddling with East Timor’s status back in August 1975. Van der Stoel firmly gainsaid any such knowledge. He also denied perceiving any direct relation between military operations in East Timor and the supply of three Dutch corvettes to Indonesia, due for delivery in 1979. This proves that Dutch condemnation was rationally measured so as not to damage economic relations with Indonesia.

In November 1976 Indonesië Groep Nijmegen tried to draw attention of the Second Chamber Committee on Foreign Affairs, sending members a report about developments in East Timor since April 1974 and requesting them to raise the issue during the debate on the budget of Foreign Affairs. The response was meagre. Only PSP wondered why the Netherlands had abstained over the motion in the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1975, instead of condemning the Indonesian intrusion. PSP submitted a motion, supported

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31 Ibid.


33 Ibid., p.18.
by Communistische Partij Nederland (CPN -- the Netherlands Communist Party), that

“events in East Timor indicate that Fretilin enjoys general support from the people of East Timor, [therefore]...the government [should] recognise the Democratic Republic of East Timor.”

Van der Stoel defended the abstention in the UN by stating that there existed the impression that Indonesia would comply with an execution of self-determination. Since East Timor did not meet any of the criteria in use for recognition of an independent state, he rejected the motion. PSP and CPN were the only parties to vote in favour of the motion.

The PvdA Election Congress was more radical than the party’s parliamentary group, who had failed to support the PSP motion. The Election Congress regarded Pronk’s measures against Indonesia as too soft and voted for a complete termination of the aid program. The Congress’ influence on the minister was limited, however, since Pronk ignored the resolution, stating that aid would continue for at least the coming year. Pronk wanted to lay down his future policy regarding Indonesia in a special memorandum, but the fall of the cabinet and PvdA’s relegation to the opposition benches prevented the report from entering the political arena.

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34 *IFM*, vol.3, no.4 (November 1976), p.16.
36 Ibid., p.908.
37 Ibid., p.1192.
38 Pronk’s successor as Minister for Development Co-operation De Koning (CDA) said about the memorandum: “I put it in a drawer and I never looked at it again.” De Koning, conversation by phone, 18 July 1993.
In March 1977, during a special interpellation at the request of the PSP Second Chamber group that constituted the first real debate dedicated to Dutch policy regarding East Timor, Van der Stoel found himself again justifying the abstentions of the Netherlands in the UN in December 1975 and April 1976. This time he used the government’s responsibility as caretaker of Portuguese interests in Indonesia as excuse. Further he emphasised that the legacy of Dutch colonialism required a careful approach, as the relationship with Indonesia was still sensitive. The minister used a lack of reliable information to discharge any claims of Indonesian atrocities, but assured that the government would condemn any proven actions of human rights violations. The situation in East Timor prior to the invasion had been confusing, with the population divided in two opposing groups. This had made it difficult to take a stand. Nevertheless Van der Stoel claimed to put self-determination first, although he did not indicate what this meant in terms of policy. Given the sensitive nature of the relationship with Indonesia, he considered the frequently used diplomatic talks best suited to serve human rights.\textsuperscript{39}

The minister’s answer did not satisfy PSP floor-leader Van der Spek and ARP’s spokesman on foreign affairs Scholten because at the time of the resolution in the UN, the Netherlands was not yet representing Portuguese interests in Indonesia. Therefore Van der Spek introduced a motion stating that the Chamber was:

Of the opinion that many reports indicate large scale human rights violations by the Indonesian army in East Timor, [therefore the Chamber] requests the government to

\textsuperscript{39} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1977-1978, pp.3575, and 3583-3885.
push for a UN commission of inquiry to visit East Timor and to allow international relief organisations entry to the Territory.\textsuperscript{40}

PvdA was divided over the motion, but the party totally disapproved of the Indonesian actions in East Timor which prevented an execution of the right of self-determination. Therefore PvdA expected the government to exercise pressure on Indonesia, using both bilateral and multilateral channels, to force it to give the people the chance to exert their right of self-determination.\textsuperscript{41} VVD, the main opposition party, supported the policy of the foreign minister. The motion, called otiose by Van der Stoel, was only narrowly defeated, 64 votes against and 62 in favour.\textsuperscript{42}

With Van der Stoel and Pronk in disagreement over the issue, PvdA representatives had been able to freely join a motion highly critical of the policy of the foreign minister, nearly forcing him to abandon his careful approach. VVD’s support for the foreign minister and his policy prevented a further dispute inside the government’s ranks. Thus parliamentarians themselves were responsible for crushing an attempt to widen the centre of policy making, with a view to changing the goals of the government’s policy. The foreign minister was clearly aiming at, although he did not publicly admit this, a smooth phase of transition with sovereignty befalling on Indonesia, but without violations of human rights. Self-determination had to be sacrificed for the sake of good relations with Indonesia. Wider geopolitical motives -- the withdrawal of American forces, the subsequent fall of South Vietnam and the Communists threatening to overpower the other Southeast Asian dominos -- would also

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p.3579.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.3582.
\textsuperscript{42} See Walraven, op. cit., p.31.
have been powerful arguments preventing the minister from criticising and weakening the pro-Western regime in Indonesia.

In the same debate PPR and CPN also wanted to bring the aid relationship with Indonesia to an end. On this subject, however, PvdA only stated that it expected the government to exert bilateral and multilateral pressure on the Indonesian government to respect the right of self-determination for East Timor. What means the government should use to exert this pressure remained unclear. Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA -- Christian Democratic Appeal) gave priority to good relations with Indonesia and supported the government.43

The narrow defeat of the government’s opponents did not silence them. In September PSP submitted a list of questions concerning East Timor, and in November 1977 Komitee Indonesië went in the offensive, starting a national campaign in support of Fretilin. Komitee Indonesië demanded an end to the arms-supply, an initiative to isolate Indonesia internationally, and recognition of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.44 Of course none of these demands was acceptable to the government, and since cabinet had resigned, signs did not augur well for the supporters of Timorese self-determination: CDA and VVD, two parties giving priority to the relationship with Indonesia over self-determination, were about to form a coalition.45

44 See, IFM, vol.4, no.5 (1978), pp.2 and 16.
45 CDA was a merger of KVP, ARP, and CHU uniting mainstream Catholic and Protestant groups.
Resuming the account of events, the invasion of East Timor had not become a major issue in Dutch politics. Neither cabinet nor the main factions in the Second Chamber paid much attention to it, lacking accurate knowledge of the situation and being aware of more important issues at stake in relations with Indonesia, particularly the solution to the Moluccan problem. In its human rights policy the government gave priority to the release of political prisoners in Indonesia. The criteria of the human rights policy were not applied to the case of denial of human rights in East Timor.

Although Pronk wanted to reconsider the future of the aid relationship, his report never saw daylight as cabinet resigned. Pronk’s involvement with East Timor had been limited. He was purposely kept unaware of the deal to supply three corvettes to Indonesia, out of fear that his passionate defence of human rights would make him a zealotic opposer. With the Minister for Foreign Affairs not prepared to condemn Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor, supported by a small majority in the Second Chamber, no action was taken against Indonesia. Although two ministers disagreed over the policy, a bureaucratic trick and the fall of cabinet helped to prevent a major confrontation. The considerable rift between Van der Stoel and Pronk was obvious, however, and was reflected in the Department of Foreign Affairs, where Pronk’s own civil servants were working on the radical policy paper for the aid relationship with Indonesia. The loyalty issue of civil servants working in a bifurcated department where two ministers were in disagreement, with all dramatic consequences for the consistency of the foreign policy, only failed to emerge because of

46 Walraven, p.13. Permission was granted by Van der Stoel in March 1974 with full knowledge of the Department of Economic Affairs, but, although according to the rules for
cabinet’s resignation. It would remain a potential source of instability in the foreign policy making centre in the Netherlands.


In spite of its election victory PvdA was unsuccessful in its efforts to form a new coalition cabinet and was sent back to the opposition benches in 1977. The new coalition cabinet of VVD and CDA, however, also acknowledged the importance of human rights, which were attributed a similar central place in foreign policy and development co-operation policy. During the four years that this cabinet was in office a comprehensive framework for human rights policy was constructed. However, CDA and VVD agreed to a careful promotion of human rights. Unlike their predecessors, the new Minister for Development Co-operation De Koning (CDA) and Minister for Foreign Affairs Van der Klaauw (VVD) worked together harmoniously. The relation-ship with their respective caucus and party congress was solid as well.

In his first speech to parliament as the new Prime Minister, Van Agt (CDA) proclaimed that his cabinet would pursue world peace, co-operation with the powers of the West and development of the Third World as three connected goals. The policy theory did not directly link promotion of human rights to these goals, but van Agt promised to continue the policy of the supply of weapons to concentration countries, the Minister for Development Co-operation should have been consulted, this was not done.
the previous government.\textsuperscript{47} Van der Klaauw emphasised the need of cohesiveness of policy in the fields of foreign affairs and development co-operation.\textsuperscript{48} Human rights would be maintained as a criterion for the selection of concentration countries.

The policy did not seem to have undergone major changes, but the emphasis on co-operation in the Western alliance, implied support for anti-Marxist regimes in the Third World, including Indonesia. References to structural changes in world relations and inside Third World countries had also been dropped. Finally, the personality of the new ministers differed very much from their predecessors. They would co-operate, and look for compromises, thus obstructing any possible interference by their party groups in parliament in the selection of policy goals and means.

Notwithstanding the strong shackles of the coalition commitment, an increased awareness of and interest in human rights issues made the Second Chamber groups of the coalition parties request that the government present a bill outlining the position of human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{49} The Minister for Foreign Affairs responded favourably to this request, although it would increase parliament’s control regarding implementation of human rights policy.

\textsuperscript{49} Ph. P. Everts and J. L. Heldring (eds.), \textit{Nederland en de rechten van de mens} [the Netherlands and Human Rights], Baarn, In den Toren, 1981, p.64.
Van der Klaauw introduced the human rights bill in the Second Chamber on 3 May 1979. All future policy would be based on this framework which outlined criteria, means, and goals of the government’s human rights policy. A lengthy phase of deliberation, in which the Department of Economics, the Second Chamber and NGOs active in the field of human rights had been given ample opportunity to express their views, had preceded the submission.

The Bill stated that human rights were an essential element of foreign policy, but their promotion depended on other foreign policy values and interests as well: “Support for human rights is one of the most important, although not predominant, aims. Human rights will be pursued without inflicting unacceptable damage to other Dutch values and interests.”

Omission of any attempt to define unacceptable damage was a clear weakness, setting the stage for arbitrary decisions. Instead of giving a general definition, a case-by-case procedure would be followed, weighing likely damage and human rights.

A human rights policy was said to aim at the creation of international norms and their observance. The second goal was subdivided into three distinct activities: dissemination of information, promotion of procedures for inspection and supervision, and responses to human rights violations. The last point comprised both activities aimed at improving a particular human rights situation as well as suppressing activities supporting these

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50 Quoted from *Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979*, 15571.
51 *Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979*, Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, 15571, no.3.
encroachments. Since this element in particular would prove a pot-hanger in Dutch foreign policy and development co-operation in the case of East Timor, it will be discussed in detail.

The Bill stated that the government wanted to help prevent human rights abuses that were gross and structural.\textsuperscript{52} Again, however, these terms were not defined which hampered any interpretation of and response to situations in which human rights were violated. This deficiency once more weakened parliamentary control in the phases of policy deliberation and evaluation.

A number of criteria were formulated for a response to these ‘gross and structural violations of human rights’. Measures should not damage bilateral relations. This would be counterproductive since good relations were conditional for the realisation of other goals. An impact assessment should precede the choice of means, in order to achieve a positive result. In case of a bilateral relationship of trust a confidential bilateral approach was considered best. In general the choice between a confidential and a public response depended on the assessment of the likelihood to achieve a better result through going public. Because of the limited influence of a bilateral representation, the government preferred to operate in concert with other states. A grave step like suspension of diplomatic relations was only allowed in exceptional cases.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979, Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, 15571, no.3.
The Bill made some specific comments about the relation between the instruments of human rights policy and the Netherlands’ economic relations with a culprit state. Conditions of gross and systematic violations of human rights could lead to economic measures against a state, but these would only be taken when other means had proven inadequate, and economic steps were expected to be successful. A case-by-case approach would be followed to decide whether limitations of economic relations were consistent with general policy activities that could create positive conditions for optimal realisation of human rights. In accordance with the rule of response to human rights violations, economic measures should not have a negative impact on the humanitarian interests of people nor inflict disproportionate damage to the Dutch economy. Far-reaching actions, like trade sanctions, would therefore be taken in co-operation with other states only.\textsuperscript{54} The Minister for Foreign Affairs was put in charge of any initiative involving economic measures.\textsuperscript{55}

The Bill also specifically dealt with the problem of human rights violations in the context of development co-operation, apparently a complicated relationship. In its selection of concentration countries the government would consider the classical freedom rights and rights of minorities.\textsuperscript{56} Development aid, however, was not an instrument for manipulation, another undefined concept but implying that aid should not serve as a reward or punishment. The aid supply would focus on the needs of people, not the behaviour of governments.

\textsuperscript{54} Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979, 15571, parts III and IV.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, 15571, no.3. Van der Klaauw later declared that discussions on co-ordination of the human rights policy with the Minister for Development Co-operation De Koning had always been very thorough, with no disagreement. Van der Klaauw, conversation by phone, July 1993.  
\textsuperscript{56} Other criteria in use were the degree of poverty and the need for aid. No order of importance was used.
Reticence would characterise action in case of human rights violations, because the contribution of aid as a means to increase respect for human rights was considered limited. A judgement of response to serious abuses would consider the type of rights that was being violated and the seriousness of the violation in combination with the effect that could be expected from a particular measure. Aid should not make a direct contribution to a continuance of repression. In case of gross and systematic violations of fundamental human rights\(^57\) -- gross and systemic were terms left undefined\(^58\) -- suspension or refusal of aid could be contemplated, but only after all relevant policy considerations had been taken into account, including implications for poor people.\(^59\) Fundamental rights included the right to life, freedom, immunity of the body, and freedom of religion and opinion. This category did not include political rights.

Given all reservations regarding the use of sanctions in development co-operation, and the lack of any clear definition of key concepts, development aid was unlikely to become a major instrument to correct human rights abuses. Should parliament agree with the vague criteria, to be applied to undefined concepts, it would give the policy making centre considerable leeway for arbitrary decisions.

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\(^{57}\) Fundamental rights included the right to life, freedom, immunity of the body, and freedom of religion and opinion. This category did not include political rights. Ibid., Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, 15571, no.3.

\(^{58}\) According to one of the drafters of the Bill, former Minister for Development Co-operation gross and systematic violations were violations on a large scale resulting from the structure of the regime/government. De Koning, conversation by phone, 18 July 1993.

\(^{59}\) Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979, no.15571.
Regarding the implementation of the policy by the Department of Foreign Affairs guidelines for judging values and interests would not be used: a case-by-case approach was the rule with Bureaus and Directorates of the Department doing the weighing. Horizontal exchanges of views with Directorates of other Departments occurred in this process. Problems that could not be routinely solved were handled at the level of Director-General. If necessary Undersecretaries or ministers would decide. Regional Directorates handled matters relating to particular states. Facts regarding these states would enter the Department as a rule via these Directorates that took care of the processing. Problems regarding the relation of human rights and development co-operation were handled by equivalent regional sections in the development co-operation half of the Department.

The Second Chamber had ample opportunity to scrutinise the policy intentions of the government and the organisational structure it would confide with the execution, and made good use of it. A long list of questions was formulated, followed by extensive debate.

Thereto encouraged by the Chamber, the Minister for Foreign Affairs unfolded a plan to improve the institutional framework of the human rights policy. He suggested to set up a standing task-force comprising all those sections of the Department of Foreign Affairs involved in human rights. This task-force would deal with aspects of general human rights problems. Further the minister was in favour of establishing an advisory body that would conduct studies into the relationship between human rights and foreign affairs: Commissie van Advies inzake de rechten van de Mens (Advisory Committee Human Rights).^{60}

Several parliamentarians also raised organisational adaptations required to make human

^{60} Ibid.

Scholten, who had become CDA’s spokesman on foreign affairs, doubted whether the formation of a special task-force to assure co-ordination of human rights policy between the various divisions of Foreign Affairs was enough. Recognising the contribution of NGOs he further wanted to strengthen the Department’s relations with NGOs. Replying to his concern, he was informed that the government had annual contacts with Amnesty International and frequent contacts with other human rights NGOs. Scholten also claimed that communication between cabinet and parliament needed to be improved.61 Ter Beek, PvdA’s spokesman on foreign affairs, also criticised the organisational component of the Bill, advocating a stronger human rights desk, at the risk of making human rights an issue of contention inside Foreign Affairs. An interdepartmental working-group should guarantee human rights a more prominent place in overall foreign policy.62 Brinkhorst (D’66) complained that criteria of the policy and organisation of the Department were opaque, making the policy unpredictable. Therefore he wanted an extra human rights section in the annual budget papers of foreign affairs.63

In his reply Van der Klaauw indicated his preference not to change the Departmental structure that took charge of human rights co-ordination. Several Directions of Foreign

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., pp.1379-1380. PPR supports the idea of better criteria. See p.1384.
Affairs were involved in execution of human rights policy, while DGIS was in charge of overall human rights. There would be a stronger task-group composed of members of DGIS and representatives of all those Directorates where human rights came into play. This way the whole Department would be infused with human rights.\textsuperscript{64}

Van der Klaauw and De Koning successfully defended the means they intended to use against human rights violations. They made no concessions to parliamentarians who rejected the case-by-case approach. Van der Klaauw added that in principle the government was prepared to contemplate suspension of aid\textsuperscript{65} and to take economic and financial steps in case of gross and systematic violations of human rights,\textsuperscript{66} but only when other measures had proven unsuccessful. De Koning added that he preferred to use development aid as a positive instrument. Restraint was required with respect to sanctions. He was opposed to a separate section on classical human rights in the Annual Report on Development Co-operation.\textsuperscript{67} Ter Beek, however, insisted and therefore submitted a motion asking the minister for an extra section to the budget papers of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{68} Like his colleague Van der Klaauw rejected the idea to report on the human rights situation in a selected number of countries, as he feared angry response from those countries. The motion was subsequently defeated; the two ministers successfully defended the Bill.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p.1388.
\textsuperscript{65} C.A. van der Klaauw, ‘De mensenrechten en het buitenlandse beleid van Nederland’ [Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands], \textit{Internationale Spectator}, vol.34, no.7 (July 1980), pp.399-405.
\textsuperscript{66} Van der Klaauw defined gross and systematic human rights violations as: “a pattern of continuous violations.” Van der Klaauw, conversation by phone, July 1993.
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980}, p.1416.
The period of Cabinet Van Agt I was characterised by cohesion and agreement within the coalition cabinet itself and between cabinet and its representatives in the Second Chamber about both goals and means for promoting and protecting human rights in foreign policy and development co-operation policy.

Although the human rights Bill was bulky and in many ways detailed, its failure to define gross and systematic human rights violations and its rejection of an accurate prescription of response in a situation where human rights were being violated, opting for a case-by-case approach instead, were significant weaknesses. This human rights policy framework allowed the policy centre considerable leeway to manoeuvre during the phases of policy evaluation and implementation, restricting parliamentary control. This conclusion particularly holds in situations where there is broad agreement inside cabinet and between cabinet and its parliamentary representatives. However, should ministers disagree over the response to be given, a case-by-case approach, with no clear-cut means to respond to a situation of human rights violations, allowed for major parliamentary involvement and a say in the policy. In theory, the loose connection between policy plan and implementation, intended to give the government flexibility in conducting its foreign policy, could backfire in case of internal disagreement and, through a widening of the circle of policy makers, restrict the centre’s policy leeway. No one realised this in 1979, however.

5. Cabinet Van Agt I and the East Timor case

68 Ibid., p.1434.
In 1978 only a few small protests were organised such as a demonstration in May against the meeting of IGGI and in support of freedom for East Timor.\textsuperscript{69} These protests did not impress the government as De Koning did not discuss East Timor when he visited Indonesia in September and met with Suharto.

In parliament, Van der Spek (PSP) brought East Timor back in the spotlight asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain why the Netherlands had abstained on the latest UN resolution. Van der Klaauw claimed that no reliable information about human rights violations was available, but he denied reports about a large scale Indonesian offensive.\textsuperscript{70} Van der Spek disagreed since Australian newspapers made clear that an offensive was raging, and therefore he submitted a motion:

\begin{quote}
Indonesia is involved in acts of war in and around East Timor...these operations are of such a magnitude and nature, that the use of three corvettes which are to be supplied by the Netherlands is likely;...the situation will still be similar by the time of delivery of the first corvette; [and] these circumstances belong to the weighty circumstances formulated by the government as a reason to reconsider the decision regarding permission to export the corvettes; [therefore] the government [should] postpone a final decision until the Chamber has been informed and consulted.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{IFM}, vol.4, nos.8 and 9 (August 1978).

\textsuperscript{70} In a conversation by phone in 1993 the former minister indicated that the information he initially received had all been indirect. Later on diplomats provided more reliable direct information. The bishop of Timor also gave important information. Direct government contacts with the major human rights NGOs regarding East Timor were notably absent.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1978-1979}, 8 February 1979, 15300-V, no.89, also see p.3112.
Ter Beek (PvdA) wanted to know what the government could do to guarantee the right of self-determination in East Timor.\textsuperscript{72} Responding to criticism on the Netherlands’ voting in the UN Van der Klaauw stated that, “the government remained of the opinion that since the end of the Portuguese presence,...the principles, as set out in the 1960 declaration on decolonisation, had not been shown to full advantage;”\textsuperscript{73} therefore the Netherlands had not supported the resolution. He added that the Netherlands would have voted in favour of a resolution that exclusively demanded admission of a humanitarian mission.\textsuperscript{74} In his argumentation the minister did not relate human rights violations to the island’s political status.

Regarding objections to the supply of three corvettes the minister suddenly did possess accurate information: unprejudiced Australian and American observers had reported that acts of war had almost fully ceased and therefore the corvettes could be supplied.\textsuperscript{75}

The firm backing of the coalition parties prevented the opposition from persuading the minister to assume a more principled policy, at the risk of economic relations with Indonesia. The existence of a human rights policy framework proved no protection against an utterly realist foreign policy. Van der Spek’s motion received support from PSP, PPR and CPN only, three small parties. PvdA voted against the motion because, as Van der Stoel

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p.3079.
\textsuperscript{73} Quoted from ibid., p.3188.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p.3220. In a phone-conversation in July 1993 Van der Klaauw reconfirmed his opinion that the human rights situation in the late 1970s had not been as bad as in later years.
explained, it was unrealistic to assume that fighting of a magnitude that might bring into action corvettes would be going on by the time that the first corvette would be supplied.\footnote{Walraven, op.cit., p.32.}

Notwithstanding the lack of political support, Komitee Indonesië remained active and issued a statement demanding an end to the war in East Timor. The statement was, subscribed by CPN, PPR, PSP and a number of NGOs and student groups.\footnote{These groups included, \textit{inter alia}, Stuurgroep Christenen voor het Socialisme (Christians for Socialism), Nederlandse Vrouwenbeweging (the Netherlands' Women Movement), Algemene Studentenvereniging Amsterdam (ASVA -- Amsterdam Student Association), Jonge Socialisten (Young Socialists), PPR-Jongeren, Nederlands verbond van Vakverenigingen (NVV -- Netherlands Association of Trade Unions), Gerakon Pattimura, and Werkgroep Indonesië. \textit{IFM}, vol.5, no.7 (April 1979).} These supporting organisations were mainly small and none had direct access to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.\footnote{Humanistisch Overleg Mensenrechten (HOM), Komitee Oost-Timor, and Pax Christi can be added to the list of active NGOs without direct contact with the minister. Van der Klaauw did have annual meetings with Amnesty International. Van der Klaauw, conversation by phone, July 1993.} Any direct impact on the policy was therefore highly unlikely.

In October 1979 PvdA submitted several questions about East Timor and during the debate about the budget of Foreign Affairs, Ter Beek attacked the government for yet again abstaining on a UN resolution on East Timor.\footnote{\textit{Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980}, 13 and 14 November 1979, 15800-V, p.1100.} CDA also wanted an explanation for the abstention. Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, (SGP -- Politically Reformed Party) CPN, and PPR were all concerned about the situation in East Timor and urged the minister to do more.\footnote{Ibid., pp.1114, 1129-1133.} Citing a report by the Australian Council For Overseas Aid (ACFOA) which
criticised the Indonesian government for its refusal admit relief organisations, Van der Spek called it naive to believe that the famine in Timor was caused by drought.\textsuperscript{81}

Notwithstanding parliamentary concern, Van der Klaauw remained unwilling to do anything and came up with various excuses. Regarding the ACFOA report he replied that it did not mention a policy of starvation as the cause of the famine. Besides, recently he had received accurate information from observers -- the minister did not disclose their identity -- who did not report any coercive military measures or a food-blockade. Therefore he concluded that there was no question of an intentional food-blockade. Thus the minister blamed natural conditions.\textsuperscript{82}

According to Van der Klaauw the UN resolution had not received Dutch backing because Indonesia had indicated its willingness to co-operate in the supply of humanitarian aid. The minister avoided discussing the political aspects of the resolution, a tricky subject. Van der Klaauw also claimed that it was hard to verify reports. This excuse absolved him of the duty to start an active human rights policy in accordance with the criteria set out in the human rights Bill.\textsuperscript{83} Again the minister received support of CDA and VVD for his policy.

At a later stage the minister gave additional information on the motivation behind the government's abstentions on UN resolutions that affirmed the people’s right of self-determination. The government recognised the right of self-determination of former colonies,

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p.1135.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p.1209.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
but the process of decolonisation in East Timor had gone wrong. In concert with the other members of the European Economic Community, the Netherlands had abstained on the latest resolution in order to contribute to a maximum relief effort. Since the resolution was not acceptable to Indonesia, its adoption would have probably resulted in Indonesian reluctance to assist in relief operations. Also the Netherlands had to be careful since it represented Portugal’s interests in Indonesia.\(^{84}\)

In December the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a small concession, informing the Second Chamber that the government continued to monitor developments in East Timor with utmost concern. The government would not hesitate to show its concern, should there be any reason and, when possible, support the humanitarian situation and economic development after first relief had been given.\(^{85}\) Komitee Indonesië sent its reply to all political parties represented in the Second Chamber, but it only managed to arrange talks with Den Uyl (PvdA), and Scholten (CDA), a dissident in his party. According to Komitee members these talks did bring about a change in PvdA’s voting in the corvettes’ case.\(^{86}\)

During the debate on the 1980 budget for Development Co-operation, PvdA indeed expressed sincere doubts about the human rights situation in East Timor. The party suggested to continue only those aid-programs where the intended effect was foreseeable; all other aid should be frozen.\(^{87}\) However, De Koning could easily reject the idea -- PvdA

\(^{84}\) Ibid., p.1299.
\(^{86}\) Walraven, p.53.
being the only party to raise the subject -- without even mentioning the situation in East Timor, a move consciously made since he considered a public discussion on the relation between human rights violations in a particular country and development aid inappropriate.  

The criteria formulated in the human rights Bill were therefore not put to use.

In February 1980 the Second Chamber debated a Foreign Affairs report about East Timor and the supply of the three corvettes. There was widespread concern over the situation in East Timor, but disagreement prevailed regarding the cause and subsequently, in the absence of an agreed diagnosis, over the measures to be taken.

The foreign minister’s depreciatory qualification of the death toll mentioned by Dunn (see Chapter VII), as ‘fantastic and mendacious’ infuriated PPR. The minister was also accused of failing to admit that the war was the main cause of famine in East Timor. Gualthérie-Van Weezel, CDA’s spokesman on development co-operation, however, mentioned the drought as one of the causes of the famine, and in spite of his concern over

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88 De Koning, conversation by phone, 18 July 1993. However De Koning seemed reluctant to enter into any discussion with policy makers on East Timor, since he purposely never put the issue on the agenda of the Council of Ministers. Since no other minister ever put the issue on the agenda, East Timor was never discussed by Cabinet Van Agt I. De Koning also expressed his satisfaction over the fact that human rights never became a separate agenda-item of IGGI meetings. De Koning declared his willingness to listen and reply to arguments of human rights organisations, but these groups did not influence his opinion.


90 Van der Spek, ibid., 3253. De Koning agreed with Van der Klaauw that one could hardly blame a blockade as the cause of the devastating famine in East Timor since crop-failure caused a precarious situation in other parts of Indonesia as well. When asked whether Indonesia met the requirements of the third criterion for concentration-countries he said: “Not by a long chalk,” but Indonesia’s great need for aid was decisive to continue its status as concentration-country. Conversation by phone, 18 July 1993.
East Timor he preferred to intensify relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{91} VVD dismissed the reports from East Timor as very contradictory and therefore inconclusive.\textsuperscript{92} Pronk (PvdA), the former Minister for Development Co-operation, disagreed with the minister’s denigrating comments about the death figure. The Netherlands ought to contribute to a political solution and help to end the blockade of humanitarian aid to East Timor.\textsuperscript{93}

According to Van der Klaauw the humanitarian situation had improved somewhat. Further the Netherlands did not recognise East Timor’s occupation.\textsuperscript{94} What implications this comment might have for Dutch policy he did not explain. The debate ended disappointingly without a consensual conclusion or expression of condemnation. While no motions were submitted, it was clear that, although both coalition parties had expressed their concern over the humanitarian situation, their desire to have good relations with Indonesia came first and therefore they supported Van der Klaauw. Again a parliamentary majority had refused to apply the principles of human rights policy to the East Timor case.

1980 was important year for bilateral relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia since De Koning, Van der Klaauw and Prime Minister Van Agt all visited Indonesia, giving their hosts the opportunity to elucidate their development efforts in East Timor. During his visit Van Agt refrained from critical talks with Indonesian leaders about East Timor. He only

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{91} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980, 21 February 1980, debate about report 15800-V, no.69, p3255.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p.3265.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p.3266.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.3268.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
exuberantly expressed his satisfaction with the positive developments.95 According to Van der Klaauw human rights were discussed, and could be discussed, since Indonesian foreign minister Malik was very open and frank.96 No details were released about the results of these talks.

In September 1980 Komitee Indonesië held a torchlight procession in Amsterdam.97 Like the previous year Komitee Indonesië failed to draw parliament’s attention; only PSP briefly touched upon the issue.98 Although Komitee Indonesië managed to organise a debate between all political parties in June 1981 at the occasion of the IGGI meeting,99 there was no denying that social and political interest in the East Timor issue was waning. The re-entry of PvdA to government, however, would bring a modest revival.

During the period of Cabinet Van Agt I an elaborate and comprehensive, although far from explicit framework of human rights had been constructed by the CDA-VVD coalition. However, ministers and their parliamentary groups had been unwilling to apply it to the East Timor case: human rights principles had been sacrificed for the sake of support for a pro-Western regime and Dutch economic interests.


95 NRC, 18 April 1980.
96 Personal comment by Van der Klaauw, conversation by phone, July 1993.
During its brief life, this cabinet made no noteworthy contribution to the human rights policy, but its party political and personal composition deserves some attention. Formed in 1981, Van Agt II saw the return of PvdA and Van der Stoel, who reclaimed the post of foreign minister. CDA and D'66 joined PvdA in the cabinet. Van Agt remained Prime Minister. His fellow party member Van Dijk (CDA) became Minister for Development Co-operation. With ministers of different parties in charge of the fields of foreign affairs and development co-operation there was a chance of discontent, but cabinet was a prey to continuing disputes that led to its demise before a clear foreign policy had been developed.

