Morning Star Rising:
Maximising the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua

By

Jason McLeod

Thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Hons).

Discipline of Politics
School of Social Sciences
La Trobe University

June 2002
Statement of Authorship

This thesis is my own work containing, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no material published or written by another person except as referred to in the text.

Signed: Jason McLeod
Date: 26th June 2002

Research Ethics Approval

For this thesis entitled, *Morning Star Rising: Maximising the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua*, submitted for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Hons), the research undertaken was approved by a University Ethics Committee, approval number 348/01.

Signed: Jason McLeod
Date: 26th June 2002
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### Part One: A Struggle for Change

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Conclusion

**Conclusion**

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ABSTRACT

Since 1988 there has been an explicit and continuous nonviolent struggle for self-determination in West Papua that has courageously persisted in the face of repressive action by the Indonesian military. Although the nonviolent struggle in West Papua has achieved modest success under difficult conditions I argue that a strategy of nonviolent action would maximise the effectiveness of the struggle. This thesis advocates one possible strategy based on the work of nonviolent activist and scholar, Robert Burrowes, articulated in his book, *A Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*. In the case of West Papua, I argue that solidarity action inside Indonesia and internationally is essential if a strategy of nonviolence is to be effective. This is because Jakarta does not significantly depend on the consent and cooperation of West Papuans to maintain the occupation, but on the diplomatic, military and economic support of international elite allies. In turn, these elite allies depend on key social groups to carry out their policies in support of Indonesia’s occupation. Drawing on the example of Australia as a case study, I show how Jakarta is indirectly dependent on the consent and cooperation of key social groups in Australia who could be compelled or induced to withdraw their support through strategic campaigns of nonviolent action. As a result, despite the monolithic appearance, Indonesian rule in West Papua is vulnerable and subject to removal.
Dedication

To the people of West Papua
and the living land they are a part of,
in the hope of peace with justice
and
to the people of Indonesia and Australia
who could make all the difference.
# List of Illustrations, Tables and Figures

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<td>AMP</td>
<td><em>Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua</em> – West Papuan University Student Alliance</td>
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<td>ADI</td>
<td>Australian Defence Industries – A 50% owned Australian arms company with several offices and manufacturing plants based in Australia. ADI produces weapons, ammunition and defence-related equipment for the ADF and for export.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>AMWU</td>
<td>Australian Manufacturing Workers Union</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Beyond Petroleum</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td><em>Dewan Papua</em> - The Papuan Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSD</td>
<td>Defence Signals Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFIC</td>
<td>Export Finance and Insurance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELS-HAM</td>
<td><em>Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia</em> - Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Purveying Incorporated</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Transport Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Komnas HAM</td>
<td>National Commission on Human Rights – Indonesia</td>
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<td>KOPASSUS</td>
<td>Indonesia’s Special Forces</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td><em>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</em> - People’s Consultative Assembly, Indonesia’s national parliament</td>
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<td>MUA</td>
<td>Maritime Union of Australia</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td><em>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</em> – The Free West Papua Organisation</td>
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<td><em>Tentara Papua Nasional</em> – National Papua Army – The armed wing of the OPM</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td><em>Presidium Dewan Papua</em> – The Papuan Presidium Council, the executive body for the <em>Dewan Papua</em> (DP)</td>
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<td>SKP</td>
<td><em>Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian</em> - The Office for Justice and Peace in the Diocese of Jayapura, West Papua.</td>
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<td>SMA</td>
<td>Scientific Management Associates – An Australian arms company that draws the technical designs for defence related goods.</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-national company</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td><em>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</em> – Indonesian National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCEN</td>
<td>The University of Cendrawasihi, Port Numbay/Jayapura</td>
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<td>WALHI</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth Indonesia</td>
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<td>WESTPANYAT</td>
<td>West Papuan National Youth Awareness Team</td>
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A Note on Orthography

The act of naming something is a powerful intervention that invests whatever is named with certain meaning. *West Papua* is the name used by most West Papuans (*Papua Barat* in Bahasa Indonesia, the *lingua franca* in West Papua) and by those in the international community who support self-determination. *West New Guinea* and *Netherlands New Guinea* refers to the Dutch name for West Papua during the period of Dutch colonialism. At the time of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands the territory was known as *West Irian*, particularly by Indonesia, the United States of America and the United Nations. From 1969 up until the fall of Suharto in 1998 the province was called *Irian Jaya*.

*Irian Jaya* has an interesting double meaning that reflects the historical and ideological importance of West Papua to Indonesia. The name is a combination of *Irian*, an Indonesian acronym that stands for *Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland* (Join the Republic of Indonesia against the Netherlands)\(^1\) and the Indonesian word, *Jaya*, meaning victorious or glorious. *Irian* is also a Biak word (an island off the north coast of West Papua and a language group that stretches from Cendrawasih Bay to the Raja Ampat archipelago, north west of Sorong), that means ‘hot land’ and refers to the mainland of West Papua.\(^2\) Since 1998 onwards West Papua has often been called *Papua*, in response to West Papuan demands for greater recognition of their distinct cultural identity: a name change supported by the previous Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid and officially endorsed by President Megawati’s administration in January 2002.

West Papua is the name most often used in the text except when referring specifically to Indonesian provincial structures, personnel or policies. In this case, *Papua* or *Irian Jaya* is used depending on the period in history. For the period up until the 1969 transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, *West Irian* is used to describe the Indonesian, United States and the United Nations perspective and *West New Guinea* to describe the colonial Dutch perspective. The eastern half of the island of New Guinea is referred to as *Australian New Guinea* (or Australian administered New Guinea) for the period in recent history up until 1975, when the territory became independent and known as *Papua New Guinea*.


Methodology and Ethics

Methodology: Praxis

This thesis is a rigorous and passionate piece of academic writing, shaped by committed action as much as by thorough research. It is essentially a work of praxis: a critical reflection of ten years of nonviolent activism and a recommitment to accompanying the people of West Papua. ‘The essence of praxis’, writes community development worker, Jim Ife, ‘is that one is involved in a constant cycle of doing, learning and critical reflection, so that each informs the others and so that the three effectively become one.’ Nonviolent activism is evaluated with reference to theory. In turn, theory is read in light of action which then re-directs both action and research. Through this process, Ife says, ‘theory and practice are built, at the same time.’

The research is based on the ground-breaking study, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, by peace researcher and nonviolent activist, Robert J. Burrowes. In his book, Burrowes argues that a strategy of nonviolent defence is the most effective way for a population to defend itself from an act of military aggression, even more effective than military defence, precisely because it addresses the systemic causes of violence. Burrowes synthesises the thinking of Mohandas Gandhi and military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, as well as integrating insights from conflict and human needs theory. However, despite the ground-breaking nature of his research, except for a descriptive piece on the Tibetan nonviolent struggle, as far as I am aware, there has not been anything written applying his theory to an actual conflict situation. This thesis examines Burrowes’ strategic theory and framework in light of the conflict in West Papua.

In writing and researching about the nonviolent struggle in West Papua, however, I have been painfully aware that I have been writing from a position of entitlement. I am advocating a strategy of nonviolence in West Papua but I have never seen my friends or family killed, nor known the corrosive fear of living in the shadow of terror. Who am I to speak of nonviolence when my country has armed and trained the soldiers who terrorise my neighbours and friends? With the privileged accident of birth comes responsibility and the ethical imperative to act.

The research method is based on an analysis of the literature, unstructured interviews and reflection on my own participation in nonviolent activism, as described above. Dialogue between myself, West Papuans and those active in the West Papua solidarity movement have shaped and directed this

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2 Ife, Community Development, 230.
research. I am explicit about the purpose of this. My concern is to defend human rights, encourage ecological sustainability, support self-determination and transform the systemic causes of oppression and exploitation in our region to reflect human needs, social justice and sustainability. I believe that how these principles are worked out in practice is a process whereby those most affected should have the most to say, within a framework of social and ecological justice. At a very practical level this thesis has been undertaken with the question: how can Australian nonviolent activists best support the nonviolent struggle in West Papua?

A number of critical methodological limitations need to be acknowledged. I did not travel to West Papua during the research period. However, in addition to personal communication with a diverse range of people from all levels of society, I was fortunate enough to interview ten West Papuan activists and one Indonesian official from the local consulate, as well as participate in a number of seminars with West Papuans and Indonesians (noted in the bibliography). I have been moved by the dignity and humanity of both Indonesians and West Papuans who generously shared their time, insights, stories and friendship. I was privileged to be able to listen to a range of West Papuan perspectives including those from women, students, church leaders, a Muslim, NGO (Non Government Organisation) activists, Presidium members (the executive body of an embryonic West Papuan Parliament) and OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – Free Papua Organisation) leaders. At the same time I feel like I have barely ‘scratched the surface’. As well as hearing the perspective of other Indonesians in conversation and at seminars, I also had the honour of hearing a first-hand perspective of a representative of the Indonesian government based in Melbourne, Mr. Kampadripta Isnomo, who generously made time available to meet, and spoke openly about the situation.

Another methodological limitation is language. Whilst I do speak a little Bahasa Indonesia it is not yet at the level to conduct interviews or read the literature written in Indonesian. All but one of the interviews were therefore conducted in English. The interview in Bahasa Indonesia was a group interview conducted with an interpreter present. Finally, a significant challenge was that there is virtually nothing written about the nonviolent struggle in West Papua. If West Papua has been marginalised in the literature and media, the nonviolent struggle in West Papua has been even further marginalised.

For a discussion on integrating the means and ends of peace research and transformative and participative methodologies see Abigail Fuller, ‘Towards an Emancipatory Methodology for Peace Research’, Peace and Change, 17, pp. 286-295. Whilst the research project was not strictly participatory research in the accepted meaning of the word (due to the constraints imposed by an honours degree), elements of the ethical and methodological dilemmas within participatory research are relevant, particularly the need to make sure the research explicitly benefits the community being researched. For a discussion on the criteria and ethics of participatory research see Budd Hall, ‘Breaking the Monopoly of Knowledge: Research Methods, Participation and Development’, Budd Hall, Arthur Gillete and Rajesh Tandon (eds), Creating Knowledge: A Monopoly? Participatory Research in Development, New Delhi, Society for Participatory Research in Asia, pp. 8-14; Michael Bopp and Naihuwo Ahi, Bougainville: From Talk to Action 1994-1997, Port Moresby, National Research Institute, 1994; Jeremy Holland and James Blackburn (eds), Whose Voice? Participatory research and Policy Change, London, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1998.

Unfortunately, many people in the solidarity movement (including those in academia) have not addressed this, and at times even speak a little disparagingly of the nonviolent struggle or do not acknowledge West Papuans explicit commitment to nonviolence. I believe, this is for two main reasons. The first reason is related to the historical importance of the OPM/TPN (Organisasi Papua Merdeka / Tentara Papua Nasional), the National Papuan Army or military wing of the Free Papua Organisation, to the struggle and the solidarity movements relationship with the OPM/TPN (who for many symbolise the struggle). The media and most popular works written about West Papua emphasise the armed struggle to the exclusion of nonviolent forms of resistance. Most active West Papuans living in exile are also former OPM/TPN freedom fighters. Perhaps the biggest problem, however, is that many solidarity activists are either not committed to, or do not understand the power of nonviolence. The irony, however, is that most people in the West Papua solidarity movement, and potential supporters active in other social movements, regularly engage in and support a variety of nonviolent actions. I hope this thesis may stimulate some discussion and interest in nonviolence in general and the nonviolent struggle in West Papua, in particular. Beyond that, I hope it encourages people to practically support an inspiring and effective struggle that persists in the face of great odds.

My original intention was to develop a nonviolent strategy for West Papua solidarity activists in Australia, in collaboration with West Papuans living in exile and consultation with West Papuans living inside the territory, using a participatory action research process. Fortunately, my supervisor, Gandhian scholar, Dr. Thomas Weber, tactfully suggested that such a project, whilst commendable and compelling, might be beyond the scope of an honours degree. Despite a more modest undertaking there were still a number of ethical dilemmas associated with the research. (Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of these dilemmas is beyond the scope of this thesis). Not least of my concerns was ensuring the safety and security of not only those West Papuans I interviewed, some of whom have since returned to West Papua, but also ensuring the safety and security of their families. This is critical as all are active in the struggle for self-determination, many have spent considerable time in jail, some have been tortured and all have lost family members. As a result, I have removed all identifying comments from interviewees I have quoted unless it is already in the public domain.

At the same time as I was conducting research into West Papua, a PhD student and solidarity activist was also carrying out in-depth interviews with a range of West Papuans who visited Melbourne. Rather than interview people twice, with the verbal consent of the participants (whom I was also able to meet), the PhD student made the transcripts available to me. Whilst not ideal and somewhat unorthodox, I believe that in each case consent was explicitly given. I also cleared this with Dr. John Miller from the

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9 Evident from personal communication with a range of people over several years.
La Trobe Ethics Committee. Because a number of these West Papuans were only in Melbourne for short periods of time and had busy schedules, this decision was also made out of respect for people’s time.

Doing research whilst actively participating in activism in the area of study also brought up a range of dilemmas. One positive aspect was that it gave integrity to the research and helped me bridge what I believe is the false divide between academia and activism; theory and practice. It also resulted in privileged access to information and data I might otherwise not have obtained. On the other hand, it was difficult to ensure that consent was always given. I grappled with these issues as best as I could, keeping in the forefront of mind the question: who does this benefit and what is the information intended for?11

One particular thorny question concerns the desire of large numbers of West Papuans who actively struggle for merdeka (freedom), commonly understood as independence from Indonesia. In the thesis I have tried to refrain from using polarising words like independence which often act to close down the space for dialogue with those with differing perspectives. However, the reason I do not refer to independence is neither technical nor pragmatic. Time and time again, West Papuans have said to me that no-one ever asked them what they wanted: Neither when the Dutch were replaced by the U.N. in October 1962, nor during the Dutch, United States and Indonesian governments negotiations over the New York Agreement nor again in 1969 when the U.N. delivered the Act of Free Choice or even recently, when the Special Autonomy Package was designed and implemented. I believe it is not unreasonable to expect that it is up to West Papuans themselves to decide their own destiny in a free and fair manner. If well meaning outsiders like myself speak of West Papuans wanting independence, we run the risk of treating West Papuans as objects again, thereby replicating neo-colonial relations. For this reason, as an outsider, I support West Papuans right to determine their future themselves and describe the resistance as a struggle for self-determination, a right of all people recognised under international law.12

When I refer to the occupation of West Papua by Indonesia I am referring to the presence of the Indonesian military and security forces who routinely violate human rights and a system that oppresses and exploit West Papuans, their land and non-human species. This system of rule, comprised of mutually reinforcing political, military, social and economic structures, is controlled by non-Papuans for the benefit of non-Papuans. In essence, I am not referring to Indonesians as people - regional neighbours who I know, love and respect - but a neo-colonial system and the values and relations that sustain and replicate it.

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11 Unfortunately there is not the space to adequately unpack these issues. My thinking in this regard was greatly assisted by the following sources: Patrick G. Coy, ‘Shared Risks and research dilemmas of a Peace Brigades International Team in Sri Lanka’, *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, Vol. 30 No. 5, October 2001, pp. 575-606; R. Divinski, A. Hubbard, J.R. Kendrick and J. Noll, ‘Social Change as Applied Social Science: Obstacles to integrating the role of activist and academic’, *Peace and Change* 19 (1): pp. 3-24; Rebecca Spence, *Promises of Peace: Processes of community participation in building peace in Down District*, PhD dissertation, Armidale (NSW), University of New England, 1999. Other ethical issues marginal to the research process not discussed here due to lack of space concern power relations and dealing with sensitive areas.

12 Article 1 of both the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR). See also Article 3 of both covenants. Self-determination could include: forms such as the special autonomy package now implemented in Papua; other federal arrangements; a land rights approach that recognises the self-determination of various indigenous groups within West Papua; ‘free association’; and independence.
Defining the Scope of the Study

This thesis will not examine horizontal conflict in West Papua; conflict between West Papuans and Indonesians and between West Papuans and West Papuans. Instead I focus on vertical conflict in West Papua; conflict between the Indonesian state and West Papuans. Nor will efforts by West Papuan elites and their allies to lobby for international support for self-determination through forums like the U.N. and the South Pacific Forum be the focus of this study. Whilst a mosaic of methods at all levels in society are needed to create change, this thesis focuses on the role of grassroots activists and organisations. This is for two reasons.

Firstly, I believe that too many political studies focus on elites, relegating much of the activity of civil society to the margins. I believe ordinary people do make a difference and that all problems can be solved using nonviolence. Violence, is symptomatic of a poverty of imagination. Most of all I am interested in supporting the participation of ordinary people to be agents of change and believe nonviolence is an extremely powerful way to create change. Secondly, because of vested interests and the impotence of states and state-centric institutions and processes to address intra-state conflicts like the conflict in West Papua, it is unlikely that the policies of state elites concerning West Papua will be altered to support self-determination by high-level discussion or lobbying alone.

This thesis will not examine principled third-party negotiation. Whilst this thesis does not discuss principled negotiation (including that by third-parties) I argue that the purpose of nonviolent campaigns is to re-create the conditions for a problem-solving dialogue. Consequently, efforts to re-create the conditions for dialogue supported by third-parties need to be interlinked with a nonviolent strategy. Nor will I examine peacebuilding processes in West Papua, although the nonviolent strategy I argue for, is firmly located within the tradition of peacebuilding.