When PvdA left the coalition Van Agt temporarily assumed the foreign ministership (Cabinet Van Agt III). With CDA in control of foreign and development co-operation policy, disagreement between top level decision makers was as unlikely as it had been during the years of brotherly co-operation between Van der Klaauw and De Koning. Especially during Cabinet Van Agt III peripheral actors would have been unlikely to penetrate the centre of decision making. It suffices therefore to discuss the main events surrounding the unaltered human rights policy only briefly. Interesting in particular is the way Van der Stoel applied the human rights policy framework during his second term.

Dealing with development co-operation, Van der Stoel upheld the human rights criterion in the selection of concentration countries. A human rights situation also had implications for the choice of means of aid, since the extent to which the fundamental rights of people were being respected by its government had a direct impact on the effectiveness of certain types of aid. The budget papers for 1982 reconfirmed that aid should never bolster a repressive
regime nor contribute to a continuation of human rights violations. However, development co-operation was not regarded as the most appropriate means to improve a human rights situation; the needs of people, not the behaviour of governments, determined what aid would be supplied. Suspension or termination of aid was an instrument to be used with extreme caution and, as it could harm exactly those people whose fate one was trying to improve, only in case of gross and systematic violations of human rights where aid did not contribute to making relations in that state more fair. The failure to define gross and systemic human rights violations made this otherwise sound reasoning unfortunately analytically faulty. An arbitrary implementation of the policy could again not be ruled out. For this reason Ter Beek (PvdA) continued his demand for an annual report on the human rights situation in a number of states, but again to no avail. This failure impeded parliament’s influence on the implementation of the human rights policy.

Being an experienced diplomat Van der Stoel emphasised the importance of finding supporters to influence a human rights situation: lobbying was elevated to a major means of policy to exert pressure. Another important point to him was indiscriminate indignation:

101 Ibid.
whatever the nature of the regime one ought to improve the human rights situation. Van der Stoel referred to the criterion in the human rights Bill and his predecessor’s maxim that no disproportionate damage should be inflicted on Dutch business interests. He agreed when this meant that repercussions of certain measures would be stronger in the Netherlands than in the country on which one tried to exert influence.\textsuperscript{103} Thus, in contrast to Van der Klaauw, he was prepared to accept an economic toll for the sake of human rights.

Van der Stoel’s replacement by Van Agt did not have significant consequences for the government’s human rights policy framework. Not surprisingly Van Agt continued to adhere to the principles set out in the human rights Bill, drafted during his first term as Prime Minister. Respect for human rights remained a central objective of foreign policy, on equal terms with other goals of foreign policy. Development co-operation, however, was declared pre-eminently a means to pursue social and economic rights that were thought to create conditions conducive to respect for civil and political human rights. Creating favourable conditions was thus on equal footing with another instrument of human rights policy in development co-operation: the response to human rights violations. The principles of non-selectivity and effectiveness were starting-points for responses: the most appropriate means in the forum most suited.

Development co-operation should not become a means of manipulation, still a term not defined nor distinguished from influence. Should human rights be violated grossly and systematically, again concepts still left undefined, then the aid relationship could be

\textsuperscript{103} Speech delivered 11 March 1982 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Van der Stoel, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, \textit{Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken 1981-1982}, Bijlage 1, pp.1B-4B.
terminated. That final step should not be taken easily because of the adverse effects on the position of the poorest people and also because contacts with Third World governments could be made subservient to an improvement of the human rights situation.\textsuperscript{104}

In summary the human rights framework was still analytically fraught with undefined concepts, allowing Van Agt to revert to a more careful application of its criteria to foreign affairs and development co-operation. Again parliament failed to tighten its control on the implementation of the human rights policy plan.

7. Van Agt II and III and the East Timor question

During the annual debate on the Foreign Affairs budget in the Second Chamber in February 1982 both PSP and PvdA paid attention to the situation in East Timor. PSP as the more radical party demanded diplomatic action against “the Indonesian policy of starvation and slavery.”\textsuperscript{105} The party introduced a motion, requesting the government to play a mediating role and assist in bringing about an agreement between Portugal and Indonesia that would allow for a democratic and independent expression by the Timorese on their political future.\textsuperscript{106} In the light of bilateral negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia, foreign minister Van der Stoel judged the motion not opportune. Further, the Netherlands as representative of Portuguese interests in Indonesia had to proceed with tact. In principle

\textsuperscript{106} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1981-1982, 17100-V, no.40.
Van der Stoel claimed to endorse the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor, an unprecedented stand, but a mediating role played by the Netherlands was an inappropriate means to achieve that goal.\textsuperscript{107} PSP, PPR, CPN, SGP, GPV and notably PvdA, the minister’s own party, voted in favour of the motion, which was nevertheless defeated as CDA, VVD and D’66 voted against.

During his visit to Indonesia in February 1982, Minister for Development Co-operation Van Dijk denied that human rights were being violated on a large scale, relieving him of any duty to raise human rights issues.\textsuperscript{108} The Committee on Development Co-operation of the Second Chamber debated his journey in April. Terpstra, VVD’s representative to debates on development co-operation, wanted to know whether the minister had discussed East Timor, and if reports about an Indonesian offensive, famine, and incarceration of 60,000 people were correct. Gualthérie-Van Weezel (CDA) was satisfied with his minister’s careful handling of human rights while in Indonesia. Van der Spek (PSP) questioned Indonesia’s status as concentration country.\textsuperscript{109}

The inexperienced minister responded carefully, refusing to answer any questions about East Timor without prior consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was after all in charge. He established, however, that in Indonesia human rights were not violated systematically and grossly to such an extent that this would have consequences for Dutch

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., pp.1947 and 2027.
\textsuperscript{108} NRC, 15 February 1982.
\textsuperscript{109} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1981-1982, 22 April 1982, 17100-V, no.90. The term ‘concentration’ implied that a country was a long-term receiver of a relatively large amount of aid.
aid. Thus the minister added ‘to such an extent’ as an extra condition to the already obscure criterion of gross and systematic violations. In typical CDA fashion, the minister was very vague in his answer. In doing so he denied parliament any interference in cabinet politics, but he was not prepared to live up to the expectations created by the human rights policy in the first place.


VVD benefited from the turmoil and chaos that characterised the last two cabinets, winning enough seats to form a coalition with CDA, led by Lubbers (CDA). Van den Broek (CDA) became Minister for Foreign Affairs and Schoo (VVD) assumed the role of Minister for Development Co-operation. Excluding the impact of the international environment, and given the coalition’s composition -- similar to Cabinet Van Agt I -- a broad endorsement and continuation of the human rights policy pursued by that cabinet could be expected.

Cabinet Lubbers’ first budget did not confirm the ambitious claim that promotion of human rights would be a central element of foreign policy, equal to other objectives. Measures aimed at protecting human rights, including economic and political sanctions, would still be dealt with on a case-by-case approach to judge their effectiveness, but a solitary action, although quite the exception, was not ruled as a useful signal with a direct impact. Most

110 Ibid.
cases, however, required international co-operation to produce any result.\textsuperscript{113} As expected cabinet offered no new vision on human rights and foreign policy, but soon some changes would be made.

In the 1984 Bill \textit{Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en werkgelegenheid} (Development Co-operation and Employment) Schoo strengthened the links with Dutch companies through introduction of a policy sub-goal: aid should make a contribution to the economy of the Netherlands, which had been badly hit by a recession, and create much needed jobs. The business community thus saw its relations safeguarded by the goals set out in the policy and through its involvement in the discussions on the achievement of the new sub-goal.\textsuperscript{114} This development obviously weakened the position of those groups advocating human rights in Indonesia. This was only one disappointment to them, more would follow.

The 1984 Bill \textit{Herijking Bilateraal Beleid} dealt extensively with the relationship between human rights and development co-operation.\textsuperscript{115} However, the paper merely restated the fundamental principles that had supported the human rights policy since 1979, including non-selectivity, the case-by-case approach, and effectiveness of measures. Respect for human

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Jaarboek van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken} 1983-1984, p.113.
rights remained one of the criteria to select concentration countries.\textsuperscript{116} The underlying theory in the Bill, linking development co-operation and human rights, and the justification of their promotion and protection, was quite different, however, and distinctly liberalist, as a major policy speech by minister Schoo showed.\textsuperscript{117}

According to the minister, promotion of social-economic growth, would contribute to create a climate that assisted in bringing about the full enjoyment of civil and political rights. However, economic growth alone would not automatically result in a more equal division, and there might still be repression. A social structure, she argued, prevented achievement of a more equitable share. Changing such a structure was exceptionally hard. Often human rights violations were exponents of these deeper, underlying structures of injustice, especially in countries of the Third World where systematically maintained situations of disparity caused resistance, creating a spiral of insurgency and repression. These policy theoretical assumptions allowed the minister to concentrate the aid policy on promotion of economic and social rights that would change the social structures causing the injustice. Ultimately political relations of a country would be affected, and an improvement in the status of civil and political rights associated such a fundamental change.

Schoo distinguished a direct impact of aid, from an indirect effect via the policy dialogue between supplier and receiver. The dialogue offered an opportunity to exert influence on the


\textsuperscript{117} Speech delivered by the Minister for Development Co-operation Schoo, ‘Development Co-operation and Human Rights’, in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken 1983-1984, Bijlage, pp.77B-81B.
policy of the aid receiving government, including its policy regarding civil and political rights. However, this influence should not become manipulation, meaning, the exertion of pressure on a government in such a way as to limit its leeway to an unacceptable extent. Although one should applaud the attempt to define the concept of manipulation, the definition offered little illumination, and only introduced more vague terms in dire need of clarification. The minister did add that aid should not serve as a reward for a good human rights performance, nor as punishment for a bad record. She took seriously, she said, objections from the side of the aid-receiving countries about the possibility of blackmail.\footnote{Ibid., p.79B.} The individual case would determine what amount of pressure was allowed: back to square one.

Given the subordinated position of civil and political rights in the policy theory and with the emphasis on the sensitivity of Third World countries, the minister was unlikely to become the brave heart of human rights. The theory about fundamentally unfair social and political structures would hypothetically allow to question Indonesia’s presence in East Timor, but a more careful track was also open: reduce tensions through the supply of aid, and discuss human rights issues privately. This was the more likely course, given that East Timor was very ‘sensitive’ to Indonesian leaders.

In the same speech Schoo tried to define gross and systematic violations of human rights in the context of development co-operation. The minister made a promising start delimiting application of the policy to questions concerning fundamental human rights, including the right to life, freedom and inviolability of the person and freedom of religion. She then went on to discuss on the nature of the violation of these rights. The minister gave a few examples
of how human rights could be violated, but unfortunately she did not make an effort to rank these violations: whether the examples given were gross or not remained unclear. Subsequently the minister argued that it was important to know on what scale fundamental rights were being violated. Disappointingly, the minister only formulated a question; she did not really attempt to provide an answer. The degree of central government involvement in a violation of fundamental human rights and its willingness to fight against arbitrary acts should also be considered according to Schoo. Finally, she did define the term ‘systematic’: were the violations in question incidents or a conscious and structured policy? But how could one establish that there was a conscious policy behind human rights violations? Replacing the term ‘systematic’ by ‘structural’ did not explain the concept and at the end of the discussion ‘gross’ and ‘systematic’ both remained vague concepts. Any judgement of a human rights violation therefore ran the risk of being branded arbitrary.

Having gone through all those steps to ascertain that there was a case of gross and structural violations of human rights, the minister addressed the problem of response. Aid was ruled out as a means of pressure or sanction. Any measures taken would only try to reduce or prevent the side effects of those human rights violations, notably regime confirmation and compliance. Also there was the criterion of effectiveness, meaning that a poor human rights situation should not frustrate the realisation of the aims of development co-operation. Possible steps would thus be taken to prevent compliance and regime confirmation. Representations and actions in international organisations were also appropriate means. Suspension of aid was a highly exceptional decision, only to be taken on the basis of

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119 Ibid., p.80B.
considerations directly related to the circumstances of the particular case, which included the expected impact on the people in need and the possibility of using the aid relationship as a means to influence that state via dialogue.\textsuperscript{120} These conclusions regarding the means of implementation were disappointing given the extensive intellectual effort that went into establishing clear analytical criteria of the human rights policy and achieve consistency in their implementation.

The aims of the foreign policy for 1985 reconfirmed the intention to promote respect for human rights and prevent violations. No new elements were added to achieve these goals.\textsuperscript{121} The budget of Foreign Affairs for 1986 likewise contributed no new elements to the policy; on the contrary. It soberly explained that development aid was only laterally concerned with civil and political human rights:\textsuperscript{122} the government was becoming increasingly conservative in its policy theory on development aid and human rights, making a forceful implementation ever more unlikely.

Recapturing this section, Van den Broek and Schoo formally continued to adhere to the policy guidelines of the human rights Bill, but their policy theory made them more conservative, certainly in respect to human rights and development co-operation.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p.81B.
\textsuperscript{121} Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 1985, Memorie van Toelichting, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1984-1985, 18600-V, no.2, pp.59-64.
9. Cabinet Lubbers I and the East Timor issue

During cabinet’s first year in office social and political interest in East Timor was at a low, allowing the two ministers to ignore the issue. In January 1983 more than 600 people signed a letter about East Timor addressed to the Dutch delegation at the UN, but their plea had no noticeable impact.\textsuperscript{123} The government was satisfied with the positive development in relations with Indonesia. The situation in East Timor, particularly the disappearances reported by Amnesty International,\textsuperscript{124} was claimed to remain a matter of concern, although no initiatives were taken to convey this concern to the Indonesian government.

In the Second Chamber Van der Spek (PSP) reproached Van der Broek for playing a waiting game regarding human rights violations in East Timor.\textsuperscript{125} Characteristically for this period of oblivion, the minister did not even reply to this remark. No other parliamentary group raised the issue.

Minister Schoo reported upon her return from an inspection in Indonesia that she had discussed human rights; she had come to the conclusion that these were not being violated systematically and grossly hence there would be no repercussions in the sphere of aid.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} IFM, vol.8, nos.7-8 (January 1983), p.10.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 16-17 February 1983, 17600-V, p.2460; Trouw, 15 June 1983.
The *Memorie van Toelichting* to the budget of Foreign Affairs for 1984 reported that the government continued to follow the human rights situation in Indonesia closely. ‘Appropriate means’ were being used to verify reports on the situation in East Timor, brought to the attention of the government by organisations such as Amnesty International.\(^\text{127}\) Since these inquiries had led the government to conclude that human rights were not violated systematically and fundamentally in East Timor there would be no repercussions for Dutch aid to Indonesia.\(^\text{128}\) The government made good use of these vague terms, successfully silencing any opponents, who apparently remained unaware of the government’s failure to come up with proper definitions of main policy concepts.

In the Second Chamber, Schoo expressed her disappointment over the resumption of the fighting in East Timor after the armistice between the Indonesian army and the Timorese resistance had collapsed in September 1983, following a breakdown in talks between Fretilin and the Indonesian government. On this occasion she did confirm that cabinet supported the right of self-determination for East Timor. However, she quickly recovered, concluding that she would not have to undertake action since the latest Indonesian offensive codenamed Persatuan, was not a new fact.\(^\text{129}\)


During the debate on the budget of Foreign Affairs for 1984 Van der Spek (PSP) was again a lonely voice, demanding action from the government in liaison with other states. The minister did not respond.

In January 1984 Van den Broek visited Indonesia in an attempt to strengthen relations. He did discuss the human rights situation on East Timor and offered assistance to find a solution. He did not indicate, however, what solution he envisaged. Schoo informed the Second Chamber that she had not discussed East Timor during her latest visit as chairman of IGGI to Indonesia. 1984 turned out to be another year of very limited parliamentary interest, allowing the two ministers in charge to keep the implementation of human rights policy to themselves, in line with their preferred approach of quiet diplomacy and serving the goal of building of better relations with Indonesia.

Komitee Indonesië organised a political manifestation in Amsterdam in June. During the IGGI meeting in The Hague, Komitee Indonesië offered minister Schoo a petition, which she accepted. Nevertheless the minister did not put human rights on the agenda of IGGI, as the demonstrators had demanded.

Signalling yet another year of inactivity in the defence of human rights in East Timor, the budget papers of Foreign Affairs argued that the human rights situation in East Timor had

131 Ibid., no.81.
133 Ibid., 23-5-1984, 18100-V, no.125.
improved in 1984.\textsuperscript{135} This did not satisfy Van der Spek (PSP) who wanted an explanation from the foreign minister about the Netherlands’ abstention during recent voting on East Timor in the UN Sub-committee on Human Rights. The outcome of the voting meant that Indonesia was no longer on the list for countries requiring special attention in the face of systematic and gross violations of human rights. Van der Spek therefore wanted to know if the minister would be prepared to place East Timor on the agenda of the next General Assembly considering that negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia had failed?\textsuperscript{136} Van den Broek, bound by secrecy concerning the voting, refused to comment. His reply was accepted by the Second Chamber.\textsuperscript{137}

Minister Schoo reported to the Second Chamber that she had discussed human rights informally during her annual visit to Indonesia in December. She called the situation still critical,\textsuperscript{138} but announced no measures to try to bring about a change. In the ensuing debate with the Second Chamber’s Committee on Development Co-operation, PvdA advocated to make human rights an agenda item in the IGGI, since any deterioration in the human rights situation would erode stability, and instability was a bad ingredient for development. CPN floor-leader, Brouwer, suggested that the Netherlands refuse to chair the IGGI any longer in the face of multiple human rights violations in East Timor. Van der Spek (PSP) proposed to close the IGGI meeting immediately after the opening-speech. The coalition parties were not so radical. CDA once again demanded careful management of the relationship with

\textsuperscript{135} Begroting van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1985, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1984-1985, 18600-V, no.36.
\textsuperscript{136} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1984-1985, 5-6 March 1985, 18600-V, p.3767.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p.3840.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 1984-1985, 7 March 1985, 18600-V, no.72.
Indonesia. Since co-operation in IGGI was to the benefit of both countries, this forum should not be jeopardised. Human rights should therefore not be discussed in IGGI. D’66 spokesman on development co-operation, Tommel, disagreed and wanted to discuss human rights in the margin of IGGI. In a motion he suggested to ask the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Affairs to study the situation regarding violations of human rights in East Timor, and see if these violations were indeed gross and systematic.\(^{139}\)

The motion was not carried as CDA and VVD supported minister Schoo. Either the situation in Indonesia was clear to them, or they feared that an investigation into the situation might be offensive to Indonesia. In any case they did not want to support the opposition. Thus the coalition parties denied the Second Chamber the chance to judge whether the situation required application of any punitive means as formulated in the human rights policy framework.

Four small leftist parties, PSP, CPN, PPR, and Evangelische Volkspartij (EVP -- Evangelical People’s Party), also introduced a motion, stating that human rights in Indonesia were being violated grossly and systematically; therefore the aid relationship should be terminated.\(^{140}\) The motion was in accordance with the criteria of the human rights policy but, with the submission of the more moderate motion by Tommel, stood no change and received minimal support only.\(^{141}\)

\(^{139}\) Ibid., no.130.  
\(^{140}\) Ibid., no.131.  
\(^{141}\) PPR, PSP, CPN, and EVP voted in favour of the motion. Ibid.
In late 1985 Schoo again reported to the Second Chamber on a visit to Indonesia. Responding to concerns by Van der Spek and her own party colleague, Terpstra, the minister again claimed that the situation in East Timor was improving. Therefore she had not discussed human rights.\textsuperscript{142}

In spite of increased parliamentary interest in 1985, and a corresponding awareness on the side of cabinet, loyalty to the coalition had prevented CDA and VVD to support a motion that tried get a grips on the implementation of the policy. Since this motion, requesting an inquiry into the extent of human rights violations, had been rejected, cabinet could continue to insist that the human rights situation was not that bad, improving, and not demanding any Dutch encouragement. The unwillingness on the side of the government and its parliamentary group obstructed a proper test of the human rights policy framework.

In 1986 there was little attention for East Timor in the general debate on foreign affairs. In reply to a question by Van der Spek, the foreign minister repeated his argument that he could not comment on the secret Portuguese-Indonesian talks.\textsuperscript{143} Schoo, was just as unwilling to link human rights to her field of policy as Van den Broek, reporting to the Second Chamber that she had [again] not discussed human rights during latest journey to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{144} Replying to questions put forward by the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation, the government declared that human rights in East Timor were

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 1985-1986, 19200-V, no.9.
\textsuperscript{143} Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1985-1986, 10 December 1985, 19200-V, p.2338.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 1985-1986, 19200-V, no.106.
a matter of continuing concern. An assurance without meaning, since any reflection of concern was lacking in the implementation.


The new cabinet, Lubbers II, was again a coalition of CDA and VVD. Van den Broek remained in office, while a fellow CDA member, Bukman, became minister for Development Co-operation. Concentrating on the domestic context, with CDA ministers running the two main policy fields dealing with human rights, one would expect minor modifications in the relation between foreign policy and human rights. Given Van den Broek’s preference to manage the relationship with Indonesia carefully and diplomatically, well hidden to any outsiders, and the high level of party discipline, any major open confrontation in parliament regarding Indonesia’s human rights violations in East Timor was unlikely.

As always, the budget papers for Foreign Affairs gave a promising impression, stating that efforts supporting human rights would be vigorously continued in 1987. They would be twofold: aiming to create conditions conducive to more respect for human rights, and correcting abuses. No new measures were suggested.146

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145 Ibid., 1986-1987, nos. 20 and 37. Foreign Affairs adds with little imagination: “reports about East Timor were followed with attention.” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken 1985-1986, p.127; see Begroting van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1987, Memorie van Toelichting, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 19700-V, no.20.

In May 1987 the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation published an update on the human rights Bill. In this *Vademecum mensenrechten: voortgangsnotitie mensenrechten in het buitenlands beleid* [Vademecum Human Rights: Progress Report on Human Rights in Foreign Policy] they discussed the implementation of human rights policy in foreign affairs, arguing that responses had become an important hallmark of human rights policy. The claim was made that the Netherlands did not shun to use its bilateral relations to put human rights violations in the pillory; a claim hard to defend in the case of East Timor that had been virtually ignored by De Koning, Van der Klaauw, Schoo and Van den Broek alike. Human rights were said to have become a standard subject during visits to states with a poor human rights record, with informal contacts in bilateral relations being an instrument used more and more frequently.

The ideas regarding the use of development co-operation to alleviate suffering caused by gross and structural denial of human rights were still in conformity with the views expressed in the bill of 1979.

Human rights remained an integral part of Dutch foreign policy, and as such were of equal importance to other foreign policy goals. The two ministers remarked that the complexity of human rights problems required a tailor-made, case-by-case solution. Therefore they rejected the use of general criteria for a response.\(^{147}\)

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As a Vademecum of development in theoretical thoughts about human rights and foreign policy the paper was most disappointing: there had been no development. The paper merely repeated the conclusions of the Bill of 1979 and broadly discussed the implementation of its directives. Either CDA and VVD ministers had identical views on the relation between foreign policy and development co-operation policy and human rights, or civil servants masterminded and controlled the policy in the absence of any confrontation with a strong political personality: a ‘Yes Minister’ situation.

In parliament Vademecum Mensenrechten in het buitenlandse beleid was debated in March 1988, after the process of written questions by parliamentarians and replies by the government had been completed. On this occasion De Hoop-Scheffer, CDA’s expert on foreign affairs and development co-operation, asserted that the government’s policy should rest on the following criteria: the seriousness of human rights violations, the degree to which a government could be held accountable, and the duration of the violations. Human rights policy should be non-selective, credible, and efficient. ¹⁴⁸ Although not contravening the government’s policy, this was quite a daring speech for a CDA parliamentarian.

PvdA and D’66 agreed with the advice given by the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, that criteria should be described and used publicly in development co-

operation policy. Motions were submitted requesting an annual report on developments in various countries and a set of clearer criteria for judging human rights violations.

In his reply Van den Broek made a distinction between external criteria and internal criteria for human rights policy. External criteria referred to the situation of human rights violations, whereas internal criteria pertained to the relation between policy means and effectiveness. In the internal judgement human rights interests would be weighed against other interests. According to the minister human rights violations in all countries were judged similarly, but the response accounted for relations of the Netherlands with the state involved and considered the most efficient means. In this respect the minister disagreed with, and refused to implement the conclusions of the Advisory Commission on Human Rights and Foreign Policy.

Bukman denied improvement of human rights and stimulation of democratic processes the status of separate goals of his development co-operation policy. They were included as sub-goals in the structural fight against poverty. Presumably his policy theory was very similar in this respect to Schoo’s: alleviation of poverty will demolish unfair social and political

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149 Ibid., 44-8/10. The Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy in its advice ‘Ontwikkelingsaanwerking en de rechten van de mens’ (Development Co-operation and Human Rights) also suggested an annual report on the human rights situation in states receiving Dutch aid.

150 The motions are recorded as 20200-V, nos.93 and 94. Van den Broek showed his repugnance and the motions did not receive majority support.

151 Ibid., p.44-20.

152 See Adviescommissie mensenrechten buiteneuws beleid, Ontwikkelingsaanwerking en de rechten van de mens [Development Co-operation and Human Rights], The Hague, 1987, pp.74-75.

153 Ibid., p.44-29.
structures, to the benefit of civil and political rights. The policy dialogue with the government of the aid-receiving state could also make a contribution to human rights. Although he mentioned IGGI in this respect, he never discussed human rights as separate issue during any of the meetings he presided.

Bukman and Van den Broek agreed on the need for careful diplomacy, hidden to outsiders. As foreseen at the introduction of this section hardly anything changed with these two caretakers at the wheel. The next section will disclose whether the ministers more seriously implemented the criteria of human rights policy to the case of East Timor.

11. Cabinet Lubbers II and East Timor

The change of government did not bring about a difference in the careful way the issue of human rights in Indonesia was treated. The aim was to intensify relations with Indonesia while also exchanging views on human rights. Bukman, however, followed the line of his predecessor and did not raise the issue during his first trip to Indonesia.

During a Second Chamber debate Bukman declared that the human rights situation in Indonesia was stable, but nowhere near ideal. The minister had discussed the issue with NGOs in Indonesia, but not with the government. He gave no pretext for his lukewarm implementation of the human rights policy. Terpstra (VVD), who had consistently expressed...


\[155\] NRC, 18 March 1987.
concern, declared that the human rights situation in Indonesia was still bad. She inquired what the minister could do about it. PSP floor-leader Van Es classified the violations as gross and systematic, and wanted the minister respond to an aide memoir produced by the International Non-Governmental Group on Indonesia (INGI). On behalf of PvdA, Knol, harassed the minister with the suggestion to raise human rights in the IGGI, but De Hoop Scheffer (CDA), loyally supported his minister, opposing even an informal discussion in IGGI. On balance, however, the minister had received a fair amount of criticism, even from the ranks of coalition partner VVD.

In March 1987 Amnesty International launched a campaign demanding attention for the problem of disappearances in East Timor. Local divisions were summoned to contact politicians, but the action had no noticeable effect on parliamentarians. PSP remained the only party to raise concern over the situation in East Timor during the debates about the budget of Foreign Affairs for 1987 and 1988. In both instances Van den Broek ignored the issue.

Except for the Amnesty action human rights groups developed few activities in support of East Timor in 1987. Komitee Indonesië held its annual actions against IGGI in June, but the protest did not specifically target East Timor this year. Bukman discussed human rights in the margin of IGGI.

159 IFM, vol.13, no.1 (June 1987).
Although the Foreign Affairs annual report for 1987 mentioned human rights in East Timor as a matter of continuing attention,\textsuperscript{161} Bukman repeated his performance of the previous year and did not discuss human rights with the Indonesian government during his annual visit to Indonesia:\textsuperscript{162} an expression of contempt for an opinion prevailing amongst parliamentarians in 1987 that more needed to be done. During the debate with the Standing Committee on Development Co-operation, following his visit, Bukman declared that the human rights situation was far from ideal, but he confessed not to have paid much attention to human rights while meeting with Indonesian leaders. On this occasion the Committee was not very critical and condoned the minister’s lack of initiative.\textsuperscript{163}

In its bilateral affairs with Indonesia for 1989 the government aimed at a further intensification of these highly validated relations.\textsuperscript{164} In an effort to achieve this goal Prime Minister Lubbers and the Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Indonesia in late 1988. On this occasion Van den Broek discussed human rights both with Indonesia’s foreign minister and President Suharto.\textsuperscript{165}

According to the Department of Foreign Affairs the human rights situation in East Timor deteriorated in 1989, due to excesses by the Indonesian army. Between April and August about 50 people were killed. With the ban on foreigners entering the territory lifted in


\textsuperscript{162} \textit{NRC}, 27-4-1988.


January -- the ban had been in place ever since Indonesia’s invasion in 1975 -- the media reported on a few more incidents that occurred in short succession, and contributed to mounting tension. Prior to the visit by Pope John Paul II in October 1989 large numbers of people were arrested and taken into custody. Nevertheless protest rallies occurred during the Pope’s visit. When the American Ambassador visited East Timor in January 1990, a peaceful protest was brutally suppressed by the Indonesian army.\textsuperscript{166} For the first time cameras provided indisputable evidence of the graveness of human rights violations. The pictures also exposed that negative sentiments about Timor's integration prevailed among Timorese youths and students. The problem was obvious and Dutch politicians could no longer claim a lack of reliable information as viable excuse for inactivity.

Coinciding with these events in East Timor there was an upsurge in lobbying activities in the Netherlands that turned East Timor into an issue that policy makers had to address seriously. Komitee Indonesië was particularly active. It stepped up its campaign against IGGI and foreign aid, organised a press-conference in The Hague, and held a demonstration at embassies of IGGI members. Also a petition demanding termination of all aid to Indonesia was presented to Foreign Affairs officials.\textsuperscript{167} At the occasion of the Pope’s visit Amnesty International started a media-campaign and during a visit to The Hague in December Portuguese President Soares also allegedly urged the Netherlands' government to defend the interests of the Timorese people with more vigour.\textsuperscript{168}

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\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 1989-1990, 21662, no.1.
\textsuperscript{167} IFM, vol.14, no.5 (August 1989).
\end{flushright}
These protest voices helped to put the plight of the East Timorese back on the political agenda. Thus the Annual Report on Development Co-operation reported that the situation in East Timor gave reason for concern in 1989. The opening of the area to foreigners on the other hand was seen as a positive sign. Security operations by the Indonesian army, however, worsened the situation. The opening of the area to foreigners denied policy makers, ministers and bureaucrats alike, the excuse that reports of human rights violations were just unsubstantiated rumours which did not require any response of the government: Indonesia itself offered the opportunity to apply the principles of human rights policy at last.

12. The period 1977-1989: Conclusions

With a brief interval in 1982-1983, CDA and VVD had been in government from 1977 until 1989. Their Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation had worked together harmoniously, sharing opinions on human rights issues in East Timor and foreign policy towards Indonesia. Party discipline had secured these ministers of support from a (small) majority in the Second Chamber for their activities, or rather the lack thereof. Thus the expectation formulated in Chapter III that the policy making centre had weakened compared with the 1950s and 1960s due to changes in its composition, organisational changes within Foreign Affairs, and stronger external opposition, is not substantiated by the findings. There was low level opposition to the government’s policy, but since the decision making centre remained united and could rely on loyal support of its parliamentary groups the policy was never in jeopardy.

168 NRC, 12 October 1989.
Although inactivity regarding human rights and East Timor characterised this era of CDA-VVD policy, concern about the fate of human rights in East Timor increased over the years. During Cabinet Van Agt I, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Co-operation could hide behind the argument that no reliable information about East Timor was available or alternatively discard those reports on large scale human rights abuses as blatant lies. With more reliable, and equally critical reports becoming available cabinet was forced to respond more seriously. Reluctant to take drastic steps involving sanctions, the two ministers directly involved then denied that human rights violations in East Timor were structural or gross, two concepts that, as outlined before, were never properly defined. Unfortunately parliamentarians never demanded an accurate definition of these important concepts. The government greatly benefited, giving it considerable leeway to conduct the policy it preferred.

Quiet diplomacy became the preferred means to serve human rights interests, keeping exacting voices in parliament at bay while not endangering Dutch corporate interests. Very much afraid to politicise human rights the Minister for Development Co-operation hardly ever raised human rights concerns in respect to East Timor with the Indonesian government. The parliamentary groups of CDA and VVD were satisfied with this implementation of human rights policy. Although human rights organisations contacted their parliamentary groups they did not strike a chord. Most of the NGOs concerned with the well-being of the

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169 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1989*.
Timorese were affiliated with left wing or extreme left wing parties, who lacked the required numbers in parliament to influence the policy.

With the opening up of East Timor, cameras filmed protests against the Indonesian regime and the brutal force that the Indonesian military used to quash this popular opposition. Action groups, in particular Komitee Indonesië, developed activities focussing the attention of the media and politicians once again on East Timor. The fact that parliamentarians from all major parties participated in its forums, supports the conclusion that Komitee Indonesië and the case it stood for had found increasing political acceptance. However, with CDA and VVD parliamentarians and ministers still favouring quiet diplomacy, and without evidence of a case involving gross violations of human rights the policy remained virtually unchanged; the policy centre and its peripheral parliamentary groups were still in broad agreement on the policy means to fight human rights abuses. This situation was about to change with the fall of the CDA-VVD coalition.


A coalition of PvdA and CDA replaced the CDA-VVD cabinet in 1989, which saw Pronk (PvdA) return as Minister for Development Co-operation. Van den Broek stayed on as foreign minister. From the outset it was clear that co-operation between Pronk and Van den Broek would be difficult; they were direct opposites in almost every sense. Pronk was rather straight forward if not churlish but deeply moved and inspired. He was prepared to take an issue outside the narrow scene of decision making so as to include social groups.
Van den Broek on the other hand was an articulate, calculated and realistic diplomat, perfectly at ease in the bureaucratic decision making situation so characteristic in foreign policy making. He relied on moderate demands, personal trust and secrecy to achieve his goals. The stage seemed set for a confrontation on application of means to the long running problem of East Timor. Before discussing that interesting political fight, the policy theory regarding human rights and foreign and development co-operation policy needs to be recaptured.

The foreign affairs budget papers for 1990 reconfirmed promotion of human rights as an essential element of foreign policy. The Netherlands would take issue with human rights violations irrespective of the country and circumstances.\textsuperscript{170} In contrast to previous years, a more assertive parliament would put these intentions to a test.

During the debate on the budget of Development Co-operation members of the opposition applauded the policy. Both VVD and D’66 were happy with Pronk’s intentions, but the latter party wanted clearer criteria to judge whether the government was living up to its policy plan. PvdA and Groen Links once again demanded a better formulation of the position of human rights in foreign policy and also wanted an annual country-specific report. In case of serious violations of human rights a reduction or a complete termination of aid should be considered.\textsuperscript{171} CDA was the only party to ignore the issue completely.

\textsuperscript{171} Van Es based her case on objections put forward by human rights NGOs united in ‘Breed mensenrechten overleg’. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, 21300, pp.30-1334 and 30-1480.
Pronk in reply reconfirmed that human rights violations would have consequences for the aid given. Concentrating on Indonesia, he declared that human rights had become an institutionalised element of discussions in the framework of IGGI, and he wanted to continue that policy. He rejected making human rights an explicit agenda item, opting for raising the issue as an element in the fight against poverty. This was in conformity with the policy theory he had used during his first term as minister. Thus he lived up to the expectations that his policy plan had created. Linking human rights directly to development co-operation, he weakened the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with permission of the Second Chamber.

In line with Pronk’s long held vision, the appendix of the 1991 budget of Foreign Affairs stressed the need to employ development aid to support processes of democratisation which would structurally transform whole societies and improve respect for human rights. The focus of development co-operation was on a positive policy that would create conditions favourable to an improvement of the human rights situation.\(^\text{172}\)

During a debate on Pronk’s major policy plan, *Nieuwe kaders voor ontwikkelings-samenwerking* (New Frameworks for Development Co-operation), VVD, supported by D’66, submitted a motion demanding better criteria for implementation of human rights in development co-operation: times were really changing. Pronk declared such a motion otiose since the criteria were already clear. CDA was wary of politicisation of development co-operation, since the use of sanctions would violate other policy objectives. Although PvdA
supported the Bill, parliament was assuming a more assertive role, increasing pressure on the government to put its cards on the table.

In the Bill *Een wereld van verschil* (A World of Difference), tabled in 1991, Pronk endorsed the theory, in fashion since the 1970s, which claimed that economic and social development would also eventually result in increased freedom and dignity, but he further refined the relation, linking development to participation and democracy. He argued that respect for those human rights that made up the core of democracy, freedom of expression and meeting, etc., was conditional for participation. Remarkable was the order in which classic and social rights were linked: freedom rights came first, generating the spin-off to social rights. Pronk reasoned that an unfree society would lead to a concentration of power depriving the majority to share in prosperity. Democracy and classic human rights were therefore indispensable conditions for a durable, and equitable development. Since classic human rights formed the pillars of democracy their enjoyment would give a wider ‘bottom group’ of society an opportunity to defend its interests. Pronk also saw sheer moralism as a reason to fight against political duress, torture, disappearances and murder.174

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Pronk intended to make better use of direct dialogues with governments of aid-receiving countries as means to defend human rights. The emphasis was on a positive support for initiatives, and not on reactionary measures such as suspension or termination of aid.\textsuperscript{175}

Human rights were also at the centre of attention in another government paper, *Voortgangsnotitie over de rechten van de mens in het buitenlands beleid* (Progress report on human rights in foreign policy). The government reiterated its goals to establish international norms, to achieve effective control regarding observance of these norms, and to achieve observance in practice. The last concern had priority. In its policy the government could take negative measures or contribute positively to conditions that better enabled observance to those human rights.\textsuperscript{176}

Reflecting traditional views about human rights and economic relations the government declared its reluctance to interfere with international economic relations since these should be primarily between private enterprises. Since the government was not a party principal, it should show reservation. Sanctions would be applied in accordance with the advice given by the Advisory Commission on Human Rights, that is, only if other less drastic measures were expected not to achieve an adequate result. Also one should have good reason to expect a better result from sanctions. Such steps would normally be taken only in a

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p.52.

concerted European alliance.\textsuperscript{177} As will be discussed, the Timor case would form a violation of this maxim, for which the Netherlands paid dearly.

VVD, of all parties, deplored the discrepancy between the criteria of the human rights policy and their implementation. Terpstra blamed disagreement inside the coalition for this shortcoming.\textsuperscript{178} Verspaget, PvdA’s spokesperson on development co-operation, was satisfied with the promise by Pronk of an annual country evaluation.

Pronk’s firmer conceptual linkage of human rights and development co-operation constituted a risk of collision with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was officially the first in charge of human rights and foreign policy. Also Pronk was turning aid more into a political instrument, which potentially threatened the cohesion of foreign policy.

The Second Chamber seemed to approve, even demand, a more transparent relation between human rights criteria and their implementation, so as to assure itself of greater control over policy, potentially challenging the privileged position of the policy making centre during the phases of implementation and evaluation. The following sections will substantiate these claims and show how (dis)agreement over policy goals and means in cabinet and between cabinet and parliament affected their implementation in the case of East Timor. Events will prove that intra-cabinet disagreement increased the chances of parliamentary groups, and their aligned NGOs, to successfully influence the content of foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
towards Indonesia and East Timor. The discussion will also clearly show the devastating consequences when domestic actors cross the limits to autonomy dictated by the international environment.

14. Cabinet Lubbers III and East Timor: the grand finale

Pronk’s personality was a major explaining factor of the human rights policy and the events that would bring the aid-relationship with Indonesia to an end. His more critical social-development philosophy made the policy centre more receptive to, and coincided with, an increased concern about human rights violations, notably in East Timor, and a desire to do something about it in the Second Chamber. Setting the tone for his more active and critical human rights policy, Pronk discussed human rights with Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alatas, during his first visit to Indonesia.\(^\text{179}\)

Van Gijzel, PvdA’s spokesman on development co-operation, raised the situation in East Timor during a debate between the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation and the ministers Van den Broek and Pronk on 10 May 1990. He considered that “continuing human rights violations in East Timor.... should persuade the Netherlands to weigh possible steps to take. Quiet diplomacy has been to little result....”\(^\text{180}\) Given that

\(^\text{179}\) Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, no.106.
\(^\text{180}\) Quoted from Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, 21300-V, no.123. Dutch special aid, valued at 27 million guilders, had already been suspended following the executions of 6 prisoners accused of having been involved in the coup back in 1965. Following this suspension, Indonesia refused to accept the total aid package worth 192 million guilders. During Pronk’s visit to Indonesia political differences were smoothed out. Quoted from Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, 21300-V, no.123.
Amnesty International reports concluded that human rights were being violated systematically and structurally he advocated the use of other instruments. Tommel (D’66) also recognised the failure of quiet diplomacy and advocated a different approach. As always De Hoop Scheffer (CDA) wanted to show reticence when it came to the use of development aid as an instrument of punishment and reward; gross and systematic violations of human rights made an exception to this rule. Beckers-De Bruijn, representing Groen Links (Green Left), a newly formed coalition of PSP, PPR and CPN, agreed with Pronk’s vision to attribute a more important role to human rights in development co-operation. She wanted to reconsider all aid given by IGGI.

Van den Broek promised the Chamber to provide a report on the human rights situation in Indonesia, but refused to give up quiet diplomacy as means to implement human rights policy. Expecting insufficient support from other IGGI members, with damaging consequences to the cause of human rights, both Pronk and Van den Broek expressed their preference for a continuation of the policy to discuss human rights in the margins of IGGI only.¹⁸¹

Soon after this discussion the human rights situation in Indonesia again formed the topic of a major debate, the occasion being the submission of a report titled, De mensenrechtensituatie in Indonesië (The Human Rights Situation in Indonesia). In this report, drafted at the request of the Second Chamber, the two ministers admitted a worsening of the human rights situation in East Timor in 1989, for which they blamed the

¹⁸¹ Ibid.
army. Because the Indonesian government was accountable for the army, measures of the human rights policy could be applied, but they were not. According to the ministers human rights were not being violated systematically and grossly, and the situation had not just worsened. Positive developments included the reopening of East Timor to visitors and the International Red Cross had been allowed to resume its work.  

During the debate in the Second Chamber on the Bill ‘Nieuwe kaders voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking’ there was also ample attention for East Timor. Terpstra (VVD) on this occasion described the human rights violations as ongoing, gross, and systematic. Therefore she wanted Pronk to develop initiatives to stop Indonesia from using violence and speed up negotiations that should result in a withdrawal of Indonesian forces.  

Terpstra thus specifically related these gross human rights violations to the people’s denial of and the desire for self-determination. According to Tommel (D’66) East Timor was a prime example of a bad application of human rights criteria in the selection of aid-receiving countries.  

For the time being the majority of the Standing Committee on Development Co-operation only made critical comments, and refrained from submission of any motions. In his reply Pronk did not specifically address concerns expressed over East Timor, since the debate was about development co-operation policy in general, this was not unreasonable, albeit disappointing in the face of general concern among the opposition.

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182 Reply by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Co-operation to questions posed by Van Gijzel, 4 September 1990, Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 21662, no.1.
In his defence of the budget of Foreign Affairs, Van den Broek faced wider criticism by the main political parties regarding East Timor. D’66 spokesman on foreign affairs Eisma wanted some initiative taken concerning East Timor, and he would like to hear the conclusions of the Dutch representative who visited East Timor; what implications would these conclusions have for the policy.  

Van Traa, PvdA’s expert on foreign affairs, accused the government of having shown too much restraint, although Pronk had given new life to the discussion. Sipkes (Groen Links) berated the Netherlands’ neutrality in the Indonesian-Portuguese conflict. Considering the condemnation by many international organisations, such an attitude was not acceptable. The issue of self-determination was slowly coming to the forefront of debate in the Second Chamber.

Van den Broek claimed that the Netherlands’ neutrality in the Indonesian-Portuguese conflict did not affect its opinion regarding human rights. Repeatedly the Netherlands had shown its concern. The visit by a Dutch observer to Timor had yielded evidence that the slight improvement in the human rights situation that occurred in early 1990 had given way for another worsening in October 1990. According to Van den Broek the situation had his full attention. He had already expressed his concern to the Indonesian authorities. The minister continued to adhere to diplomatic representations which at best mitigated the symptoms of the underlying problem. However, since the minister’s reasoning failed to recognise this deeper cause of human rights violations, his human rights policy was bound to target the wrong goals with the wrong means.

184 Ibid., p.22-50.
185 Ibid., 11 December 1990, 34, p.2056.
186 Ibid., 34, p.2062.
During a conference organised by Komitee Indonesië, Indonesisch Documentatie & Informatie Centrum [INDOC -- Indonesian Information and Documentation Centre] and Studie- and Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten [SIM -- Study and Information Centre Human Rights] all major political parties sent delegates to participate in a debate, a clear symptom that Komitee Indonesië had developed from an obscure pressure group whose political ties were restricted to small left wing parties, into a widely respected human rights defendant whose activities were acknowledged and appreciated by left and right alike. The unanimous opinion was that human rights were being violated systematically in Indonesia. Such consensus, with its potential implications for development aid marked a major shift in the opinion of policy makers, one that paved the road for more radical actions against human rights violations.  

In December 1990 Asia Watch reported that the situation in East Timor was worse than any time since the mid-eighties, a vision shared by Dutch policy makers in Foreign Affairs. And so the stage was set: deteriorating human rights conditions in East Timor had the full attention of a critical Second Chamber and a Minister for Development Co-operation who was using a policy theory which directly linked political human rights to development, and who was prepared to accept the consequences that such a perspective could have on

187 Ibid., 36, p.2326.
188 The conference, which saw the participation of all major political parties, was the culmination of actions organised by Komitee Indonesië in liaison with other NGOs. The actions helped to re-establish East Timor as an issue on the agenda of the major political parties, thus allowing Komitee Indonesië access to the centre of decision making. This helps explain the Second Chamber’s political diatribe on Indonesia following the Dili shooting.
189 Asia Watch, 1990.
development aid in case of serious human rights violations. All that was needed to cause a conflagration in relations with Indonesia was a spark.

Some spark it was when in November 1991 cameras filmed the brutal shooting of Timorese demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery by Indonesian soldiers, causing an international outcry. On 14 November the Indonesian Ambassador to the Netherlands was summoned over the shooting. His government was requested to investigate the incident thoroughly and to punish those who were responsible. The Indonesian government was also urged to give the Timorese who had been taken prisoner a humane treatment, to release the innocent, and to fully support an independent and impartial, and if necessary international investigation. Although Foreign Affairs’ expression of concern over the human rights situation in East Timor was unprecedented, the Department still refused to relate the violations to the denial of self-determination. Given Pronk’s policy theory, the political regime could have been identified as a structure impeding democratic development, casu quo, an execution of the right of self-determination. However, Foreign Affairs refused to adopt this theoretically correct, but for relations with Indonesia, devastating position.

At the initiative of the Netherlands’ chairmanship, foreign ministers of the European Community released a common statement that they were “deeply concerned over the incident...[and] condemned such violence.” A trial of the military in charge was also urged. The international situation seemed right to take tougher action against Indonesia.

190 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Jaarverslag Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1990.
192 Quoted from ibid.
On 21 November the Second Chamber debated the shooting in Dili. Beckers (Groen Links) set the trend for the rest of the debate. She rejected any Indonesian inquiry and instead demanded an impartial, international investigation into the shooting preferably conducted by the UN. Her position implied a rejection of Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty. Awaiting the findings she wanted to suspend all development aid to Indonesia. The Netherlands as chairman of IGGI and the European Community should ask other states to take a similar stand.¹⁹³

Van Gijzel (PvdA) had no faith in an Indonesian investigation either; besides East Timor was not an internal matter as the territory was a Portuguese mandate. He too wanted an inquiry carried out under UN authority, and, pending the outcome, no new aid projects should be started. Further the government should lobby other European Community members to follow suit. In East Timor, according to Van Gijzel, there was a “structural concatenation of severe incidents of human rights violations,”¹⁹⁴ a qualification he used to justify tough means in accordance with the human rights policy. The UN should send an international team to East Timor to supervise the situation for an indefinite spell. The government should take an initiative accordingly in the UN. Finally Van Gijzel wanted the European Community to impose an arms-embargo against Indonesia, to be maintained until the Timor problem had been solved.¹⁹⁵ Although he did not mention self-determination, his reasoning obviously envisaged an execution of self-determination as solution to the continuing human rights violations.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁹⁵ Ibid.
Terpstra (VVD) agreed that the shooting was not an isolated event, but part of a series of extremely serious incidents. She shied away from classifying the human rights violations as structural, but she too had no confidence in an Indonesian investigation. The Netherlands must take the initiative in IGGI, suddenly considered a suitable forum to deal with human rights after all, and the European Community to push for a truly impartial, and thus independent investigation.\footnote{Ibid.} The small Christian parties RPF and SGP were in favour of an international inquiry as well. D’66 accused the government of lethargy, to be ended through an initiative in IGGI and the European Community aimed at bringing about an international investigation. Awaiting the results no new aid-projects should be started.\footnote{Ibid.} Huibers, CDA spokesman on development co-operation, was more careful. The party endorsed the incisive condemnation by the European Community, but all that Huibers asked from the government was to lobby for a special UN representative to East Timor.\footnote{Ibid., p.1629.}

Minister for Foreign Affairs Van den Broek defended the measures taken so far. He did not want to speak a word of no confidence in the Indonesian investigative commission yet. Thus he wanted to reconsider the matter after the commission had finalised its report. Only then did he want to decide possible repercussions for bilateral relations.\footnote{Ibid.}

Pronk reported on a phone-call with Radius Prawiro, the Indonesian Minister of Planning and Economic Development, in which he had warned the latter for possible consequences
for development co-operation. He joined sides with Van den Broek regarding an investigation, but awaiting the findings the Netherlands would not offer any new aid-projects to Indonesia.²⁰⁰ Pronk promised to act as much as possible in concert with the IGGI partners.

Although Beckers was satisfied with this concession, she introduced a motion: “Considering the desirability of an independent international inquiry under auspices of the United Nations to investigate recent events in East Timor...invites the government to take steps to bring about such an inquiry.”²⁰¹ The motion received general support from the Chamber. Van den Broek warned that without consultation of the partners about an international investigation, such an action by the Netherlands could fail with effects that might be extremely damaging.

A few days later, in a reply to Weisglas, VVD’s spokesman on foreign affairs, Van den Broek reported that the international responses about an international inquiry were mixed.²⁰²

The Minister for Foreign Affairs suffered a heavy defeat in this debate, having to swallow a suspension of new aid as well as an unanimously supported motion demanding that the

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²⁰⁰ Although Pronk put forward the idea in the debate to temporarily suspend new aid-projects it was in fact Van den Broek who made this gesture during a pause in the debate, in an attempt to satisfy the Second Chamber and avoid a motion demanding an international investigation. Van Gijzel. Interview, The Hague, July 1993. Civil servants of DGIS did not agree with this conditioning of the aid, according to sources within the Department of Foreign Affairs. Allegedly Pronk’s communication with DGIS and Bureau Indonesië was insufficient in this period of tension, leaving him poorly advised. Bureau Indonesië maintained very frequent contact with DGIS and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who in turn would contact the Minister for Development Co-operation. But contact between the two Ministers is said to have been laborious.


government take steps to assure an international inquiry into the shooting. Human rights were thus drawn into the political sphere and for this the Minister for Development Co-operation received the Chamber's explicit support. At last development co-operation was used as a sanction, after the Second Chamber had ruled that the situation in East Timor complied with the criteria formulated in the human rights policy.

On 29 November Komitee Indonesië, supported by other human rights NGOs, wrote a letter to Van den Broek also urging him to push for an independent investigation and permission of human rights organisations to visit East Timor, as well as a guarantee that international law would be applied to those people who remained in detention. In his answer on 18 December 1991 the minister did not make any promises. Komitee Indonesië, however, did not see the need to develop any further significant lobbying activity towards parliament as it had already taken a critical stand.

In December an East Timor week was organised, a joint effort by Oost-Timor Groep Nederland and Komitee Indonesië. Participating NGOs included Nederlands Juristencommittee Mensenrechten (NJCM -- the Netherlands Committee Juridical Committee) and Pax Christi. The manifestation ended with a debate on 14 December in

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204 Yvette Lawson. Interview, Amsterdam, 16 June 1993.
205 Certain parties and their representatives were never approached since Komitee Indonesië considered that a waste of energy. Parliamentarians mentioned in this respect were Weisglas (VVD), and De Hoop Scheffer (CDA).
which politicians of three major parties were prepared once again to express publicly their concern about the human rights situation in East Timor.206

In a letter written on 20 January 1992 Van den Broek, on behalf of the government, called the preliminary report by the Indonesian investigative committee into the Dili-shootings hopeful. This judgement was motivated by the committee’s conclusions about the death-toll, which was higher than originally admitted. The presidential order to search for the missing persons and the ruling that the army had acted arbitrarily were positive signs as well. Also two generals had been demoted over the shooting. President Suharto had given his condolences to the victims and had stated his intention to prevent any repetition of events. Further minister Alatas had declared on 14 January that a representative of the Secretary-General would be welcome. The government would closely follow developments, but in the meantime discussions with Indonesia on aid for the coming year would start as planned in February. Should the UN Secretary-General not come to an agreement with the Indonesian authorities, then the Netherlands would contact its European Community partners to discuss any further steps.207 The minister thus failed to implement the motion of the Second

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206 The participants were Van Gijzel, Terpstra, and Eisma.
207 Letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Van den Broek, 20 January 1992, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1991-1992, 22300-V, no.72. The letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs is couched in placable terms, corresponding with the minister’s desire to deflate the issue, as advised by Bureau Indonesia. This Bureau favoured undoing the sanctions. The talks with the Indonesian government about the aid program would not touch on human rights and East Timor. The relations between Van den Broek and Pronk worsened, and their contact became limited to the Council of Ministers, where Pronk’s position was strong with the solid support of the Second Chamber for tough action. The row between the two ministers did affect the harmony of the Department of Foreign Affairs as well. According to certain voices within the Department the battlelines were not drawn along the functional divisions as one would expect. Rather Pronk’s position is described as having become increasingly isolated, with civil servants of DGIS disagreeing with the conditioning
Chamber regarding an international investigation. The Second Chamber saw no need to respond immediately, presumably partly because the UN representative had not tabled his report yet.

In February 1992 the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community repeated their concern over the fate of those people who had been taken prisoner and those who were still missing, but no further action was taken. The issue was starting to fade away, weakening the international position of the Netherlands, a fact not widely picked up by members of the Second Chamber.

In the same month Amnesty International claimed that the shooting at Santa Cruz was not an isolated incident, but a sign of a pattern of gross and systematic violations of human rights in East Timor. Amnesty demanded a firm response from the international community. An independent international inquiry should be held to investigate the shooting.

Van den Broek reported by letter to the Second Chamber about a talk he and Pronk had with the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26 February. Van den Broek told Alatas in that conversation that the Netherlands had regarded Indonesia’s reaction to the conclusions of the preliminary report positive, but he had underlined the importance of the conclusions of the representative of the UN Secretary-General, Amos Wako. Van den

of the aid. Allegedly Pronk did not enjoy the support of the DGIS-bureau on development co-operation with Indonesia. “Pronk’s personal policy within the Department was only buoyed by those civil servants supporting Pronk’s political party, PvdA.” This opinion is not undisputed, however, with Groen Links claiming that the Department was divided according to functional lines.
Broek had asked for additional information about the fate of the missing people and the trials against demonstrators and soldiers.

Pronk reported to have told Alatas that all Dutch political parties were very dismayed. He had emphasised the importance of a proper long-term policy and elucidated the decision of 21 November 1991 to suspend aid for new projects, in combination with the announcement of 20 January 1992 that discussions could go ahead after all. Alatas had expressed the Indonesian government’s objections against political conditions to economic aid. No decision had been taken about a resumption of Ministerial talks over aid, which were suspended indefinitely at the request of Indonesia.²⁰⁸

On 18 March 1992 the Committee for Development Co-operation of the Second Chamber debated the Timor issue with minister Pronk. Huibers (CDA) regarded the Indonesian investigation as a positive signal and was in favour of a resumption of talks about the aid program. He stressed that it was very important to continue the dialogue about human rights, and to hear about the fate of those people who were in prison or missing.

Van Gijzel (PvdA) acknowledged the positive signals, but these still had to be implemented. Once again he demanded an international inquiry, East Timor not being Indonesian territory. He expected the government to have the result of Mr. Wako’s investigation debated in the

²⁰⁸ Letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs van den Broek, 3 March 1992, Bijlagen Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1991-1992, 22300-V, no.91. Although human rights and East Timor would not have been on the agenda, Pronk wanted to visit Atjeh as chairman of IGGI. Although the request was later dropped, it might have been indigestible for the Indonesians and contributed to their response not to resume talks yet.
UN. Van Gijzel was also concerned about the tough reaction by the Indonesian military and the sacking of journalists.

Terpstra (VVD) was confused about the intentions of the policy: did the government want an independent investigation or not? In its opinion the government should resume talks about resumption of the aid program should Indonesia desire so, because of the encouraging signals. D’66 was also satisfied with the impact of international pressure; the aid dialogue could be resumed. GPV and Groen Links, however, remained opposed.

In his reply Van den Broek called the demand for an international inquiry premature, since both the Netherlands’ government and the European Community had urged Indonesia to find the missing people. Further, the Red Cross had been admitted to the prisoners, who were being treated well.209 Pronk reiterated that there were no specific political conditions for a resumption of the aid dialogue in the letter sent to the Second Chamber on 20 January 1992.210 Thus a growing number of parliamentarians saw no further need to push for an international inquiry, but the link between development aid and human rights was maintained, much to the displeasure of Indonesia.

On 19 March 1992 there was yet another debate in the Second Chamber about development co-operation with Indonesia. Although last year’s visit by Pronk to Indonesia formed the subject of debate, attention was focused on the events in Dili and the handling of

affairs after that tragedy. Sipkes (Groen Links) claimed that human rights were violated structurally in East Timor. She criticised the fact that human rights were only informally discussed in IGGI. A continuation of pressure on Indonesia was essential to bring about an improvement in the human rights situation. Terpstra (VVD) wanted to know if it would be possible to send European observers to the trials against people who participated in the protest march in Dili back in November. Huibers (CDA) pleaded for a dialogue instead of a constant threat to cease the aid-supply. Tommel (D'66) preferred a continuation of a frank discussion on human rights with Indonesia. According to Verspaget (PvdA), Indonesian dependency on aid offered the possibility to stimulate positive developments in the field of human rights. The Dutch government therefore had a clear duty. Events would prove her wrong.

Minister Pronk stressed that the government was playing a careful role and showing restraint because Indonesia was very sensitive to conditions being placed on aid because of its human rights record. Nevertheless human rights were an integral part of the developmental process, and as such an inherent element in Dutch aid-policy.\textsuperscript{211}

Indonesian diplomats followed the debate and sent an alarming message to Jakarta that parliament and minister continued to link human rights and development co-operation. The Indonesian embassy allegedly refused to pass on to Jakarta information provided by Foreign Affairs that explained the position of the Second Chamber and the policy of the

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 19 March 1992, 22300 and 22398.
government. President Suharto thus received incorrect information, allegedly based on poor translations of a complicated debate. Foreign Affairs, aware of its failed attempt to have the decision of the Second Chamber portrayed in its context in the report that was sent to Jakarta, raised the alarm with Pronk on 24 March, but the minister did not take the warning seriously.

Thus on 25 March 1992 Indonesia terminated the aid relationship with the Netherlands and dissolved IGGI. Pronk and Van den Broek announced the Indonesian decision in a letter to the Second Chamber. According to the ministers, the Indonesian government had claimed that the Netherlands’ policy since the Dili shooting had reminded Indonesia of the colonial past. Especially the decision of 21 November 1991 to suspend new aid projects even before the Indonesian commission of inquiry had reported, had peeved the Indonesians. There was also annoyance over the linkage of development-political conditions to the aid policy.

The Indonesian decision resulted in an immediate general revision of Dutch policy-theoretical ideas regarding the effectiveness of human rights policy, including human rights and development aid. The letter settled the dispute between Pronk and Van den Broek regarding the question who was in charge of human rights in foreign and development co-operation policy, as it explicitly reconfirmed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was in charge.

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212 Bureau Indonesië had almost non-stop contact with the Indonesian Ambassador to indicate that Pronk’s more extreme approach did not receive general support from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
214 Ibid.
charge of human rights. He would take a decision, on behalf of cabinet and on a case-by-case basis, which would try to prevent any unwanted rupture in the relations with the other state involved. Further the Minister for Foreign Affairs was the first responsible administrator for the implementation and explanation of the policy.\textsuperscript{215}

The media claimed that Pronk and Van den Broek disagreed over human rights and development aid given to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{216} Pronk's comment that he did not to expect that the aid-relationship with Indonesia would be restored -- "perhaps with the next political generation in Indonesia, but not before"-- only contributed to a further deterioration of the bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{217} Pronk would pay dearly for this comment, as CDA requested an emergency debate.

During this special debate in the Second Chamber on 2 April 1992, Beckers (Groen Links) expressed her fears that the cataclysmic developments in the relation with Indonesia would result in an adaptation of the policy: a return to quiet diplomacy. She blamed domestic reasons for Suharto’s decision. In her opinion Pronk’s interview in Dutch daily \textit{Algemeen Dagblad} had not contributed to an escalation of the conflict.

De Hoop-Scheffer, replacing Huibers as CDA’s speaker on Indonesia in this important debate, disagreed with her. He emphasised that CDA supported the content of policy, but

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{IFM}, vol.17, nos. 2-3, p.8; \textit{NRC}, 26 March 1992.
\textsuperscript{217} Quoted from \textit{Algemeen Handelsblad}, 28 March 1992.
disagreed with the presentation, style and tone of policy by the Minister for Development Co-operation. A cumulation of events, he added, had caused Indonesia’s reaction. De Hoop-Scheffer regarded Pronk’s desire to visit Atjeh in 1992 in his capacity as chairman of IGGI as a cause of irritation. Also his comment, in Algemeen Dagblad of 18 March, that Indonesia was a spoilt country, had contributed to Indonesian annoyance. In his latest interview Pronk had again disqualified the leaders of Indonesia. De Hoop-Scheffer strongly warned Pronk to refrain from any remarks that could cause more irritation in Indonesia, this to avoid further statements by CDA concerning the minister’s political position.