Due to the restrictions of space and the constraints of time I do not attempt a detailed discussion of the various components of the nonviolent strategy including: organisation, leadership, communication, preparations, constructive programme, strategic timeframe, tactics and peacekeeping and evaluation. Whilst some of these components are mentioned in brief, a detailed exploration of each of these vitally important elements in relation to the struggle in West Papua is beyond the scope of this study.

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15 Rebecca Spence and Jason McLeod, ‘Building The Road As We Walk It: Peacebuilding as principled and revolutionary nonviolent praxis’, in Social Alternatives, (forthcoming).
This thesis will also not examine how a strategy of nonviolence could be introduced into West Papua: an extremely important factor if any strategy of nonviolence is to be accepted. To develop a process of introducing a strategy of nonviolence into West Papua it would be necessary to fully appreciate the indigenous basis of the nonviolent struggle. Regrettably, such an undertaking is also beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, from my discussions with West Papuans there is widespread interest in strategy and I strongly believe that it is possible to introduce a process for developing a nonviolent strategy so that it is ‘owned’ by West Papuans themselves as well as a process for socialising the strategy.

What this thesis does discuss, is how grassroots nonviolent action inside and outside West Papua can make a difference. More precisely, I introduce a strategic theory of nonviolence and give an overview of a strategic framework that could guide the struggle. Properly understood and implemented, I argue a comprehensive nonviolent strategy may dramatically maximise the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua.
The Morning Star in West Papua

The Story of the Morning Star16

The Biak islanders sing an epic of a woodcarver, a man who embodied great spiritual power named Manarmakeri. Manarmakeri means both ‘scabious old man’ and ‘old man of the star’. Manarmakeri was both the rejected one and at the same time the link between those less than human and the divine. One day, on top of the mountain, Yammaibori, a spirit from the land of souls spoke to him from a flat stone in his food garden, telling him he was like a flower about to open, ready to begin a long journey. Manarmakeri descended the mountain and travelled to the island of Meok Wundi where he took up the practise of distilling palm wine. One day he discovered his wine had been stolen. Hiding, he caught Kumeseri (also called Sampari), the Morning Star, stealing his wine. Manarmakeri held Sampari and refused to let the Star go. Frightened because of the coming dawn, Sampari offered Manarmakeri the secret of the Morning Star to share with his people. Manarmakeri refused to keep the secrets for his tribe alone and instead sought the gift of peace and renewal for all people. To this Sampari agreed and Manamakeri let the Sampai go. Sampari gave Manarmakeri a manes fruit, one of the tropical fruits of West Papua, fruit, telling him to throw it at the breasts of a young woman when he returned to his village. Manarmakeri did as Sampari said and a young woman, Insokari soon became pregnant. No-one one knew who the father was until Insokari’s son, Konori, recognised him. Manarmakeri performed many miracles. He drew a boat in the sand which became real. He burnt his old skin, stood in the fire and was renewed as a young man. Seeing his skin was too light, he stepped back into the fire. This time, his skin was the right shade. Leaving his village Manarmakeri went on another journey. This time he journeyed towards Sorong then overseas to the West – to Europe, to Australia, to the United States. When Manarmakeri left, Biak islanders became poor; but one day Manarmakeri will return to West Papua with others and his return will herald a new age of freedom, peace and justice. Manarmakeri showed the way of peace and renewal to all people of West Papua. For this reason the Morning Star was chosen to be placed upon the flag of West Papua, where it shines today.

The Morning Star Flag

Blue signifies Faith. White signifies Peace. Red signifies courage (Freerk Ch. Kamma, *Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area*, The Hague, Koninklijk Instituut, M. Nijhoff, 1972: 158). The colours are also said to be the Dutch tri-colour reversed; ‘a metaphor for the turning round of the existing state of affairs’ (Nonie Sharp, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, 54). The Star, ‘an indelible imprint of a divine power’ represents the story of Manarmakeri and Kumeseri-Sampari, the Morning Star. The myth is at once a story of human interactions, the relationship between the human and the divine and a story of liberation and solidarity. It is one of the creation stories that inspire people to participate in the act of what people of the North coast of West Papua call, koreri – renewal and transformation.

Introduction

How can the nonviolent struggle in West Papua maximise its effectiveness? Unfortunately, most people struggle to find West Papua on a map, let alone know that since 1988 there has been an explicit nonviolent struggle for self-determination going on. Given the memory of the violence in East Timor we saw erupt on our television screens in September 1999, even fewer would countenance that nonviolence could be effective against the ruthless violence that the Indonesian military is capable of carrying out. Yet, there is a nonviolent struggle in West Papua that has persisted, and against remarkable odds, achieved modest success.

In this thesis I argue that the success enjoyed by nonviolence can be dramatically increased through systematically planning and applying a comprehensive nonviolent strategy. While Jakarta does depend on West Papuans, it is significantly more dependent on popular support inside Indonesia and the diplomatic, military and economic support of international elite allies like Australia. Because of this, an integral component of any strategy is solidarity campaigns, both inside Indonesia and in the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies.

The thesis is structured around four chapters organised into two parts. Part one is concerned with the struggle for self-determination inside West Papua, part two with a strategy that might assist that struggle. Both parts are further organised into two chapters each. Chapter one introduces West Papua and examines the causes of the conflict. Chapter two discusses resistance to Indonesian rule with a focus on the nonviolent struggle. Chapter three lays the theoretical foundations of nonviolence and nonviolent strategy and chapter four applies the insights of chapter three. In chapter four, using the example of Australia as a case study, I demonstrate how Indonesia is indirectly dependent on key social groups. I proceed to illustrate how this indirect dependency provides enormous potential for solidarity campaigns that could dramatically assist the struggle inside West Papua.
PART ONE:

A struggle for change
Chapter One:

Conflict
Introduction

West Papua, the disputed territory currently governed by the Republic of Indonesia, is the western half of the island of New Guinea and borders the independent state of Papua New Guinea (see Map). West Papua has a population of approximately two million people, of which roughly 70% are indigenous West Papuan. West Papua is one of Australia’s closest neighbours, with land about half the size of New South Wales. Originally colonised by the Dutch and now controlled by Indonesia, West Papua has been struggling for self-determination since early Dutch colonial rule.

This chapter will examine the causes of conflict in West Papua. I will argue that the West Papuan claim for self-determination is indisputable. The basis for this claim, I will argue, is that the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia by the United Nations, the United States of America, the Netherlands, Indonesia and Australia, via the process of developing and delivering the 1969 Act of Free Choice, was illegal, undemocratic and fraudulent. I will also argue that this transfer fundamentally violated West Papuans rights. The Indonesian view of the integration of West Papua will be discussed before examining the recent Special Autonomy legislation. Finally, the impediments of state-centric institutions and processes will be analysed. This chapter will provide the political, economic and historical context for a strategic evaluation of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua.

The historical roots of a political problem

In 1848, the Netherlands Indies Government in agreement with the Germans and the British partitioned the island of New Guinea in two, along the 141st meridian east of Greenwich. Originally established as a buffer zone to protect the Dutch East Indies Company’s lucrative spice trade, this artificial colonial boundary became the western extent of official Dutch rule in the archipelago. At no stage was any thought given to the indigenous people who had inhabited the

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2 Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War; Budiardjo and Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of A People; Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of ‘Cargo’ Cults in Melanesia, London, Paladin, 1970: pp 26-145; Kamma, Koreri.

3 The Dutch first laid claim to the western half of the island of New Guinea in 1606. An administrative presence in West New Guinea was established in 1828 but West Papua was not brought under permanent Dutch control until 1898, when the Netherlands government built an outpost in the southern part of the territory in response to British complaints of ‘cross-border’ raids from the Marind people (see Judith Bennett, ‘Holland, Britain, and Germany in Melanesia’, in Howe, K.R. et al (eds.), Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1994: 50; and M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, Hampshire, Palgrave, 2001: 178).

island of New Guinea for tens of thousands of years, some of whom now found an international border separating their food gardens and ancestral land from their homes.⁵

After a period of Dutch colonial rule West Papuans were prepared for self-government. Initially Australia supported self-determination for West Papuans, even going as far as signing a joint statement with the Dutch in November 1957, declaring the intention of the two countries to work cooperatively together. ‘It was asserted that the two halves of the country were culturally and ethnically similar and through the commitment to self-determination the way was opened to the unification of New Guinea and the establishment a nation state covering the whole island, if the inhabitants so chose.’⁶ However, by 1962 Sir Garfield Barwick, the architect of the New Agreement, declared Australia’s absolute support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity: a 180 degree policy reversal!

During the Dutch supervised preparation for self-determination West Papuans were inducted into a national legislature. A national anthem, ‘Hai Tanahku Papua’, was adopted, and on December 1st 1961 the name Papua Barat (West Papua) was agreed upon and the West Papuan national flag, the Morning Star, unveiled.⁷ Although there was never a declaration of independence, many West Papuans believe that this date marks the beginning of West Papua as an ‘independent’ and ‘Sovereign Nation and State’.⁸

In 1961, the Netherlands’ government presented the ‘Luns Plan’ to the United Nations General Assembly, proposing that the United Nations administer West Papua until West Papuans were considered ready to exercise their right to self-determination. The plan won majority support but fell short of the required two-thirds majority to be passed. Prompted by Indonesian military aggression and fear of Indonesia’s growing relationship with communist Russia,⁹ the United States Kennedy administration stepped in to broker a bilateral agreement between the United Nations, the

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⁵ One example is the Mountain-Ok people (see for example Barry Craig and David Hyndman (eds.), *Children of Afek: Tradition and Change Among the Mountain-Ok of Central New Guinea*, Sydney, University of Sydney, 1990: pp. 2-3 and maps from page 211 to page 213).


⁷ Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, pp 23 – 25.


Netherlands and Indonesia. The hurried negotiations culminated in the New York Agreement, which was signed on the 15th of August 1962.

The New York Agreement transferred the administration of the territory over to a United Nations transitional authority for a minimum of seven months before it passed to Indonesia on the 1st of May 1963. The New York Agreement was fundamentally flawed in terms of upholding democratic principles. There was a total absence of West Papuan participation, or even consultation, in a decision that would fundamentally effect their lives. Nonetheless, the agreement did give West Papuans certain rights, including the rights to free speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement. It also stipulated that the act of self-determination was ‘to be carried out in accordance with international practice’. Under the terms of the agreement the U.N. was to ‘advise, assist and participate’ in the preparations for an act of self-determination stipulated to take place within six years of the beginning of the Indonesian administration.

The 1969 act of self-determination was called the Act of Free Choice. A cursory inspection of the process soon shows why West Papuans call it the Act of No Choice. Ortiz Sanz, the United Nations special representative to West Irian, didn’t arrive in West Papua until August 1968. Shortly after his arrival the United Nations acquiesced to Indonesian demands that the democratic principle of universal suffrage be abandoned in favour of ‘collective consultation’. Despite the spurious Indonesian claim that West Papuans were too primitive to vote, several democratic elections had already been held under the Dutch. Moreover, in 1971, two years after the Act of Free Choice, Indonesia was ‘cajoling Papuans to participate in general elections based on universal suffrage.’

Leading up to the Act of Free Choice Indonesia bombed West Papuans from the air, strafed them with machine-gun fire, detained them without trial, and tortured, disappeared and executed

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11 According to David Marr, the biographer of the Australian Politician Garfield Barwick, Barwick was the chief architect of the New York Agreement (Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, 30).
12 Saltford, ‘Indonesia 69’. In particular see Articles 16, 17, 18 and 22 of the New York Agreement.
13 Personal communications with West Papuans’, Jacob Rumbiak, for example. See also Rumbiak, ‘Knowing and Understanding’, 9.
14 The Indonesians asked Sanz to delay his departure for Irian Jaya until armed rebellion in West Papua particularly by the Arfak people was brought under control (Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, 40).
15 For the Indonesian argument see for example Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, 32. The agreement made between the Netherlands and Indonesian governments to forgo universal suffrage was known as the ‘Rome Agreement’.
16 Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, 24. Nonetheless when free of an atmosphere of violence and intimidation the Indonesian process of collective community consultation, known as musyuwarah, can be an extremely effective and participative form of decision-making that generates high levels of community ownership.
those who dissented against Indonesian control. Two West Papuans, Willem Zonggonau and Clemens Runawery attempted to travel to New York to alert the United Nations to what was taking place. At the request of the Indonesian Foreign Minister at the time, Adam Malik, Australian officials on Manus Island forcibly detained the two when their plane stopped to refuel. Dr. Sam Blay, Professor of law and legal counsel to the West Papuan Independence body, the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium council), argues that the Dutch, United States, British, Indonesian and Australian governments acted in concert to intentionally stifle potential debate at the United Nations General Assembly and within the Dutch parliament. With the deliberate suppression of West Papuan appeals to the outside world, Indonesia was given a free reign to crack down on dissent. Thousands of West Papuans were forced to flee into Australian administered New Guinea. Eventually, 1022 West Papuans, less than 1% of the entire population, were handpicked by Indonesian officials, held in isolation and under duress, intimidation and outright violence not surprisingly ‘voted’ unanimously to remain with Indonesia.

Sanz’s final report to the U.N. should have alerted the General Assembly to the travesty of justice that took place. The report specifically mentioned violations of West Papuans political and human rights and the fact that the act of self-determination was not in accordance with international practice. Despite protest from West Papuans and some members of the United Nations General Assembly, notably a delegation of fifteen African States led by Ghana, on the 19th November 1969 the UNGA noted the results of the Act of Free Choice and the integration of West Papua into the Republic of Indonesia. With the passing of Resolution No. 2504 West Papua was removed from the list of countries awaiting decolonisation.

According to an important paper by the scholar John Saltford, the United Nations failed to both protect the political and human rights of the West Papuans and to ensure that the act of self-

17 Saltford, ‘United Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-determination in West Irian (Indonesia West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969’, pp. 73, 83-84. See also Budiardjo and Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, pp. 15-26. and Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War, pp. 31-49.
20 Osborne and Budiardjo and Liong all write that 1,025 West Papuans ‘participated’ in the Act of Free Choice whilst Rumbiak in ‘Knowing and Understanding How the West Papuans Were Robbed of their Right to Independence’ cites 1,026. Saltford, who has written the most authoritative work on the subject, clarifies the matter. According to his extensive research the original number was 1,025 with one late addition. However, 4 people were sick and did not participate, thus bringing the number to 1,022.
22 Even the Indonesian account of the Act of ‘Free’ Choice reveals that of 1,026 participants originally selected to participate only 175, fifteen per cent, signed a statement recognising West Papua’s integration into Indonesia. Over eight hundred, or eighty-six per cent, a clear majority, did not sign the statement. See R1, PEPERA di Papua Barat, Departemen Penerangan; cited in Rumbiak, ‘Knowing and Understanding’, 11.
determination was ‘carried out in accordance with international practice’. In fact, Saltford goes on to argue that this failure was deliberate and that ‘self-determination was never seen as an option’ by the United States, the Netherlands or Indonesia.23 ‘It was cold war politics,’ says Saltford, ‘and the rights of Papuans counted for nothing.’24 The United Nations Under Secretary for the Act of Free Choice, Chakravarthy Narasimhan agrees. In a recent interview with Associated Press reporter Slobodan Lekic, he admitted that the whole process was a sham:

'It was just a whitewash. The mood at United Nations was to get rid of this problem as quickly as possible …. Nobody gave a thought to the fact that there were a million people who had their fundamental rights trampled …. How could anyone seriously believed that all voters unanimously decided to join his [Suharto’s] regime? …. Unanimity like that is unknown in democracies.'23

The Indonesian view of the transfer of sovereignty

There are three prevailing reasons why Indonesia wanted and still wants to rule the territory. These reasons are necessary to understand because of the way they work to reinforce Indonesia’s determination to retain the province. Not only is the territory of historical and ideological importance to Indonesia, it is also important economically.