De Hoop-Scheffer did not stop here. Not only did he intend to deny Pronk any future role in relations with Indonesia, he also had fundamental changes of the policy in mind: a reconsideration of the implementation of the policy principles. Development co-operation should not be politicised, in the sense that it would become an independent instrument of foreign policy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was responsible for human rights policy, and his preferred instrument of quiet diplomacy had been effective in the past.

Van Gijzel (PvdA) acknowledged the usefulness of quiet diplomacy as instrument of human rights policy. Nevertheless he defended the policy as pursued by the government and initiated by the Second Chamber, which had been based on stronger means to exert pressure. He blamed this firm policy for Indonesia’s decision to end the aid relationship. Van Gijzel acknowledged the importance of relations with Indonesia. He also agreed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was responsible for diplomatic relations and human rights, but
the important relation between human rights and development co-operation was and should continue to be a common responsibility.

Tommel (D’66) was not surprised about Indonesia’s reaction, in the face of unanimous support for the tough approach to the shooting, right until the last debate. He disagreed with Pronk’s comments in *Algemeen Dagblad* but CDA’s response was overstated.

Weisglas, replacing Terpstra as VVD’s speaker on the issue of development co-operation, pointed out how damaging the events were for relations with Indonesia. He blamed disagreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the relation between human rights and development aid for the row. VVD supported the link, and had supported the government’s policy concerning the shooting. VVD would continue to adhere to the goals of this policy. The way the two ministers had publicly pursued this policy could have contributed to the irritation on the Indonesian side and Pronk’s comments were harsh. Weisglas wanted to concentrate on other elements in relations with Indonesia. Prevention of a further escalation of the conflict had priority. Therefore he wanted Pronk to disappear from the stage: the Minister for Foreign Affairs should manage relations in the future.

Van den Broek explained that the special nature of relations with Indonesia and sensitivity on the part of Indonesia’s leaders for the critical Dutch approach had contributed to the situation. Indonesia did not accept the linkage between human rights and development aid. Human rights could be discussed with Indonesia, but not in the context of development aid. Van den Broek would discuss with the Indonesian government how other relations could be
imbued. Human rights would also be discussed on that occasion. The minister did not want
do deny differences of opinion with Pronk, but said that the government had pursued one
policy. Pronk agreed, stating that the policy had been a cooperative effort; decisions had
been taken together. Weisglas, however, claimed that Pronk’s comments had rendered a
resumption of the aid-relationship impossible. Pronk thus received the black mark for the
debarcle of the stranded aid-relationship. In his reply Pronk only said that a disagreement
over the relation between aid and human rights was the cause.

In this debate CDA and VVD had closed their ranks and given Pronk a severe reprimand,
but matters went from bad to worse for Pronk. Van den Broek even tried to have the post
of Minister for Development Co-operation abolished altogether. Not surprisingly Pronk
disagreed and Van den Broek’s attempt failed.

A flurry of diplomatic activity was developed in months following the fall out, with Van den
Broek trying to pick up the pieces of a marrered relationship during a visit to Indonesia in
July. Indicating their continued commitment to the policy pursued immediately after the Dili-
shooting, Van Gijzel, Terpstra, Beckers-de Bruijn and Tommel asked the Minister for
Foreign Affairs his opinion about the Indonesian investigation and how he would respond to
the committee’s report. Van den Broek only declared to have expressed the European
Community’s concern in talks with Alatas and to have discussed Indonesia’s policy since 12

218 The differences between Van den Broek and Pronk have a longer history than the
conflict over the policy following the Dili shooting. Co-ordination of policy was problematic
as early as 1990. A special Committee-session was held on 3 May 1990 to solve the
trouble between the two. IFM, vol.15, nos.4/5, p.19.
219 De Telegraaf, 4 April 1992.
November 1991. The minister was back to his old form of diplomacy behind closed doors. He ignored all other questions and failed to provide any details.²²¹

15. The period 1989-1992: Conclusions

The extensive discussion showed that in a coalition cabinet different ideological views increase the risk of a difference of opinion between ministers. When two such ministers share responsibility for a single policy field, as was the case with human rights and East Timor, and the departmental structure allows for a reflection of those disagreements, as was the case in the diarchically organised Department of Foreign Affairs, comprising parallel hierarchical structures of foreign affairs and development co-operation, the intra-cabinet policy dispute exceeds its narrow boundaries and the number of actors that through involvement becomes influential increases vastly. A foreign policy model aiming to understand and explain Dutch policy conducted after the Dili-shooting should therefore take into account the various social forces: what alliances did these pressure groups form and how were they linked to the policy making centre. An analysis purely focused on the centre would fail to acknowledge the contribution of pressure groups and parliament to goals and means of policy. The Timor case provides ample evidence in support of this conclusion.

Although the foreign minister gave a clear diplomatic signal of concern to the Indonesian government, parliament, thereto encouraged by the media and well established human rights NGOs, in particular Amnesty International and Komitee Indonesië, used the radical Minister for Development Co-operation to put in place a series of more drastic measures all in agreement with the official policy means as formulated in the 1979 Bill on human rights and foreign policy, but hitherto never applied to the East Timor case.

The balance of power shifted again when the international environment, that is Indonesia, took strong and unexpected sanctions against the Netherlands, removing the stick used by the more radical group of human rights advocates headed by the Minister for Development Co-operation. Effectively excluding his involvement with Indonesia, the more conservative group in the Department of Foreign Affairs, probably supported by the Department of Economic Affairs, and employers' organisations, regained control. NGOs lost their key player -- the Minister for Development Co-operation -- who was no longer directly involved with Indonesia, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs re-established his prerogative concerning human rights policy. International events created the opportunity for a tougher stand on human rights, but in the end also destroyed it.
Chapter VII

Australian Foreign Policy and the Timor case: 1974-1992

When Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 the Netherlands had profound reasons not to take a strong line and subsequently the matter did not become a major issue in the media or politics. Australia, more so than the Netherlands, was confronted with a dilemma. There was a need to preserve the important relations with its nearest Asian neighbour, but this state denied the East Timorese the right to self-determination and committed large scale violations of human rights in a territory that was geographically close and emotionally dear to Australian war veterans; to other Australians Timor was still relatively unknown. As will be shown the Indonesian invasion caused an initial outcry in Australia, but the government gradually softened its opposition and accepted the takeover, although Timor support groups have consistently protested against this policy. The chapter will explain why Australian policy makers accepted Indonesia’s illegal regime in East Timor and paid so little interest to self-determination and human rights.

1. Whitlam and the Timor question

Until 1974 Portuguese Timor was a relatively unknown colonial remnant. Although during the West New Guinea crisis there had been concern about Indonesia’s intentions, the Australian government was not suspicious as the Indonesian government had repeatedly guaranteed that it
had no territorial claims to Portuguese Timor which had never been part of the Dutch East Indies.¹

In Australia the Timor question was therefore regarded as a colonial issue, which, given the rapid worldwide dismantling of colonialist regimes in the early 1960s, had to be addressed. Some examples may substantiate this assertion. The 1963 ALP Federal Conference called for the end of Portuguese colonialist rule and on 9 July 1963, Gough Whitlam, whose policy as Prime Minister in 1974 and 1975 would be strikingly different and decisive for Australia’s later policy, declared during a speech: “The right to self-determination of the Timorese must be fully granted. Our allies hesitate to speak because they are also Portugal’s allies in NATO; we are not so embarrassed.”² The ALP’s commitment, however, was dropped after the 1966 Conference,³ but the implications of this decision for self-determination were unclear. The Whitlam Government’s vote in favour of resolution 2918 (XXVII), tabled 14 November 1972, which reaffirmed “the inalienable right of the people of...other Territories under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence”⁴ forms yet forms another example that shows that even in office Whitlam continued to support application of the principle of self-

¹ Indonesian officials particularly stressed this point during the crisis over West New Guinea. But even in June 1974 foreign minister Malik made no territorial claim when he told Ramos Horta of the Associacao Social Democratica de Timor (ASDT) that “the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor.” Quoted from Helen Hill, *The Timor Story*, 2nd edn., Fitzroy, Vic., Timor Information Service, 1976, p.5.
⁴ Helen Hill, op. cit., p.3.
determination to Portuguese Timor. The Department of Foreign Affairs reiterated this position in 1973.\(^5\)

However, this apparent support for self-determination should be seen in the context of Prime Minister Whitlam’s general policy aimed at promoting Australia’s economic and political interests in the region and restoring the trusting relations with Indonesia that were, according to Whitlam,\(^6\) established in the late 1940s and badly damaged by Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over West New Guinea. In order to achieve these goals Whitlam focused on building a personal relationship with President Suharto, attributing to himself a main role as architect and executive in Australia’s policy making towards Indonesia. Whitlam’s personal goals and actions as Prime Minister were major factors in directing and conditioning Australia’s policy regarding Timor’s decolonisation.

Throughout 1974 the situation in Portuguese Timor changed rapidly, something that went unnoticed to the Australian public, since the press, absent when the Portuguese were in control, paid little attention to these developments.\(^7\) The Australian government of course had its own sources of information and would have been thoroughly briefed. Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) and Associacao Social Democratica Timor (ASDT), which changed its name to Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin) in September 1974, were fledgling

\(^5\) 15 July 1973, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, p.72.
political groups demanding independence from Portugal. Initially the Australian government did not seem opposed to the idea of an independent East Timor, and the Indonesia Desk of Foreign Affairs in Canberra advised to give aid to Portuguese Timor. However, when ASDT representative Ramos Horta visited Australia in July 1974 asking for support for Timorese independence, the government refused, a bad omen.

Whitlam’s talks with President Suharto on 5-7 September 1974 in Java were a turning-point in the government’s policy, but since the issue had not yet assumed significance in Australian party politics, this redirection with far reaching consequences for future Australian policy, caused no public and political protest in Australia. Until this fatal meeting self-determination had been Foreign Affairs’ and foreign minister Don Willesee’s main policy objective. Whitlam’s Departmental brief confirmed this policy line, but during the discussions in Indonesia Whitlam put his stamp on the policy, changing the order of importance of policy goals. He ruled that since an independent East Timor would not be viable economically and could pose a security

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9 Hill, op. cit., p.5.
10 Hill’s claim that the Indonesia desk of Foreign Affairs advocated integration casts doubt about the firmness with which the Department would have followed its policy line.
threat to the region, integration by peaceful means into Indonesia was the most desirable solution, but the East Timorese should have the ultimate say on their future.\(^\text{12}\)

Whitlam kept the content of the conversation with Suharto to himself, leaving Willesee, and other members of cabinet unaware of his executive decision to emphasise peaceful integration instead of self-determination.\(^\text{13}\) Whitlam was claimed to have been restrained from going public on the issue out of fear for a rekindling of the Threat-from-the-North doctrine, something he abhorred in itself and diplomatically damaging to Australia.\(^\text{14}\) Also Australia’s record of unrealistic opposition and empty posturing during the West New Guinea conflict is said to have influenced him: no repeat of that hypocrisy and humiliation! Finally Whitlam also would have feared an outbreak of ideological opposition from within the ALP towards Indonesia, which would have damaged the government electorally.\(^\text{15}\)

With Australian media interest in Timor’s decolonisation increasing, the leaking of Whitlam’s brief to his Departmental staff upon his return from Indonesia made headlines as the Canberra Times published it on 9 September 1974: “Whitlam is understood to have indicated Australia felt an independent Timor would not be a viable state and a potential threat to the stability of the area. But he is also thought to have made clear that the people of the colony should have the


\(^{14}\) Viviani, op. cit., pp.200-201.
Thus it became common knowledge that the official policy diverged from the policy as pursued privately by Whitlam. As Whitlam had feared, the issue left the ALP divided. The party’s right wing backed Whitlam while left wingers supported Willesee’s preference for self-determination. Whitlam’s strong constitutional prerogatives gave him easily the upper hand over his adversaries in the party, but this would not protect him against stinging attacks from the opposition, who were familiar with Labor’s intra party controversy over the policy, and the inconsistency between Whitlam’s public and private policy.

Whitlam, however, was not without allies. In a background report dated 11 September 1974 Foreign Affairs discussed Indonesia’s strategic concerns over East Timor, sharing Whitlam’s doubts about the economic viability of an independent state. The Indonesian government’s anxiety was well understood. The authors advised that the government should “share [Indonesia’s] belief that a voluntary union of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia on the basis of an internationally accepted act of self-determination, would seem to serve the objective of decolonisation....and stability of the region.”

With an influential section of Foreign Affairs endorsing Whitlam’s ideas, the Prime Minister’s policy line prevailed over the views publicly stated by his foreign minister and elements within the Department of Defence which were allegedly opposed to integration, preferring an independent state rather than a potentially

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15 Tiffen, op. cit., p.176.
16 Quoted from Viviani, op. cit., p.199. Viviani regards the quote as accurate since Whitlam never denied or amended it.
17 Renouf, op. cit., p.446.
18 Quoted from Nicol, pp.275-276.
dangerous big neighbour as successor of the Portuguese administration.\textsuperscript{19} Whitlam dismissed these views circulating amongst a ‘small faction’ in the Department of Defence as an attempt to form a security enclave within the Indonesian archipelago, this in order to compensate for past frustration over the failure to keep West New Guinea out of Indonesia’s hands.\textsuperscript{20} There was some truth in Whitlam’s reasoning as Defence authorities, ever since the Japanese onslaught in 1942 along the Kokoda Trail near Port Moresby, had cultivated a fear of an Asian threat to Australia coming from the North. Given Whitlam’s low regard for this strategic analysis, he would not have weighed this view seriously in his decision making.

In the face of the serious situation -- for a detailed account of all major events in Portuguese Timor in 1974 and 1975 see Chapter I -- Horta again travelled to Australia in December 1974 to see Willesee but not surprisingly given the government’s internal disagreement he received no guarantees of support.

Australian community support was more forthcoming and the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) was formed.\textsuperscript{21} The group tried to increase public awareness, and lobbied members of parliament. CIET firmly and consistently backed Fretilin. Its campaign was run by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). Support CIET received mainly from the small CPA and the political Left Wing in the ALP, this of course did not ameliorate Fretilin’s reputation in Australia. CIET’s left-wing origin and orientation alienated potential allies, such as Australian

\textsuperscript{19} Hill, op cit., p.6.
\textsuperscript{20} Whitlam, \textit{The Whitlam Government}, p.110.
Council For Overseas Aid (ACFOA)\(^{22}\) and Timor war veterans, and increased opposition from groups and people not principally opposed to nationalist movements, but wary of any such groups associated with the Communist ideological foe, particularly when these were active in an area considered important to Australia’s security.\(^{23}\) Nevertheless Horta had managed to establish a bridgehead in Australia, which would guarantee the issue a place on the Australian foreign affairs agenda.

Although the co-operation between UDT and Fretilin had calmed the situation in Timor a leaked report by the Australian Department of Defence asserted that an Indonesian intervention would take place in January or February 1975.\(^ {24}\) Indonesian foreign affairs minister Adam Malik contributed to this scare by openly declaring that integration was the only solution for Portuguese Timor.\(^ {25}\) This alarming news triggered off a process of growing media attention and political awareness in Australia. Responding to articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)* on 21 February and *The Age* on 22 February 1975 which reported Indonesia’s apparent

\(^{21}\) Jolliffe, op. cit., p.249.

\(^{22}\) ACFOA is the co-ordinating body of a number of Australian NGOs working in the field of aid and development. ACFOA often serves as an intermediary, making representations on behalf of those NGOs keen to address protests to the government regarding East Timor and West Papua. Comment by Pat Walsh. Interview, August 1995.

\(^{23}\) Max Lane distinguishes three different sources of community support for East Timor, each going their own way. Besides CIET, ACFOA and Community Aid Abroad (CAA) were active, the latter group being the more involved and more radical. The third group consisted of people with personal and historical attachment such as Mrs. Shackleton, James Dunn, and war veterans; they were only loosely organised. Max Lane. Interview, 26 April 1996, Sydney.

\(^{24}\) Hill, op. cit., p.8.

intentions to intervene militarily in Portuguese Timor,\textsuperscript{26} opposition spokesman on foreign affairs Andrew Peacock (LP) initiated a parliamentary debate on East Timor’s future. This brought the matter to the forefront of Australian foreign policy. Peacock urged the government to become more involved in finding a solution in accordance with the wishes of the East Timorese. In particular he wanted to secure a “just and democratic determination of the future of the people of East Timor, through a free act of self-determination.”\textsuperscript{27} Peacock, disqualifying both Indonesia and Australia as parties principal, advocated an Australian initiative to bring the quarrelling Timorese parties together: the government ought to restrain Indonesia from intervention. Although Peacock confirmed the importance of good relations with Indonesia, he also wanted to ensure a democratic future for East Timor through an act of self-determination. Peacock set the stage for future controversy, accusing Whitlam of having approved an Indonesian takeover during the meeting with Suharto in September 1974.\textsuperscript{28}

The thankless task of defending the government’s position in the House, as minister representing the foreign minister, was left to the Minister for Science, a former diplomat in Southeast Asia, Morrison. He emphasised the importance of Australian-Indonesian relations and his reluctance to be drawn into a debate which jeopardised these. He put the official policy on record, but this did little good since the debate was about Whitlam’s own secret and deviant policy agenda. Whitlam’s absence from the House of Representatives was significant and turned the defence of

\textsuperscript{26} Tiffen, op. cit., p.166.
\textsuperscript{27} Quoted Peacock, House of Representatives, 25 February 1975, p.640.
\textsuperscript{28} Peacock claimed that a Foreign Affairs summation of Whitlam’s discussion substantiated this account of affairs. Ibid., p.642.
the policy into a hollow farce. According to Morrison the government would accept integration only after the Timorese had expressed a wish for it in an internationally recognised act of self-determination. To this end the government supported a “measured and deliberate process of decolonisation in Portuguese Timor leading to an internationally accepted act of self-determination.”

Morrison believed that the political maturity which would allow for an act of self-determination to take place had not been reached yet, but the government had made it ‘very clear’ to Indonesia that Australia would be ‘seriously concerned’ by any unilateral action of Indonesia which would prevent such a future act of self-determination. Morrison, however, refused to provide any evidence to substantiate this claim, using diplomatic confidentiality as an excuse. Thus he put off parliamentarians with an answer, that denied them any real insight into policy goals of the government and efforts at implementation.

In March 1975 a delegation of six ALP backbenchers -- referred to by Whitlam as backbench partisans of Fretilin -- visited Timor and concluded that independence of the territory was desirable. Not surprisingly, given Whitlam’s hostile position, their views carried no weight since both Whitlam and Foreign Affairs rejected the delegation’s suggestion to reopen the Australian consulate, closed in the 1960s.

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29 Quoted from ibid., 25 February 1975, p.644.
30 Ibid., p.645.
31 Whitlam, op. cit., p.110.
32 Taylor, op. cit., p.5.
Following the outbreak of inter-party fighting in East Timor in August 1975 Peacock moderated his stand during the latter half of 1975 to the point where it almost corresponded with the government’s, showing growing understanding and concern for Indonesia’s interests. Like the ALP, the Liberal Party was divided over the Timor issue, something that would be reflected in its policy in 1976. While still in opposition Peacock balanced his concern over self-determination with the need to maintain good relations with Indonesia. In contrast with Fraser and the leader of the National Country Party, Doug Anthony, who, being consumed by fear of having a communist bulwark just North of Australia, with the potential to destabilise the region and threaten Australia’s security, on one occasion expressed their view that Indonesia should have the freedom to intervene.

In April 1975 Suharto met Whitlam in Townsville where he gave an assurance that Indonesia did not want to incorporate Portuguese Timor. The Defence Department, had again expressed its security concerns in the Prime Minister’s brief. In particularly it feared that the issue “might develop in such a way as to substantially impair the friendly relations between [Australia and Indonesia], and to identify Australia in Indonesian eyes as an adversary.” According to Whitlam he agreed with President Suharto that the Portuguese should stay for some time to

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33 Whitlam scornfully dismissed his own party’s delegation as: “Some backbench Fretilin partisans...accompanied by a candidate from the far right of the NSW Liberal Party.” Quoted from Gough Whitlam, op. cit., p.110.


come in order to give the local people some experience in administration, but he blamed Portuguese irresponsibility and the intransigence of the Timorese parties for frustrating this opportunity. Understandably then to Whitlam, Suharto rejected independence outright only months after their meeting.

Of major importance for the direction of Australia’s foreign policy was the advice given by the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott. A series of cables which would be leaked in January 1976, much to the embarrassment of Woolcott and also Whitlam and his government, disclosed the sensitive nature of his advice, which formed a classical case of realism prevailing over moralism. On 12 August 1975 Woolcott cabled Canberra that the East Timorese were in no condition to exercise a right of self-determination, and he warned that the longer the conflict went on the higher the risk of Chinese or Soviet involvement. These two facts, he concluded, supported the idea of integration into Indonesia. On 17 August Woolcott warned that the Indonesian government was not prepared to accept the risks involved in an independent East Timor, and he did not think that the Australian government could change this opinion. It would therefore be best for Australia to disengage from the issue as much as possible, and, “if and when Indonesia does intervene, act in a way which would be designed to

36 Quoted from a minute from Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, 9 October 1975, Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-1975, J.R. Walsh & G.J. Munster, Hongkong, 1980.
37 Whitlam, op.cit., p.108.
38 Woolcott himself admitted that he was recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand, “but that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.” Quoted from Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-1975, p.200.
39 Ibid., p.193.
minimise public impact in Australia and show privately understanding. In Woolcott’s judgement the potential economic benefits flowing from an agreement on the sea border, which was more likely to be reached with Indonesia than with Portugal, outweighed any defence concerns.

In spite of this secret advice from Woolcott, Whitlam publicly continued to support the people’s right to determine East Timor’s future, while also expressing understanding for Indonesia’s interests. However, when he commented on the coup by UDT on 11 August 1975 (see Chapter I for an account of events) he was mindful of his Ambassador’s advice, declaring that the territory should not become a source of instability.

With East Timor by now receiving ample attention from the Australian media, the coverage of events would have a lasting impact on Australian public opinion. Whitlam, however, was not receptive to press reports. Press coverage upset the quiet political consensus and put the issue firmly on the agenda, defining it in terms of self-determination, aggression and appeasement.

On 26 August Whitlam finally made a statement in the House in which he rejected any Australian involvement in the decolonisation process in Timor, Australia not being a party principal. He declared that the Australian government had been in contact with other governments, but he refused to accept any political obligation to mediate. His first objective was

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41 See Tiffen, op. cit., p.162.
42 Ibid., p.181.
to put an end to the fighting which had broken out between Fretilin and UDT after the latter party’s coup on 11 August, and to restore order, but this responsibility rested mainly on Portugal. Although Portugal was clearly in no position to bring about such a result, Whitlam refused to come to its aid.\footnote{House of Representatives, 26 August 1975, pp.491-493.}

Peacock used the opportunity to score some easy points, upbraiding the government for being passive in the face of a situation entailing potential danger for Australian security. Peacock suggested involving the UN and ASEAN. Cabinet’s internal division was once again a serious handicap as Peacock used his knowledge of this to explain and attack the government’s unprincipled and wavering efforts to smother the problem.\footnote{Ibid., pp.509-510.} Whitlam’s desire to minimise his exposition of foreign policy in parliament backfired in this situation. Since he did not re-enter the discussion Peacock had a free ride which damaged the government’s credibility: a clear example where secrecy in case of a divided policy making centre has the potential to weaken the centre’s position vis-a-vis its policy making periphery.

Not only the opposition attacked Whitlam’s record but also members of the ALP who had visited Timor -- this is highly unusual given that strict party discipline is required from Caucus members. They expressed their discontent with his policy in a letter, accusing him of being
unrealistic to expect that the Portuguese could re-establish their own control: Australia ought to
mediate, they argued.\textsuperscript{35}

Internal disagreement in the opposition camp offered the government some protection,
preventing more stinging attacks by Peacock, who, in October, resumed his accusation that
Whitlam had failed to take any diplomatic initiatives.\textsuperscript{46} Again Whitlam’s refusal to enter into a full
policy debate or to make a comprehensive policy statement -- the last one was made in May 1973
-- allowed rumours to prevail in parliament, further weakening the government and
Whitlam’s own position.

Internally the government bureaucracy remained divided over the best strategy for dealing with
the East Timor problem in the wider context of Australia’s political and security interests with
Indonesia. On 9 October the Strategic and International Policy Division of the Department of
Defence sent a minute to its minister Bill Morrison, the former Minister for Science, which
opposed the policy consistently advocated by Ambassador Woolcott in his cables to Foreign
Affairs and Whitlam. In this minute Bill Pritchett, First Assistant Secretary, took issue with
Woolcott’s revamped realist assessment of the meaning of Indonesia to Australia’s security and
especially its economy, opting instead for the traditional analysis regarding the meaning of a
potentially powerful and populous Asian neighbour for Australia’s security. Pritchett saw in
Indonesia a potential threat and wanted that country to shift from a policy of confrontation to

\textsuperscript{35} Russell Skelton, \textit{The Age}, 28 August 1975.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 2 October 1975, p.1660.
one of co-operation, allowing self-determination in Portuguese Timor. He feared that “the issue...might develop....to substantially impair the friendly relations between [Australia and Indonesia], and to identify Australia in Indonesian eyes as an adversary....with erosion of mutual confidence essential to our long-term defence interests.”

Although predicated upon a conservative doctrine, these conclusions proved prophetic. Pritchett went on to stress that the government had pursued incompatible objectives: Portuguese Timor should be peacefully integrated into Indonesia but the people of East Timor should approve integration through a genuine act of self-determination. In the face of strong local support for Fretilin he warned that integration by coercion would result in a prolonged guerilla struggle; an outcome that both Australia and Indonesia needed to acknowledge.

Defence also took issue with Woolcott’s argument that Australian domestic pressure could and, in Australia’s long-term interests, should be contained. Fearing a conflict with Indonesia if Australia’s policy did not reflect reality, Defence consistently suggested acceptance of an independent East Timor. This argument re-established the link between Australia’s security and the right to self-determination for a population engaged in a process of decolonisation. Whitlam, remembering the strained relations with Indonesia at the time of the West New Guinea crisis in the early 1960s, rejected this theory. Instead he preferred to build a solid relationship with Indonesia based on shared economic and political interests. An unstable, economically not viable, and Marxist oriented state, would only obstruct and contradict these aims. Defence’s

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47 Quoted from Aarons, op. cit., pp.20-22.
48 Ibid.
analysis was therefore not acceptable to Whitlam, who preferred to handle the matter diplomatically and with minimal involvement from outsiders, whose criticism could damage relations with Indonesia.

On 16 October 1975 the unexplained death under suspicious circumstances of an entire team of journalists working for Australian broadcasting companies while on a mission in East Timor caused the general outrage in Australia that Whitlam had feared most. The incident turned the media permanently against Indonesian operations in Timor, and increased public awareness of the problems on Timor. The Indonesian army was accused of the killing, but an Indonesian investigation did not discover the truth. For obvious reasons, neither the Whitlam nor the Fraser Governments put any pressure on the Indonesian government to have a serious investigation into the deaths of the journalists. These deaths, attributed to the Indonesian army, probably contributed much to Fretilin’s popularity in Australia. An opinion poll showed that two-thirds of the Australian population were in favour of independence for East Timor, and there was a two to one majority opposed to a military takeover by Indonesia even if a left wing group would gain control in East Timor.\(^4\)

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In parliament on 30 October 1975 Willesee refused to implicate Indonesia and merely deplored the fighting in the border region. He hoped for a peaceful solution without external intervention. These thoughts, he said, had been conveyed to the Indonesian government.  

Peacock continued to moderate his stand and showed understanding for Indonesia’s feelings of uneasiness about the destabilising effects of the conflict. Appreciating the importance of relations with Indonesia, Peacock, in early November 1975, concluded that the solution to the conflict had to be acceptable to Indonesia -- a cryptic statement given the advanced state of the conflict and Indonesia’s military involvement. Peacock further continued to upbraid the government for standing idly by and making Indonesia’s position more difficult. In a statement on 26 November as caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs, after the change of government on 11 November, Peacock made stronger allegations. He admitted that Indonesia had been reluctant to intervene militarily, and Whitlam’s refusal to become involved in Timor’s problems was to blame for Indonesia’s intervention. The argument that Whitlam had missed opportunities to stop Indonesia and safeguard a process in which the people of East Timor could peacefully engage in an act of self-determination would in the years to come serve as justification for the Fraser Government to acquiesce in Indonesia’s integration of East Timor without a proper act of self-determination.

50 Senate, 30 October 1975, pp.1609-1610.
51 Peacock, op. cit., p.7.
2. The Fraser Government and Indonesia’s invasion and integration of East Timor

Before Indonesia took the plunge into the unknown of military invasion, Australia had become embroiled in a constitutional crisis in which the Whitlam Government was sacked by the Governor-General. Malcolm Fraser was appointed Prime Minister of the caretaker government, and a double dissolution of the House and Senate and federal elections followed. The consequence was that neither the House nor the Senate could directly debate Indonesia’s invasion. Development of a policy response was entirely up to the caretaker government. With the nation deeply divided over the Whitlam Government’s removal from office, East Timor -- a sensitive issue to both parties in the first place -- did not make headlines in the election campaign. Just days after the invasion Fraser celebrated an overwhelming election victory, ending the constitutionally imposed limitations on the government. Peacock became the new Minister for Foreign Affairs.

These remarkable political events in Australia formed the context against which the drama in East Timor unfolded. Without these events, there would have been more political, media, and public attention which could have brought more pressure on the Australian government to respond more strongly than it did. At least the government would have had the authority to put in place policies of its own, rather than limit its activities to management of the existing policies.
Keeping in mind these unique circumstances the outline of events in Timor and Australia’s response will be continued.

In late November a fast succession of events heralded the final act of the drama of Timor’s decolonisation. On 28 November 1975 Fretilin declared independence, to which UDT and Apodeti responded by signing a declaration of integration with Indonesia, an indication that an invasion was imminent. Malik declared that it was Indonesia’s intention to fight, warning Ambassadors not to be surprised by developments that might take place in Timor. Caretaker foreign minister Peacock took the precaution of evacuating all Australian citizens just days before Indonesia launched an all-out invasion on 7 December 1975.

Although Australia was in the middle of a bitter election campaign various protest marches were organised in response to the invasion, but the number of participants was quite small. Bob Hawke, president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), condemned Indonesia’s intervention, and a ban on the handling of Indonesian-registered ships was imposed. ACFOA called on the government to cease all military aid to Indonesia. These protests were not very successful as the response of the main political parties, embattled in the election campaign and reluctant to make an issue of this difficult matter, was very weak, even though a few ALP Representatives were supportive of the Timorese cause.