The historical importance of the territory to Indonesia. After an intense struggle for freedom that was actively supported by the Left in Australia, including an extremely effective solidarity campaign waged by Australian unions, particularly the stevedores union,26 Indonesia finally won its independence from The Netherlands in 1949.27 However, West Papuans were only marginally involved in the struggle for independence from the Dutch. Consequently, the Indonesian revolution did not shape West Papuan identity in the way that it formed a national Indonesian identity in the rest of the archipelago.28

After Indonesia gained independence, the Dutch retained control of the territory29 arguing that West New Guinea was a distinct political entity from Indonesia because it had been administered separately from the rest of the Dutch East Indies and had no significant historical or cultural connection with the rest of Indonesia.30 This claim was vehemently rejected by Indonesian representatives to the United Nations who insisted that West Irian was ‘part and parcel of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.’ Any attempt by the Dutch to retain control of the territory

27 For an excellent overview of the formation of the Indonesian state and a national Indonesian identity see Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200.
29 Bone, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, pp. 55-56.
30 See Taylor in Bone, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, 57.
was merely a holding action, asserted Indonesia, a desperate refusal by a colonial power to relinquish the last vestiges of a crumbling empire.\textsuperscript{31} According to Indonesian representatives, the ‘Luns Plan’ was simply a ‘plot’ that constituted a ‘continuation of the Netherlands colonial policy of divide and rule…under the guise of self-determination.’\textsuperscript{32}

For many Indonesians West Irian was a place of exile for nationalist heroes who resisted Dutch rule and the territory became in Ben Anderson’s words, a ‘sacred site in the national imagining,’\textsuperscript{33} a rallying point for Indonesian nationalism.\textsuperscript{34} It was a matter of national pride, therefore, that Sukarno launched a “liberation campaign” for an independent Indonesia that included the entire former Dutch East Indies, from ‘Sabang to Merauke’.\textsuperscript{35}

The ensuing military struggle against the Dutch, and the military invasion of West Papua was viewed as a continuation of Indonesia’s revolution and fight against colonialism. This belief is still a strong part of Indonesian nationalism: recalling her father, Sukarno, the current Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri recently said that ‘… without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is not complete.’\textsuperscript{36} Many Indonesians still perceive Indonesia as the liberator of Papua.\textsuperscript{37} The endorsement of the ‘return’ of the territory by the international community through the United Nations, serves to further reinforce Indonesian perceptions of legitimacy of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{The ideological importance of the territory to Indonesia.} For the Indonesian nationalists the idea of self-determination was not related to either religion or ethnicity, but ‘rather a shared history, suffering, [and] fight against a common adversary.’\textsuperscript{39} According to Richard Chauvel, an academic and political analyst specialising in Indonesian politics, it was precisely because there was

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\item \textsuperscript{31} A view reinforced by the attitude of right-wing politicians and opinion makers in the Netherlands at the time. See for example Bone, \textit{The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem}, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Cited in Bone, \textit{The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem}, ix. See also page 26.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Herb Feith, \textit{The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia}, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962.
\item \textsuperscript{35} From Sukarno’s Independence Day anniversary speech cited in Bone, \textit{The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem}, pp. 85-86. Sabang is a small island off the northern tip of Sumatra and Merauke is a town in southern West Papua, close to the Papua New Guinea border. Some Indonesians also allege that West New Guinea fell under the jurisdiction of the small Maluku feudal states, the foremost of which was the Sultanate of Tidore (see for example Bone, \textit{The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem}, pp. 9-23. For a dissenting West Papuan view see Rumbiak, ‘Knowing and Understanding’.
\item \textsuperscript{36} International Crisis Group, \textit{Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya}, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{37} For example, in 1998 when members of FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian) addressed one of Irian Jaya’s Indonesian parliament representatives, Abdul Gafur, about Indonesian treatment of West Papuans and West Papuans aspirations, Abdul Gafur responded by saying that Indonesia had liberated West Papua from Dutch colonialism (from a presentation by FORERI member Yohanis Bonay at the West Papua: Promoting Reconciliation as a Way Towards Peace Dialogue, the second workshop organised by the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, December 12\textsuperscript{th} – 13\textsuperscript{th} 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{38} See for example, Republic of Indonesia Embassy – Canberra, The Restoration of Irian Jaya into the Republic of Indonesia, \url{http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/7/irianjayav.htm}, accessed 26\textsuperscript{th} May 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Chauvel, ‘Decolonising without the Colonised’.
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some recognition of the ethnic difference between Papuans and other Indonesians, that the incorporation of the territory became so important. According to the Indonesian argument, it was necessary that West Irian becomes part of the Indonesian state precisely ‘to demonstrate that Indonesia was a political concept’ and not based on religion or ethnicity.40

The economic importance of the territory to Indonesia. Whilst a potent combination of colonial history and nationalism motivated Indonesia’s initial push into West Papua, the continued occupation is significantly sustained by the abundance of natural resources and the high levels of wealth this generates for Indonesian and international corporate, government and military elites. West Papua has extensive mineral deposits including nickel, gold and copper as well as oil, natural gas, valuable tropical timber and fisheries.41 West Papua’s nickel mine operated by BHP-Billiton on Gag Island in the ecologically diverse Raja Ampat archipelago is believed to hold as much as 10% of the world’s nickel deposit.42 The gold and copper mine in West Papua’s highlands, Freeport, is the world’s largest mine. Freeport McMoRan, the United States based company which owns and operates the mine (with substantial support from the Australian and British mining giant, Rio Tinto),43 is one of Indonesia’s ‘largest corporate taxpayers, among the biggest private employers and one of the top exporters’.44 The revenue from BP’s proposed Liquefied Natural Gas Project in Bintuni Bay, home to the South East Asia’s largest intact tropical mangrove forest, is expected to dwarf even that of Freeport.45

These multinational resource extraction industries not only generate substantial revenue for Jakarta, they are a lucrative source of income for the Indonesian military. According to Lesley McCulloch46 and retired Australian Army officer, Robert Lowry,47 the Indonesian military only receives 20%-30% of its operating budget from the state. The remainder is made up from legal and

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40 Chauvel, ‘Decolonising without the Colonised’.
43 Rio Tinto has a 12% stake in the overall project and a 40% interest in any expansion of the Grasberg deposit, one of the deposits of the mine. See Project Undergrounds report, Project Underground, Risky Business: An Independent Annual Report on P.T Freeport Indonesia, Berkeley, 1998.
47 Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Allen and Unwin, St Leonard’s, NSW, 1996.
illegal business activity.48 Through businesses operated by the Indonesian military, the TNI has its fingers firmly in the economic pie.

The hand-in-glove relationship between global capital and the TNI is characterised by shared interest and mutual dependency. If multinationals resist the TNI’s involvement in places like West Papua, the military seeks to extort money and/or engineer incidents that create the pretext for them providing a security presence with the aim of leveraging greater economic advantage.49 Consequently, many corporate elites feel that they have to engage the military to protect business interests, whilst the TNI view multinational investment as a legitimate source of personal income and institutional financial support. In fact, the distinguished outspoken Indonesian academic, George Aditjondro, who has spent many years studying the financial interests of the Indonesian military, argues that it is impossible for any company to do business in Indonesia without some links to either the police or the military.50 This is certainly the case with Freeport. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s civilian Defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, recently conceded that the military incited unrest at Freeport to highlight the benefits of their presence. The local commander requested and received payments considered ‘necessary’ for operational costs. As a result, Freeport/Rio-Tinto paid TNI a one off payment of U.S $35 million and pledged annual contributions of U.S $11 million.51

**Structural and cultural violence in West Papua**

Conflict in West Papua cannot be solved by addressing the historical and political causes alone. Unless the structural causes of violence in West Papua are transformed both at the level of institutions and processes and at the level of culture and consciousness then conflict will continue, even after political questions are resolved. Peace researcher, Johan Galtung defines structural violence as violence in the form of oppression or exploitation that is built into the structures of society, manifested as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.52 Because structural violence (in particular militarism, violence against women, forms of governance that

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48 In West Papua this includes official corruption, appropriation of land by force for commercial activity, the appropriation of military equipment for financial gain, extortion rackets, smuggling of wildlife (especially Birds of Paradise), drugs, gunrunning, security operations on behalf of corporations, gambling, mercenary work, illegal mining, illegal logging (including in National Parks and Nature Reserves) and prostitution. See for example McCulloch, ‘Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business’, pp. 12-31; and personal communication with a Tapol (U.K based human rights organisation focusing on Indonesia) researcher. For a recent discussion on TNI’s links with illegal logging in West Papua see Tempo, ‘Squeezed by Logging’.
alienate indigenous communities, and social dislocation and ecological destruction created by resource extraction and capitalism) in West Papua is a major cause of conflict, a strategy of nonviolence that aims to transform the root cause of conflict itself must go beyond the goal of instituting protection for human rights, recognising West Papua’s distinct cultural identities, and reviewing the 1969 Act of Free Choice, to incorporate a structural analysis of the conflict. In practice this will involve developing a constructive program of economic self-reliance and ecological sustainability (to address the problem of exploitation and environmental destruction caused by global capital), developing structures and processes to address militarism, patriarchy, racism, corruption and political process that are not inclusive and participatory. More fundamentally, a program to address structural violence will need to look at ways of instituting values that transform the underlying culture and consciousness that creates oppression.

A particular manifestation of structural violence is cultural violence. Galtung defines cultural violence as ‘any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural form.’ One example is the popular belief internalised by many Indonesians, that Javanese culture is inherently superior to Papuan cultures. This attitude of cultural chauvinism combined with the project of constructing a national Indonesian identity, has resulted in the practice of ‘Indonesianising’ West Papuans. The day after the transfer of West Papua to Indonesia, one of Indonesia’s first acts as administrator on behalf of the United Nations was to burn books and artefacts connected with West Papuan culture. In the initial period of the occupation Indonesian foreign minister Subiandrio explained that the Indonesian policy towards West Papuans was ‘to get them out of the trees, even if we have to pull them down.’

In an effort to displace indigenous and national West Papuan identity Jakarta introduced the policy of transmigration. The policy, funded for many years with substantial support by the World Bank, involved the relocation of settlers from other parts of Indonesia, particularly from Java, Bali and Sulawesi to West Papua. Settlers, often poor farmers, are given appropriated land, often unsuitable for agricultural techniques practised in their places of origin, and a small start up kit. One Indonesian Minister for Transmigration, Mr. Mortono, explained that ‘by way of transmigration we will try and integrate all the different ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation and the different ethnic groups will disappear because of the integration and there

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53 Many West Papuans are already considering these factors. See for example a West Papuan law student’s proposal of a democratic tribal confederacy in Eben Kirksey, ‘Playing up the primitive’, New Internationalist 344, April 2002: pp. 20-21.
55 Budiardjo and Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 15.
56 Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War, 136.
will be one kind of [person].\textsuperscript{58} The prevalence of widespread cultural violence view was reinforced when I visited West Papua in 1991 and confirmed in interviews and extensive conversations with West Papuans. Transmigrants and voluntary Indonesian settlers now threaten to outnumber West Papuans in parts of the country.\textsuperscript{59} The repression of cultural identity, however, only exacerbates violence.

**The Special Autonomy proposal: could it be a solution?**

Regional Autonomy for outlying provinces was implemented in January 2001 and Special Autonomy was granted to Papua in November 2001. This was a genuine effort to address long-standing conflict in Indonesia. The Special Autonomy package was designed to satisfy Indonesia’s need for security, West Papuans’ need for identity and to address economic disadvantage in the province. At a material level, the initiative returns 70\% of oil and gas royalties and 80\% of mining, fishing and forestry royalties from West Papua to the province (a substantial difference from the small amount received in the past) and hands over greater decision making power to the Papuan people.

In the absence of a clearly articulated policy on autonomy from Jakarta and mindful of the short timeframe before parliament deliberated on the Special Autonomy draft, the Papuan Governor, Dr. Jap Solossa, seized the initiative and with the help of a team from the University of Cendrawasih (UNCEN) in Jayapura, embarked on a process of drafting an autonomy proposal that reflected the aspirations of the Papuan people.\textsuperscript{60} Widespread Papuan elite support for independence notwithstanding,\textsuperscript{61} the Papuan Special Autonomy proposal draft was designed to avoid the ‘paralysation of polarisation’ of either *otonomi* (autonomy) or *merdeka* (independence) and recreate the political space necessary to move the conflict forward.\textsuperscript{62}

After intense lobbying by the Governor and the UNCEN team in Jakarta, a new draft of the Papuan proposal, stripped of its most controversial elements, was accepted by Indonesian national parliament. The demand for greater economic returns to the province formed the core. Key symbols of Papuan cultural identity such as the flag and anthem were also accepted provided they

\textsuperscript{58} Quoted in Tracey Groome, *Arrows Against the Wind*, Australia, Land Beyond Production, 1992; See also Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of A People*, pp. 48 – 49, 54, 56; Mathew Jamieson, ‘West Papua: Hidden Land’, *Habitat* 21 (2), 1993: pp. 31, 32.

\textsuperscript{59} ICG, ‘Ending Repression in Irian Jaya’, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{60} For an excellent discussion of the process of adopting special autonomy see Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian (Office for Justice and Peace or SKP), *Special Autonomy: It’s Process and Final Contents*, SKP Jayapura, December 2001.

\textsuperscript{61} SKP, *Special Autonomy*; ICG, *Ending Repression in Irian Jaya*, pp. 9-10, 15, 23. According to the ICG; ‘There are few Papuans who publicly advocate that remaining part of Indonesia represents the preferred future for the territory.’ The key differences between moderates and the majority of the population are over ‘the timeframe, means and likelihood rather than the objective.’ (ICG, *Ending Repression in Irian Jaya*, 15).

\textsuperscript{62} SKP, *Special Autonomy*. 

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constitute an expression of identity and not independence, although how this would be determined has not been spelt out, providing an opening for a return to the repression of West Papuans displaying these symbols by the TNI. Proposals that reopen dialogue on the political future of West Papua and 'rectify history' were rejected along with demands to oppose further transmigration and to insist on being consulted about the deployment of the security forces.

Jakarta’s underlying ‘basic assumption is that Papua is and will always be an integral part of the Indonesian Republic’. The feeling of some key people who helped draft the proposal is that in the eyes of Jakarta the problems in West Papua have again been reduced to a ‘mere failure of development policy’. Despite the attempt by the UNCEN team, NGOs and some of the Papuan elite to communicate that Special Autonomy should not be seen as the opposite to independence, but a partial (but nonetheless real) response to West Papuan demands, opposition to the proposal has been ‘widespread and intense’.

According to Jacob Rumbiak there are several reasons for this. Essentially large numbers of West Papuans simply do not trust Jakarta. West Papuans were promised ‘special autonomy’ in 1969 but all it resulted in was ‘a litany of horrors’. In the short period since Special Autonomy was introduced, human rights violations have continued. The International Crisis Group (ICG) agrees Jakarta has a significant ‘credibility’ problem that needs to be addressed if the cycle of repression and alienation is to be broken.

The assassination of the nonviolent leader, Theys Eluay, shortly after the package was introduced certainly did not help the process. Eluay's murder, widely believed to be carried out by the TNI’s special forces (KOPASSUS), as part of a policy by Jakarta to derail West Papuan demands for independence, profoundly damaged the hopes that Special Autonomy would lead to the protection of human rights. More fundamentally, the package does not sufficiently address the deep seated West Papuan need for self-determination nor examine the historical cause of the problem, the delivery of the Act of Free Choice and the transfer of West Papuan sovereignty to Indonesia. For this reason broad sections of West Papuan society including students, the Dewan Papua, the PDP, OPM and many sections of the rural and urban poor, reject the proposal.

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63 Examine the events surrounding the Act of Free Choice.
64 SKP, Special Autonomy.
65 SKP, Special Autonomy.
66 Richard Chauvel, Otonomi Indonesia Seminar, Victoria University, 4th April 2002.
69 For a list of West Papuans confirmed killed and injured by the Indonesian security forces see for example Rumbiak, ‘Why the Majority of West Papuans Oppose Special Autonomy’, 5.
70 ICG, Ending Repression in Irian Jaya , 22.
Impediments to conflict solving processes

These problems partly stem from differing perceptions of the conflict. Jakarta considers the conflict about lack of economic development, while West Papuans view the conflict as primarily about violations of human rights and self-determination. Jakarta has certainly been able to reassert its authority in West Papua, but with every human rights abuse its legitimacy is further undermined. If Jakarta is serious about Special Autonomy to convince West Papuans that their preferred political option is to remain within the Indonesian state then serious confidence building measures need to follow. Most importantly, trust needs to be restored by examining past human rights violations, holding the TNI accountable for human rights violations. Furthermore, West Papuan grievances about ‘rectifying history’ and a people’s inalienable right to self-determination need to be respected.

Unfortunately, Jakarta does not appear to take seriously West Papuan’s concerns about human rights and the legitimate need for self-determination. The legislation does provide for a Papuan only governor, a Papuan only Upper House (elected by Papuans) and incorporates traditional leaders into provincial decision-making processes. The legislation does not provide for a process to examine the events surrounding West Papua’s integration into the Republic of Indonesia. With the opening of political space in 1998 now closed, Jakarta is embarking on a dangerous and contradictory path of offering Special Autonomy on the one hand, whilst returning to the familiar policy of repression, on the other, suggesting that it has ‘few ‘assets’ in its political control of the province, other than its near monopoly of military force.’

On the positive side, Special Autonomy appears to acknowledge West Papuans’ the lack of development. However, the legislation still does not empower local communities to address environmental, human rights, economic and social concerns surrounding resource extractive industries such as logging and the BP and Freeport projects.

The options therefore are clear. West Papuans can accept Special Autonomy and use the policy framework to expand the space for change whilst continuing to work towards independence. This is the path currently being pursued by many moderates in West Papua. Alternatively, West Papuans can reject Special Autonomy and work towards independence or another solution that meets their needs, either by active nonviolence or by military means. Either way it appears clear that at this stage Jakarta’s determination to retain West Papua at all costs remains strong.

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Indonesian and West Papuan needs

Conflict theorist John Burton, defines needs as universal, unchanging and fundamental drives, essential for the growth of individuals and the development of a cooperative and harmonious society. According to Burton the fulfilment of human needs are necessary for the organisation of society itself and will be pursued by all means available, ‘acting alone or in association with others, regardless of consequences to self and society’. Burton distinguishes needs from values, which are culturally specific, and interests, which are motivations that change according to circumstances.

It is clear that both Indonesia and West Papua are trying to satisfy a number of needs and pursue a range of interests. For Indonesia, the occupation of West Papua is tied up with preserving its territorial integrity and enforcing an imagined national identity. For the last forty years, however, these interests have been pursued at the cost of West Papuan needs for identity, if not survival. West Papuan’s need for self-determination is inextricably tied up with their identity.

Indonesia has been trying to meet its need for economic security. However, the economic benefit of resource extraction has only flowed to Indonesian elites. Indonesia promotes resource extraction at the expense of many West Papuans being able to participate meaningfully in the local economy and at the expense of the environment and social relations. Under Suharto’s New Order, national economic security has given way to institutional corruption and unbridled greed by those with close personal connections to the Suharto family. In West Papua this is especially true in the case of the TNI which has protected it’s economic interests through intimidation and violence. Therefore, in reality this need can be considered an interest. The key question is: can Indonesian and West Papuan needs be met within the existing framework?

The impotence of state-centric institutions and processes

There is another fundamental impediment to resolving the conflict in West Papua: the impotence of traditional state-centric processes and institutions. According to Benjamin Reilly from the Australian National University, institutions such as the United Nations are unable to resolve intra-state conflicts. States are founded on the assumption that they are ‘the basic unit of international order and not, as so many of the Asia-Pacific’s conflicts suggest, artificial and

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77 Burton, Conflict, pp. 36-39; Burton, Global Conflict, 145.
78 Indonesian author Goenawan Mohamad argues that since the illegitimate and forced incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in 1975, Indonesia was transferred from an ‘imagined community’ into a ‘forced coherence’. He wonders whether ‘being Indonesian’ could be about genuinely being open, inclusive and mutual? Mohamad, Goenawan, On being Indonesia, an unpublished talk presented at a recent conference in Tasmania, year unknown (1999?).
ephemeral creations of colonialism and circumstances. Consequently, states such as Australia, the United States and members of the European Union, become locked into supporting the territorial integrity of other states with little room to address ‘non-negotiable claims to separate statehood’.

Similarly, state-centric international processes are increasingly unable to resolve intra-state conflicts. Processes such as ‘preventative diplomacy’, ‘international intervention’, ‘peace agreements’ and even ‘autonomy packages’ may work when negotiating over interests. But they are completely inadequate when trying to negotiate compromises over fundamental human needs such as the need for security, identity, protection of human rights and self-determination, because needs cannot be compromised. Indeed, as Burton argues, fundamental human needs like identity, self-determination and the protection of human rights, in the case of West Papua, will be pursued regardless of the consequences. John Rumbiak agrees. The question of identity and self-determination, he explains, ‘… is a deep psychological need. It is about the self-identity of a people or group that have been denied and oppressed for many years. The Indonesian Government needs to recognise and address this before anything can go forward.’

Jakarta’s commendable desire to resolve the conflict through introducing Special Autonomy certainly goes a long way to address conflicting interests surrounding the distribution of wealth between Jakarta and Papua and some way to addressing West Papuan needs for identity and self-determination (in the form of representation in provincial parliament). However, Special Autonomy does not address West Papua’s more fundamental need to open an examination of the historical roots of the problem and the protection of human rights. While the prevention of the vast majority of human rights abuses could be secured through withdrawing the security forces from West Papua, and reforming the military and judiciary, addressing West Papua’s need for self-determination will require more fundamental changes. West Papua’s fraudulent and aggressive integration into the Republic of Indonesia needs to be examined and reviewed coupled with concerted commitment to transforming structural and cultural violence. Unless there is a genuine process for addressing legitimate West Papuans’ needs, such as the protection of human rights and self-determination, it seems clear that the conflict will continue to escalate.

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83 John Rumbiak works with ELS-HAM (*Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia* - Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy) in West Papua.
84 John Rumbiak, ‘Underlying causes and a way forward’.
Conclusion

West Papua’s claim for self-determination is indisputable. Self-determination is an inalienable right enshrined in international law. West Papuans have been denied this right. The transfer of West Papua into the hands of Indonesia in an atmosphere of intense repression through the design of the undemocratic 1962 New York Agreement and the delivery of the fraudulent 1969 Act of Free Choice is a ‘blot’ on the history of decolonisation. Since Indonesia assumed control in 1963 its rule in West Papua has been characterised by repression and neo-colonialism. The West Papuan struggle for self-determination has been made more difficult not only by the 1969 failure of the international community to protect the rights of West Papuans and ensure that an internationally acceptable act of self-determination took place, but also because of the great historical, ideological and economic importance of West Papua to Indonesia. The conflict in West Papua will not be solved, however, just by addressing these political challenges. More fundamental structural change is also needed.

While Special Autonomy has the potential to provide a framework that could help create institutions and policies to address some of the causes of disadvantage in the territory it does not address the historical roots of the problem. The process by which the international community delivered West Papua into the hands of Indonesia without the consent of West Papuans themselves. Nor does it sufficiently address West Papuans’ need for identity, self-determination and survival. It appears that Jakarta’s overriding reason for the introduction of Special Autonomy is to protect Indonesia’s territorial integrity by trying to convince West Papuans that their preferred political option is to remain within Indonesia.

An explicit and widespread commitment to nonviolence will certainly meet the need for safety of Indonesians living in West Papua. Jakarta’s insistence on a policy of security and identity based on the territorial integrity of the existing state, however, is an interest distorted by ideology and mythmaking, and made more complex by the involvement of global capital in resource extraction as well as the TNI’s lucrative economic interests. Yet there are always creative solutions. West Papuan politician and Presidium leader, Willy Mandowen, has suggested that West Papua could help address the TNI’s lack of funds by establishing a special trust fund to pay the military.\textsuperscript{85} Regardless of the merits of this suggestion, creative options like this could act as ‘circuit-breakers’ to ridged thinking and hardened attitudes.

Indonesia’s original identity is of a people committed to self-determination and resisting colonialism. Yet Jakarta continues to use military aggression as a means to assert its authority. Unfortunately for Jakarta, repression only stokes the fires of dissent. The more Jakarta tightens its

\textsuperscript{85} Chris Richards, ‘Reach for Morning Star’, \textit{New Internationalist} 344, April 2002:27.
grip on West Papua through force, the more West Papua will slip through Jakarta’s fingers. One example of this are the large sectors of West Papuan society that have rejected Special Autonomy and continue to resist Indonesian rule and campaign for self-determination. It is to this history and active nonviolent resistance that we will now turn.
Chapter Two:

Resistance
Introduction

West Papuan resistance to foreign rule has been expressed through armed struggle, strategies of cultural resistance, cooperative development endeavours and nonviolent struggle. The resistance implied in all of these has kept alive the hope of self-determination, defended land and identity, and been an outlet for West Papuans to express their aspirations. Since 1988, there has been an explicit commitment to nonviolence, which reached a new stage of intensity and openness during the ‘Papuan Spring’ between 1998 and 2000. From August 2000 the situation dramatically deteriorated, heralding Jakarta’s return to the repressive practices of the past. In the face of repression, however, nonviolent struggle in West Papua has enjoyed modest success. The name of the province has been changed to Papua and the Morning Star flag is now permitted to fly. There has also been a slow but steady increase in international awareness at all levels in society about the plight of West Papua. This chapter will briefly discuss the history of nonviolent struggle in West Papua, explore the failure of armed struggle and pose some challenges the nonviolent struggle faces.

Armed struggle in West Papua

In the face of overwhelming adversity, the armed wing of the OPM, the OPM/TPN, has resisted the might and superior firepower of the Indonesian military. During the period from the 1960s to 1998 it was the principal organisation of West Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule. Small disparate groups of OPM/TPN operating in the rugged interior of West Papua, often armed with little more than traditional weapons – spears, bows and arrows – but benefiting from an intimate knowledge of the terrain and supported by popular sympathy, have waged a protracted guerrilla war characterised by flag-raising, sporadic attacks on TNI outposts, ambush of TNI units, sabotage and hostage taking.\(^1\) While a number of attempts have been made to unify the OPM, it has continued to exist as a decentralised political and military network of resistance groups. Simultaneously, ‘being OPM’ is also a source of West Papuan identity for large numbers of West Papuans who are not active in the armed struggle.\(^2\) Recently, popular resistance by the OPM/TPN has been transformed from a low-level armed struggle in the jungles and mountains to open nonviolent popular urban resistance.\(^3\) The OPM has intentionally developed a political wing committed to nonviolence and formed links with civil society, particularly students and tribal groups.\(^4\) Some West Papuans claim

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\(^1\) Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*.

\(^2\) The international officer for the Presidium, for instance, Mr Franzalbert Joku, said that the OPM is ‘a slogan’ (Personal communication with Franzalbert Joku, May 2001); To some extent this perspective was also confirmed in conversation with someone who recently visited West Papua (Personal communication with an AWPA member, April 2002).

\(^3\) Interview with participant 04, December 2001 and participant 07, September 2001.

\(^4\) Interview with participant 04, December 2001 and participant 07, September 2001.
that the OPM/TPN has adopted a policy of only using violence as a last resort, as a means of
defence.\(^5\) They claim that recent attacks on civilians and security forces are incidents engineered by
the TNI to justify repression.\(^6\) Whilst a lack of independent investigation, communication problems
and the decentralised nature of the armed struggle make it difficult to ascertain the truth of these
claims, other OPM/TPN leaders remain prepared to launch military offensives.\(^7\)

**Introducing nonviolence**\(^8\)

Nonviolent action is a highly ethical and extremely effective way of bringing about personal
and social change. Nonviolence aims to transform the patterns of relations and structures that create
and sustain conflict. It is first and foremost action, not passive. Combining unyielding resistance
with genuine respect and regard for all people, nonviolence excludes retaliation or flight and comes
out of a deep longing for personal wholeness, human reconciliation and ecological sustainability.
Nonviolence has existed across cultures, religions and epochs.\(^9\) Nonviolence does not assume that
one’s opponent will be nonviolent, but endeavours to transform conflict through relentless and
peaceful persistence in the face of repression. Nonviolent action is certainly not limited to peaceful
dialogue, but is action intended to create the conditions for a problem-solving dialogue for peace
with justice.

**Nonviolent struggle in West Papua: A brief history**\(^10\)

West Papua has a rich history of nonviolent social change, which has not been well
documented. During colonial times nonviolent action (against both the Dutch and Japanese)
included tax resistance, strikes to resist forced labour, religious movements with political
aspirations, defiance of bans on traditional dances and singing, and cooperative economic
development.\(^11\) At one stage, during 1938 – 1943, Angganitha Bin Damai (Angganitha Woman of

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\(^5\) For instance Rex Rumakiek, *West Papua Project*, 13\(^{th}\) December 2001; Interview with participant 01, July and

\(^6\) Some West Papuans speaking at the *West Papua Project*, 13\(^{th}\) December 2001.

\(^7\) See for instance Kabar-Irian, ‘Irian Jaya hard-liners threaten guerrilla warfare’,
[http://www.campeace.org/Wparchive/hard_lines.htm](http://www.campeace.org/Wparchive/hard_lines.htm)
accessed 23\(^{rd}\) January 2002; Paul Kingsnorth., ‘They walk on the
leaves of trees’, *New Internationalist* 344, April 2002: pp. 25-26. Examples include taking two Belgium filmmakers
hostage in June 2001 and attacks on logging companies and security forces in Manokwari and Illaga.

\(^8\) Chapter three will explore the theory of nonviolence in greater depth.

\(^9\) See for example Bruce Bonata., *Peaceful Peoples: An Annotated Bibliography*, Metuchen (New Jersey), Scarecrow
Rienner Publishers, 1994; Signe Howell and Roy Willis, (eds), *Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives*,

\(^10\) See Table 2.1 for examples of nonviolent action in West Papua.

Peace) lead a 30,000 strong nonviolent uprising against colonialism. 12 Nonviolent resistance continued under Indonesian rule.13

During the 1970s the Indonesian military re-launched a renewed massive and brutal military offensive against the people of the highlands. The experience has formed an indelible imprint on the collective memory of the people. *Memoria passionis*, the memory of suffering, has become a potent force for change. Suffering has strengthened indigenous identity and traditions, and galvanised people’s commitment to resisting Indonesian ideology and behaviour.14 At the same time resistance to Indonesian rule is not only rooted in the shared experience of suffering, but springs from a distinct identity and popular consciousness of historical injustice.

In 1980, six courageous West Papuan women, led by Prisila Jakadewa raised the flag outside the governor’s office in Port Numbay/Jayapura.15 This is one example of numerous flag-raisings, a popular expression of resistance and identity. Cultural resistance in West Papua was further popularised by the West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap, before he was murdered by the Indonesian military in 1984. Ap and his popular group, *Mambesak*, revitalised traditional songs and dances from different cultural and linguistic groups, helping strengthen a national identity. His performances and recordings inspire the struggle. ‘Songs’, proclaims one West Papuan, ‘are the last bullets of resistance…. Listening to them makes me not afraid to die.’ 16

In late 1980s, the West Papuan intellectual and international lawyer, Dr. Thomas Wanggai, who studied Gandhi and the nonviolent struggle in South Africa, developed an explicit nonviolent strategy for change. Aware of the political and strategic deficiencies of armed struggle, Dr. Wanggai advocated people-centred development based on West Papuans distinct identity as Melanesians. This vision was also integrated with a strategy of principled nonviolent resistance, influenced by indigenous traditions and the gospel imperative to love.17 In December 1988, after an open flag raising ceremony at the Port Numbay/Jayapura soccer stadium, Dr. Wanggai was arrested, sentenced to 20 years in jail and along with his Japanese wife and a number of supporters, imprisoned. In 1996 he died in jail. Around the same time, Jacob Rumbiak, a former guerrilla fighter and contemporary of Thomas Wanggai, started promoting nonviolent struggle amongst his

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13 There is very little in the literature explicitly written about nonviolence in West Papua in general, but particularly so in relation to the period from 1961 through to the 1998.
15 Benny Giay, ‘Against Indonesia: West Papuan strategies of resistance against Indonesian political and cultural aggression in the 1980s’, in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (ed.), *Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia*, New York, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001: 133. This act was one of many flag-raisings, the most prominent from of nonviolent resistance to Indonesian rule.
16 Interview with participant 01, January 2001.
17 Interview, with participant 04, December 2001.
students at Cendrawasih University. In December 1989, after being listed as ‘subversive’ by the military, Jacob and three others took refuge in the PNG consulate in Port Numbay/Jayapura. After negotiations failed, Rumbiak was arrested and sentenced to 17 years prison.  

There has also been widespread resistance to global capital, particularly around the Freeport gold and copper mine. When the U.S company established itself in West Papua in 1967, two years before the question of West Papua’s sovereignty was ‘resolved’, the highland Amungme people positioned traditional taboo sticks around Freeport’s base camp to prevent and contain the operation. Since then, nonviolent actions have included public demonstrations, sit-ins and flag raisings. When the company dismissed the Amungme’s right to supply fruit and vegetables to Freeport employees, Amungme cut up vegetables and spread them on the airstrip at Timika and lit a huge bonfire, closing the runway for several days, preventing both Freeport as well as the Indonesian military from using the airport. There have also been nonviolent actions to resist logging companies, for example by the Moi, and recent nonviolent occupations of BPs Bintuni Bay base camp by traditional landowners, angry that BP had reneged on an earlier agreement to consult with them.  

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the struggle that many West Papuans call ‘a struggle with love and peace’ entered a new phase of openness and intensity. Following the July 6th Biak Massacre in 1998, Church leaders established FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya). After FORERI persuaded Papua’s parliamentary representative, Abdul Gafur, to organise a meeting with then Indonesian president Habibie, a group of West Papuans flew to Jakarta to meet Habibie to discuss the prospects of a national dialogue. On arriving at the Presidential palace, Thom Beanal  

18 In 1999, after serving ten years, many of which were in solitary confinement, Jacob Rumbiak was released to house arrest. From here he escaped to East Timor to assist the East Timorese with their historic referendum. After narrowly cheating death in the TNI orchestrated post-ballot violence, Rumbiak fled to Australia on the same plane as Bishop Belo. He now lives in Melbourne where he continues to advocate nonviolent struggle for self-determination. Jacob Rumbiak is committed to building understanding between ordinary Indonesians and West Papuans with the hope of ‘cleaning-up Indonesia’s reputation as a coloniser’. For more on Jacob Rumbiak’s story see Tom Hyland, ‘A Guerrilla’s Story’, The Age, Thursday 7th September 2000.  

19 Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’.  


23 Interview with participant 01, July 2001; Personal communication with a journalist and solidarity activist who travelled to West Papua this year (2002).  

24 Captain Andrew Plunkett, an Australian Defence Force intelligence officer who served with INTERFET in East Timor, claims the massacre was a ‘dress rehearsal’ for TNI organised militia violence in East Timor and that the Australian government ‘buried’ a ‘crucial intelligence report’ into the incident for fear of ‘offending Indonesia’ (Andrew West, ‘Our silence on massacre ‘encouraged Timor killing’, Sun-Herald, 3rd June 2001).  