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53 Hill, op. cit., p.17.
54 Ibid., p.18.
As caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs, Peacock condemned the invasion on 8 December 1975, calling for an immediate cease-fire but not demanding an Indonesian withdrawal. This implied that he could at least to some extent understand Indonesia’s need to intervene. The impact of this condemnation was further limited through a message allegedly sent by Fraser to Suharto in November, in which he had expressed the desire to find a solution appropriate to Indonesia’s interests and pledged that Australia would continue to seek close relations with Indonesia.56

The international response in the UN was swift and firm. Only days after the invasion UNGA adopted resolution 3485 (XXX) which called upon:

Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory, in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence...[it also called upon] all states to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence and to determine their future political status in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The phrasing of the resolution reconfirmed self-determination as the right course to follow in a process of decolonisation. Thus Indonesia’s invasion was regarded as an unwarranted interference, which explains the strong support for the resolution. Australia was among the 72 members voting in favour; the US and most European countries abstained. Apparently Fraser

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56 Twaney, op. cit., p.33.
and Peacock decided to support the resolution, against the advice of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. An angry protest by the Indonesian Ambassador followed.

On 22 December the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 384 couched in similar
terms. On 22 April 1976 the Security Council, in response to the findings of a UN envoy sent to
Timor, repeated its call in resolution 389, but on this occasion the US abstained. The Australian
representative demanded an immediate cease-fire and a peaceful process of self-determination
in which the UN would play an institutionalised role. He further suggested the appointment of a
special representative of the Secretary-General to undertake an on the spot assessment and
submit a report with recommendations as to further action.

The Fraser Government came under fire for its reaction from the Ford Administration who
urged it to come to terms with the reality of integration. Woolcott too undertook to persuade the
government to accept the inevitability of East Timor’s incorporation. In his opinion steps should
be taken to limit any further growth of hostility towards Indonesia within the Australian
community. Nevertheless Peacock remained committed to the initial policy approach when he
met Malik in Jakarta on 19-20 January. He conveyed Australia’s ideas regarding a UN

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57 Fraser wanted to show that Australia could act independently of its allies. Peacock’s tough
stand met with mounting opposition, even from among his own advisers such as Woolcott. Ibid.,
p.42.
59 Cable sent by Woolcott in January 1976 which was leaked. Viviani, ‘Australians and the
Timor Issue: II, p.246.
representative who was to visit East Timor, and Peacock demanded immediate access for the
International Red Cross.\textsuperscript{60}

Prime Minister Fraser was also travelling in Southeast Asia at this time. Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Kwan Yew’s concern -- he feared that Indonesia’s action might become a
precedent for the settlement of other territorial disputes -- impressed Fraser, who expressed
support for the continuation of Peacock’s so-called four principle policy.\textsuperscript{61} The policy entailed a
call for cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, a genuine act of self-
determination and supply of aid through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In the House, on 24 February 1976, Peacock repeated his four policy principles and explained
that in order to achieve these goals the government had supported multilateral moves and held
bilateral talks with the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{62} Peacock again reconfirmed his policy in
parliament on 4 March during his first Ministerial speech on foreign policy. On this occasion he
vowed to continue to pursue the issue, but he made the reservation that it should not lead to a
breakdown in relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{63}

Substantial parliamentary attention to the East Timor issue was first paid during a general debate
on the Governor-General’s speech. On that occasion the Coalition seemed divided into a group

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p.245.
\textsuperscript{61} Twaney, op. cit., p.47.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 4 March 1976, p.568.
willing to support the government, and a group who wanted to abandon all criticism of Indonesia, fearing Fretilin as a communist movement. John Martyr (LP) was most outspoken, and, suspecting a conspiracy, berated the communist orientation and membership of various Australian Timor groups.\footnote{Ibid., 23 March 1976, pp.922-924. John Martyr (LP) received support from John Sullivan (LP/NCP), albeit in more moderate terms.} Faced with attacks on the Whitlam Government, Labor Members only interjected that Fretilin was merely a nationalist movement fighting for the principle of self-determination.\footnote{See speech by Kenneth Fry (ALP), ibid., pp.1082-1083.} The debate was no more than a series of statements and it failed to reach any bipartisan conclusion. Only a few members felt the desire to touch upon the sensitive issue.

The ALP’s role in opposition on East Timor was severely hampered by its internal disagreement and the Whitlam Government’s own record. The party was still split into a Whitlam camp, which wanted to accept the takeover, and a Willesee camp, the majority of Caucus, which preferred to give the Timorese self-determination. Whitlam’s recalcitrant behaviour, using every conceivable means to delay or avoid a discussion of Timor and an investigation into his own contribution as Prime Minister, was an issue of growing contention in the ALP.\footnote{In his diaries Clyde Cameron deals extensively with the East Timor issue and Whitlam’s involvement. He discusses an article in the \textit{National Times} of 18 July 1976 by Michael Richardson which outlined the discussions between Whitlam and Suharto in Bali and Townsville. The author, using those sources, claims that Malik’s opposition to interference was undermined by Whitlam’s advance compliance with integration. According to Richardson, Whitlam’s attitude denied Canberra any future initiatives to deflect Indonesia from occupying East Timor. Also Richardson claimed that Whitlam did not inform Willesee, or any officials in Foreign Affairs other than a very small inner circle, of the nature of his conversation with Suharto. Thus Richardson puts a large part of the blame for Australia’s poor record on East Timor on Whitlam, a view which Cameron seems to support wholeheartedly. Clyde Cameron, \textit{The Cameron Diaries}, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990, pp.223-224.} Whitlam
formed a major impediment to an effective and credible opposition, a master card repeatedly and successfully played by Peacock who threatened in the House to disclose discreditable information about Whitlam’s record. These tactics effectively silenced voices criticising the government for being too soft on Indonesia.

In May 1976 the House again discussed the Timor issue at the initiative of Tom Uren, Deputy Leader of the Opposition and a former minister in the Whitlam Government. Backed by an ALP Federal Executive decision of 30 January to support self-determination, a policy also approved by the ALP Caucus on 31 March 1976, Uren demanded that the government use all available means to ensure that an act of self-determination would take place. Mentioning a massive death toll, he criticised the government for failing to push the issue, and take a more active stand.67

Coalition Representatives effectively parried Uren’s attack by pointing to the ‘abysmal’ record of the Whitlam Government, but also reconfirmed their commitment to the four point policy, but only when this would not result in a deterioration of relations with Indonesia. In this respect they referred to Australia’s vulnerable position given its regional isolation over the Timor issue.68 Remarkably, though not unusual in Australian politics, Peacock, the minister in charge, did not even participate in the discussion, which saw both government and opposition close ranks, leading to a deadlock. Since the debate was an urgency debate or a ‘discussion of a matter of

68 David Connolly (LP) in the House. Ibid, pp.1853-1855.
public importance’, no voting took place. Effluxion of time ended the debate, leaving the policy intact.

On 20 May Peacock reconfirmed the government’s support for an act of self-determination, but he remained silent on the means to bring about that goal.\textsuperscript{69} In his opinion the UN was the appropriate forum. Since Peacock wanted to keep the relationship with Indonesia in perspective while taking a principled stand on Timor he rejected the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), as a suitable forum.\textsuperscript{70} Thus Peacock rejected any relationship between Australian aid and Indonesia’s regime in East Timor. On 1 June Fraser too reconfirmed support for an act of self-determination, but also emphasised the importance of relations with Indonesia, particularly with a view to regional stability and avoidance of great power conflict in South East Asia.\textsuperscript{71}

Indonesia in the meantime tried to counteract international condemnation by orchestrating a process of people’s consultation, which resembled the requirements formulated in several UN resolutions, notably 1514 (XV) and 2625 (XXV), with the intention to grant its presence legitimacy. For that purpose it set up a provisional government, made up of UDT and Apodeti members. This provisional government invited Indonesia to proclaim sovereignty over East Timor, and in February it banned all political parties.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 20 May 1976, p.2270.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 4 June 1976, p.3031.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 1 June 1976, p.2739.
\textsuperscript{72} Taylor, op. cit., p.9.
In compliance with the UN resolution, in late January a UN envoy, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, visited a few towns in East Timor, but he concluded that his investigation was not a proper assessment of the situation emerging.\textsuperscript{73} On receiving his inconclusive report in April the Security Council repeated its call on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor, a resolution Indonesia ignored. Peacock made another visit to Jakarta on 13-15 April, reconfirming that the government favoured a withdrawal of Indonesian troops and self-determination. But he was in damage control mode at the same time, emphasising the importance the government attached to close relations with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{74} A change of policy was ever stronger in the air.

Against this background of international developments, the ALP executive continued to struggle with its own record when in government. The ghost of the past was still present, Whitlam being opposed to terminating military aid to Indonesia as well as a resolution from the ALP national executive which deplored Indonesia’s refusal to comply with the UN resolutions and condemned the Fraser Government for not fully cooperating with the UN representative.\textsuperscript{75} A leaked report which disclosed that the Whitlam Government had known that Indonesian forces were active in East Timor when Willesee addressed the Senate on 30 October 1975, only further embarrassed and undermined the ALP’s position. It was again Woolcott who had sent the embarrassing cable which declared: “Although we know it is not true, the formal position of

\textsuperscript{73} Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, \textit{The Human Rights and Conditions of the People of East Timor}, Canberra, AGPS, 1983, p.37.
\textsuperscript{74} Viviani, Australians and the Timor Issue: II, p.251.
\textsuperscript{75} Id., p.248.
the Indonesian government is still that there is no military intervention in East Timor. If the minister said or implied in public that the Indonesian government is lying we would invite a hurt and angry reaction.  

This cable made any moralising opposition by the ALP a farce. The opposition’s impact on policy making in the case of East Timor reached a new low at this stage.

Indonesia did not linger long in contriving the integration of East Timor. On 1 June the People’s Assembly and the Provisional Government presented a request for integration to Suharto who decided to send a parliamentary delegation to East Timor to report on the level of support for the request. Not surprisingly it concluded that there was strong support, and the Indonesian parliament passed a bill for integration on 15 July. When Suharto signed the bill on 18 July, the process of self-determination had been concluded: East Timor had become an Indonesian province, where international concern could be disqualified as outside interference in the internal affairs of the state.

In Australia, trade union leaders, churches, members of parliament, student leaders, and aid organisation figures called on the government to reject the annexation. Peacock’s initial response was positive, stating that the Australian government could not recognise the broad requirements for a satisfactory process of self-determination as having been met. Nevertheless government support for East Timorese resistance continued to dwindle, as Peacock soft-pedalled his opposition to using the Indonesian Red Cross to get aid into Timor: one of the four principles of his policy was expediently dropped, and more would follow. Another omen was

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76 Jolliffe, op. cit., p.257.
the confiscation of a transmitter in Darwin which formed the only direct link with the outside world to the East Timorese resistance.

The real turn-around in policy came with a visit by Prime Minister Fraser to Indonesia in October 1976. Prior to his departure Fraser had emphasised the great importance of the relationship with Indonesia, and declared that Timor would not be a major topic during the upcoming talks. In parliament Fraser had already shown great reluctance to make any more comments on Indonesia’s actions, instead he would refer to previous statements by Peacock. Distancing himself from Peacock’s critical policy Fraser was able to make a placatory change in policy towards Indonesia. A few ardent ALP Members continued to attack the unprincipled policy, but their attempt failed. Still divided itself, the ALP could not speak with one voice, which diminished its potential to have an impact on the policy. On the government’s side Fraser would not discuss the matter, and Peacock, not for the first time, did not even participate in the debate. No serious debate on goals and means of policy therefore took place prior to Fraser’s talks with Suharto. Until his visit the government had officially adhered to its four principle policy, notwithstanding a reprimand Fraser had received from the US government.

77 See for example Fraser’s reply to Uren (ALP). House of Representatives, 6 October 1976, p.1535.
78 The demand for admission of the ICRC had already been dropped in August.
79 Nichterlein, op. cit., p.47.
During his talks with Suharto, Fraser promised not to restate his previous policy.\textsuperscript{80} He kept his word when, upon returning to Australia, he refused to repeat the four principles, which he claimed were already on the record. Quietly Fraser tried to remove the issue from the political agenda. His reticence coincided with the start of bilateral talks on the seabed boundary in the so-called Timor Gap zone on 9 October 1976.\textsuperscript{81}

With Fraser distancing himself from the four principles, Peacock became isolated and his position was weakened. In the House he explained that Australia needed to balance its interests and responsibilities, unable to afford a conflict with Indonesia. Therefore he took into account Indonesia’s position that East Timor had become an Indonesian province.\textsuperscript{82} This situation was unlikely to change according to the minister. This argumentation foreshadowed the gradual process of accommodation which would characterise the government’s policy.

Fraser’s visit to Indonesia was followed by a debate on the government’s East Timor policy, in which a few members of the opposition accused the government of giving in. Since neither Peacock nor Fraser participated in this ‘debate’, parliament’s relevance to the policy making process was downgraded. Whitlam then introduced a motion of no confidence over the Fraser Government’s handling of foreign affairs. In particular he had in mind the East Timor issue, but again the foreign minister was absent. The debate ended in a slanging match between Fraser and

\textsuperscript{80} Twaney, op. cit., p.60.
\textsuperscript{81} Taylor, op. cit., p.10.
\textsuperscript{82} House of Representatives, 20 October 1976, pp.2015-2016.
Whitlam, each abusing the other’s record, but offering no new viewpoints. The motion was overwhelmingly defeated.

On 20 October 1976 Peacock was left the difficult job to set about modifying the means of the government’s Timor policy, the goals he did not even mention. Referring to the exigencies of Australia’s regional environment he claimed that the government had to consider Indonesia’s view that Timor had been integrated. Peacock then unfolded his ‘three stage process of recognition of sovereignty’. Informal relations on a non-recognition basis formed the first step, followed by *de facto* recognition and the ultimate step, *de jure* recognition. Using this model, Peacock declared that the government had not recognised the incorporation, but for practical reasons had to live with it.83

By the end of 1976 church reports mentioning large numbers of casualties in Timor appeared, and were taken seriously by human rights groups, but discounted by officials. UNGA carried another resolution (31/53) by 69 to 48 with 20 abstentions, rejecting the Indonesian claim to integration since the people of East Timor had not been able to freely exercise their right of self-determination. Australia abstained on the ground that the resolution was neither realistic nor constructive. The US voted against, a signal of acquiescence with the situation. The process of Australia’s accommodation had almost been completed. Pressure by US officials, who had warned Fraser during his visit to the United States in August 1976 that any further deterioration of relations with Indonesia was unacceptable to the US, and the influence of Foreign Affairs
officials and business groups, notably the Australia-Indonesia Business Co-operation Council (AIBCC), had much to do with this, but Fraser himself had also become aware of the lasting damage to other aspects of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia.

In 1977 Peacock and Fraser appeared in broad agreement over the policy. Peacock sounded like Fraser when he stressed the need to contain differences over East Timor, since the relationship with Indonesia was one of the most substantial in Australia’s foreign relations. Caught in a cross-fire between human rights defenders and groups stressing the importance of the relations with Indonesia, he opted for the easy way out, blaming the Whitlam Government for having failed to take action when there were still opportunities to influence events. Time and again Peacock and Fraser, as well as their colleagues in the House, successfully applied this argument in debate, immobilising any criticism of their own failure to take any determined action on behalf of the Timorese, and pointing to the attitude of Whitlam, and his cabinet ministers’ collective responsibility, for a policy which sealed the fate of East Timor. An alternative strategy applied to startle the nerves of parliamentarians and reduce their enthusiasm for Fretilin’s cause stigmatised Fretilin as a Marxist organisation. Eventually this combination of arguments achieved the objective to neutralise opposition to the government’s policy of accommodation.

83 Ibid., p.2016.
84 Fearing damage to business relations with Indonesia its president had succeeded in making various representations to Fraser and Peacock, calling on them to accept Indonesian rule in Timor. Jolliffe, op. cit., p.294.
86 House of Representatives, 15 March 1977, pp.203-204.
In March 1977 the ALP was still battling its internal division, as is illustrated by the Caucus debate on the question whether to move for a Senate inquiry into East Timor. Whitlam vehemently opposed inclusion in the Committee’s mandate of inquiry into the origins of the conflict and the Indonesian invasion. Kim Beazley Senior, however, pressed on, as he wanted to know if the Indonesians were telling the truth, that they had been encouraged to invade East Timor, and, if so, by whom. In spite of Whitlam’s opposition Caucus carried the proposal on 9 March 1977.⁸⁷

Following this Caucus decision Senator Arthur Gietzelt submitted a motion to the Senate on 17 March 1977 asking that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into, *inter alia*, “the conflict between Timorese and Indonesian forces and the position of the Timorese civilian population, the origins of the conflict and its impact on the Timorese people...”⁸⁸ The Coalition in the Senate opposed an inquiry, which Senator Reginald Withers (LP) disapprovingly called a “witch-hunt into the misdemeanours of Labor’s own government.”⁸⁹ The Coalition was not willing to investigate allegations of atrocities, some of which were “clearly exaggerated and unsubstantiated.”⁹⁰ The Coalition obviously did not want to look back at the ugly record which both parties shared, given also the risk of straining relations with Indonesia.⁹¹ Instead the Coalition preferred to concentrate on the politically less sensitive issue of continuation of efforts

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⁸⁷ See Clyde Cameron, op.cit., pp.336-337.
⁸⁸ Quoted from Senate, 24 March 1977, p.523.
⁸⁹ Ibid., p.524.
⁹⁰ Ibid., p.526.
to relieve the suffering. When, after a prolonged debate, the motion was put to a vote on 26 May 1977, it received the support of a unanimous ALP and two Liberal Party Senators, still not enough to prevent a defeat by 26 to 32.\textsuperscript{92} Ironically Whitlam was saved from a major embarrassment by the Coalition parties in the Senate who, out of fear of offending the Suharto regime, elected to concentrate on the further building of a mature relationship with Indonesia.

Tom Uren, a former minister not shying away from admitting collective guilt, supported by Senator Gordon Bryant (ALP), refused to sacrifice the Timorese for the sake of Australia’s relations with Indonesia. He suggested that the Australian government support Portugal and vote against Indonesia in the UN in order to put pressure on Indonesia.\textsuperscript{93} Bill Hayden (ALP) also entered the debate. Being concerned with the extremely high death toll persistently mentioned in various reports he demanded the government put pressure on Indonesia to reverse its policy.\textsuperscript{94} A number of other reasons motivated ALP speakers to oppose the government’s policy, such as: emotional ties dating back to the Second World War when East Timorese assisted Australian troops fighting the Japanese; the denial of self-determination; the brutality of Indonesia’s rule, and fear that Indonesian control over Timor might pose a threat to Australia’s security. The ALP recognised the importance of relations with Indonesia, but many felt that a more determined stand on the Timor issue would not necessarily put the relations in jeopardy.

\textsuperscript{91} Senator Scott explicitly referred to the relative acquiescence of countries in the region and the likely damage that a solitary action by Australia would do to both its economic relations with Indonesia and its aid efforts. Ibid., pp.532-533.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 26 May 1977, pp.1488-1489.
\textsuperscript{93} House of Representatives, 15 March 1977, p.226.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, 16 March 1977, p.259.
On the government’s side Michael Hodgman (LP), who would develop into a consistent critic of the government’s policy of acquiescence, supported the ALP when a report produced by James Dunn, Director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Legislative Research Service of the Australian parliament, was released which accused Indonesia of committing atrocities: he demanded a parliamentary investigation. 95

However even the ALP’s attempt to start a serious debate failed: the endeavour was haunted by the ghost of Whitlam’s record. 96 The debate did not end with a vote being taken on a motion. It was clear, however, where majority support rested. Given the opposition’s disarray and low credibility, Peacock’s absence was understandable. Hodgman’s position on the issue was the exception to the rule of general support amongst the ranks of the Liberal and National Country Party Representatives, who allowed the government a free hand, not even demanding a public defence of its policy in parliament.

95 Ibid., 10 March 1977, pp.113-114. James Dunn had travelled to Portugal to interview Timorese refugees. These people testified of widespread atrocities and mass killings committed by Indonesian soldiers in East Timor. Dunn used his report to urge governments to adopt a policy in support of the Timor cause. He achieved some success when the US Congress Sub-Committees on International Organisations and Pacific Affairs asked him to testify and defend his findings which mentioned a very high death toll. However, since his casualty figures were not substantiated by cast-iron evidence the Committee did not support his findings.

96 In Cameron’s view Whitlam had lost even more credibility following an article in The Australian which claimed that Indonesian foreign minister Malik had told a reporter that Whitlam had been given advance warning of Indonesia’s plan to invade East Timor. Peacock claimed that Malik has shared this information about Whitlam with him as well. Cameron, op. cit., p.487.
Peacock who, compared with Fraser, had so far been regarded as more sympathetic towards the East Timorese claim to self-determination came under intense scrutiny and criticism from the ALP, and particularly Whitlam, over a meeting with two Indonesian officials in Bali in September 1975. During this meeting, which was claimed to have been held at Peacock’s request, the then opposition spokesman on foreign affairs was accused of having approved Indonesian intervention in Timor. Any Liberal Party opposition would therefore have been only pro forma, aiming to put the blame on the Whitlam Government. Whitlam produced a cable sent by Woolcott and the Indonesian record of the conversation in support of his case. These documents showed that the issue of self-determination had not been a topic of discussion. Therefore Whitlam accused Peacock of lying in parliament and submitted a no confidence motion. In the process he secured the support of two of the ALP’s most fervent supporters of the East Timor cause, Uren and Kenneth Fry, turning the matter into a party-political issue which, without the necessary numbers, he could not possibly hope to win. The motion alienated supporters of a pro-Timorese policy on the side of the government, and thus did considerable damage to the Timor lobby in the House. The motion also restored Whitlam’s reputation to a certain extent. Perhaps these were his true objectives, although a recent repeat by Malik of Whitlam’s own knowledge of Indonesia’s intentions discredited him anew.

97 According to the record of the conversation Peacock said that the Liberal Party would not protest against Indonesia if that state was forced to do something about Portuguese Timor, for example to ‘go in’ to restore peace there. At the maximum Peacock would criticise Whitlam and his government for hesitating to join in solving the Portuguese Timor problem, thereby forcing Indonesia to act unilaterally. House of Representatives, 3 May 1977, p.1448.
Whatever Whitlam’s motivations, Peacock denied the allegations and the reports, claiming that these were false, distorted and, in the case of Woolcott’s cable, incorrect. 99 The motion of confidence received 32 votes in favour and 81 opposed and was not carried. Notwithstanding his victory, the matter cast some doubt on Peacock’s sincerity and split the ranks of the critics of the Timor policy, which further weakened the Timor cause. 100

As the opposition to the policy crumbled, the Australian government continued slowly to move closer to official recognition, although this was consistently denied. A visit by Australian Embassy staff to East Timor, was one such small step towards recognition, being in conformity with the first stage of Peacock’s three stage process of recognition of sovereignty. Thus, although Peacock denied any significance to the visit in terms of recognition, his own criteria yielded evidence to the opposite. 101

Despite the government’s moves towards accommodation and recognition, Timor remained an issue on the agenda of parliament, where 95 members of Amnesty’s Parliamentary Group

98 Clyde Cameron, op. cit., p.517.
99 According to Twaney, later investigations seemed to support Peacock’s claim, as they found that the record of the meeting that Whitlam produced was in fact written by a member of the Indonesian Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Mr. Harry Tjan, and leaked in an attempt to embarrass Peacock. Twaney, op. cit., p.32.
100 The fact that Peacock ordered the evacuation of Australian citizens from East Timor on 2 December 1975 just days before the invasion can be regarded as evidence that the subject of Peacock’s conversation with the Indonesian officials was not as innocent as he wanted parliament to believe. Either a warning by Australian intelligence sources or the Indonesian government that an intervention was imminent would have persuaded Peacock to undertake action.
101 House of Representatives, 28 April 1977, p.1340.
signed a petition to US President Jimmy Carter, requesting him to exert pressure on Indonesia to comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and grant the International Red Cross access to East Timor.102 Parliamentary concern was not limited to the ALP, but those few expressing public concern on the government’s side were backbenchers only. Without majority support no definitive steps could be taken to persuade the Fraser Government to develop a more active and critical policy.

In July 1977 the ALP Conference condemned Indonesia’s invasion and demanded withdrawal of Indonesian troops: a victory for the anti-Whitlam group. The Conference noted the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November 1975. It wanted a resumption of humanitarian aid through the International Red Cross. A future ALP government would suspend all military aid to Indonesia and recognise the government of East Timor if a genuine act of self-determination established independence as the choice of the East Timorese.103

The content of the resolution showed that the ALP’s pro-self-determination faction had gained the upper hand over the Whitlam group which gave priority to the relationship with Indonesia. Whitlam himself did not accept defeat and a serious confrontation in Caucus took place in September 1977 when Whitlam refused to adhere to the policy as decided by the ALP Caucus, and publicly expressed his personal views instead. Whitlam was reprimanded severely and,

103 Ibid., 6 October 1977, p.1770.
when that proved an insufficient remedy to force him to comply, was confronted with a motion of censure. Caucus reconfirmed its adherence to the decisions taken during the Perth Conference, including support for East Timorese self-determination.\textsuperscript{104}

To the outside at least the resolution had closed the ranks of the ALP, but with leading figures of the former Whitlam Government still prominent amongst its ranks, the party remained vulnerable to criticism from the government. The most receptive reply by the government to ALP insistence on self-determination stated that the need to develop relations with Indonesia required a balanced approach to the Timor problem. This cryptic formulation concealed that the government continued to move closer to accepting the integration of East Timor. The Prime Minister already gave absolute priority to the relationship with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{105}

In November 1977 UNGA adopted another resolution which reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, and rejected incorporation into Indonesia. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to send a special representative to East Timor to prepare for a visiting mission from the UN Committee on Decolonisation, and called upon Indonesia and Fretilin to facilitate entry to East Timor for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Again Australia abstained on the resolution on the grounds that it suffered from defects similar to those of the 1976 resolution.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104} Clyde Cameron, op. cit., pp.619-620, and pp.645-650.
\textsuperscript{105} See Fraser’s reply to a question by Kevin Cairns (LP). House of Representatives, 12 October 1977, pp.1895-1896.
\textsuperscript{106} Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Annual Report} 1977, pp.7 and 40.
The real explanation for Australia’s international posture was that a long standing tradition, dominant in the Department of Foreign Affairs, regarded Indonesia as crucial to Australia and restricted the government to swallowing its discontent over certain issues and concentrating on the long term building of a solid relationship. This emphasis on development of relations with its geographic environment was indeed reflected in the government’s general foreign policy plans at the time. These declared that the Australian foreign policy was aiming at *inter alia* further developing its relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with an emphasis on ASEAN as a major point of contact with Australia’s nearest Southeast Asian neighbours. The theoretical foundation of the foreign policy did not allow Australia to remain publicly opposed to Indonesia’s occupation of Timor. Domestic opposition, however, required a careful process of moving to acquiescence.

Peacock shrewdly used parliament’s recess to take the penultimate step in this policy of gradual accommodation: the announcement of the government’s *de facto* acceptance of East Timor as a part of Indonesia. The statement of 20 January 1978 declared: “The government has decided that although it remains critical of the means by which integration was brought about it would be unrealistic to continue to refuse to recognise *de facto* that East Timor is part of Indonesia.”

107 Ibid., p.1.
Peacock’s move was widely condemned in the media and by Timor support groups, but a crucial step had been taken. The move had a beneficent effect on relations with Indonesia, and helped to get talks on the Timor Gap under way, although the Australian government would still have to make one further conciliatory move: extension of *de jure* recognition. Peacock denied allegations that the recognition was in consideration of arrangements for oil exploration rights, claiming instead that it was motivated by the fact that Indonesia controlled the major administrative centres of East Timor. According to Peacock the move would also contribute to the government’s family reunion program for East Timorese and the rehabilitation of East Timor. These last two goals he claimed, required more intense contact with Indonesian authorities.\(^{109}\)

The government could of course count on support from its own ranks when it claimed that the circumstances justified the move, and that it had not been able to change the situation due to the policy put in place by the Whitlam Government.\(^{110}\) However, with this move, Australia was in the vanguard of international recognition and it ran contrary to the expressed opinion of a majority in the UN.

ALP speakers certainly contested the importance of mere control, condemning recognition as a disgrace in the face of the 200,000 people who had perished since the Indonesian invasion.\(^{111}\)

\(^{110}\) Hodgman made a notable exception to this rule.
\(^{111}\) The death toll has been much disputed and is still not exactly known. Mentioning this figure here does not mean that the author of this thesis accepts its correctness.
With the ALP’s ranks closed since its 1977 Conference, Hayden (ALP) berated the appeasement policy of the Fraser Government which, in his opinion, did nothing to enhance Australia’s credibility in Indonesia. He wanted the government to take a strong stand towards Indonesia, given persistent reports of mass and indiscriminate killing in East Timor. Uren (ALP) shifted the blame for the policy onto an influential section in Foreign Affairs, and, given the consistency in policy this was a plausible explanation. Without the numbers to support their opposition against the policy of the government, these angry speeches were futile attempts to change the policy.

In a Ministerial statement on 9 May 1978 Peacock declared that, being concerned over human rights violations wherever they occurred, Australia supported action against gross violations of human rights, but in this respect he failed to acknowledge the government’s lack of support for UN peace-making initiatives in East Timor. An initiative put forward by Michael Hodgman (LP) to make Australia a mediator did not even get a lukewarm response.

Ambassador Critchley visited East Timor in September 1978, the first ambassadorial visit since the Indonesian invasion. His visit, however, was less an expression of the government’s concern

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112 Whitlam, in his capacity as Leader of the Opposition, was opposed to the new policy, and continued his opposition in 1978, undermining the ALP’s position.
than a cover up. Critchley reported that the resettlement of thousands of people in Indonesian camps was posing a great problem to the authorities. Food was not in short supply, but distribution was difficult. Instead of regarding humanitarian problems as symptoms of general discontent and continuing opposition against Indonesia’s regime, they were attributed to logistical shortcomings. Peacock’s approval of additional aid to be supplied through the Indonesian Red Cross was consistent with this view. The political situation on the one hand and famine and deprivation on the other were diagnosed as unrelated problems, and so the humanitarian concerns were treated alone. Peacock’s refusal to answer a question regarding recognition also indicated that Australia was closer to full acquiescence in Indonesia’s authority.\textsuperscript{116}

In December 1978 UNGA carried resolution 33/39, which reaffirmed the right to self-determination for the people of East Timor and called for a UN mission to visit the territory. As was to be expected Australia voted against the resolution arguing that it did not reflect a realistic appreciation of the situation in East Timor and that no practical purpose was served by it.\textsuperscript{117} The view taken was consistent with the \textit{de facto} recognition given earlier in 1978, and facilitated the final step in the gradual process of recognition. It allowed the Fraser Government to announce its willingness to engage in talks over the disputed Timor Gap during a visit by Indonesian

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 11 May 1978, p.2230.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 23 November 1978, p.3278.
\textsuperscript{117} Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Annual Report 1978}, p.30.
foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja to Australia in December 1978. However, Foreign Affairs advised the government that a legal basis was required to solve the border problem and therefore *de jure* recognition had to be given. Thus the final step in the process of accommodation was set in early 1979 when the Fraser Government extended *de jure* recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Considering the difference between *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of sovereignty -- the first concept is only a temporary recognition of a government or state, pending further developments, while the latter term implies a definite recognition of a government or a state as a full international entity -- it is plausible that the Indonesian government put forward *de jure* recognition over East Timor as a condition to start negotiations with Australia over the seabed. According to Suter the Australian government required for extending *de jure* recognition that a government had effective control over the territory concerned and the existence of a broad congruence between the views of this government and the population. Finally this government should have the capacity to enter into relations with other governments. Thus, granting *de jure* recognition legally enabled such a government to start discussions with other states over the

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118 Ibid., p.29. Compare *AFAR*, vol.50, no.5, May 1979, p.305, which claims that delimitation talks did get under way in December 1978 and that the two ministers also reached agreement to have a second round of talks. Between 22 and 25 May delegations met again in Jakarta.

119 Garrie Gibson, conversation by phone, 25 April 1996.


121 Ibid. Suter unfortunately fails to substantiate his claim about the criteria allegedly in use by the Australian Government for extending *de jure* recognition.
territory in question, a welcome consequence for the Fraser Government, which was eager to begin talks over the disputed seabed boundary.

The first two criteria were clearly not met in the case of East Timor in 1979, and the third criterion was doubtful at best, given that the United Nations had still not accepted Indonesia’s rule in the absence of a proper act of self-determination. The decision to grant *de jure* recognition to Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor was a clear case where pragmatism and realism prevailed over principles in foreign policy. In the process of reconciliation with the Indonesian government the original goals of policy had been abandoned in favour of goals more in accordance with Australia’s perceived interests. In order to disguise the sacrifice of the East Timorese right to self-determination the policy was suffused with humanitarian concerns, but in reality aid distributed via the Indonesian Red Cross, as a means of policy implementation, only contributed to the establishment and recognition of an oppressive regime. Without a clear policy framework relating human rights to Australian aid, regime establishment as consequence of aid supply was of no concern to the government, a fact that went unnoticed by supporters of the Timor cause both inside and outside parliament: the supply of aid served as a means to quell the desire for self-determination and remove this nuisance in bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia.

When the ICRC was first granted access to East Timor in March 1979 the magnitude of the population’s deprivation and suffering as a result of military campaigns, famine, drought and forced relocations became known. Accusations of human rights violations, including executions,
continued to be reported throughout the year. Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar admitted that approximately 120,000 people had died in the civil war since 1975.\textsuperscript{122}

These revelations formed no impediment for the Australian government to accept Indonesia’s offer to start official talks over the seabed boundary: Australia now fully recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty. In June in parliament the ALP expressed its unanimous opposition to \textit{de jure} recognition. But Fraser was determined, and held new talks with Suharto on Bali. He did not even discuss East Timor on this occasion since in his opinion disagreements between Australia and Indonesia belonged to the past and he wanted to concentrate on the future. Self-determination should no longer interfere with bilateral relations and played no more part in Australia’s official policy.\textsuperscript{123}

A few ALP Members, however, continued to raise their concerns over mass starvation in East Timor and substantiated their case with figures provided by the Indonesian churches. A report by the Foreign Affairs Research Group of the Parliamentary Library was also extensively used. The report established a causal link between the widespread human suffering in East Timor and Indonesia’s campaigns: “The poor physical condition of the Timorese are the grim consequences of the deliberate Indonesian strategies designed to starve Fretilin and its supporters into surrender.”\textsuperscript{124} The report further concluded that the relief efforts of the

\textsuperscript{122} Taylor, op. cit., p.21; Department of the Parliamentary Library, \textit{East Timor: A Challenge for Indonesia and Australia}, Indonesian issues, Brief no.4, 1992.

\textsuperscript{123} House of Representatives, 7 June 1979, p.3164.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 10 October 1979, p.1878.
Indonesian Red Cross were totally inadequate to cope with the humanitarian disaster, and that there was growing evidence that the scale of the suffering was far greater than hitherto believed.\textsuperscript{125}

These damning revelations of human suffering and Indonesian involvement failed to trigger any response from the government. Peacock expressed his confidence in the Indonesian capacity to distribute available food stocks and said that the record of the Indonesian Red Cross was reasonably satisfactory. Not satisfied with the minister’s reply, Hodgman (LP) protested by means of a notice of motion which demanded that a parliamentary delegation should make a fact-finding trip to East Timor.\textsuperscript{126} Doug Anthony declared on behalf of the government that the request would be considered, but he never reported back.\textsuperscript{127}

Just how little the government was prepared to do was highlighted by Australia’s vote in 1979 in the UN against a report containing a ‘Resolution on Timor’ emanating from The Fourth Committee, which specialises in human rights issues. The resolution re-affirmed the Timorese right to self-determination and called for international relief agencies to be allowed entry into East Timor.

The debate in the House on Hodgman’s motion was a repetition of previous mutual mudslinging, with government representatives once again blaming the Whitlam Government’s poor

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p.1881.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 6 November 1979, p.2592.
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\end{footnotesize}
record to justify their own failure to act. They claimed that the Indonesian relief record was not bad, or, as Connolly put it: “We are confident on the basis of the record which has been given to us by the Indonesian authorities that they are doing a very good job indeed in supporting what they know are major social problems in Timor.” Less extreme representatives argued to concentrate on the future, not the past. Australian security was also an argument used. The debate ended without a vote on the motion, although it was obvious that members of the government would not press for a parliamentary fact-finding mission. Peacock himself ignored the debate, but in reply to a question he had to admit that he did not possess any accurate information which contradicted the allegations of Indonesian genocide and figures which put the death-toll as high as 200,000. Since nothing was being done to substantially alleviate the grave human rights situation, the conclusion can be drawn that human rights concerns were sacrificed in the process of building better relations with Indonesia. The government’s policy received support from its own parliamentary group and some ALP Representatives.

Australian interest in the East Timor problem seemed to wane in 1980. Discussions in the House covered no new ground. No major debate on the issue took place, only a single notice of motion was submitted by an ALP back-bencher, Brian Howe, which demanded a public

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127 Ibid., 8 November 1979, p.2765.
128 Ibid., 13 November 1979, p.2899.
129 Quoted from House of Representatives, 13 November 1979, p.2900.
130 See Robert Katter’s (NCP) speech. Ibid., pp.2906-2907.
131 Ibid., 22 November 1979, p.3529.
investigation into the 1979 reports which had alleged gross violations of human rights resulting in large scale loss of life.\textsuperscript{132} The motion was never actually discussed by parliament.

Although the most intense battles between Indonesian forces and Fretilin were over, more sporadic fighting continued, and so did the killing of civilians. ACFOA therefore urged the government to cease all military aid to Indonesia until a genuine act of self-determination had taken place.\textsuperscript{133} UNGA once again adopted a resolution calling for self-determination for East Timor, but with a majority smaller than previous year’s. Australia voted against it.

Ambassador Critchley, who paid a second visit to East Timor in May 1980, confirmed that the Indonesian government was exercising effective control. Accurate figures of casualties were still not available but, with the fighting having abated, he concluded that casualties would be few in the future.\textsuperscript{134} This conclusion implicitly supported the case to leave the past behind and concentrate on the future, a policy the government was very keen to follow.

In 1981 Indonesia started another offensive, code named Keamanan (‘Security’), involving a wave of arrests, torture, massacres, the burning of villages and the notorious ‘fence of legs’ campaigns, whereby civilians were forced to precede soldiers, thus forming a protective shield in mopping up operations.\textsuperscript{135} These new allegations of widespread human rights violations,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 25 March 1980, pp.1105-1106.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Timor Information Service, no.29, November 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{134} House of Representatives, 18 September 1980, p.1603.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p.30.
\end{itemize}
however, had no impact upon the policy of the Fraser Government which did not waver in its support for Indonesian control. A Portuguese request to assist in bringing about a political solution by means of self-determination was rejected by the new foreign minister, Tony Street, who had succeeded Peacock in April 1981.\textsuperscript{136} Although human rights were an issue of concern for Australian government officials, a relation between the denial of self-determination and Indonesian human rights violations was not acknowledged.

Taking issue with the government, Hayden (ALP), who had taken over the party leadership from Whitlam, claimed in the House that the ALP did not see Indonesia as vitally important to Australia. He called Indonesia’s human rights record appalling.\textsuperscript{137} At last the Senate, too, assumed a firm stand, when it ordered its Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs to investigate the East Timorese problem and its implications for Australian-Indonesian relations.

In 1982 the ALP Federal Conference adopted a resolution strongly supporting the case for self-determination stating that it:

\begin{quote}
Recognises the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence and condemns and rejects the Australian government’s recognition of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor...The ALP will continue to support UN resolutions which promote the rights of East Timorese. The ALP will further...press for a parliamentary inquiry into all aspects of the East Timor question.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{136} Twaney, op. cit., p.104.
Although this strongly worded resolution gave firm backing to the Timorese cause, the ALP was not unanimously united behind the Timorese. The most notorious and recalcitrant opponent remained Gough Whitlam, whose continuing involvement damaged a party trying to rid itself of its defiled record. Whitlam went on a personal crusade to crush domestic and international support for self-determination, accepting an invitation extended by the Indonesian government in March 1982 to visit East Timor. He concluded that there was no truth in reports which spoke of famine.\(^{139}\) In November Whitlam, at his own request, addressed the UN Committee on Decolonisation in an attempt to remove East Timor from the agenda. Fraser too did some lobbying among South Pacific states to muster support for Indonesia in the UN. Bill Hayden later also claimed that he had reservations regarding the ‘confrontationist’ policy adopted by the 1982 Federal Conference of the ALP.\(^{140}\) In 1982, however, Hayden followed his party’s policy and refrained from publicly expressing his dissenting view.

A major international development in 1982 was the passing of a compromise resolution in the UNGA which requested the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the issue and to report to the 38th UNGA. Australia voted against this resolution, which would keep the issue on the agenda, postponing a final decision indefinitely. UNGA reaffirmed its recognition of Portugal as

\(^{139}\) During a brief visit to East Timor in December 1981 Rawdon Dalrymple, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, had also reported that there was no evidence of serious malnutrition or famine conditions. His opportunities for an accurate assessment had been limited, however, since he had travelled by helicopter. Rawdon Dalrymple. Interview, Sydney, 20 April 1995.
administering power and reasserted self-determination for East Timor. The Secretary-General was instructed to bring about discussions with all parties concerned and to report to the next UNGA.  


In March 1983 the ALP won the federal elections, ending the rule of the Fraser Government, which had gradually accepted Indonesia’s takeover. Given the ALP’s support for self-determination expressed during several Federal Conferences, a change in government policy seemed likely. However, when senior officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs explained to the novice Prime Minister Hawke and foreign minister Hayden that the ALP resolution, which demanded steps in favour of the Timorese case, could have serious repercussions on Australia’s trade and defence relations with Indonesia, they were not prepared to take any risks. Thus they distanced themselves from the ALP’s 1982 resolution. Hayden declared that there was no timetable for implementation of the resolution, and Hawke said that in the interests of the local people East Timor should remain part of Indonesia: self-determination was not a realistic

142 A view supported by Garry Gibson, a former ALP representative. Conversation by phone, 25 April 1996. Assuming that Hayden told the truth in his autobiography, that he had doubts about the ALP’s policy before he became a minister, he would have been most receptive to the advice of his Foreign Affairs civil servants.
option. He argued that policy decisions should be made on the basis of current conditions, rather than those at the time when the policy was adopted. According to Hawke the situation had taken a turn for the better.

Foreign Affairs officials felt relieved, the Department being staffed with supporters of the view that cultivating stronger and closer ties with Indonesia is important to Australia’s economy, international political position, and security. There had been a risk that, with the ALP assuming office, resolutions adopted by the 1982 ALP Federal Conference would be put in place as policy, jeopardising the precious relationship with Indonesia which they saw as a cornerstone of Australian foreign policy. In the context of Australia’s economic and political interests in the Southeast Asian region, relations with Indonesia remained a high priority. Australia and Indonesia were said to share broad strategic, political and economic interests.

No doubt officials in the department had conveyed these interests to members of the incoming government, with the effect that they reconsidered the policy they had previously advocated when in opposition.

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144 Hawke mentioned an acceleration of family reunions, and the projected visit to East Timor by a parliamentary delegation. AETA, op. cit., p.22.
145 Richard Woolcott, a former Ambassador to Indonesia, and major proclaimer of this view, allegedly managed to get many associates appointed in strategically important positions, forming a strong lobbying force. A view expressed by Gibson. Conversation by phone, 25 April 1996.
While defence minister Killen in the Fraser Government had concluded, during a visit in January 1983 to East Timor, that the bad situation there was the result of Portuguese neglect, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hayden, in April assumed a position more supportive of the East Timorese plight, noting the incorporation of East Timor while also expressing deep concern that an internationally supervised act of self-determination had not taken place. However, a process of reconsideration started in the same month when Hayden met President Suharto and Minister for Foreign Affairs Mochtar.

Prime Minister Hawke moved faster than Hayden towards accommodation and when Hayden still gave the impression of being more favourably disposed to the Timor cause, Hawke already bluntly refused to comply altogether with the ALP’s 1982 policy directive to cease military aid to Indonesia. He even argued that the Timor issue ought to be dropped. Acknowledging Indonesia’s importance as a key member of ASEAN, sound bilateral relations must prevail, he said. Hayden too showed ever stronger doubts about the matter and declared that Indonesia would never leave East Timor. Safeguarding Australian business interests, which stood to lose about $160m. motivated his refusal to support an anti-Indonesian resolution in the UN. Local Timorese support groups, such as the Timorese Association in Victoria, showed their disappointment, but that made no difference.

147 Taylor, op. cit., p.39.
148 Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, No.377, Canberra, 13 April 1983.
149 Taylor, op. cit., p.40.
150 Henderson, loc. cit.
Almost coinciding with a visit by a joint parliamentary delegation, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence submitted a critical report which concluded that no genuine act of self-determination had taken place in Timor within the meaning of UNGA resolution 1541 (XV). Therefore Australia should oppose any action endorsing the legality of East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia, and make recognition conditional on the holding of an internationally recognised act of self-determination. Many basic human rights had been violated since Indonesia’s takeover, notably those relating to self-determination. The Committee concluded:

The process of self-determination conducted under Indonesian auspices in 1976 does not represent a genuine act of self-determination within the meaning of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). The Committee recommends that, in the absence of a genuine act of self-determination, the Australian government oppose any action or statement which implies legality of the incorporation of the territory of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia....[A]s a consequence of both the invasion and its subsequent integration....there have been gross violations of human rights....[therefore] the Australian government [should] use its influence in the UN and other international fora to maintain pressure on the Indonesian government to redress the legitimate grievances of the people of East Timor.

152 W. Lambourne, *Australian Foreign Policy towards Indonesia and East Timor: Realpolitik, Ethics and the National Interest*, MA research essay, Research School of Pacific Studies, Canberra, ANU, 1992, pp.18 and 80.
153 The report mentioned: curtailment of free speech, assembly, and movement, widespread torture, arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.
Thus the Committee, regarding the right of self-determination as of overwhelming importance, suggested a fundamental re-evaluation of the goals and means of policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs was accused of being an uncritical accomplice of Indonesia’s actions. The Committee rejected this appeasement policy as an undue sacrifice of the principle of self-determination and human rights for the sake of good relations with Indonesia.155

In the event the Hawke Government could ignore these findings because of the Committee’s internal disagreement.156 The Committee’s discord was reflected in the Senate, which was also divided. The impending publication of the report by the joint parliamentary delegation, which was based upon an on-the-spot assessment of the situation, even further reduced the authority of the Senate’s report.

As mentioned earlier a joint parliamentary delegation led by Bill Morrison was permitted to visit East Timor in July 1983, well in time to have its conclusions considered by the ALP Federal Conference. Allegedly Morrison, who would later become Ambassador to Indonesia, played a

155 Ibid., pp.78-79.
156 Committee members in support of the conclusions were: G.D. McIntosh (ALP), Nick Bolkus (ALP) and Cyril Primmer (ALP). Members opposing the findings were David Hamer (LP), David MacGibbon (LP) and Douglass Scott (NP). The latter group feared adverse effects on the important relationship with Indonesia. These members cast doubts as to the reliability of the evidence: “The information at the disposal of the Committee cannot give an accurate appraisal of human rights and conditions.” Quoted from ibid., p.90.
key role in reversing ALP policy. The visit and the report caused much controversy. The report argued that, if Australia were to change its vote in the UN, the situation in East Timor would not change, but the effect on relations with Indonesia would be detrimental and reduce Australia’s capacity to exert any influence. This important conclusion, however, was not substantiated by any evidence. Senator Gordon McIntosh (ALP) reached different conclusions in his minority report, and received support in the House from Fry (ALP). But Sinclair (NP), another member of the delegation, went so far as to claim that, “the question of the status of the province of East Timor within Indonesia...[is] fortunately in the view of the majority of the members of the parliamentary delegation, no longer an issue.” Expecting an economic bonanza for Indonesia in the near future, good relations with Indonesia were considered essential. The report amounted to nothing more than another attempt to hush up the rights of the Timorese for the sake of relations with Indonesia. A majority of the ALP’s parliamentary caucus was now backing this policy.

The report, however, did not bring a definite end to the ALP’s internal division over Timor. Particularly between its State branches and the Federal Government the gap was growing. Victorian ALP president Crawford accused Hayden of back-pedalling, and he assured Fretilin of his branch’s continued determination to make the Federal Government comply with ALP

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157 During his tour around the island Morrison refused to meet Xanana Gusmao and other leaders of the Timorese resistance. An Australian academic interviewed in Melbourne classified his performance as ‘miserable’.
158 Parliamentary Records, House of Representatives, 6 September 1983, pp.384-388. James Dobie (LP), a member of the visiting mission also spoke of the unrealistic assumption that the situation could be reversed. Ibid., p.388.
Hayden, becoming increasingly assertive, reiterated the government’s acceptance of East Timor’s incorporation, although he said that the government remained committed to human rights in general. His argumentation failed to recognise the underlying cause of continuing human rights violations and became distracted in a palliative treatment of the symptoms. Since this approach reconfirmed Indonesia’s authority there was of course no negative impact on relations with Indonesia.

Whereas the Australian government, supported by a parliamentary majority, tried to bury the issue of Timorese self-determination, the 1983 UNGA meeting kept East Timor on the international agenda, deciding to defer the issue for a year and asking the Secretary-General to report on the possibility of arranging negotiations between the parties involved.  

In 1984 the Department of Foreign Affairs continued its policy of putting a stronger emphasis on building substantial relations with Asian neighbours, notably Indonesia. It judged the relationship as sound, despite continuing Australian concern over East Timor. Diplomatic posts were ordered to report more frequently on human rights, and quiet diplomacy acquired prominence as a means to safeguard human rights.

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159 Quoted from House of Representatives, 6 September 1983, p.398.
160 Retboll, op. cit., p.133.
161 Taylor, op. cit., p.43.
162 Bilateral trade however was only marginally important, amounting to $790m in 1984-1985, less than 1% of Australia’s total foreign trade. Indonesia ranked 20th among purchasers of Australian exports. J.S. Holloway, ‘Australia-Indonesia Relations’, AFAR, vol.57, no.9, 1986, pp.789-792.
In March 1984 Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mochtar, apparently satisfied with the Labor government’s initial policy and wishing to encourage it to continue on that road, finally proposed to hold more talks on the oil-rich disputed part of the Timor Sea. Hayden jumped at the opportunity and stressed the need to reconfirm Indonesian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{164} Nevertheless, the Victorian ALP State Conference continued to show strong support for the Timor cause and the South Australian ALP State Conference was expected to follow suit. The more right wing ALP in New South Wales on the other hand was reluctant to debate East Timor at all.\textsuperscript{165}

Negotiations between Australia and Indonesia were experiencing some progress in February 1984 when the ALP formally changed its policy on East Timor. The ALP traditionally consisted of three factions. Support for the Timor cause was mainly confined to the Left Wing faction. The Right Wing preferred to emphasise the relationship with Indonesia. The third faction, the Centre Left, held the balance of power. When the ALP was in opposition, the Centre Left, which counted Hayden amongst its ranks, had opposed the policy of recognition of Indonesia’s authority. The Centre Left, thereto strongly encouraged by Hayden -- “I was....fighting a sustained battle to pitch out, or modify into more reasonable terms, a clutter of impractical or imprudent foreign policies”\textsuperscript{166} -- shifted ground when the ALP assumed office, in the process tipping the balance in favour of the right wing faction led by Hawke.\textsuperscript{167} On 12 July 1984 a resolution was adopted by the Party Conference which failed to mention self-determination for

\textsuperscript{165} Retboll, op. cit., p.141.
\textsuperscript{166} Quoted from Hayden, op. cit., p.396.
East Timor. A resolution asking the government to reverse the decision to recognise East Timor’s annexation suffered a crushing 43 to 55 defeat.

At the conference Hayden vigorously argued the need to develop a closer, more understanding, realistic and productive relationship with Indonesia. A more moderate resolution, calling on the government to support international initiatives, especially in the UN, to reach a Timor settlement, was adopted by the Conference. In the event Hawke and Hayden could ignore even this resolution, although the latter during a visit to Portugal declared that he would encourage a further dialogue through the UN. In *Australian Foreign Affairs Review* Hayden repeated this view that the people of East Timor could be helped only through the use of diplomatic means. Efforts to bring about an act of self-determination would alienate Australia from Indonesia according to Hayden, and render other efforts aimed at the well-being of the Timorese impossible. The 1984 ALP Federal Conference officially removed self-determination as a goal of policy, but in practice it had been abandoned earlier.

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167 Gibson, conversation by phone, 25 April 1996.
169 The resolution stated: “ALP expresses its continuing concern at the situation in East Timor, particularly its officially stated objection to...incorporation without people having had proper opportunity to express themselves...the ALP calls on the Australian government to give active support to international initiatives that aim to achieve a settlement.” Quoted from AETA, *Newsletter*, vol.9, no.3, 1984, p.2.
170 Lambourne, op. cit., p.42.
Internationally, too, the case of East Timor suffered a setback when the UN Human Rights Committee, in spite of submissions testifying to human rights violations in East Timor, including one by Amnesty International, removed the charges from its agenda. The European Parliament on the other hand passed a resolution condemning Indonesia’s occupation and demanding an act of self-determination.

On 22 August 1985 Hawke reaffirmed the Australian government’s *de jure* recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty, while repeating his objections to the way the area was incorporated and his commitment to human rights and the general well-being of the East Timorese. The move was welcomed by Mochtar and allowed a new round of talks on the Timor Gap to get under way in October.

The shallowness of Hawke’s earlier expressed concern with human rights was exposed by Hayden who declared in parliament that the Australian delegation at the UN would not undertake any lobbying to put the question of East Timor on the agenda of the UN Human Rights Commission. However, at the previous session Australia had indicated its preference to keep the situation under review, a view not endorsed by the majority of the Commission. Australia would not lobby in the absence of evidence indicating a continuing pattern of gross

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172 The submission mentioned resettlement camps, cases of torture, trials, a massacre in a village named Krakas and other killings. Taylor, op.cit., p.48.

173 Ibid., pp.53-54.

violations of human rights, a concept he failed to define.\textsuperscript{175} This left innocuous diplomatic representations behind closed doors as the only means to express concern over human rights. This approach was fully in line with Hayden’s policy, which revolved around the predominant objective of protection and promotion of the national interest, defined in terms of the security and economic well-being of the Australian people, and the pursuit of a determined and independent role as a middle power in search of a better world order.\textsuperscript{176} The second objective was notably vague.

In his reply to Hayden’s speech Peacock remained silent over Timor, thus tacitly approving the government’s policy. Opposition leader John Howard even declared relations with Indonesia as of the highest priority.\textsuperscript{177} Thus there was clear bipartisan support for the idea that the relationship with Indonesia should prevail over human rights concerns.

In a major speech on human rights Hayden stated as the government’s goals: “[To] encourage and promote the fundamental rights of individual human beings; whenever possible, to induce changes in societies where those rights are denied; and to contribute to the integrity and effectiveness of international human rights standards.”\textsuperscript{178} Hayden wanted to pursue these goals through international institutions and bilaterally, although Australia’s aid program would not

\textsuperscript{175} House of Representatives, 17 October 1985, p.2460.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 26 November 1985, p.3657.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 5 May 1986, p.3031.
\textsuperscript{178} Ian Russell, Peter van Ness and Beng-Huat Chua, \textit{Australia’s Human Rights Diplomacy}, Canberra, ANU, 1992, p.28.
become an instrument for showing (dis)satisfaction with a country’s human rights record. Assuming the minister’s sincerity, this well intended human rights plan was almost meaningless, given that none of the central concepts were properly defined. Exact criteria directing the government’s implementation were also absent. To parliamentarians this obscure framework was apparently sufficiently transparent, as no questions were raised or a debate demanded.

In April 1986 the volatility of Australian-Indonesian relations was shown when an article written by David Jenkins in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, exposing the business empire and corrupt practices of the Suharto family, caused a crisis in Australian-Indonesian relations. Although the article seriously ruffled Indonesian spirits, talks on the seabed boundary continued. Conservative voices in Australia accused journalists of giving a coloured and biased opinion of a regime which was stable, friendly towards Australia and of fundamental importance to Australian security. In this climate of damage control, the pro-Timor movement suffered. Howard (LP) stated in the House: “I say to the Prime Minister: Get the monkey of the left wing’s obsession over East Timor off your back and recognise that our relationship with Indonesia surpasses virtually any other country (sic.) in the world…” Restoration of the threatened relationship was the only thing that mattered to the Liberal leader.

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179 Id.
181 Quoted from House of Representatives, 29 May 1986, p.4249.
Australia was in touch with its region, where Indonesia’s sovereignty was accepted and accusations of human rights violations not raised publicly, but lost touch with the larger international scene where the East Timor issue refused to go away and was discussed openly. The European Parliament, under Portuguese influence, again passed a resolution condemning the annexation of East Timor and calling for an act of self-determination. In the UN the Committee on Decolonisation heard submissions on human rights violations in East Timor, but a motion was adopted to postpone further discussion until the Secretary-General would have delivered his final report on Portuguese-Indonesian talks. The Portuguese parliament decided that Portugal ought to play a more assertive role in securing an act of self-determination in Timor and, being a member of the European Union, Portugal’s influence was far stronger than the country’s status as a small power warranted. In the years to come the Portuguese government willingly responded to parliament’s request, developing major diplomatic initiatives against Indonesia.

In 1987 Indonesia also came under renewed British criticism with the publication of a parliamentary report recommending against recognition of the annexation of East Timor. With Portugal appointed to the presidency of the UN Committee on Decolonisation hearings on East Timor were resumed. In the Council of Europe, Portuguese President Soares mentioned the Timor problem and Portugal also raised the issue with the US, where it found some Senators supportive. US Ambassador to Indonesia, Walters, implying American neutrality, declared that

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183 Ibid., p.64.
the Timor issue was one to be resolved between Portugal and Indonesia without outside interference. In the UN Committee on Decolonisation organisations from sixteen countries issued petitions.\textsuperscript{184} The UN Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities [Human Rights Sub-Committee] adopted a resolution in support of negotiations under supervision of the Secretary-General. In Portugal the incoming government stated that it had dropped the demand for self-determination as a precondition in order to be more flexible in talks with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{185} Just days later the Indonesian government reopened the talks with Portugal. The Secretary-General in his long awaited report concluded that little progress had been made. Debate on the matter was therefore adjourned for another year.\textsuperscript{186} The final international development of 1987 was the condemnation of the Indonesian occupation by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.\textsuperscript{187} Although no progress had been made, East Timor was back on the international agenda thanks especially to efforts by Portugal.

In spite of these international developments, the Australian stand did not change in 1987, even though Hayden declared in May that human rights had the highest priority in his policy. He deplored violations wherever they occurred and would oppose them notwithstanding the ideology of those responsible.\textsuperscript{188} Apparently the case of East Timor was an exception, as

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p.72.  
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p.73.  
\textsuperscript{186} Loc. cit.  
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p.74.  
\textsuperscript{188} Russell, op. cit., p.31.
nothing new was attempted. In parliament a few lonely voices continued to demand support for self-determination and a renewed effort to bring about a negotiated settlement.\textsuperscript{189}

Gareth Evans succeeded Hayden as foreign minister in August 1988. He had ambitious human rights objectives, particularly intensification of the use of existing human rights instruments.\textsuperscript{190}

Since Australia’s interests had to be balanced, the means used to serve human rights would be adjusted to the situation. Seeking to kill two birds with one stone, Evans utilised the instrument of diplomatic representation. A sound bilateral relationship was seen as a precondition for the effective use of this instrument. During his term as minister Evans would only occasionally inform his party caucus, and a little more frequently its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, about the representations he or Australian diplomats had made, but never did he reveal the response of the Indonesians.\textsuperscript{191} This limited caucus’ insight into the instrument that was used for implementation of the human rights policy.

Like Hayden, Evans did not openly admit a connection between human rights violations in East Timor and the territory’s forced integration with Indonesia. Not the regime itself but only its functioning was questioned. Denial of self-determination and violation of other human rights were unrelated events in Evans’ policy theory. In assuming this stand Evans optimistically tried to be both a moral champion of human rights, and a realistic defender of Australian interests,

\textsuperscript{189} For example Peter Milton (ALP) and Warren Snowdon (ALP), who became an advocate of the many East Timorese in his Darwin constituency.

\textsuperscript{190} Russell, op. cit., p.35.

\textsuperscript{191} Comment by Gibson. Conversation by phone, 25 April 1996.
building a solid relationship with Australia’s gateway to Asia. Events would again prove the fallacy of this kind of theory.

Internationally the link between human rights abuses and the invasion and denial of self-determination was acknowledged by Portugal and the European Parliament. Portuguese President Soares launched a bitter verbal attack on Indonesia for ignoring the right of self-determination in contempt of all UN norms. In January 1988 a report highly critical of the human rights situation in East Timor was presented to the European Parliament’s Political Affairs Commission, by its chair. In June the Political Affairs Commission approved the report which called on the member states to take action for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops and respect for the rights of the people of East Timor, including the right of self-determination.192 In March 1988 the plenary session of the European Parliament had already condemned the Indonesian occupation of East Timor,193 but Indonesian foreign minister Alatas remained determined in his opinion that integration was an accomplished fact. In May European pressure increased further with the first adoption of a resolution by all twelve European governments which stated that, “[the members] support[ed] the talks under auspices of the Secretary-General with a view to achieving a fair and internationally acceptable settlement which would safeguard the rights of the people of East Timor...” 194 Another initiative by European Parliamentarians, which drew the attention of Anthony Lamb (ALP) in the House in Canberra, was the formation of Parliamentarians for East Timor, which aimed at co-ordinating and

192 Taylor, pp.79-80.
193 Ibid., p.83.
promoting activities in support of self-determination for the East Timorese.\textsuperscript{195} As in the previous year, however, the House hardly discussed the Timor issue in 1988.

In the UN Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities no progress was made, the debate being postponed for another year. In the European Parliament a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and affirming the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor was adopted by an overwhelming majority.\textsuperscript{196} The US government, however, issued a statement declaring that it accepted East Timor’s incorporation even though no valid act of self-determination had taken place.\textsuperscript{197} Growing international concern thus seemed to be confined to the European Community. Indonesia was certain of the support of its Southeast Asian neighbours and the US indicated its acquiescence.