25 Abdul Gafur’s initial response was that Indonesia had liberated West Papua and that Indonesia was helping develop the province. Members of FORERI realised that the talks were not getting anywhere. They decided to prepare two photo’s. The first photo was entitled, ‘The success of development in Papua’ and had a picture of a KOPASSUS soldier
Amungme elder and leader of the ‘Team 100’ – declared that West Papuans wanted independence. Habibie was stunned and the space for dialogue about West Papuan concerns closed.26

In the window of opportunity that reformasi (democratic reform) created, West Papuans successfully challenged the dual function of the military: the military’s involvement in politics and society. In 1999, West Papuans in the Fak-Fak and Nabire regencies held nonviolent demonstrations for several days to insist that a Papuan civilian was appointed to the office of the regional head of government. The demonstrations achieved this objective.27

The call for ‘peaceful dialogue’ was taken up again in both the Mubes’ (Musyawarah Besar – Large consultation) in Port Numbay/Jayapura in February 2000 and again in the Kongres Rayakat Papua II (Second Papuan People’s Congress) in May/June 2000. At the Mubes the Papuan Council (Dewan Papua – DP) was elected along with the executive, the Papuan Council Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua - PDP). The composition of the DP and PDP was confirmed at the second congress and Theys Eluay was elected Chairperson with Thom Beanal as vice-chairperson. The second congress was supported financially by the then President, Abdurrahman Wahid. The Papuan Council broadly reflects West Papuan society and includes representatives from traditional tribal groups, youth, women, Churches and religious organisations (including indigenous West Papuan Islamic organisations) and political organisations as well as Indonesian settlers and transmigrants who support independence for West Papua. The PDP stated West Papuans’ non-negotiable desire for independence and called for a process to ‘rectify history’ and investigate the basis for West Papua’s incorporation with Indonesia.28

Both the Mubes and congress electrified the West Papuan population and for the first time since integration, created a united and legitimate national organisation. Both events were attended by thousands of people. Over 20,000 attended the second congress including large numbers of Highlanders in traditional dress who walked over 300km to be present at the event. Delegates then returned to their own communities to ‘socialise’ the results of the Mubes and congress. From August 2000, however, the ‘Papuan Spring’ ended as five PDP members were arrested and the TNI began to clamp down on popular expressions of the people’s aspirations.29

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27 Giay, ‘Against Indonesia’, 130.
November 2001, Theys Eluay was assassinated.\textsuperscript{30} Since then NGOs, Presidium members, Protestant and Catholic Churches and West Papuan Islamic organisations, have renewed their call for a creation of a ‘zone of peace’ in West Papua; a unilateral withdrawal of all non-local security forces.\textsuperscript{31} In this climate of repression, the People’s Consultative Assembly, Indonesia’s national parliament (MPR), granted Papua Special Autonomy, meeting several important West Papuan demands including permission to fly the Morning Star and renaming the province from Irian Jaya to Papua.


\textsuperscript{31} Kurniawan Hari, ‘Papuan leaders want troops withdrawn’, \textit{The Jakarta Post}, 7\textsuperscript{th} June 2002.
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<th>Protest and Persuasion</th>
<th>Noncooperation</th>
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<td>Raising the Morning star flag (including women only)</td>
<td>Refusing to speak or use Bahasa Indonesia in the company of Indonesians</td>
<td>Establishing the Dewan Papua and Presidium Dewan Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing flags</td>
<td>Refusing to eat Indonesian food</td>
<td>Growing and eating Papuan food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing flags</td>
<td>Tax resistance</td>
<td>Establishing Papuan cooperatives (koperasi – Bahasa Indonesia) to promote development and defend Papuan identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising the West Melanesian flag</td>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>Establishing development and human rights organisations such as Mama Yosepha’s HAMAK based in Timika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaring independence and re-reading of texts proclaiming independence</td>
<td>Student strikes</td>
<td>Promoting indigenous beliefs and identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composing and singing traditional songs and hymns</td>
<td>Refusing to work</td>
<td>Producing and distributing newsletters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing traditional dress</td>
<td>Going slow at work</td>
<td>Rectifying the history of West Papua and producing pocket books about West Papua’s history</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singing the West Papuan national anthem – Hai Tanahku Papua</td>
<td>Making mistakes at work</td>
<td>Promoting West Papuan history in elementary schools right up to college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous religious movements with political intentions</td>
<td>Rejecting Indonesian culture, thinking and ideology</td>
<td>Developing traditional dance and music groups like Arnold Ap’s Mambesak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral story telling about suffering and resistance</td>
<td>Exile (in countries other than Papua New Guinea)</td>
<td>Courses on human rights and participative and interactive training of local human rights monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>Boycotting Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>The creative class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public statements</td>
<td>Traditional custodians refusing to recognise and stop at checkpoints established by transnational mining companies on their own land</td>
<td>The disruptive class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letters to the authorities, papers and solidarity groups</td>
<td>Hunger strikes</td>
<td>Interrupting meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputations and official dialogue with the Indonesian government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupations of Parliament, universities, government offices and of areas used by multinational companies (such as BP’s base camp in Saengga, Bintuni Bay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogue with members of the TNI and police</td>
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<td>Blockades of roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting of human rights violations</td>
<td>Using the U.N. machinery to raise concerns about violations of political and human rights</td>
<td>Planting traditional taboo sticks and using other traditional methods to prohibit tresspass on traditional lands by resource extraction companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using the U.N. machinery to raise concerns about violations of political and human rights</td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>Seizing forestry equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Traditional dancing</td>
<td>Seeking asylum – embassy invasions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Discussions</td>
<td>Surrounding buildings (where meetings are being held such as the Mubes) in order to hold representatives accountable.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Church services and prayer meetings</td>
<td>Surrounding and escorting representatives of the international community or independent investigators to meetings organised by the Presidium rather than official meetings organised by the Provincial government.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fasting</td>
<td>Confiscating the TNI’s supply of alcohol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Celebrating significant dates in West Papua’s history</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Distributing pamphlets and leaflets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Socialising of information and activities in rural areas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Making airstrips unusable</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Marches</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Long marches/walks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Demonstrating whilst running and dancing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Waiting and camping outside jails where activists are imprisoned</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marking traditional land – (such as the use of taboo sticks to restrict Freeport by the Amungme)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returning honours from the Indonesian government</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 2.1 Types of nonviolent action undertaken by West Papuans. Based on Sharps typology of nonviolent action (The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: Methods of Nonviolent Action, Boston, Porter Seargent, 1973). Examples have been collected from interviews with West Papuans and a reading of the literature.
The failure of armed struggle to bring about self-determination in West Papua

On many levels the armed struggle led by the OPM has been heroic. To paraphrase Gandhi, it is better for a person to use violence to fight injustice than do nothing.\(^\text{32}\) However, there is another way: nonviolence. Nonviolence has already proved successful in the face of Indonesian aggression in West Papua. Nonviolence is not only a more ethical form of resistance than armed struggle, it can also be more effective. Nonetheless, it is vital that people understand the ethical and strategic problems of violence in order to choose nonviolence from a position of strength.

**Ethical problems with violence.** At the most basic level conflict cannot be resolved by killing people. ‘Violence is grossly dysfunctional’ says Robert Burrowes. ‘It cannot resolve conflict or satisfy human needs. And whenever it has been used in the service of major political goals it has lead to suffering and death, often on a massive scale.’\(^\text{33}\) Violence also violates the sanctity and dignity of human beings. As John Rumbiak says, ‘we want to campaign and educate people that taking up arms sacrifices human rights.’\(^\text{34}\)

**The strategic shortcomings of violence.** At the level of strategy, continues Rumbiak:

We want to make it very clear to the political activists that the values that they are fighting for, and the enemy they are fighting against are two very different things. This has to be very clear otherwise the Papuans are going to repeat the same problems. We learn from our colonial masters. Look at the Indonesians. Three hundred and fifty years learning from the Dutch. They colonized their own people. That is what is going on.\(^\text{35}\)

Violence only reinforces the structure and culture of militarism. On a purely pragmatic level armed struggle has little chance against the superior strength of the TNI. In fact, it shifts the struggle to where Indonesia is strongest. Strategically speaking, however, Indonesia’s power to maintain the occupation of West Papua does not come from its military capability alone. It is sustained by popular support inside Indonesia and internationally. Therefore, the struggle should be directed at altering the will and undermining the power of those who continue to support the occupation, something that is far more likely to be achieved by nonviolence.; this is because nonviolence combines human psychology and political power to cause the repression of the opponent to rebound whilst simultaneously creating third-party support. Simultaneously it lays the foundation for the new society and promotes human reconciliation in the midst of the struggle. Another significant shortcoming of armed struggle in West Papua is that the cost is


\(^{35}\) Tok Blong Pasifik, ‘The John Rumbiak Interview’, 18.
disproportionately paid by the civilian population.\textsuperscript{36} At the same time armed struggle decreases participation by favouring fit young men. It could be said that militarism of West Papuan society also increases the likelihood of gender based violence within West Papuan society.

While it is possible that armed struggle in West Papua could continue indefinitely due to the inaccessible terrain, tribal affinities and popular support for the cause, the purpose of armed struggle is to ultimately find a political solution to the problem. In West Papua, however, the armed struggle appears to be isolated politically from the PDP and PD who are searching for a solution through nonviolent means. Consequently, if the armed struggle suffers substantial loses or is isolated politically, those groups that wage armed struggle will be left with little political muscle and increasing feelings of frustration. Given this, it is imperative that linkages are made with the OPM/TPN (a fine line between avoiding isolating the OPM/TPN and contaminating the nonviolent struggle) and that if possible they are supported to develop greater capacity for civilian-based resistance including implementing a programme of sustainable development that meets the needs of the people.

Finally, in the current international political climate, groups that advocate and use violence to achieve political ends will find that international support for their cause will diminish. It will also be more likely that they will be subjected to increased repression. Moreover, a resumption of armed struggle would strengthen the hand of Jakarta by enabling them to brand West Papuan independence groups who use violence as terrorists, a process that would allow the TNI to increase its use of force against West Papuans and alienate potential third-party support.

**Challenges for the nonviolent struggle in West Papua**

There are significant challenges for nonviolent struggle in West Papua. These include the following:

**Repression.** The suffering of people in West Papua has been immense. Whilst no-one knows exactly how many West Pauans have died, killings by the Indonesian military have been on such a scale as to threaten the very survival of the West Papuan people.\textsuperscript{37} One purpose of repression is to stop the struggle for self-determination, whether that struggle uses violence or nonviolence. Therefore, it is vital that activists find ways to undermine the power of violence by continuing to find ways to persist with nonviolent action. In sharp contrast to Aceh where violence


\textsuperscript{37} Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of A People*. 
from both the armed struggle (GAM) and the TNI has entrenched a cycle of violence that routinely claims the life of up to 20-30 people each week. West Papuans have managed to avoid provocation. As one West Papuan comments:

They killed Theys Eluay, but there was no war. They tried to arrest Papuan leaders, but still Papuans want nonviolent movement. Then they started spreading rumours. And these are still ineffectve. We want peace, security and stability in West Papua … we want Indonesia to stop its state terrorism.38

Repression follows effective dissent. To maintain the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle continued discipline is essential. Embracing a path of nonviolent resistance does not mean that nonviolent activists will be immunised from state terror. The assassination of Theys Eluay and murder of countless other West Papuan activists is testimony to that. Nonetheless, it is clear from the historical record that it is likely that there will be substantially less casualties if people choose nonviolent struggle over violence.39 This does not mean, of course, that nonviolent action will not result in heavy casualties.40 One thing is certain. Life under any ruthless regime will involve suffering, whether people resist or not or whether they resist violently or nonviolently.

Success will depend on four critical factors: Firstly, whether the struggle maintains a disciplined and explicit commitment to nonviolence. Secondly, whether the struggle develops and implements a strategic plan that directs sustained nonviolent action at the source of Indonesia’s power. Thirdly, whether the repression of the opponent and the nonviolent resistance of activists, is made visible to an audience who will be motivated to act in solidarity with the resistance.41 And finally, whether, nonviolent activists persist, even in the face of repression.

Mixed defence.42 There is a view amongst some West Papuan advocates of nonviolence and some proponents of armed struggle, that the movement for self-determination in West Papua could combine both armed struggle and nonviolence.44 Petrus Tabuni, a district leader of the DP says that the approach adopted by the resistance will now be ‘two-pronged’. ‘We will use guerrilla tactics through the Free Papua Movement (OPM),45 and dialogue with the central government

39 It is instructive to compare nonviolent resistance to the British in India with the violent Mau Mau resistance against the British in Kenya during the same period. In India, including the North West Frontier Province where the ‘benign’ British ruthlessly repressed the resolutely nonviolent Pathan’s (see Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed, pp. 103-124) some eight thousand people out of a population of 350 million died (see Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence, 100). Compare this to Kenya where the British killed 11,503 Kenyans out of a resistance movement of 100,000 (cited in Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 239).
41 Martin et al, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression’.
42 Mixed defence is a term that refers to a combination of armed struggle and nonviolent resistance.
43 Interview with participant 01, July 2001.
44 On a positive note it this could be read as an encouraging sign that some members of the OPM/TPN may be open to exploring the potential of nonviolent struggle.
45 To help counter-act inevitable misunderstanding about nonviolent struggle amongst members of the TPN it is important that nonviolence is seen not as an option for those that lack the courage to take up arms, but a superior way of
through the Papua Presidium’, says Tabuni.\textsuperscript{46} Whilst all liberation struggles have included elements of both violence and nonviolence in various concentrations, the view that nonviolent and armed struggle could be \textit{combined into a unified grand strategy} of mixed defence is a dangerous one. In practice, one cancels out the other. A nonviolent movement linked with strategies using violence could easily be contaminated by violence.\textsuperscript{47} At a more fundamental level a strategy of mixed defence plays into the hands of the TNI. Not only does it undermine the trust nurtured by a principled commitment to respect ones opponent and not to use violence against them, it also makes it easy for Jakarta to portray nonviolence as a ruse for violence, helping justify increased military repression and alienating third-party support.

\textbf{Dialogue.} At the moment, dialogue with Indonesia, says prominent West Papuan sociologist and theologian, Dr. Benny Giay, is ‘like boiling a stone that will never cook’.\textsuperscript{48} West Papuans want to talk about the history but Indonesians do not. Indonesians want West Papuans to bury the past though West Papuans cannot. As a result, the dialogue has reached an \textit{impasse}. However, this does not mean that nonviolence has reached a dead-end. Dialogue, is but one element in the rich repertoire of nonviolence.\textsuperscript{49} In situations like this, the purpose of nonviolent struggle is to re-create the conditions for dialogue. This could be achieved through campaigns of nonviolent action intended to alter Indonesia’s resistance to talking about history and human rights and undermining their power to avoid talking about it.

\textbf{Constructive programme.} By intentionally integrating what Gandhi called a ‘constructive programme’ (living models of decentralised self-management and self-reliance) into a strategy of resistance, West Papuans can begin to create the kind of society they would like to live in now.\textsuperscript{50} Far from a retreat from active participation in the struggle, by creating new structures and values struggling that requires great inner strength. Indeed the discipline, courage and organisation that characterise an army, are valuable skills essential for the success of nonviolence. Furthermore, indigenous people steeped in violence have been transformed into nonviolent soldiers before. For more on how the Pathan, indigenous people characterised by violence and a commitment to blood feuds, were transformed from armed fighters to a resolutely nonviolent army that helped liberate their homeland from the British see D. G. Tendulkar, \textit{Khan Abdul Gaffer Khan: Faith is a Battle}, Varanasi, Sarvodaya Sahitya Prakashan, 1967; Eknath Easwaran, \textit{Badshah Khan: A Man to Match his Mountains}, Tomales (California), Nilgiri Press, 1985; Mukulia Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier}, Santa Fe (California), School of American Research Press, 2000.


\textsuperscript{48} Giay, \textit{West Papua Project}, 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2001.


\textsuperscript{50} See for instance Burrowes, \textit{The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense}, pp. 204-206.
that address the needs of West Papuans and lay the foundations for a new society, West Papuans will also withdraw their consent and cooperation for institutional oppression. In doing so they also undermine the power of the occupation.

**Vision.** One shortcoming with the nonviolent struggle in West Papua is that there is no clear vision for West Papua. What is meant by independence and *merdeka*? What does it mean for the poorest and most disadvantaged in West Papua? Benny Giay believes this should be a project for West Papuans at all levels. ‘What kind of society do we want in fifty years from now? How do we get there?’ John Rumbiak believes that whilst the identity and needs of West Papua’s 250 tribes are paramount, a new generation of non-Papuans now call West Papua home. Any vision for a New Papua, therefore will need to be inclusive. It is unrealistic to expect that peace, justice and ecological sustainability will automatically result from the removal of Indonesian rule. Even if the historical and political causes of conflict are resolved, certain aspects and legacies of the structural causes of conflict: militarism (the politics of violence), capitalism (the economics of exploitation), a racist education system, violence against women and a hierarchical and corrupt political system, to name a few, will no doubt remain regardless of the political future of the territory. West Papuans children’s children will benefit from serious thought given to these questions now.

**Timeframe.** It seems clear that the conflict in West Papua is deeply entrenched and that Indonesia’s will to retain West Papua at all costs is strong. Consequently, there needs to be a realistic strategic timeframe for change and preparation for protracted struggle. This equally applies to solidarity activists. An unrealistic strategic timeframe could contribute to increased feelings of frustration and result in a return to violence. Structural change will also require revolutionary patience. Challenging global capital in West Papua and developing alternative economic systems should be seen in a global context. Change in this regard is part of a global protracted struggle.

**Strategy.** Finally, the power and effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua will be significantly enhanced by a nonviolent strategy. This discussion will be the subject of Part Two.

**Conclusion**

Despite the prevalence of significant challenges, nonviolent struggle has achieved modest success, far beyond any gains achieved by armed struggle. In the face of extremely ruthless

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repression, West Papuans peacefully persists to resist neo-colonisation, militarism and exploitation. Part Two examines how a nonviolent strategy could maximise the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle. Chapter three examines the theoretical basis for a nonviolent strategy. Chapter four demonstrates that to be effective, a nonviolent strategy for self-determination in West Papua must intentionally incorporate a program of solidarity action into a strategy for change.
Part Two:

A strategy for change
Chapter Three:

Theory
Introduction

This chapter concerns the theoretical foundations of nonviolence and nonviolent strategy that should inform the struggle for self-determination in West Papua. I will argue that a nonviolent strategy will maximise the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle. I will briefly review the literature related to nonviolent strategy and discuss the conceptions and orientations of nonviolence that guide resistance as well as the dynamics and theory of power nonviolent action is based on. I propose that the nonviolent struggle in West Papua utilise the strategy and strategic framework developed by Robert Burrowes because of the strategic guidance it provides and because of the way it is orientated towards transforming the underlining causes of conflict. As history testifies and the logic of the theory demonstrates, nonviolent action can be effective against an extremely ruthless opponent. This will be discussed with relevance to Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua. I will then proceed with a discussion on theoretical basis of strategy. I will conclude with a discussion of the strategic framework, political purpose and strategic aims of the strategy itself. This chapter forms a solid theoretical basis for a discussion on how nonviolent strategy could maximise the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua.

Maximising effectiveness: the importance of strategy

A strategy, however, is simply a planned and coordinated set of activities designed to achieve a desired outcome, and is as relevant to nonviolent struggle as it is to military campaigns. Tactics refer to specific actions taken within a particular strategy. Despite this, most nonviolent movements have neglected the role of strategy. ‘With certain exceptions,’ writes Gene Sharp, the main theorist of nonviolent action,

nonviolent movements have been merely reactive, often relying on spontaneous mobilizations and tactical countermoves … With such neglect to the role of strategy in nonviolent struggle, especially in comparison to military conflicts, it is surprising that so many nonviolent campaigns have indeed succeeded.¹

Although strategy is by no means a rigid formula for success, and needs to take into account circumstances and context, there is no doubt that careful planning, intensive training, and thorough organisation and coordination dramatically increases the effectiveness of nonviolent action.²

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Over the years a number of nonviolent strategic frameworks have been developed and several books written about the importance of strategy for nonviolent action. Joan Bondurant’s excellent analysis of key Gandhian campaigns highlighted Gandhi’s strategic and tactical insight. In his famous essay, ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’, Martin Luther King jnr set out his nonviolent strategy and the steps that needed to be undertaken in any nonviolent campaign to combat injustice. Subsequent practitioners such as George Lakey have developed these steps, which have then informed a host of campaigns for ecological sustainability, peace and justice. Gene Sharp in his seminal work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* has done as much as anyone to promote careful planning, organisation, training and discipline in nonviolent action. There have also been a number of scholarly works, particularly in the field of civilian-based defence. Other books have examined the theory of strategy or enunciated key principles that should guide strategy.

Given the array of works on nonviolent strategy available, why then use the strategic framework developed by Robert Burrowes? The key difference between Robert Burrowes work and other nonviolent strategies or books about strategy, is that Burrowes’ strategy provides strategic guidance. Whereas other authors and practitioners have described steps that need to be taken, Burrowes helps identify where to direct campaigns of nonviolent action and gives a comprehensive framework for developing the necessary components of any strategy.

### Conceptions of nonviolence

Once there has been a decision to struggle nonviolently, the question is what kind of conception of nonviolence will guide the struggle? There are many different conceptions of nonviolence and without widespread discussion, debate and understanding about why a particular conception of nonviolence has been chosen, confusion will inevitable arise along with the danger that nonviolence could become reduced to its most ineffectual bottom line: passivity and physically not hurting people.

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7 See for example Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*.

8 Ackerman and Krueger, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*.

The conception of nonviolence is the heart and soul of any nonviolent strategy because different conceptions of nonviolence guide strategy and tactics in different ways. There are two broad approaches that inform nonviolent action, pragmatic nonviolence and principled nonviolence. Practitioners of pragmatic nonviolence essentially view nonviolence as a technique to bring about desired change, whilst practitioners of principled nonviolence view nonviolence as an underlying ethical principle that determines action. Both aim to be effective and both pragmatic and principled nonviolence can be orientated towards either reform or revolution. Principled nonviolence orientated to fundamental structural change offers the best hope of building peace in deeply divided societies because it addresses both the root causes of conflict, generates the conditions for psycho-social healing through the transformation of human relationships, and is ultimately directed towards human reconciliation.10

In relation to strategy, given the range of different conceptions of nonviolence it is important that there is widespread discussion about what conception of nonviolence should guide the struggle and that the conception of nonviolence utilised is made explicit and widely known. This does not mean that all people in West Papua need to adopt a particular conception of nonviolence for all time, but rather that there is an agreement on what constitutes nonviolent behaviour for the purposes of the struggle. In addition, many experienced practitioners of nonviolence argue that there should be a code of discipline or agreement made which engenders disciplined activist behaviour and makes it more difficult for agents provocateurs to create disturbances.11

The consent theory of power

A theory of power is fundamental to any political movement or strategy for change. A conception of power only in terms of the ability of one party to dominate or control another,12 however, is by no means the only conception of power used to guide strategies for change.13 Indeed nonviolent

activists maintain that if the dominant conception of power is used to inform action, a new form of
domination will merely replace the old. Conceptions of power, grounded in cooperation and inspired
by higher moral and political values, challenge the dominant conception of power and inform
nonviolent action, which in turn is guided by the consent theory of power.

First articulated by Etienne de La Boetie\(^\text{14}\) in the sixteenth century, the consent theory of power
holds that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few rulers at the top of a ‘pyramid’ but is
dispersed throughout society. La Boetie argued that elites depend on the passive and active consent
and cooperation of ordinary people to maintain their rule. This insight has continued to guide
nonviolent struggle. To illustrate this point, Gandhi said that ‘the British have not taken India from us,
we have given it to them.’\(^\text{15}\) Based on this insight he led a successful nonviolent revolution to induce
and compel the British to quit India (See diagram 3.1). According to nonviolent activists, therefore,
people are the sources of all power. Should they withdraw their consent and cooperation in sufficient
numbers and for long enough, then even the most ruthless regime will crumble.\(^\text{16}\)

Nonviolence is extremely effective, even against an extremely ruthless opponent. The
empirical evidence confirms this. Nonviolent action has been effective in the Middle East (against the
Shah),\(^\text{17}\) in Asia (against Marcos),\(^\text{18}\) in numerous cases in Latin America\(^\text{19}\) and Eastern Europe,\(^\text{20}\)
against the Soviet Union,\(^\text{21}\) and even against the Indonesian military.\(^\text{22}\) Although nonviolent stories

Reprint, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1975.
\(^{15}\) Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1939: 35.
\(^{16}\) For more on the consent theory of power see Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part One Power and Struggle.
\(^{17}\) See for example, Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah, Trans. Roger Liddell, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
a New Society, 1980.
\(^{18}\) See for example Jim and Nancy Forest, Four Days in February: The Story of the Nonviolent Overthrow of the Marcos
\(^{19}\) See for example, Patricia Parkman, Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America 1931-1961, Cambridge Mass., Albert
Einstein Institution, 1990; See also numerous examples, particularly from Guatemala, Argentina and Uruguay, in Phillip
McManus and Gerald Schlabach, Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America, Philadelphia, New Society
Publishers, 1991; and examples from El Salvador and Chile in Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A
\(^{20}\) See for example, Michael Randle, People Power: The Building of a New European Home, Stroud, England, Hawthorn
Press, 1991. For examples of nonviolent action against Hitler see Jacques Semelin, Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian
1992; Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper and Gregory Freidin, (eds.), Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the
\(^{22}\) Brian Martin, Wendy Varner and Adrian Vickers, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower-
profile Nonviolent Resistance’, Pacifica Review 13(2), 2001, pp. 143-156; and an analysis of the shift from armed struggle
to nonviolence in East Timor in Chisako M. Fukuda, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance
British rule of India

The result of Indian withdrawal of consent through the Indian independence campaign: the British rule in India collapses

Adapted from Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 88
have certainly been marginalised, history bears witness to what happens when people undermine the legitimacy of a regime by withdrawing their consent and cooperation.

It is not the purpose of nonviolent action to avoid conflict. Conflict is both a positive and desirable source of personal growth and societal transformation. What is crucial is how the conflict is dealt with. Nonviolent action seeks to intentionally generate conflict so that the underlying injustice and exploitation becomes explicit. Through nonviolent methods, activists then seek to transform the conflict from destructive to creative patterns that lay the foundations for peace, justice and sustainability. In recognition of this insight, nonviolence is not restricted to peaceful dialogue or passive resistance (mostly low-level acts of hidden noncooperation) but encompasses acts of protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. In order for change to be created it is imperative that nonviolent activists analyse the sources of support their opponents depend upon to maintain their rule and either withdraw that support themselves or design campaigns to induce or compel others to withdraw their support. In addition, for nonviolent action to be successful not only must consent be withdrawn by a clear refusal to cooperate, there must also be a collective commitment to peaceful and disciplined action in the face of repression and a coherent strategy that guides action.

‘The great chain of nonviolence’

For withdrawal of consent and cooperation by a resisting population to be effective in bringing about change, the regime has to be a significantly dependent on the people ruled. However, the reality is that in some situations elites do not sufficiently depend upon the consent and cooperation of the people they dominate. Consequently, Galtung has argued that a dependency relationship can be created through what he calls the ‘great chain of nonviolence’.

Galtung proposes that in cases where no dependency relationship exists, or the social distance between the oppressor and the oppressed is great and the oppressed have been dehumanised by the

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24 Gene Sharp, in The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action, has documented 198 methods of nonviolent action from the three classes of nonviolent action, protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent intervention also includes initiatives to create community-led processes and institutions as well as disruptive actions designed to interrupt or intervene in injustice. Since writing The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Sharp has said that since The Politics of Nonviolent Action was published he has ‘discovered’ at least another 200 methods of nonviolent action (Ralph Summy, ‘Nonviolence and the Extremely Ruthless Opponent’, Pacifica Review Vol. 6 No. 1, 1994: pp. 1-29).
27 Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine, 26.
oppressor, (as was the case during the civil rights struggle in the U.S and is the case in West Papua) a third party sympathetic to the struggle of the oppressed and who is viewed favourably by the oppressor, could intercede on behalf of the oppressed. This action creates a psychological ‘link’ or ‘communication chain’ between the oppressor and oppressed. Action by a third party who the oppressor elite even partially identifies with can significantly weaken the resolve of the oppressor to continue dominating the oppressed and significantly strengthen the struggle of the oppressed. This was the role sympathetic middle class whites played during the U.S civil rights struggle and the role sympathetic white women (and later sympathetic white churches) played during apartheid in South Africa.

Because West Papuans are viewed as culturally inferior and backward by vast numbers of Indonesians, particularly the Javanese, sympathetic Indonesians could play a significant role in personalising the humanity of West Papuans and communicating the aspirations of the West Papuan people to Indonesians’ hostile to, or unconvinced of, the merits of West Papuan demands. For this reason the West Papuan leadership of the nonviolent struggle should continue to intentionally cultivate solidarity relationships with Indonesians throughout the archipelago in general, and in Java, the engine room of Indonesian politics, in particular.

Of course, given the high levels of accumulated trauma in the individual and collective memory of West Papuans, it may not be possible for all West Papuans to do this. Hate and rage borne of deep suffering is difficult for even the most gracious and forgiving individual to overcome. But it is possible. ‘During the long periods of isolation and deprivation many of us learnt to stop hating the oppressors’, says one West Papuan ex-political prisoner. ‘Hating takes a lot of energy…. In the loneliness of the prison cells we learned about reconciliation and rebuilt our souls and our spirits.’

In order to build effective solidarity relationships it may be necessary to create safe spaces to process deep emotional pain caused by living in the shadow of terror and seeing ones family and friends killed. This is vital to develop the capacity to build relationships with Indonesian allies.

In recognition of the importance of building relationships with Indonesians, WESTPANYAT (West Papuan National Youth Awareness Team) has been developing student support groups in Bali, Java and Sulawesi. AMP (Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua – the Alliance of Papuan University Students)

29 Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine, 26.
31 Interview with participant 01, January 2001.
leaders are also doing the same. The grassroots in Indonesia are the key says one WESTPANYAT leader: ‘The Indonesian government depends on what the grassroots want. Indonesia will lose power over West Papua when we build understanding between ordinary Indonesians and people in West Papua.’ Solidarity activists from outside Indonesia could also play an important role in helping bridge the gap between progressive students in Java, for example, and progressive students in West Papua. Through the medium of media and through personal introductions and coordinating and facilitating solidarity tours third parties could help lessen social distance.

By intentionally developing nonviolent solidarity campaigns inside Indonesia that draw on the insights of Galtung’s ‘great chain of nonviolence’, West Papuans could significantly undermine popular Indonesian support for repression and over time perhaps even Indonesian legitimacy for the occupation itself. Third party support for self-determination in West Papua from Indonesians will be significantly improved by the ability of the West Papuans to continue to maintain nonviolent discipline in the face of repression. This will continue to expose the brutality of the Indonesian military, provoke questions in ordinary Indonesians minds about why there is a conflict, undermine international support for the Indonesian occupation of West Papua and make it increasingly difficult to portray the conflict as a law and order issue or as another example of international terrorism.

Towards a new consent theory of power

Nonviolent solidarity campaigns inside Indonesia are vitally important. Nonetheless because of the symbolic and economic importance of West Papua to Indonesia, campaigns of nonviolent action inside West Papua that utilise the insights of ‘the great chain of nonviolence’ may not, by themselves, be enough to alter Jakarta’s will towards maintaining the occupation. In essence this is because of two major limitations that need to be taken into consideration so that the consent theory of power retains its utility to nonviolent struggle in West Papua. Firstly, the historic, ideological and economic importance of West Papua to Jakarta translate into a strong and unified political will to retain the territory at all costs. Moreover, Indonesia does not sufficiently depend upon the consent and cooperation of West Papuans to maintain the occupation but instead relies on the support of international government and corporate elites (see Figure 3.2). The second fundamental problem is that the consent theory of power (particularly that popularised by Sharp) does not sufficiently address the role of the structures in creating and perpetuating oppression. It is these problems that I will now turn to.

32 Personal communication with a confidential source.
33 Interview 22nd July 2001.
34 Thanks to Sam da Silva and an AMP activist for this insight.
Figure 3.2 Support for Jakarta’s continued rule in West Papua

Support for the occupation inside Indonesia

Jakarta’s occupation of West Papua

International support for the occupation

Result of a withdrawal of consent and cooperation from West Papuans inside West Papua only: the regime remains

Adapted from Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 89
First criticism of the consent theory of power: The opponent may not be sufficiently dependent on the people they dominate. Increasingly, elites do not depend on the consent and cooperation of the people they dominate but on the political, economic and military support of other elites. Even if all West Papuans nonviolently withdrew their cooperation from the regime more Indonesians could be brought in to take over the day to day affairs of administering and exploiting the territory. To a large extent it does not appear that Indonesia wants the people, they are only interested in the land, or more to the point the resources. Amungme tribal leader, Thom Beanal agrees. ‘Could it be that the Indonesian government is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its natural resources? he rhetorically asks. However, although an invader may not be dependent on the people they dominate, they are always dependent on external sources of power.

Jakarta is heavily dependent on the diplomatic, economic and military support of other elites. These international and national elite allies operate in ways that mutually reinforce one another’s actions (See diagram one). Diplomatically, Indonesia relies on member states of the United Nations to continue to recognise territorial integrity of Indonesia and the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia through the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Economically, Indonesia depends on the continued investment of multinational corporations as well as the continued economic support of the IMF and World Bank through the Consultative Group on Indonesia. Militarily, Indonesia depends upon countries like the United States to arm and train the TNI and legitimise the role of the TNI in securing the territorial integrity of Indonesia. In turn, Indonesia’s elite allies depend on the active and passive consent of local constituencies such as voters, bureaucrats, workers, intellectuals, soldiers and unions, to maintain support for Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua. Indirect dependency on key social groups inside the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies is the Achilles’ heel of Indonesia’s occupation in West Papua.

Burrowes’ argument is that the consent theory of power that informs nonviolent action should be modified so that activists look beyond Galtung’s ‘great chain of nonviolence’. This involves developing a strategy in which solidarity groups in the society of the opponent elite and opponent elite allies, in cooperation with the resisting population, conduct campaigns of nonviolent action designed to induce or compel those constituencies which the opponent elite depends on, to withdraw their support for the occupation (see Figure 3.3).

35 Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 266.
36 Abrash and Kennedy, ‘Repressive mining in West Papua’, 71.
37 Looking at Australia as a case study, this will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Four.
(insert Figure 3.3 ‘Solidarity action is essential’)
The second criticism of the consent theory of power: the lack of a structural analysis of power. Although La Boetie identified the importance of social structures, Sharp has paid insufficient attention to them. According to Brian Martin, Sharp’s theory of consent is ‘individualistic and voluntaristic in orientation, as shown by his attention to psychological reason’s for obedience.’ In theory if people no longer agree to be ruled and collectively persist in withdrawing their cooperation from a regime, the regime will collapse. In reality, however, there is not a simple relationship between the ruled and the ruler. Instead the situation is much more complex. Power, argue the structuralists, is deeply rooted in social relationships and patterns of social behaviour that become instituted and replicated over time. The consent theory of power ignores people’s dependency on social structures, the coercive nature of those structures and the way power relationships shape the actors within the structures and underpin conflict. The relationship between the ruled and the ruler, conceptualised by Sharp, is of limited value when trying to understand the dynamics of nonviolent struggle in and around social structures such as capitalism, the state and patriarchy. The challenge for activists, asserts Brian Martin, is to combine the consent theory of power with a structural analysis of local systems of power. A strategy of nonviolent action can then provide strategic coordination and guidance for local campaigns.