Given the lack of regional support for East Timorese self-determination, the Australian government saw no need to redirect its course, and continued to build its relationship with Indonesia. Major progress was achieved in the negotiations with Indonesia over the disputed seabed in the Timor Sea when the two governments reached an interim agreement on 15 November 1989 to establish a zone of co-operation.

\textsuperscript{194} Quoted from Taylor, op. cit., p.84.
\textsuperscript{195} Id., p.86. Lamb called upon his fellow Members to join the group. House of Representatives, 31 August 1988, p.758.
\textsuperscript{196} Taylor, op. cit., p.88.
\textsuperscript{197} Comment made by Charles Redman, a State Department spokesman. Ibid., p.89.

Since the invasion in 1975 Indonesia had denied foreigners access to East Timor, but in January 1989 the ban was lifted, a sign that Indonesian authorities believed they had mastered the situation. It was a miscalculation, which resulted in an increase in international concern with human rights in East Timor. In February 1989 Bishop Belo of Timor wrote to the UN Secretary-General, asking for a referendum on Timor’s future. US Vice-President Quale discussed with Suharto the political prisoner issue and repressive practices applied in East Timor. Members of Congress requested President Bush to also raise East Timor with Suharto during the latter’s visit to the US.

With the opening up of East Timor to the media and tourists in 1989 various incidents attracted the attention of audiences around the world. In October 1989 Pope John Paul II visited East Timor, which resulted in a filmed protest by people demanding self-determination. On the occasion of a visit by the US Ambassador to Indonesia in January 1990 students staged a protest rally, which was brutally broken up by Indonesian military. The damage had been done, however, since reports of the brutality with which Indonesian soldiers had responded reached the outside world. A further setback for Indonesia was that due to active Portuguese lobbying the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided to put East Timor back on the agenda, a decision implying that human rights were being violated consistently. Portuguese lobbying in the European Community resulted in a joint statement to the

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198 Taylor, op. cit., p.95.
UN Sub-Commission which expressed the Community’s ‘grave concern’ and called for a ‘just settlement’ in accordance with the UN principles and ‘the legitimate interests’ of the Timorese people.\(^{199}\) Portugal further brought the Australian-Indonesian Agreement on the Timor Gap before the International Court of Justice, disputing Australia’s right to sign an agreement with another state whose sovereignty had not been accepted by the United Nations. Given all this international activity the East Timor issue was truly experiencing a revival.

This growing international involvement left the Australian government out, being mesmerised with the goals of reaching an agreement over the Timor Gap and to further improve relations with Indonesia. Finally Evans and Alatas agreed to establish a zone of co-operation in the Timor Gap.\(^{200}\) The agreement made a clear contribution to Evans’ goals to pursue trade, investment and economic co-operation and maintain or strengthen a positive security and strategic environment in Australia’s region.\(^{201}\) Evans also saw the treaty as important for Australia’s regional security, since it contributed to the economic stability of Indonesia. In terms of Evans’ fourth foreign policy priority -- contributing to the cause of good international citizenship -- the contribution was less obvious.\(^{202}\) Certainly it deprived Evans once and for all of the option to

\(^{199}\) ACFOA, ‘East Timor Towards a Just Peace in the 1990s’, p.8.


\(^{201}\) Although Evans admitted that the bilateral trade volume was disappointingly low, only $1.2 billion, rapid structural changes in Indonesia would offer great opportunities to expand trade considerably. Gareth Evans, ‘Australia and Indonesia: A Developing Relationship’, *AFAR*, vol.60, no.12, 1989, pp.703-706.

question Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor and to bring up the issue of self-determination. In more than one aspect the treaty was highly profitable for Indonesia.

The Australian parliament hailed the signing as an event of major importance to relations with Indonesia. The East Timor problem was discussed as a matter of secondary importance. None of the parties showed any doubts as to the legitimacy of Australia’s handling of the issue, which found its justification in the acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty. One ALP Member, Keith Wright, who wanted the Timor issue removed from the international political agenda, even claimed that it was “the East Timorese who invited Indonesia into East Timor [and] that invitation was accepted by Indonesia.” The general attitude in parliament towards the East Timor issue was one of accepting the irreversibility of the area’s political status. Certainly Australia was not considered in a position to do anything other than continue to stress the need for improving human rights and the economic well-being of its population.

Hawke’s comment following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 that big countries could not invade small neighbours and get away with it, was a slip of the tongue, which offered opponents of the government’s Timor policy a chance to demand a change of policy to make it consistent. Evans had to come to the aid of the faltering Prime Minister, declaring that there was  

possibility of a contradiction in Australia’s perceived interests and policy priorities. Further he does not lay down any rules for making an on the spot decision regarding the priority of goals to be pursued and the means attributed to that end.

Quoted from House of Representatives, 9 May 1990, p.100.
no international legal obligation for Australia to change its recognition of East Timor’s forcible incorporation.\(^{204}\)

Broad policy statements on human rights have been regrettably very few, but the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted a policy summary in 1990.\(^ {205}\) The statement assumed that more respect for human rights would contribute to a more just international order, which in turn would improve the security and prosperity of states and individuals alike. Not just this self-interested motive but also a translation of Australia’s own democratic and social values motivated the government to pursue an active policy aimed at promotion and protection of human rights. Upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the statement rejected any claim that human rights were an internal matter. Varying social, cultural, and historical interpretations of human rights, however, would be considered when dealing with a particular human rights situation. Regarding all rights as equally important, the statement declared that economic rights and civil and political rights were mutually supportive.\(^ {206}\) Although recognising the beneficial impact of respect for individual rights on a state’s economic performance, this theoretical conclusion was not reflected in Australia’s development aid policy, which continued to focus on social and economic rights.


\(^{205}\) Unfortunately the authors of the report are unknown, and most regrettably so is the source in which the statement titled, ‘Submission by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the Australian Government’s International Human Rights Policy and Activities’, was found.

\(^{206}\) Ibid.
In addressing human rights violations the Department preferred a private dialogue to public expressions of discontent and sanctions as a means to serve the interests of the victims. Strong diplomatic relations could serve as a means to convey the Australian government’s concern. The defence of human rights would be consistent and non-selective, although flexibility in judgement and approach would be essential. Thus a case-by-case approach would be followed to judge any particular human rights case and the most appropriate response. Punitive measures would be exceptional and reserved for cases where there was strong international support, and no other means of persuasion. The Department pledged to investigate all human rights violations brought to its attention and, should there be any substance to a claim, seek clarification with the government involved in a way that avoided confrontation. 207

The summary was fairly comprehensive but it contained some major weaknesses, reminiscent of the Dutch policy framework, but amplified by the general process of foreign policy making in Australia. The Department simultaneously favoured a secretive approach on a case-by-case basis, which took account of cultural, social and historical factors, however, in some tension with this, it also proclaimed the need for consistency. In any case parliamentary control, and indeed any influence from outsiders, would be reduced to a minimum, giving the executive virtually unrestricted leeway to apply its principles. Any serious discussion on how to establish links between means of response and the nature and extent of human rights violations was missing in the summary, which further allowed for ambiguity and arbitrariness. Direct implications for the approach to the Timor case were negligible: the government had always

207 Ibid.
relied on maximum discretion to Indonesia in its representations concerning human rights. The basic policy in place was not affected by this new direction in human rights policy.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade also continued its strenuous efforts to link Australia more closely with its immediate region. The government continued to follow an approach of direct dialogue with other governments on human rights violations, in accordance with its human rights policy. Evans intended to give priority to those policy fields where Australia’s interests coincided with some opportunity to influence their achievement. Evans again categorised his foreign policy objectives, and ranked them. Australia’s contribution to the cause of good international citizenship, which included human rights, came at the bottom of his list. According to his theory respect for human rights would result in tolerant societies, which in turn would lift the standards of international behaviour. Internal stability would thus promote international stability.\(^{208}\)

Since pursuit of trade, investment and economic co-operation were ranked above good international citizenship, human rights were likely to receive less emphasis than achieving a more solid relationship with Indonesia, the more so since Evans regarded as remote the chance of exercising influence on Indonesia in the East Timor case. Therefore Evans would continue his low profile policy of isolated diplomatic representations, this being in line with his philosophy on internal stability. He still failed to acknowledge the causal relation between human rights

violations in East Timor and Indonesia’s presence there; it was something he did not want to envisage.

A parliamentary delegation visited Indonesia and East Timor in February 1991. In April Garrie Gibson, an ALP member of the delegation and a member of the group Parliamentarians for East Timor, made a comprehensive statement in the House -- the first of its kind in many years -- asking attention for the fate of Timor. Unlike other members Gibson intended to combine an effort to bring about a proper act of self-determination with good bilateral relations. Other delegation members immediately took issue with Gibson’s account of the situation in East Timor. John Riggal (LP) even stated that Indonesian rule was the best thing that could have happened to the East Timorese.

To the bitter disappointment of the East Timorese, a Portuguese parliamentary delegation cancelled a visit to the province on 24 October 1991. It formed the prelude to a period of unrest and Indonesian repression. On 28 October Indonesian troops stormed the Motael parish church, shooting two people. During the funeral ceremony for these victims in Dili on 12 November Indonesian soldiers indiscriminately gunned down mourners and demonstrators. A number of people were taken into custody and allegedly, together with a number of the wounded who had been taken to hospital, shot two days later. A third brutal killing was

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209 According to Garrie Gibson about 40 Members had joined the group, which was opposed to the government’s policy, instead demanding an internationally recognised process of self-determination and an end to human rights abuses. House of Representatives, 17 April 1991, p.2883.
orchestrated on the 17th, and a fourth on the 19th. On these two occasions another 17 people were allegedly murdered.\textsuperscript{211} The death toll from the massacres in 1991 could be as high as 272.\textsuperscript{212}

The massacre was condemned by all political parties in Australia. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade received a spate of angry protests from various organisations.\textsuperscript{213} The government summoned the Indonesian Ambassador and urged the Indonesian government to conduct a thorough investigation. Those responsible for violations of human rights should receive proper punishment and Hawke instructed Evans to discuss the matter with Alatas on 14 November.\textsuperscript{214} The following day Hawke for the first time mentioned a death toll of 50, the number later also mentioned by the Indonesian investigative committee.

The government quickly played down the shooting as an incident, which it condemned, but which was kept separate from Australia’s position of recognition of East Timor’s integration. Admitting that a problem still existed, Hawke asked the Indonesian government to negotiate a solution with the Timorese which would allow East Timor to remain a part of Indonesia in a

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p.2887.
\textsuperscript{212} This figure was mentioned by Jose Gusmao, representative of National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in Darwin. Interview, Darwin, 19 August 1995.
\textsuperscript{213} Among those groups protesting were: the Uniting Church in Australia, Australia-Asia Workers Links, the Free East Timor Japan Coalition, ACFOA, the Timorese Association in Victoria, the Indonesian Studies Group of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, the East Timor Alert Network (Canada), and Teachers for Peace.
\textsuperscript{214} House of Representatives, 13 November 1991, p.2951.
manner acceptable to both parties. Without a sincere effort to meet Australia’s concerns, Hawke warned that his government would have to reconsider its policy.\textsuperscript{215}

Using the opportunity to stage the first proper debate in more than a decade on Australia’s East Timor policy, Garrie Gibson (ALP), implementing an ALP caucus resolution, introduced a comprehensive motion, strongly supported by Warren Snowdon (ALP), demanding \textit{inter alia} a free, accurate, just and thorough inquiry conducted fairly and impartially, and with proper action taken against those found guilty. The motion also demanded that the government do its utmost to achieve a solution to the conflict by putting pressure on the Indonesian government to negotiate with all parties in order to find a solution. The Australian embassy and a representative of the UN Secretary-General should be sent to East Timor to provide an independent assessment.\textsuperscript{216} The motion did not go so far as to ask for an international inquiry, as this would have raised doubts on Australia’s recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty. Such a policy reversal most members of the ALP’s caucus and the government would not have been willing to support.\textsuperscript{217}

In spite of this precaution, the resolution was too far reaching for the Liberal and National Parties, who submitted an amendment which did not endorse the demand to put pressure on the Indonesian government to make a serious effort to reach a negotiated settlement.\textsuperscript{218} This meant

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 27 November 1991, p.3399.  
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., pp.3463-3464.  
\textsuperscript{217} Gibson, conversation by phone, 25 April 1996.  
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., p.3466.
that, like the government, the opposition separated the massacre from the political status of East Timor. The opposition supported the position of Prime Minister Hawke concerning a review of relations with Indonesia should the Indonesian inquiry be unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{219}

For resources minister Alan Griffith it was nevertheless business as usual when he signed a further part of the Timor Gap Treaty in the second half of November,\textsuperscript{220} the clearest indication that the government was unlikely to adopt a radically different policy regarding the matter of Timorese self-determination. Fearing that Australia would achieve very little with a big stick Evans preferred to continue his diplomatic representations as a means to make the Indonesians more humane in their administration of East Timor. For this reason he diluted the ALP caucus resolution, but he had a difficult battle in cabinet where a withdrawal of Australia’s \textit{de jure} recognition had been a topic of discussion. However with Hawke’s support he carried the day.\textsuperscript{221} Nevertheless, his internal opposition forced Evans, at least for the time being, to maintain a strong stand and in late November he reiterated the government’s insistence on a full, fair and comprehensive inquiry, and he and Hawke received Horta early in December, a first for the Prime Minister. At this stage, however, Evans had already started to play down the Dili events. Maintaining his own doctrine that human rights violations and East Timor’s political status were not related, Evans now called the shooting an incident, while Horta insisted that it reflected a

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., pp.3466-3469.
\textsuperscript{220} Aarons, op. cit., p.66.
\textsuperscript{221} See Lambourne, op. cit., p.45.
pattern of behaviour of Indonesian soldiers. This talk failed to bring the parties any closer, as did several other talks between Horta and Evans.

The Australian branch of the International Committee of Jurists testified before the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that the Djaelani Committee, set up by the Indonesian government to investigate the shooting, did not meet the standards necessary for such an inquiry. Evans, however, who had declared his willingness to review relations with Indonesia should the results of the investigation be unsatisfactory, ruled the findings “credible and reasonable: they display a clear sense of responsibility on the part of the military for the tragic events in Dili.” The minister also repeated his call on the Indonesian government to develop a strategy for longer term reconciliation. In an interview Evans declared that Australia’s recognition of the integration was based on the reality and irreversibility of Indonesian rule, not on morality.

Reflecting community indignation since the killings in November, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, disagreed with the minister’s judgement and was merciless in its verdict on his policy:

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222 It was the first time that Hawke in his capacity of Prime Minister had spoken with a representative of the Timorese resistance. Ibid., p.44.
223 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, Canberra, AGPS, 1992, p.71.
224 News Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 February 1992. Quoted from Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p.75.
Given the situation in East Timor, its proximity to Australia and its historic and emotional ties for many Australians and, in particular, the scale of the massacre on 12 November and the injustices done to the victims of that incident, it would seem the incident and its outcome deserved much stronger condemnation.226

The Committee’s criticism regarding consistency in the implementation of the government’s human rights policy was equally severe:

It is important that the Australian government should be consistent in its reaction to human rights outrages of this kind...By softening, as Australia did, the strongly worded resolution on the massacre which was drafted by the European Community, we have lessened our credibility.227

The government failed to respond to this criticism.


On a more fundamental policy level the Overseas Service Bureau (OSB), an independent NGO which sends skilled Australians overseas, recommended in February 1992 that the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade use Australia’s aid to promote, through discussions with high level officials, all human rights endorsed by international conventions. In case of serious violations Australia should consider all measures to show its disapproval. In less

225 Aarons, op. cit., p.39.
226 Quoted from Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p.76.
227 Ibid.
severe cases of violations, diplomatic and political use of aid should be restricted to a minimum, but trade sanctions were nevertheless regarded as a suitable instrument. In order to improve public control over government activities in the implementation of human rights policy, OSB requested that the governments to which representations had been made by DFAT be listed. Also OSB wanted better integration and an expansion of the human rights section in DFAT, using a comprehensive system for monitoring and responding to human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{228}

With regard to Indonesia, OSB regretted that DFAT had been extremely restrained and cautious in making representations. OSB took issue with the DFAT submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade which claimed that the human rights situation in East Timor had been improving over recent years. According to OSB the Dili massacre was by no means an aberration but part of a military strategy of suppression. The November statement by Hawke, which appealed to Indonesia to negotiate a lasting peace, was welcomed, but it was contradicted by DFAT’s lobbying against inclusion of Timorese self-determination for the agenda of the February meeting of the UN Sub-Committee on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{229}

On 26 March 1992 the House resumed its debate on the critical motion put forward by Gibson (ALP) and the more moderate amendment to it by Philip Ruddock (LP). Speakers from both sides tended to re-establish the connection between human rights violations and self-determination, at least in their argumentation. But generally Liberal Party speakers emphasised

\textsuperscript{228} Overseas Service Bureau, ‘Submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Human Rights Sub-Committee)’, February 1992, pp.4-5 and 8-9.
the need to respond to the Dili events in the context of overall relations with Indonesia. That state should not be told how to run its affairs as this would only offend its leaders and not improve the fate of the Timorese. John Moore (LP) even judged Australia’s initial response as an over-reaction, which came close to excluding Australia from having any influence. He was fearful of Indonesian retaliation, characterising the bilateral relationship as asymmetrically dependent. He therefore concluded that it was better to focus on the future, not the past, implying that any reversal of the decision to recognise Indonesia’s de jure sovereignty should not be discussed.

Gibson (ALP) expressed his satisfaction with Indonesia’s response to international criticism, since the Indonesian government had taken the unprecedented step of suspending local commanders in East Timor. The report produced by the Indonesian investigative commission was ‘fairly strong’, he said. Nevertheless, he criticised Indonesia’s administration for having failed to convince the Timorese that it was in their interests to stay with Indonesia. Therefore Gibson continued to dissent from Australian acceptance of the incorporation. With Prime Minister Paul Keating’s visit to Indonesia impending, he suggested the withdrawal of all Indonesian forces and some form of local autonomy for East Timor short of total independence so as not to violate Australia’s acceptance of the incorporation. He urged the Prime Minister to

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229 Id.
pursue these two matters in order to reduce violations of human rights and satisfy the desires of the population.\textsuperscript{231}

The debate, which proceeded rather haphazardly and was dominated by backbenchers, ended unsatisfactorily without any voting. A real conclusion was therefore not reached. However, a few days after the debate Keating crushed any expectations there might have been regarding an Australian initiative to substantially improve the Indonesian administration, by endorsing Evans’ approval of the ‘credible’ report submitted by the Indonesian commission of investigation into the Dili massacre. He explicitly separated human rights concerns from the autonomy issue and declared his opposition to linking Australian aid to human rights conditions in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{232}

On 18 January 1992 the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Richard Woolcott, had already warned that the relationship with Indonesia should be regarded as paramount in and not subject to moralistic views on human rights issues.\textsuperscript{233} He had no reason to be concerned since Keating declared in Jakarta on 22 April 1992:

\begin{quote}
We consider the subsequent actions of the Indonesian government...to constitute a credible response. Our aim is to assist where we can in measures for [the people of East Timor’s] welfare, and to support a process of reconciliation between them and the Indonesian authorities.\textsuperscript{234}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., pp.1191-1193.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 30 March 1992, p.1335.
\textsuperscript{233} Lambourne, op. cit., p.47.
\textsuperscript{234} Newspaper article in ACFOA info-map.
Evans reconfirmed the policy as well and explicitly rejected any link between human rights and Australian aid. His concern was with the well-being of the people, and to this end Australian aid and human rights policy had to contribute.\textsuperscript{235} In August 1992 the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists called for a withdrawal of all Indonesian forces.\textsuperscript{236}

In December 1992 the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade advised the government in its report \textit{A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights} to support a UN initiative to start talks with all parties to the East Timor conflict in order to reach a settlement by peaceful means. With respect to Australia’s human rights efforts, the Committee demanded reinstating the annual report from diplomatic missions, thus increasing parliamentary control over the implementation of Australia’s human rights policy.\textsuperscript{237} Some suggestions by the OSB in its submission were thus accepted by the Joint Committee.

The Department accommodated the Committee regarding its wish for an annual report. In the first report of its kind, the government declared it would use flexibility, consistency, confidentiality, non-discrimination and non-confrontation in its case-by-case bilateral and multilateral approaches. Any punitive action would only be taken if there was a strong international coalition for it. The Committee endorsed these policy principles and means of

\textsuperscript{235} Gareth Evans in a letter to ACTU president Martin Ferguson, 31 August 1992.
\textsuperscript{236} \textit{SMH}, 15 August 1992.
\textsuperscript{237} Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade, p.XXX and p.XXViii respectively.
implementation. Foreign Affairs, using a social-economic definition to describe the intentions of its aid program, continued to refuse to link its aid program to political and civil rights, and the Joint Committee agreed that there should not be a punitive connection, to the disappointment of human rights NGOs.

The East Timor Talks Campaign started a new campaign to bring about the fundamental change in Australia’s foreign policy that seemed to have been briefly on the horizon immediately following the massacres. The group aimed to re-establish the connection between those brutal violations of human rights and political discontent in East Timor regarding integration. According to the East Timor Talks Campaign the process of reconciliation as proposed by the government would not contribute to finding a long term solution. Rather it would improve Indonesia’s day-to-day operating in Timor in a revitalised ‘hearts and minds’ approach. The group also claimed that the Australian government was unlikely to support any reopening of the Timor case in the UN because that would jeopardise its case on the Timor Gap Treaty at the International Court of Justice.

Although the Dili massacre may have revitalised Australian community protests, the previous discussion of the response by Australian policy makers gives no reason for assuming that East Timor’s political fate will once again become a prominent issue of discontent between Australia

\[^{238}\text{Ibid., p.9.}\]
\[^{239}\text{Ibid., p.50.}\]
\[^{240}\text{‘East Timor Talks Campaign: 1992’}.\]
and Indonesia, simply because most politicians and bureaucrats regard good relations with Indonesia as very important to Australia.

5. Conclusions

Australia’s policy regarding the Timor question in the period under concern has undergone various phases of gradual transition alternated by rapid and fundamental change, but on several occasions it also survived circumstances which seemed likely to bring about a modification in either means or goals. These challenges to the policy and their success or failure will be explained in this final section. Based on the findings of this chapter the following phases in Australia’s Timor policy are distinguished, which do not in each case contrast with a previous phase of policy but they illustrate the challenge of change:

A. Whitlam’s diplomacy after September 1974;

B. Gradual accommodation to Indonesia’s authority during the Fraser years: 1976-1982;

C. Defeat of the ALP’s grassroots challenge to acquiescence: 1983-1984;

D. Acquiescence under Hawke and the international challenge: 1985-1991;

E. Renewed acceptance of East Timor’s political status despite Dili.

5.1 Whitlam’s diplomacy after September 1974
In the lead up to the Indonesian invasion of December 1975 the traditional view regarding Indonesia as a security threat propagated by the Department of Defence vied for supremacy with the comparatively novel philosophy of improving trade links with Southeast Asian states, propagated by the Australian embassy in Jakarta and the Indonesia desk of Foreign Affairs. The opinion of the Prime Minister was decisive. In September 1974 Whitlam decided to adopt the policy advocated by his Ambassador and accept Timor’s integration into Indonesia by peaceful means. Whitlam kept the change in policy emphasis, from self-determination to integration for Portuguese Timor, to himself, knowing that he would have met with strong opposition not only in cabinet but especially in the ALP Caucus. Thus it happened that the official policy deviated from the policy actually pursued. When this fact was leaked, the government became very vulnerable to outside criticism, and duplicity of the party’s leadership denied the ALP effectiveness in its future opposition to the policy of accommodation.

Whitlam’s diplomacy was a true landmark but his handling of the East Timor problem was also characteristic of his dealing with human rights issues in bilateral relations with Asian states. In such instances forging state-to-state relationships would generally prevail over the sensitive issue of human rights. Whitlam’s personality, described as vain, egocentric and without respect for other people’s opinions, is also a variable which helps to explain the course of events. Whitlam’s diplomacy split the policy making centre, and when his interference became public knowledge, the opposition, in Australian politics easily ranked amongst the outsiders in foreign policy making, became involved and scored some easy points against the government. Finally,
Whitlam’s arbitrary actions -- he ignored the Department of Foreign Affairs and its minister and did not inform his own cabinet -- substantiates the claim that the Prime Minister’s position vis-à-vis other key actors in the policy making centre is very strong.

5.2 Gradual accommodation to Indonesia’s authority during the Fraser years: 1976-1982

Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor forced the Fraser Government at an awkward moment to formulate and implement a new policy. From the outset the policy was a compromise, with initially an emphasis on self-determination, a goal pursued by diplomatic means in the United Nations. Without persistently strong international support, the government, internally divided over the issue in the first place, reassessed its policy in the face of Indonesia’s determination to integrate East Timor, and encouraged by the prevailing doctrine in the Department of Foreign Affairs that a stable and friendly Indonesia was of crucial importance to Australia. With the opposition in disarray over its own failure when in government to give sufficient support to the Timorese struggle for self-determination, and with the backing of its own parliamentarians, the government could prevent parliament from becoming a major actor in policy making.

When Fraser won the elections, the Timor support groups lost whatever links they had with the policy making centre. The movement had been hampered by its ideological division -- this problem would stay with the groups for many years to come -- which prevented them from

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mounting a single campaign. Also most of those groups were small and only locally active, which precluded any significant influence on foreign policy which is made at federal level. These weaknesses were partly compensated for by media support. This denied the government to move too quickly towards acceptance of Indonesia’s sovereignty and kept the issue on the public and political agenda. Nevertheless decision making inside the Fraser Government was the decisive factor in redirecting policy. The faction more favourably disposed to self-determination, headed by Peacock, gradually gave way to the group advocating acceptance of Indonesia’s integration. The government’s eventual acceptance of Indonesia’s *de jure* sovereignty paved the way for better relations with Indonesia and offered an opportunity for talks on the undefined boundary in the Timor Sea. In this process of accommodation Australia all but sacrificed support for self-determination.

5.3 Defeat of the ALP’s grassroots challenge to acquiescence: 1983-1984

What looked like a major challenge to established policy turned into bitter disillusion for the Timor support groups in 1983-1984, who had successfully lobbied the ALP to change its platform on Timor. While in opposition after 1977 both the ALP caucus in parliament and its Federal Conference had consistently expressed strong support for Timorese self-determination. With both Hawke and Hayden seemingly backing this stand, the stage seemed set for a major redirection of policy when the ALP formed government in 1983. Once in government, however, compare Feith who refused to accept those reasons as an explanation for the limited influence of the Timor groups because the media and hence the public at large were unaware of
Hawke and Hayden quickly set about modifying their party’s approved policy to the point where they completely ignored the Conference’s resolutions. In 1984 the pro-Timor alliance in the ALP was dealt a final blow when Hayden managed to have a resolution in support of self-determination defeated.

The ALP’s change of policy was a devastating blow to the East Timor groups who became demoralised in the face of their political isolation. Besides, they lost the activist support from ALP and CPA. Only the long term activists remained committed, but without a proper organisational framework. Fretilin’s military defeats caused a further loss of faith. The remaining supporters were clear outsiders to policy making.

The change of front by Hayden and Hawke confirmed the influence of the Indonesia lobby. When assuming office the two politicians were quickly tainted with the ‘Indonesia first’ doctrine, spread by this influential group of diplomats, and others, which had also killed all desire amongst members of the Fraser Government to defend the right of the Timorese to self-determination at the risk of straining relations with Indonesia. Since Hayden later declared that he had been against the tough resolutions at the time these were adopted by the ALP Federal Conference, he acted opportunistically as well when he advocated the Timor cause, thereto encouraged by those handicaps. Herbert Feith. Interview, Monash University, 16 and 17 August 1995.
the parliamentary system in Australia which is based on confrontation between the government and the opposition.  

When the House, following an on the spot assessment by a delegation, supported the government’s policy and the underlying philosophy, the issue of Timorese self-determination faded away, with both the policy making centre and the policy periphery in broad agreement.

5.4 Acquiescence under Hawke and the international challenge: 1985-1991

When Prime Minister Hawke reconfirmed Indonesia’s *de jure* sovereignty in 1985, a policy aimed at trying to boost relations with Indonesia and therefore to remove the contentious Timor issue from the bilateral agenda experienced its heyday. Both Hayden and Evans as foreign minister carefully distinguished their humanitarian concern over reported human rights violations from the political status quo, which they accepted. Thus quiet diplomatic representations became an established element of Australia’s human rights policy. These representations were intended to serve moral goals as formulated in the foreign policy and silence any potential critics of the government, while yet not jeopardising the goal of strengthening relations with Indonesia through public criticism. The signing of the Timor Gap Treaty after many years of talks bore witness to a successful implementation of these dual goals.

Max Lane supports this view, claiming that Hayden supported the East Timor case in order to get public support. In government he needed business support and therefore changed his
However, growing Portuguese diplomatic activity and the opening up of East Timor to outsiders interfered with this harmonious situation, revitalising domestic opposition in Australia. After years of little activity East Timor groups increased their activities, but several weaknesses still hampered their success. Although ideological differences had largely disappeared the activists remained divided and failed to organise a national campaign. Many groups were also still active at a local level and had insufficient means for a broader campaign. Without adequate support in parliament the pro-Timor groups failed to bring about a change in Australia’s means of implementation, let alone its established policy philosophy and resulting goals. However, with ample media coverage they formed a vocal nuisance to the reigning policy, and were a constant threat to Australia’s special relationship with Indonesia, which had received even more emphasis in the context of Australia’s all out push into Asia.

Indonesia itself created a serious challenge to the policy centre and its policy -- Indonesia’s contempt for human rights was painfully exposed to the TV camera in Dili in November 1991. International criticism was severe. In Australia, the government condemned the massacre as well but it quickly renounced any desire for a fundamental change in policy. Parliament moved also closer to this line, and the motions submitted only supported a process of reconciliation between all parties involved in Timor. The international climate had been favourable to a more mind.

244 According to Herb Feith the movement has become of age and the ideological split and reputation of pro-Communism has disappeared. Interview, Monash University, 16 and 17 August 1995. Max Lane recognised three main groups that are active in Australia: UDT, Fretilin and CNRM. In his opinion the absence of an umbrella organisation was a clear disadvantage. Interview, Sydney, 26 April 1996.
fundamental reconsideration of the Timorese position but, given the emphasis on fostering relations with Indonesia, neither the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence, nor the government and its supporters in parliament were prepared to proceed on that road. The opportunity offered by the international environment to forward East Timorese self-determination was missed.

5.5 Renewed acceptance of East Timor’s political status

The events in Dili did not bring about a fundamental rethinking of Australia’s policy and in 1992 the Government resumed its dualistic approach, expressing concern over human rights in private while publicly acclaiming the importance of expanding relations with Indonesia.