Nonviolence against an extremely ruthless opponent

One of the persistent criticisms levelled at proponents of nonviolent action is the assumption that nonviolence is ineffective against an extremely ruthless opponent such as the Indonesian government and military. Ignoring the fact that the same could be said about violence or armed struggle, it is important that West Papuan and solidarity activists address this question and prepare for repression. The logic of the theory and the empirical evidence demonstrate that nonviolence can be effective against an extremely ruthless opponent. But is nonviolent action tactically effective against an extremely ruthless opponent?

There is certainly no doubt that Indonesia, or to be more specific, the Indonesian military, constitutes an extremely ruthless opponent. The case of nonviolent resistance against the Indonesian

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42 Summy, ‘Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent’, pp. 159 and 161.
43 In 1966 the Indonesian military orchestrated anti-communist pogroms throughout the archipelago that resulted in the murder of up to a million people. In East Timor between 1975 and 1999 the Indonesian military killed up to two-thirds of the population and in the horrified gaze of the international community unleashed an orgy of post-referendum violence in
military in West Papua may constitute what could be considered a worst case scenario: a largely isolated rural opposition against a genocidal opponent. So what tactical choices help make nonviolent action less vulnerable to ruthless repression?

Burrowes suggests seven ways nonviolent activists may help reduce repression when taking part in nonviolent action. They include: emphasising dispersion rather than concentration; organising tactics in a novel way or invest them with new meaning; creating opportunities for advance personal contact with the military; preparing a contingency plan; developing high levels of courage and discipline; withstanding greater forms of suffering; and using the media to make the nonviolent resistance and opponents repression visible to an internationally sympathetic audience. In addition, it may be possible to utilise or develop international non-partisan protective accompaniment, like that provided by Peace Brigades International in Colombia, Chiapas and Aceh. Non-partisan and international protective accompaniment can dramatically ‘expand the space for peace’ for local activists working to bring about change in an extremely repressive environment.

In summary, the tactical effectiveness of nonviolence against an extremely ruthless opponent will be dramatically increased by developing a clear plan of action (including contingencies) for responding to repression and implementing this plan in an organised and disciplined manner.

Defining key concepts

There are three key concepts underpinning the nonviolent strategy advocated here that need to be elaborated on. These concepts draw on the thought of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz and include: ‘the centre of gravity’, ‘the superiority of the defence over the offence’ and ‘power and will’. I will examine each of these concepts in turn.

September 1999. They have waged war in Aceh and continue to persist in carrying out repressive military operations in that troubled province. In West Papua there were massive military operations leading up to the Act of Free Choice and numerous military sweeps such as ‘Operation Annihilate’ in the 1970’s and ‘Operation Military’ following the Lorenz hostage crisis of 1996. Military sweeps such as ‘Operation Comb and Destroy’ in Waisor, Manokwari 2001, continue to this day. Recent examples of massacres include the Biak Massacre, when several hundred people were killed on Biak Island in 1998 following a flag-raising (Human Rights Watch, Indonesia Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya, Human Rights Watch Report 1998; Rutherford, ‘Waiting for the End in Biak’).

45 See also Martin et al, ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression’; Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle.
**Centre of gravity.** Theorists have differed about the precise nature of what constitutes the centre of gravity. Boserup and Mack argue that it is the unity of the resistance,48 Gene Keyes, the morale.49 Burrowes, however, prefers the utility and comprehensiveness of Clausewitz’s definition. Clausewitz argues that ‘the centre of gravity is the centre of power’ on which the entire strategy depends. According to Burrowes, this constitutes ‘the finite pool of social resources that support the strategy’.50 This definition includes both power, the capability to conduct or resist the aggression, and will, the inclination to resist or persist. This definition also encompasses the importance of unity and morale.

Much military thinking is based on the incorrect assumption that violence must be counted in kind. Strategically, however, weapons and tactics, ‘have no intrinsic value whatsoever’, except in so far as they weaken the opponent’s centre of gravity and/or strengthen one’s own centre of gravity.51 If a weapon like a gun, for example, cannot do this, ‘it is just a piece of iron.’52 Properly chosen then, the mode of defence is an ‘immense and decisive advantage’.53 This is because of the inter-relationship between the mode of defence and the centre of gravity. It is the mode of defence that in fact determines the centre of gravity and therefore what ‘weapons’ will be successful and what ‘weapons’ will be useless.54

**The superiority of the defence over the offence.** While the aggressor decides what the object of their aggression will be, the superiority of the defence stems from the fact that the defence’s choice about how to respond to an act of aggression defines its centre of gravity. In other words the defence’s response determines its centre of gravity: what supports the resistance and what the resistance depends upon to continue its resistance. A centre of gravity could be ‘the defence’s armed forces, … the armed forces of a stronger ally, the community of interest among allies, the personalities of leaders and public opinion, or the economic capacity to sustain the war.’55 Whatever ‘choice’ the resistance makes about how to defend itself from an act of aggression determines the ‘finite pool of social resources that support the struggle’ including the will to resist and the power to do so.56

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49 Keyes, ‘Strategic Non-violent Defense’, 133.
If the defending population views its military capability as being decisive for victory then the defeat of its military forces will be a decisive victory for the opponent, irrespective of how strong the society may be. If however, the defending population locates the resistance in social acts of resistance and an attitude of defiance by a strong social order then it is in the social order that the centre of gravity will be, regardless of the society’s military capability. In the case of West Papua, the centre of gravity has shifted from the armed struggle to the will of the population to resist.

The ‘choice’ of how to resist made by the defence will determine where any strategically thinking aggressor should attack, what they should attack and what ‘weapons’ the defence should be attacked with. The reverse is also true for the resistance. Nonviolent action to assist the struggle for self-determination in West Papua should be deployed against Jakarta’s centre of gravity and be designed to alter the will and undermine the power of Jakarta to perpetuate the occupation. A careful analysis of Jakarta’s centre of gravity should help determine what tactics will help alter Jakarta’s will (or whatever social group nonviolent action intends to influence) and undermine it’s power.

Power and will. According to Burrowes, ‘in the narrow strategic sense, power is the capacity to conduct, or to resist, aggression’, and will is the ‘inclination to resist (in response to the drive to satisfy human needs)’. Will and power are both important. For example, if the will to conduct or sustain aggression is altered by satisfying the opponent’s needs then the power to conduct it is irrelevant. Conversely, if the power to conduct the aggression is withdrawn, then the will to conduct it is immaterial. Of course, to address the cause of a particular conflict, any unmet needs driving ‘will’ deserve considerable attention if the conflict is not to re-emerge.

The Strategic Framework

The strategy is represented visually by the strategy wheel (figure 3.4). The strategic framework has twelve components: four core components that direct and guide the overall strategy and eight ‘outer’ components essential for strategic planning. Nonviolent strategy is guided by a thorough political and strategic assessment of the conflict, including its structural dimension. Each strategy then has a political purpose and political demands (sometimes expressed by way of a political program). The political purpose is guided by the two strategic aims. The entire strategy is based on a particular conception of nonviolence. For reasons outlined previously, this

Figure 3.4 The Strategic Framework.

strategy is based on a conception of nonviolence that is principled in practise and revolutionary in orientation. These four elements form the core of the strategic framework (represented at the centre of the strategy wheel). The surrounding eight elements of the strategy wheel give particular attention to specific aspects of nonviolent action and are used to guide the planning, coordination and implementation of the two strategic aims (represented visually by figure four). The eight ‘outer’ components are: organisation, leadership, communication, preparations, constructive program, strategic timeframe, tactics and peacekeeping and evaluation.

**Political Purpose**

The political purpose is to ‘create the policy, process, structural and systemic conditions that will satisfy human needs’.

The political purpose refers to ‘what you want’ and is usually expressed as a political program or list of demands. Political demands are vitally important and should be compiled with five criteria in mind. The political demands should be concrete, easily understood and within the power of the opponent elite to yield; they should accurately reflect the needs of the people in order to gain widespread support for the struggle; include an explicit commitment to the needs of the opponent; may expose the moral weak points of the opponent; and make up the substance of the political purpose.

In West Papua the purpose of the nonviolent struggle is regularly stated as ‘full independence’, or complete independence from Indonesia. This is often contrasted to special autonomy. Moderate West Papuans are more inclined to emphasis a process (peaceful dialogue and perhaps even a period of special autonomy as a bridge to a ‘New Papua’) rather than an outcome (independence), and couch the purpose of the struggle as a desire to end human rights violations and create the conditions for genuine self-determination by West Papuans. Moderates (West Papuan elites in NGOs, Provincial Parliament, UNCEN and the PDP) tend to favour dialogue while radicals (predominately students, members of the political wing of the OPM and members of the Dewan Papua) tend to favour nonviolent action that encompasses the full spectrum of nonviolence. The central demand has been for either an internationally acceptable act of self-determination, in essence a referendum, or an open-

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61 Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 130. For a list of five criteria that can help develop a list of demands see pp. 208, 210.
63 *West Papua Project*, 12th and 13th December 2001.
64 Of course there are notable exceptions to this description and at times, fluidity.
65 This encompasses acts of protest and persuasion, noncooperation and the two classes of nonviolent intervention: the creative and the disruptive. See Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. See also Table 2.1.
ended third-party mediated dialogue with Indonesia. Any dialogue would need to discuss the people’s concerns and their aspirations, particularly human rights violations and self-determination. This would include opening up discussion about the events of 1961 and the legal basis for the delivery of West Papua to Indonesia through the 1962 New York Agreement and the 1969 Act of Free Choice. The political purpose needs to be expressed in specific and concrete demands that reflect the day to day needs of ordinary people. Whilst the political purpose is important, ‘it does not provide strategic guidance; that is the function of the two strategic aims.’

The Strategic aims

The strategic aims relate to ‘how you get what you want’. There are two strategic aims (see figure 3.5).

Strategic aim one: Building a movement: Developing a network of groups that assist the struggle. The first strategic aim is to strengthen the centre of gravity of the defence. In other words, to increase support for the struggle by intentionally developing a network of groups that will support and participate in the struggle. It is useful to not only work with those groups who actively support the struggle but also to identify other key groups whose support would help build the movement and at the same time possibly withdraw key support from the opponent.

Strategic aim two: Engaging the opponent: Altering the will and undermining the sources of the opponent’s power. The second strategic aim, the strategic counter-offensive, is to weaken the opponent’s centre of gravity. In other words, to engage the opponent by developing a series of campaigns of nonviolent action designed to ‘alter the will of the opponent elite to conduct the aggression – in favour of their participation in a problem-solving process that will create the conditions necessary to satisfy human needs – and undermine their power to do so.’ The opponent’s will may be

68 I am indebted to Mark Planigale for his renaming of strategic aims one and two.
69 See for example Richard Taylor, Blockade: A Guide to Non-violent Intervention, New York, Orbis Books, 1977. In order to halt arms sales to Pakistan nonviolent activists in the U.S built relationship with members of the Longshoremen Union whose support was necessary for the U.S government to continue sending arms to East Pakistan. This is also what Jacob Rumbiak and Louise Byrne have been doing in relation to Australian Unions, Religious institutions and educational institutions. For example a Memorandum of Understanding between Jacob Rumbiak, as a representative of the West Papuan community and eleven Australian Trade Unions was signed on the 24th October 2000. Memorandum of Understanding between West Papua and Eleven Australian Trade Unions, 24th October 2000.
altered by ‘offering a set of satisfiers that meet their needs’ within the context of participating in a problem-solving process that also allows participants to ‘save face’.  

Sometimes, however, despite clear and concerted efforts to persuade the opponent to engage in a problem-solving process, this effort may not be successful. This is certainly the case in regards to West Papua. In these circumstances it is necessary to nonviolently induce or compel the opponent to re-engage with a political dialogue focused on solving the problem. This can be achieved through designing a series of campaigns of nonviolent action that undermine the ability of the opponent to perpetuate the problem. The focus of campaigns of nonviolent action are determined by identifying the key social groups that support the opponent practically and politically, including international elite allies and the key social groups that support them. Campaigns should be designed to compel or induce those key social groups who support the problem to withdraw their support.

It is still vitally important to analyse what needs the opponent is trying to achieve through violence and consider how these might be meet. Of course, an activist’s perception of their opponent’s needs may differ from the opponent’s perceptions of their needs. Consequently, it is useful to check any assumptions with allies from the society and culture of the opponent elite. At a fundamental level nonviolent activists can make it clear that they will not seek to harm the opponent elite or members of the opponent elite’s ‘identity group’ and endeavour to treat the opponent with respect at all times. The trust generated through such continual actions will help create the conditions necessary to transform the conflict.

See Figure 3.5 for a visual representation of the political purpose and strategic aims. These are informed by an ongoing political and strategic assessment of the conflict (Figure 3.4 two of the components in the centre of the circle) and the conception of nonviolence. See Figure 3.6 to see how this framework might be applied to West Papua.

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The political purpose of the nonviolent defense:
To create the policy, processes, structural and systemic conditions that will satisfy human needs

**Strategic Aim 1:**
To consolidate and increase support for the struggle by developing a network of groups who can assist the struggle

**Strategic Aim 2:**
To alter the will of the opponent elite to carry out aggression and undermine their power to do so

**Strategic Goals:**
To mobilise key social groups to support the struggle

**Strategic Goals:**
To alter the will and undermine the power of key social groups who support the occupation

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Figure 3.5 The political purpose and strategic aims
(Adapted from Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, 209)
Figure 3.6  The political purpose and strategic aims applied to a nonviolent strategy for self-determination in West Papua

(Adapted from Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 209)

The political purpose: self-determination

Strategic Aim 1:
To increase a support for self-determination in West Papua by developing a network of groups who can assist the struggle

- Religious
- Traditional
- Students & young people
- Women
- NGOs
- Indonesian solidarity
- The OPM & OPM/TPN
- Indonesian settlers & migrants
- International solidarity

Strategic Goals:
To mobilise key social groups to support the struggle

Strategic Aim 2:
To alter the will and undermine the power of those groups that support Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua

- The TNI
- West Papuans
- Indonesians
- The international community
- The United Nations
- Corporations
- International financial institutions

Strategic Goals:
To alter the will and undermine the power of key social groups who support the occupation
Intermediate strategic goals

Most conflict formations are complex. This is certainly true of West Papua. Therefore, both strategic aims need to be broken down into achievable intermediate strategic aims within the context of protracted struggle. This makes it possible to systematically progress towards the political purpose within an achievable timeframe. Each intermediate strategic goal should be clear, specific and measurable. In planning any strategy activists should consider which tactics or combination of tactics (protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention)\(^{72}\) are most likely to help achieve the strategic goal of the campaign.

When planning nonviolent actions it is important to consider exactly ‘who you want to influence’ and ‘what you want to them to do’. Nonviolent action should then be designed to achieve these strategic objectives. Strategically speaking, it is immaterial if an action fails to achieve its tactical objective, as long as it achieves its strategic objective. A tactical objective could be to blockade a bulldozer, for instance. The strategic objective, however, could be to mobilise people to speak out against the activities of a particular logging company, to support the activists and to encourage consumers to refuse to buy rainforest timber. Although a campaign may have only one tactical objective it should have multiple strategic objectives. These objectives should not be dependent on achieving the tactical objective but on the qualities and integrity of the action and participating activists. Nonviolent actions, therefore, should always be planned and implemented with the strategic objectives in mind.\(^ {73}\)

The intermediate strategic goals should also identify whether they increase the sources of power available to the resistance, by mobilising social groups to support the struggle, or whether they reduce the power of the opponent, by altering their will in favour of re-engaging in dialogue or undermining their power to perpetuate the problem, in this case the occupation. Each strategic intermediate goal may need its own well-focused campaign with its own strategic plan.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical and strategic foundations of nonviolent action. The importance of clearly identifying and making explicit the conception of nonviolence that informs the struggle, as well as the benefits of adopting a conception of nonviolence that is both principled in practice and revolutionary in orientation, has been discussed along with a detailed examination of the

\(^{72}\) Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

theory of power that is the basis of nonviolent action. I have argued that nonviolent action can be strategically effective against an extremely ruthless opponent. To maximise the power of nonviolence, however, it is necessary to develop a strategy. Because of the complexity of the conflict formation in West Papua such a strategy needs to be comprehensive. Because the strategy developed by Robert Burrowes provides strategic guidance and synthesises the insights from the best of conflict theory, nonviolence and military strategist Clausewitz, I have presented his strategic framework and theory as a possible basis for a nonviolent strategy for self-determination in West Papua. Chapter four will focus on the key domains where the strategy could be applied, and look at Australia as an example of how strategic campaigns of nonviolent action in the domains of Indonesia’s elite allies could assist the struggle.
Introduction

Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua is extremely vulnerable on two counts. Firstly, Jakarta cannot maintain its rule without repression on a near continual basis. Yet each act of repression only stokes the fires of dissent and deepens feelings of alienation towards Jakarta amongst West Papuans. Secondly, Jakarta depends on diplomatic, military and economic support from international elites to maintain the occupation. In turn, these elites depend on key social groups to carry out elite policies in support of the occupation. In many cases the cooperation of these social groups is tenuous and could be withdrawn. As a result, despite the illusion of Indonesia’s monolithic invincibility, in reality, Indonesia’s rule in West Papua is fragile and subject to removal.