The Timor groups were back where they were in 1984: their claims were vindicated by events and their case was morally and publicly invigorated, but politically they were without allies. Their inability to put differences over the end result behind them, has prevented them from organising a single campaign. Their actions have therefore not risen above the level of pin-pricks: they hurt but do not inflict a significant injury. With only a small number of active supporters and their limited resources scattered the Timor groups will remain outsiders to the process of policy making. Given this conclusion it is most unlikely that Australia will alter its policy in the foreseeable future.
Chapter VIII

Conclusions

1. Introduction

This final chapter will discuss and compare the findings of this study in terms of the theory put forward and answer the central questions raised. Using the two by two research design, self-determination and human rights as elements of foreign policy in the two case studies will be investigated and explained for Australia and the Netherlands separately. This requires an analysis of the impact of changes in the variables that form the foreign policy model used here on the goals and means pursued by the Netherlands and Australia in their respective foreign policies in the two cases. Therefore relations between the model’s main variables will also be investigated. The foreign policy model propounded the following variables: international environment, institutions, roles and procedures, and coalitions. Linking several variables, two comparisons will be made. The first comparison requires a focus on the interplay between changes in the international environment, on the one hand, and foreign policy perceptions and preferences amongst dominant actors/alliances in Australia and the Netherlands on the other. The analysis will concentrate on issues in international and national politics, highlighting the dynamic nature of foreign policy making.
The second comparison is between foreign policy making processes in the Netherlands and Australia. This analysis compares the impact of structural components of foreign policy making on pursuit of self-determination and human rights in the two cases. The emphasis will thus be on institutional and procedural variables of foreign policy making.

2. The international environment and self-determination in the foreign policy of the Netherlands and Australia

The impact of the international environment on foreign policy making in the Netherlands and Australia was both general and case specific. First the general state of the international environment will be discussed, and subsequently its impact on Australia and the Netherlands in terms of their actors’ preferences among foreign policy goals and means.

Intense ideological, political and strategic rivalry between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its vassals dominated international relations in the 1950s and 1960s. A third group of non-aligned states, mainly former colonies, became caught up in this all-out struggle for domination, and manipulated the two blocs in return for support. Intense East-West rivalry subsided in 1980s, but had until then strongly directed the foreign policy agendas of individual states. In this climate of hostility security issues claimed priority over economic and other utilitarian and idealistic concerns, such as human rights.

The UN as the main international institution for conflict resolution and co-operation was also infested with bloc thinking: state behaviour was prescribed by the interests of the various
blocs. In this climate of rivalry East and West alike tried to seduce the non-aligned states into supporting their struggle for hegemony.

The 1950s were also the era of decolonisation. Many of the non-aligned states had a colonial background and were keen to eradicate colonialism entirely. Under these conditions the concept of self-determination attained prominence as a principle applied to decolonisation. The concept of self-determination was still improperly defined in the first place, but given the importance of the non-aligned group in the UN, its application became arbitrary, and an element in the world wide struggle for power between East and West.

Both West New Guinea and East Timor suffered from these unfavourable international conditions. Indonesia could count on the support of many newly independent states, to whom support for application of the principle of self-determination as proposed by the Netherlands and Australia meant honouring claims by ethnic minorities which could affect their own territory and security. It was in these states’ own advantage to adopt the maxim that the successor of the colonial state should inherit the former state’s territory. In the case of West New Guinea this doctrine paralysed the United Nations.

Although a majority in the UN supported application of the principle of self-determination to the East Timor case, the UN lacked the means to force Indonesia to comply. Individual states operating outside the UN would, as in the case of West New Guinea, determine the course of events. The United States, as dominant player in both cases, only pursued
strategic interests. Fear that Indonesia would become a Communist stronghold dominated 
American thinking.

Resuming the discussion, general conditions of the international system were unfavourable 
for pursuit of self-determination by Australia and the Netherlands in both cases. Security and 
bloc interests coincided and dominated the agenda of individual states and also ruled their 
behaviour in the UN.

The following exposition will discuss the implications of the interplay between domestic 
actors and international circumstances for self-determination in the policy of the Netherlands 
and Australia.

When Indonesia became independent, the emotional and economic ties with the Netherlands 
were still very strong. Dutch pride had been hurt during the colonial war for independence. 
In the 1970s and 1980s these emotions had largely subsided, and Dutch policy makers 
were far more conscious of Indonesia’s difficulties in accepting Dutch moralism regarding 
human rights. The bilateral relationship was still sensitive, but its economic and political 
importance had declined. In marked contrast with the 1950s policy makers in the 
Netherlands no longer wanted to vindicate the colonial administration, which had put them 
on a course of confrontation with Indonesia. Rather they tried to make amends for the 
shamefulness of the colonial record. Nevertheless the feeling of involvement and 
responsibility for events in Indonesia still existed. Tension between the two states was 
therefore always latent.
Hard feelings over the loss of the East Indies and a desire to prove that the colonial regime had not been entirely bad, certainly better than the Sukarno Government, in combination with a sense of mission, are factors which go a long way in explaining why Dutch decision makers were prepared to accept such high political and economic costs over the issue of West Papuan self-determination.

As long as Indonesia was without allies Dutch policy makers had little to fear, and they could continue to hold on to sovereignty over the territory for some time to come. Self-determination was both a well-intentioned attempt to prove that the Netherlands was capable of administering a colony properly after all, and also a means to accumulate international support and crush Indonesia’s attempt to take over West New Guinea. When this policy proved successful and the UN held aloof from the conflict, few people correctly assessed Indonesia’s determination to risk a major conflict.

Domestic opposition increased when the conflict escalated and started to hurt Dutch interests in Indonesia, but it was too late. Dominant actors in the Netherlands’ foreign policy making remained unswerving and accepted economic damage. However, with Indonesia becoming more assertive the military vulnerability of West New Guinea forced the Netherlands to ask its allies for more than political support. Foreign minister Luns only succeeded in getting some vague promises from the United States for West New Guinea’s security. When Indonesia started to purchase large amounts of weapons these promises were no longer enough to preclude the possibility of an armed conflict, but since Luns did
not disclose just how precarious the situation was, denying people the opportunity to reassess the situation, support for his policy of speediest preparation of the Papuans for self-determination remained strong.

When the seriousness of the situation became known eventually, the government had to rid itself of the West New Guinea burden. The United States was not prepared to let the dispute develop into a cold war conflict. With Communism already on the increase in Indonesia, and this country purchasing Soviet arms, the United States wanted to bring about a solution by peaceful means. The Netherlands was given the chance to involve the UN in the administration of West New Guinea but, for reasons explained above, failed to acquire the necessary two-thirds majority. Without friends willing to support the Netherlands militarily, bilateral negotiations with Indonesia were the only way to end the conflict. Not capable of fighting without assistance the Netherlands sacrificed the principle of self-determination. This principle had long outlived its usefulness, but pride and loyalty to commitments forced the government to make the best of it during the negotiations in 1962. The result was a face saving formula. The misinterpretation of the international leeway to pursue a policy of self-determination had resulted in a dramatic, humiliating and costly defeat.

No doubt Dutch policy makers kept the defeat of the West New Guinea policy in mind, when they were confronted with the problem of East Timor. As mentioned earlier emotions did not play such a strong role any longer, but in the 1970s human rights gradually developed into an established element of Dutch foreign policy. In their policy, decision makers had to balance Indonesia’s reluctance to be lectured by the Netherlands with
possible consequences for Dutch economic interests, a genuine concern for human rights, a still existing sense of post-colonial responsibility and, finally, a desire to strengthen relations with Indonesia and its pro-Western regime. Foreign ministers and Ministers for Development Co-operation only marginally differed in the emphasis they put on these various elements.

Twice the East Timor case became prominent internationally: after the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and again following the Dili massacre in 1991. In 1975 the Netherlands operated in concert with its European partners in the UN and abstained over a resolution condemning the invasion. Since then policy makers have consistently tried to remove the contentious issue from the bilateral agenda, claiming that the UN should solve the dispute. When reports about large scale violations of human rights became indisputable, the government remained reluctant to apply its stringent human rights criteria to its foreign policy and development co-operation policy towards Indonesia. The decision making centre remained unwilling to risk any conflict with Jakarta.

The Dili crisis resulted in widespread international condemnation. This gave the lobby in favour of translating human rights criteria of Dutch foreign policy into punitive steps the idea that the international situation left the Netherlands ample room for such a policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands was divided, but its political branches received ominous signs from Indonesia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was not prepared to risk Dutch business interests, unlike his predecessor during the West New Guinea crisis, and continued to advocate a moderate policy. The Second Chamber and the Minister for
Development Co-operation either had insufficient knowledge of the real state of affairs, or interpreted the situation differently. In any case they were wrong. Efforts to find allies for a tough stand on human rights had failed and the Netherlands was once again isolated, as it had been in 1961-1962, allowing Indonesia to inflict another defeat upon it. The causes were virtually identical to 1962: although far more careful, important actors in Dutch foreign policy making, who were this time predominantly motivated by a genuine sense of morality, had overplayed their cards as a result of a failure to properly perceive the international position of the Netherlands.

Thus twice the international environment had eventually corrected the perception of Dutch policy makers, finally removing self-determination for both the West Papuans and East Timorese from the foreign policy agenda. The Netherlands still had not learned enough lessons from the defeat of its West New Guinea policy. As the following discussion will show, Australia proved a better student, however deplorably, in comparison.

The Second World War ushered in a period of rapid and fundamental change in the balance of power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia needed time to let the colossal implications of these changes sink in. The Menzies policy in the West New Guinea case was therefore obsolescent, almost from the outset. Since his government stubbornly clung to its philosophy the policy became increasingly impracticable. The Timor case, by contrast, showed that the Australian policy making centre had radically adjusted its policy to the post-colonial paradigm, embracing the notion that Australia’s interests were inevitably closely linked with Asia. The implications of the revised doctrine behind Australia’s foreign policy in terms of self-determination will be illustrated by the two cases.
From the recent past the Menzies’ Government had learned to appreciate the weakness of Australia’s Northern frontier. Having a Western power to guarantee stability and thus security was very reassuring for Australia, which in this period regarded itself as a Western outpost facing an alien, and thus frightening, Asian world.

Although there was no “natural” affinity with Indonesia, this state’s geographic location had proved its importance to Australia’s security. Therefore the Australian government wanted to cultivate bilateral relations, while at the same time denying Indonesia’s claims to sovereignty over West New Guinea in order not to endanger Australia’s security: a politically stable Western power was preferred to a young and rather unstable Asian neighbour.

The third pillar in Australia’s foreign policy outlook was the acceptance of the need to have a superpower on its side. After the Second World War the United States fulfilled this role. Without its support, Australia felt unable to operate independently in Southeast Asian affairs.

Not sufficiently realising that the era of colonialism was coming to an end, the government put its cards on support for the Netherlands. In practice this meant supporting an indefinite continuation of Dutch administration until in a distant future it would be replaced by self-determination. Voting patterns in the UN gave a clear warning that times were changing, and the government responded through the public adoption of self-determination, a popular
concept particularly among former colonial states. This step, however, offered no solution to the conflict as the UN remained divided.

Caught in its own web of dependency and conflicting goals, the government’s promotion of security through support for self-determination, was increasingly at odds with international developments, although Indonesia’s deteriorating stability deceptively seemed to justify a continuation of opposition to its claims. The United States pursued similar security goals, but had a better understanding of the changing international conditions and gradually modified its policy accordingly. Self-determination had outlived its usefulness when Indonesia embarked on its policy of confrontation and the US refused to pledge military support, but Australian policy makers were unwilling to accept this conclusion and modify their policy.

Although Australian policy makers gradually distanced themselves from the conflict in an attempt not to alienate Indonesia too much and in response to hints from the Netherlands that it wanted to withdraw from West New Guinea as soon as possible, this was not a fundamental change of policy. Australia was forced to put all its cards on self-determination to avoid an Indonesian takeover when the Netherlands submitted a resolution in the UNGA in 1961. However the attempt failed and left the Menzies Government at a loss what to do next.

A reshuffle of the policy making centre accelerated Australia’s transition to a more up-to-date theory of the policy required to serve its security interests. The new Minister for External Affairs, Barwick, accepted the consequences of the US determination to solve the conflict and translated them accordingly into his policy. He abruptly abandoned the long
standing opposition to an Indonesian takeover, being not prepared to risk alienating Indonesia any further since this would bring a military confrontation closer and strengthen Communist forces in Indonesia. Cold War conditions and a slow reassessment of Australia’s position in a post-colonial Asia-Pacific environment at last fully penetrated the perception of the foreign policy decision making centre in Australia. Self-determination had caused havoc to Australian-Indonesian relations and Indonesia’s internal stability had suffered from Dutch-Australian opposition as well; therefore this opposition had to be abandoned.

Australia’s failure to keep up with international changes between 1949 and 1962, had inflicted great damage to its international position. None of its policy goals for West New Guinea were achieved, and most certainly nothing was done to improve Australia’s security situation, and during the final negotiations over a settlement Australia was almost like an outcast: unwanted by Indonesia for its previous opposition to its demands, and unpopular with the Netherlands which felt betrayed by Australia’s sudden change of heart. Australia’s policy of opposition to Indonesia’s territorial demands was a total failure.

The negative experiences with opposition to Indonesia would play a major role in the assessment of the East Timor problem. Starting with the Whitlam Government, Australian policy makers tried to enmesh more closely with their neighbours: Australia had come to terms with its geographic position and adjusted its priorities of alliance accordingly. Indonesia played a major role in this new doctrine, pursued consistently by a strong coalition of politicians and Foreign Affairs officials between 1975 and 1992.
The international situation at the time of the Timor crisis had not changed significantly: Southeast Asia was still considered to be under threat of communism. The Indonesian regime, however, was a potentially important Western ally, and was as such acknowledged in Australian government circles. Under these circumstances a conflict over the future of a small colony appeared to offer communism a bridgehead in the worst scenario, and at the least it threatened regional stability and thus Australia’s security. Since self-determination was seemingly at the centre of the Timorese dispute, integration of East Timor into Indonesia was judged to serve Australia’s security interests.

However Indonesia’s invasion was considered an improper means to bring about the desired solution, and in concert with other states Australia condemned the move. Probably inspired by past experiences the Australian government nevertheless toned down its criticism when the United States and Southeast Asian states gave up their opposition, which had been weak in the first place. Another reason for accepting the takeover was that, unlike in the West New Guinea case, self-determination and Australia’s security interests were perceived as mutually exclusive. Although in both cases realist interests motivated Australia the policy theory differed.

Under influence of domestic concerns over human rights violations and denial of self-determination, Australian politicians occasionally seemed willing to raise a critical voice. Each time, however, they responded quickly to Indonesian signals of discontent with Australian criticism and softened their stand. There was a very close link indeed between
the international environment and the policy theory of the policy making centre in Australia. Therefore conflicts over this potentially contentious issue were prevented.

Gareth Evans as foreign minister tried to find a compromise, raising human rights concerns privately and keeping them separate from Australia’s acceptance of Indonesia’s sovereignty. It was a fallacious solution. The Dili protest and the Indonesian response proved beyond doubt the connection between human rights violations and the political situation. Nevertheless Australian policy makers tried to remove the issue from the foreign policy agenda, aware of the potential damage that protests could inflict on Australia’s political and economic interests: after all Indonesia was the gateway to Southeast Asia in their policy theory. Thus the international environment and the perception thereof are reflected in Australia’s foreign policy, and accordingly deny policy makers any real leeway to link human rights and self-determination in foreign policy towards Indonesia.

Most striking in the comparison between the Netherlands and Australia is that Dutch policy makers for a long time were led by emotions, pride and principles rather than by an assessment of interests that should be pursued given the international state of affairs. Self-determination vastly benefited from this remarkable motivation behind policy. Australian policy makers were led by more realistic concerns when they promoted self-determination for the Papuans, but their policy miscalculated the international state of affairs. The influence of the international environment on Australian and Dutch policy making was therefore not as direct as might have been expected, but when both policies produced insufficient results, the impact of the international environment vastly increased, forcing Dutch policy makers to start
thinking realistically and Australian policy makers to reconsider their policy theory. In each case the result was a change in both goals and means. Eventually the Netherlands concluded that it could not and Australia reasoned that it should not pursue self-determination.

Ethical and moralistic sentiments continued to inspire Dutch policy makers, more so than their Australian counterparts, in the Timor case. Although both countries based their policy on a realistic assessment of their interests, the Netherlands tended to explore what room there was to improve respect for human rights. In these attempts emotions and old sentiments ultimately caused a crisis, as the Netherlands forgot to trim its concerns to the policy leeway that international conditions determined. Australian policy makers assumed that utmost care had to be exercised, given that Indonesia occupied a central role in the realisation of Australia’s political and economic interests. Since self-determination for the East Timorese was at odds with the aforementioned interests, policy makers took no risks and used a theory which did not challenge the existing political situation in East Timor. Development aid as an indirect means to prevent human rights violations even contributed to the perpetuation of the political situation. Unlike the Netherlands, Australia never tested its assumptions regarding the leeway that international conditions left it to pursue human rights. A broad coalition endorsed this doctrine.

An important finding of this thesis is that damage to other interests that policy makers in both the Netherlands and Australia were prepared to accept for the sake of pursuit of self-determination differed hugely in the two cases. For Australia the underlying policy theory of decision makers explains this striking difference between the cases of West New Guinea and East Timor. The West New Guinea case illustrates that even a policy motivated by
realist concerns will, when human rights are presumed to make a contribution to achievement of these realist goals, result in a realistic pursuit of moral goals. The Timor case is a typical example of the opposite situation, and is more in accordance with realist theories of foreign policy. In contrast with Australia, in the Netherlands emotions, not rational calculations, motivated policy makers to put so much emphasis on self-determination in the West New Guinea case. Self-determination mainly became important because it satisfied frustration with the colonial past. These feelings had disappeared when the East Timor problem emerged, and thus self-determination and human rights were more realistically weighed against, and usually subordinated to, other interests, in accordance with realist theories of foreign policy. Thus the remarkable difference between self-determination in Dutch and Australian policy in the two cases is explained.

Although the general characteristics of international relations did not significantly differ in the two cases, specific conditions and Australian policy makers’ perception thereof did and with important consequences for Australia’s foreign policy agenda. The Netherlands had also adapted to the new circumstances, but opponents of a policy strongly based on pursuit of material and political interests were more numerous and, as the following section will argue, were offered better institutional and procedural opportunities to have their views considered in the foreign policy making process.

3. Self-determination in Dutch and Australian foreign policy: the impact of institutions and procedures
Unfortunately a reservation needs to be made regarding the comparison that can be made on the basis of the findings of the two cases studies. The analysis of Australian and Dutch policy in the West New Guinea case vastly benefited from the availability of plentiful primary sources. The study of the East Timor case unfortunately suffered from a dearth of primary sources, which particularly made it difficult to gather evidence about the Indonesia lobby in Australian politics, the existence of which is not much in doubt, but it is very hard to put one’s finger on its composition and contribution to policy making. The analysis may therefore be unbalanced, putting too much emphasis on those actors described in the primary sources in the case of West New Guinea. Without detailed insight into decision making processes in central decision making units in the East Timor case too much importance may be attributed to actors operating in the penumbra of these units. The findings must therefore be interpreted with care, particularly when comparing the two cases.

Chapter II assumed a connection between institutions -- they decide on the composition of the field of actors and their individual tasks, which in turn tends to determine the opinions of actors -- and procedures, which regulate the opportunities of actors to participate in the four analytically distinctive phases of foreign policy making. The findings of the case studies were as expected but with one anomaly: in the case of West New Guinea bureaucrats in the Netherlands lost complete track of those foreign policy interests that one would expect them to pursue. This had important policy implications: with only policy making outsiders, mainly business groups, defending economic and political interests at stake in relations with Indonesia these were eclipsed by a strong coalition which pursued self-determination.
The West New Guinea case in Dutch foreign policy was unusual, since bureaucrats sided with other actors in their pursuit of self-determination. This large coalition camouflaged underlying patterns of institutional-functional influence on policy goals and means. Only when disagreement over policy increased in the late 1950s did these surface. Until the settlement of 1962, however, various departments continued to defend a policy not in accordance with their realistic interests. Ministers, however, assumed a party-political stand in cabinet, turning cabinet into a party-political rather than a bureaucratic battleground.

Dutch coalition politics allowed political disagreement to enter into cabinet and, when splitting the centre, contributed to increasing the otherwise limited procedural involvement of parties and their parliamentary groups. The impact of outsiders could have been much larger if Dutch society had not been so docile in the 1950s and 1960s. Hence public protests were almost absent and did not prevent policy makers from proceeding with their preferred policy. Party discipline among government factions in parliament remained high throughout, but loyalty to the coalition governments diminished. However, since parliamentary groups were reluctant in general to bring down the government they could not make cabinet listen to all their demands, and had to settle for a policy of backtracking and indecisiveness, leaving it up to international conditions to eventually dictate Dutch policy goals and means.

Thus coalition politics both created and restricted Parliament’s room to dictate policy. Self-determination benefited from the political stalemate. Coalition interests demanded that supporters of the government in parliament show restraint in their input to policy during re-evaluation/deliberation. Institutional prerogatives left central decision makers in control of
implementation, which also gave them the upper hand in the Council when goals and means were evaluated.

Circumstances in the East Timor case were entirely different. The role that parliament could play in human rights increased when a set of human rights criteria and principles was formulated for Dutch foreign policy. However, with several departments and ministers pursuing realistic interests, they kept the human rights criteria vague and used their own privileged access to diplomatic and intelligence sources to deny parliament from getting a good insight into their implementation. Since a majority in parliament consistently supported the ministers, coalition politics allowed the executive to use its functional advantages and control the implementation phase of policy. Although in theory the policy making centre in the Netherlands faces competition in the phases of deliberation and evaluation, coalition commitments prevented parliament from exercising dual control. Since the main factions in parliament agreed on the need to be very careful with criticism of Indonesia’s human rights record and the use of instruments of human rights policy, human rights groups had to look to small radical parties to advocate their views. Their influence was of course very limited.

The Dili shootings showed the reverse of the medal, exposing the vulnerability of the decision making centre. As political discord had impeded Cabinet’s decisiveness in the West New Guinea case, so in the Timor case discord also affected the bureaucratic component of the decision making centre. Political and functional-institutional disagreement coincided, with Van den Broek leading the political section of Foreign Affairs, which was reluctant to impose sanctions on Indonesia, and Pronk running that part of Foreign Affairs
that was involved in development co-operation and in favour of punitive steps. Pronk’s coalition also encompassed leading human rights organisations and a majority of the Second Chamber. His coalition was strong enough to penetrate all phases of the foreign policy making process, which brought human rights to the forefront. When Indonesia terminated the aid relationship Pronk was removed from the scene and the balance of power quickly shifted back to Van den Broek’s invigorated coalition. Indonesia’s snub destroyed the alliance in parliament -- a majority preferred not to risk further damage to relations with Indonesia -- which tacitly withdrew, leaving the executive to reclaim lost ground regarding the implementation of human rights criteria.

A similar scenario is unthinkable in Australia where parliamentary politics usually resembles a model of confrontation: the government versus the opposition. Party discipline is almost absolute, which often precludes the majority from using whatever means it has against the government. The result is a very strong policy making centre, typically in control of all phases of policy making. The policy making centre, usually at least comprising Foreign Affairs and its minister, and certainly the Prime Minister, decides if, and to what extent, human rights will become part of Australia’s policy.

In the West New Guinea case self-determination was pursued until 1961 because it supposedly enhanced Australia’s security. In the East Timor case self-determination and public criticism of Indonesia’s human rights record were perceived as at variance with the interests that policy makers were supposed to defend, and consequently self-determination did not become an element of Australia’s foreign policy. The institutional-procedural
superiority of the executive over the legislature explains why the media and East Timor
groups, both highly critical of Indonesia’s human rights record, have been utterly unable to
change the goals or means of policy.

Differences between the Netherlands and Australia are not so much institutional or
functional. Rather two different political models are in use: co-operation versus
confrontation. In a model of confrontation the policy theory of the decision making centre
will explain the goals and means of foreign policy, and thus determine whether human rights
will be pursued or not. Admittedly, functional involvement of external actors in Australia is
more restricted in the first place, giving bureaucrats already an advantage. An analysis of
foreign policy in the Netherlands needs to look at those actors which provide
representatives to the decision making centre. A far more complicated pattern of political
and bureaucratic interests and ideas, mixed with loyalty to the coalition, will eventually
determine if self-determination and political and civil human rights become elements of
foreign policy. Given that far more outsiders have a say in policy making the risk that the
policy will not be an appropriate response to the international situation also increases, which
partly explains why the Netherlands clashed several times with Indonesia and Australia did
not.

4. Final Comments

The analysis of the relations among the variables that were used to reconstruct and explain
the foreign policy of Australia and the Netherlands has given a comprehensive answer to the
main questions of this study as formulated in Chapter I. The findings go beyond that though and allow a few more general theoretical comments about international relations, foreign policy and human rights.

In each of the policies under review other states ultimately in effect decided the policy goals of Australia and the Netherlands. The interests of those states seemed to originate in turn in the competitive nature of the international system. These conclusions strongly support a realistic explanation of a state’s foreign policy. This conclusion, though, is too crude, and ignores the considerable leeway that the states central in this study appeared to enjoy for many years.

Peculiarities related to a state, such as structures and procedures of foreign policy making as well as its historical background and moral values and traditions, make each state unique in international politics. An analysis of foreign policy is incomplete when it ignores those features which, as was shown in this study, help to explain the agenda of a state’s foreign policy.

Regarding pursuit of human rights the findings of this study do not give much reason for optimism. General conditions of the international system remain unfavourable, even though security interests no longer dominate the foreign policy agenda of states. Economic interests now seem to have soared in importance, creating a new dilemma for states. In a world where economic competition has replaced ideological rivalry, states can still not afford to be very concerned with human rights. This remains the tragic truth of realism.
# List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACET</td>
<td>Australian Council for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFOA</td>
<td>Australian Council for Overseas Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDAB</td>
<td>Australian International Development Assistance Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AETA</td>
<td>Australia East Timor Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFET</td>
<td>Australians For a Free East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGPS</td>
<td>Australian Government Publishing Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIBCC</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Business Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-United States (Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodeti</td>
<td>Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti Revolutionary Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associacao Social Democratica de Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASVU</td>
<td>Algemene Studentenvereniging Amsterdam (Amsterdam Student Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Boerenpartij</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Community Aid Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>Christelijk Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIET</td>
<td>Campaign for an Independent East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Party, in 1975 renamed National Country Party (NCP), see below</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPN</td>
<td>Communistische Partij Nederland (Netherlands Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’66</td>
<td>Democraten ‘66 (Democrats ‘66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGIS</td>
<td>Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (Directorate General International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGPZ</td>
<td>Directoraat-Generaal Politieke Zaken (Directorate General Political Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETRA</td>
<td>East Timor Relief Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNV</td>
<td>Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (Federation of Netherlands Trade Unions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOET</td>
<td>Friends of East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPV</td>
<td>Gereformeerdd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Humanistic Overleg Mensenrechten (Humanistic Deliberation Human Rights)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>Indonesia Feiten en Meningen (Indonesia Facts and Opinions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGGI</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDOC</td>
<td>Indonesisch Documentie &amp; Informatie Centrum</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGI</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWGIR</td>
<td>International Working Group for Indigenous Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVP</td>
<td>Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIPO</td>
<td>Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek (Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NJCM</td>
<td>Nederlands Juristencommittee Mensenrechten</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVV</td>
<td>Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (Netherlands Association of Trade Unions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organisation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSB</td>
<td>Overseas Service Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Kommunis Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPR</td>
<td>Politieke Partij Radicalen (Political Party Radicals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Pacifisch Socialistische Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Reformatiorische Partij Federatie</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSL</td>
<td>Returned Services League</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Round Table Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Politically Reformed party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIM</td>
<td>Studie- and Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten (Study and Information Centre Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Sydney Morning Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Uniao Democratica Timorense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTEA</td>
<td>United Nations Temporary Executive Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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APPENDICES

Appendix I


(Excerpts)

Indonesian administration and self-determination

Article XIV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of the present Agreement. New laws and regulations or amendments to the existing ones can be enacted within the spirit of the present Agreement. The representative councils will be consulted as appropriate.

Article XV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, the primary task of Indonesia will be further intensification of the education of the people, of the combating of illiteracy, and of the advancement of their social, cultural and economic development. Efforts will also be made in accordance with present Indonesian practice to accelerate the participation of the people in local government through periodic elections. Any aspects relating to the act of free choice will be governed by the terms of this Agreement.

Article XVI

At the time of the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia a number of United Nations experts, as deemed adequate by the Secretary-General after consultation with Indonesia, will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. Their duties will, prior to the arrival of the United Nations Representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising on and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination except in so far as
Indonesia and the Secretary-General may agree upon their performing other expert functions. They will be responsible to the Secretary-General for the carrying out of their duties.

**Article XVII**

Indonesia will invite the Secretary-General to appoint a Representative who, together with a staff made up, *inter alia*, of experts referred to in article XVI, will carry out the Secretary-General’s responsibilities to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. The Secretary-General will, at the proper time, appoint the United Nations Representative in order that he and his staff may assume their duties in the territory one year prior to the date of self-determination. Such additional staff as the United Nations Representative might feel necessary will be determined by the Secretary-General after consultations with Indonesia. The United Nations Representative and his staff will have the same freedom of movement as provided for the personnel referred to in article XVI.

**Article XVIII**

Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include:

(A) Consultations (Musjawarah) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.

(B) The determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period of established by the present Agreement.

(C) Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.

(D) The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination, including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.

**Article XIX**

The United Nations Representative will report to the Secretary-General on the arrangements arrived at for freedom of choice.

**Article XX**

The act of self-determination will be completed before the end of 1969.
Article XXI

1. After the exercise of the right of self-determination, Indonesia and the United Nations Representative will submit final reports to the Secretary-General who will report to the General Assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.
2. The parties to the present Agreement will recognize and abide by the results of the act of self-determination.

Rights of the inhabitants

Article XXII

1. The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the UNTEA.
2. The UNTEA will take over existing Netherlands commitments in respect of concessions and property rights.
3. After Indonesia has taken over the administration it will honour those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory. A joint Indonesian-Netherlands commission will be set up after the transfer of administration to Indonesia to study the nature of the above-mentioned concessions and property rights.
4. During the period of the UNTEA administration there will be freedom of movements for civilians of Indonesian and Netherlands nationalities to and from the territory.
Appendix II

United Nations Resolution 2504 (XXIV). Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1752 (XVII) of 21 September 1962, in which it took note of the Agreement of 15 August 1962 between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), acknowledged the role conferred upon the Secretary-General in the Agreement and authorized him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein,

Recalling also its decision of 6 November 1963 to take note of the report of the Secretary-General on the completion of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West Irian,

Recalling further that the arrangements for the act of free choice were the responsibility of Indonesia with the advice, assistance and participation of a special representative of the Secretary-General, as stipulated in the Agreement,

Having received the report on the conduct and the results of the act of free choice submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with article XXI, paragraph 1, of the Agreement,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with article XXI, paragraph 2, both parties to the Agreement have recognized these results and abide by them,

Noting that the Government of Indonesia, in implementing its national development plan, is giving special attention to the progress of West Irian, bearing in mind the specific conditions of its population, and that the Government of the Netherlands, in close cooperation with the Government of Indonesia, will continue to render financial assistance for this purpose, in particular through the Asian Development Bank and the institutions of the United Nations,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and acknowledges with appreciation the fulfilment by the Secretary-General and his representative of the tasks entrusted to them under the Agreement of 15 August 1962 between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian);
2. Appreciates any assistance provided through the Asian Development Bank, through institutions of the United Nations or through other means to the Government of Indonesia in its efforts to promote the economic and social development of West Irian.

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