This chapter identifies and examines the domains of the struggle where campaigns of nonviolent action take place. These domains encompass the struggle inside West Papua, engaging the TNI inside West Papua, engaging Indonesia’s domestic constituencies and engaging constituencies within the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies that support the occupation. Campaigns of nonviolent action in the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies intended to alter the will of key social groups within these societies who support Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua have the potential to have a major bearing on the outcome of the struggle for self-determination in West Papua. As civil society increasingly realises their power and coordinates nonviolent action, campaigns for social change will become even more powerful. The last section focuses on Australia as a case study. I discuss how three solidarity campaigns may significantly help alter the will and undermine the power of Australian elite support for Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua.

Introducing the domains of the struggle

‘The domains of the struggle’ refer to the broad arenas of the opponent’s power where campaigns of nonviolent action take place. Robert Burrowes identifies three distinct domains of nonviolent action: the opponent elite’s troops, the society of the opponent elite’s domestic constituency and the domestic constituencies of allied elites.1 These domains are not definitive and the relative importance of each domain will vary depending on a continual political and strategic assessment of the conflict. Each domain is guided by its own strategic plan (based on the twelve interlocking and reinforcing components of the strategic framework) and intermediate strategic goals. For the purpose of this thesis I have divided the domains of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua into four distinct arenas: West Papuan society; the TNI; Indonesian society; and the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies.

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I will briefly discuss campaigns inside West Papua before demonstrating the importance of strategic international solidarity with reference to Australia.

**Campaigns of nonviolent action inside West Papua**

To be effective the leadership of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua needs to identify the sources of support within West Papua for the occupation, and design campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of those constituencies which passively or actively support the occupation. The resistance then needs to work out a set of intermediate strategic goals in relation to each group identified. Each intermediate strategic goal should be specific: to alter the will and undermine the power of a particular social group that supports the occupation. Action may be taken by the group themselves (in the case of a strike, for instance) or by West Papuan activists who wish to induce or compel a particular social group to take action. To maximise effectiveness, each campaign should be based on a modified version of the strategic framework outlined previously.

There is great potential for strategic nonviolent campaigns inside West Papua. Each arena of action will require its own campaign of strategic nonviolent action coordinated by an organisational process that assumes overall responsibility for the grand (national) strategy. The provincial administration and educational facilities, for example, are arenas of cooperation with Jakarta that provide powerful opportunities for nonviolent action. Nonviolent campaigns could also be designed to engage the TNI (and to address the related militarisation of West Papuan society). Another crucial but often neglected component of any nonviolent struggle is a constructive program designed to empower and meet the needs of West Papuans. This will help strengthen the identity of West Papuans and is a practical way of developing self-reliance and reducing dependency on global capital and the Indonesian state. Indonesian, transnational and multinational corporations also depend on West Papuan cooperation to carry out resource extraction. However, because corporations do not significantly depend on the consent and cooperation of West Papuans to extract their resources it is vitally important that contact is made with international groups in the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies. In consultation

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2 For a discussion on organisational processes to coordinate a grand strategy see Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, pp. 184-189. It may also be necessary to have separate strategies in different parts of West Papua coordinated by a national strategy. This is because of the distinct conditions in different parts of West Papua. For example, although West Papuans are repressed by the TNI all over the province in areas surrounding Freeport, for instance, a specific nonviolent strategy would need to be developed for that unique situation.

3 ELS-HAM is leading West Papuan NGO addressing militarism in West Papua and working to empower the people.

4 According to Nonie Sharp cooperatives have long been part of West Papuan cultural continuity and resistance (Sharp, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, 41).
with West Papuans these groups can design campaigns of international solidarity directed at those
groups that corporations *do* depend on.

Jakarta certainly depends on West Papuans to maintain the fiction of the legitimacy of
Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua and to reinforce an Indonesian identity in the province. As a
result, one of the key West Papuan demands has been for a process of ‘rectifying the history’ of West
Papua’s fraudulent incorporation into the Indonesian state. This has enormous potential to be further
developed into an ongoing campaign. West Papuans have also drawn on their unique cultural identity
as Melanesians and significant cultural heritage and identity to resist Indonesian rule. Continued
Papuanisation of West Papuan society will not only withdraw consent from Indonesian rule it will also
lay the foundations for a ‘New Papua’.

**Campaigns to engage the TNI inside West Papua**

Altering the will and undermining the power of the TNI to carry out acts of aggression is an
important strategic goal. This will also seriously undermine the power of Jakarta to maintain the
occupation. Although this will be extremely difficult, there are several historical examples where
dialogue and nonviolent action has been successful in altering the will and undermining the power of
an aggressive military force. Nonviolent resistance to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
the dramatic Philippine people’s power overthrow of Marcos in 1986 and the defeat of the Soviet coup
in 1991 are all examples where dialogue and nonviolent action to convince soldiers to disobey orders
and support the resistance has been a decisive factor in creating change. ‘In each of these cases,’
argues Burrowes, ‘the outcome was a direct result of an intuitively understood or clearly defined
strategic goal.’

This strategic goal can be achieved through a combination of dialogue and carefully selected
nonviolent tactics that evoke sympathy and support for the resistance through moral persuasion.
According to one West Papuan activist, efforts to humanise and ‘soften’ the TNI is a key strategic aim
of the nonviolent action. Women, in particular, have a ‘special ability’ in this regard. ‘They bring
flowers and give them to the police and military before the demonstration. This makes it hard for the

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6 The entire *raison d’être* of the TNI is defend the unitary nature of the republic of Indonesia. See Lowry, *The Armed
Forces of Indonesia*. Consequently, movements for independence or self-determination are seen as a threat to the very
purpose of the TNI. Moreover, the TNI’s lucrative involvement in business is also a disincentive to resist orders. Despite
the difficulties of trying to alter the TNIs will it remains an important strategic goal. See Burrowes, *The Strategy of
Nonviolent Defense*, 257 for comments on the points of leverage for nonviolent action.
military – their heart is confused’.9 When the police or military is strong’, says one West Papuan, ‘we sit down and sing songs – traditional songs and church songs. Sometimes the people also do traditional dances so that the police and military don’t want to fight with us because we use nonviolence.’10

One important element of communication with the TNI would be for West Papuans committed to nonviolence to insist that they do not want to physically hurt individual soldiers in any way and to demonstrate respect to members of the TNI. ‘Given the inherent needs for recognition and self-respect’ writes Burrowes, ‘interactions that affirm the dignity and worth of the individual are most likely to induce soldiers to consider alternative information, to question their orders, and ultimately, to challenge the legitimacy of their military role.’11 Such an approach can be aided by differentiating between the person performing a role as a soldier and the TNI culture and structure they operate in.

Dialogue might also ‘involve “deliberate and carefully calculated attempts” to make the troops realise the degree of suffering their actions are causing’.12 This would involve communicating the way the TNI’s actions tarnish the international reputation of Indonesia. Because of the way religious traditions permeate the culture of Indonesia, appeals to TNI personnel on the basis of religion can also persuade soldiers to act more humanely. Jacob Rumbiak knows this from his experience in Indonesian jails, where he was sentenced to 17 years for advocating nonviolent struggle. Tom Hyland, foreign editor for The Age, narrates what happened.

Twice he was told he would be killed. Once he was trussed up in a military Hercules aircraft. The rear ramp was lowered in mid-flight and he was told he would be thrown out. He sang a spiritual song and the soldiers relented. Another time he was told he would be shot.

Rumbiak tells the story: “I said give me time to pray to my Lord. If you kill my body, you won’t kill my soul. I will move from my body and I will wait for you. My soul will pray for you. Jesus loves you and I love you too, because you don’t know what you are doing, because you are following the command of your leaders. But one time the Lord will ask what did you do in the world for human rights.”

He laughs. “And you know, they’re confused when I talk like this. And they lowered their guns and two soldiers, they cried.”13

Nonetheless, despite Jacob Rumbiak’s example of what is possible, because the social distance between ordinary West Papuans and Indonesian soldiers is great, to maximise the effectiveness of nonviolent action, West Papuan and solidarity activists should draw on the insights of ‘the great chain

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9 Interview, July 2001.
10 Interview, July 2001.
12 Nonviolence and civil defence theorist Adam Roberts cited in Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 220. Examples are also given about how dialogue helped encourage Soviet soldiers to withdraw their support for the 1991 coup.
of nonviolence’ and work with Indonesian solidarity activists to systematically achieve this strategic goal. This is critical because soldiers in Indonesia are regularly rotated and because in crisis situations regimes often bring in troops from other provinces who have not had prior contact with the people.\footnote{This was a factor in ending the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The Biak massacre was also carried out by a battalion of soldiers brought in from outside the territory, in this case from the Maluku’s. See for instance Andrew Kilvert, ‘Human Rights: Behind the Biak Massacre’, \textit{Asia Pacific Network}, 11th October 1998.} In addition to utilising ‘the great chain of nonviolence’, communication could also take advantage of written materials and the use of specially trained unarmed peacekeepers during demonstrations. The strategic effectiveness and communicative potential of such tactics will be dramatically enhanced by making both disciplined nonviolent action and any repression from the TNI or police visible to an audience that can mobilise in support of the resistance.\footnote{Martin and Varney, \textit{Nonviolence and Communication} (forthcoming).} Undermining the power of the TNI also has an international dimension which will be discussed below, in the section on international solidarity campaigns.

As in East Timor, the TNI is actively organising militias. Recently, the militant Islamic group, \textit{Laskar Jihad} (\textit{jihad} – guerrilla-fighters) arrived in West Papua from the Maluku’s and \textit{Barisan Merah Putih} (the ranks of the Red and White – the colours of the Indonesian flag) was established in Wamena. In these difficult situations West Papuans have been working to defuse the situation. In particular, Thaha Al Hamid, General-Secretary and Islamic representative of the PDP, has been collaborating with Church leaders and ELS-HAM to initiate a dialogue with \textit{Laskar Jihad} and undertake a community education process alongside alerting international networks about the situation.\footnote{Interview with participant 03, 13th December 2001.}

Despite the strategic utility of widening spaces for dissent within the TNI, there are some situations where there are good tactical and strategic reasons for not engaging the military. In particularly isolated West Papuan communities where the TNI is involved in acts of repression, or at certain volatile times or when the resistance is overwhelmingly outnumbered by the TNI and militia, it may not always be wise to engage soldiers at the site.\footnote{A great deal of discernment, calm and courage is needed to know when it is possible to confront the military during potentially volatile demonstrations. At a demonstration of several thousand people in Rangoon in 1989, where the army was deliberately trying to provoke the people, Burmese democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi ‘used carefully chosen words’ to maintain the discipline of the crowd and facilitate a withdrawal of the army (Daniel Benjamin, ‘Under the Boot’, \textit{Time}, 14th August 1989).}
Engaging key social groups inside Indonesia

The nonviolent resistance will need to identify the key social groups in Indonesian society that Jakarta depends upon to maintain the occupation. The resistance then needs to work out a set of intermediate strategic goals in relation to each group identified. Each intermediate strategic goal should be specific: to alter the will and undermine the power of a particular social group that supports the occupation. The most appropriate nonviolent action to achieve these strategic goals may be taken by West Papuans themselves living inside Indonesia or by Indonesian solidarity groups on behalf of West Papuans or by a combination of both.18

To maximise the insights of the ‘great chain of nonviolence’, nonviolent activists in West Papua will need to identify the social groups in Indonesia that are particularly likely to act in solidarity with West Papuans.19 These may well include women,20 students and the pro-democracy movement,21 the Acehnese self-determination movement,22 religious leaders23 and those in the Non-Government Organisation (NGO) movement.24 Solidarity action by these groups, on behalf of, and with, West Papuan activists will help close the social distance between the oppressed and the oppressor.25 Consequently, it would be valuable for nonviolent activists in West Papua to continue to cultivate and

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18 During East Timor’s campaign for independence, particularly after the Dili massacre, solidarity groups in Indonesia were formed or became much more active. Solidamor was one example of a group that helped lobby Indonesian political elites, hold dialogues with the TNI and disseminate information about East Timor to the Indonesian public. (Indonesian solidarity activist Bonar Tigor Naipospos cited in Fukada, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action’, 24).

19 These alliances were of great significance to the East Timorese in their struggle for Independence. See Fukuda, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action’, pp. 20, 22, 24.


21 Students play a big role in Indonesian politics. The action of students was decisive in bringing about the fall of Suharto. See Martin, Varney and Vickers., ‘Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression’; Ed Aspinall, ‘The Indonesian student uprising of 1988’, in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and change in Indonesia, Monash University Clayton, Monash Asia Institute, 1999. The pro-democracy movement, (many members of which were students) also significantly aided the East Timorese struggle for independence. See Fukuda, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action’.

22 Because both West Papuans and Acehnese share the same problem of Indonesian military aggression and are both pursuing self-determination there are natural opportunities to work together.

23 For example the former president of Indonesia and chairperson of the large and powerful religious Muslim organisation in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama, Abdurrahman Wahid, supported the emergence of the Papuan Council and Presidium Dewan Papua and helped advocate for greater recognition of West Papuan identity. Although he does not support independence he is very committed to nonviolence and is one of many religious leaders whose support could help legitimise the nonviolent struggle in the eyes of ordinary Indonesians and help them understand the cause of their grievances. For an interesting article where Abdurrahman Wahid discusses nonviolence see Abdurrahman Wahid, ‘Islam, Nonviolence and National Transformation’, Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, and Sarah Gilliat (eds). Islam and Nonviolence, Honolulu, Centre for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii, 1993: pp. 53-57. Because of the relationship between the Christian Church (protestant and catholic) in West Papua and the Church in Indonesia here is also potential for solidarity action by the Church in Indonesia.

24 The NGO movement has proliferated in Indonesia over the last few years and there are a number of Legal Aid, Human Rights, Advocacy and development agencies that support West Papua. Unfortunately some parts of the Independence movement apparently broke off contact with many Indonesian NGO’s precisely because they were Indonesian. Personal communication with Emmy Halfid, coordinator of WALHI - Friends of the Earth Indonesia, October 2001.

25 Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine, pp. 19-27.
strengthen relationships with these social groups inside Indonesia. One important strategic goal of such activity is to sensitise ordinary Indonesians to the active nonviolent struggle inside West Papua as well as the history of colonisation and repression.

As I have discussed in the section on the TNI, an important strategic goal of the nonviolent resistance is to alter the will of the TNI to conduct acts of aggression. Nonviolent action in this regard can also be taken within Indonesia, the principle aim of which should be to create disquiet and widen space for dissent within the TNI itself.\(^{26}\) Although soldiers resistance movements have been veiled in secrecy and subject to intense media censorship they have significantly aided progressive social movements in the past.\(^{27}\)

Solidarity actions inside Indonesia by West Papuans and Indonesian solidarity activists could involve the full spectrum of tactics from the three classes of nonviolent action.\(^{28}\) However, West Papuans coordinating campaigns of nonviolent action, will need to make an astute political and strategic assessment of appropriate timeframes for action and stage campaigns ‘to gradually encourage participation, awareness, commitment, discipline and courage’.\(^ {29}\)

**Engaging key social groups in the societies of Indonesia’s international elite allies**

Indonesia depends on significant international diplomatic, military and corporate support to maintain the occupation. In turn, these elites depend on the passive and active support of key constituencies within the societies of these allied elites. Therefore, campaigns of nonviolent action should be designed to alter the will of these groups to support the occupation. Guided by the strategic plan and framework, each intermediate strategic goal of campaigns within the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies should be clear and specific: to alter the will of a particular social group whose support or ‘neutrality’ is necessary for Indonesia to continue to maintain the occupation. This will undermine Indonesia’s international elite’s ally support of the occupation. In some circumstances such as undermining the ability of Indonesia’s elite allies to continue to train and arm the TNI, it will help undermine Indonesia’s power directly.

Although factors can coalesce to produce change quickly, as the events of 1998 and 1999 demonstrated for East Timor, it is unlikely that solidarity campaigns will be successful in the short

\(^{26}\) For a discussion on this dynamic in relation to East Timor see Fukada, ‘Peace through Nonviolent Action’, pp. 24-25.


\(^{28}\) Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

term. Therefore, it is wise to prepare for protracted struggle and identify short-term changes that demonstrate growing support for self-determination in West Papua and less support for the occupation. These changes can assist first world nonviolent activists to resist the temptations of despair, urgency and powerlessness. They are indications that solidarity campaigns are gradually but surely undermining the legitimacy of Indonesia’s neo-colonial rule and building a popular consensus for change.

The power of international solidarity campaigns: Australia as a case study

To demonstrate how international solidarity campaigns could functionally support a nonviolent strategy in West Papua I will focus on the example of Australia as a case study (see Figure 4.1). I have chosen Australia for three reasons. Firstly, Australia provides significant support to the occupation. Secondly, Australia is the major power in the region, and is seen as such by people in West Papua.30 For better or worse, the Australian government’s policy and the attitude of government representatives, civil servants and civil society, will have a major bearing on conflict in the region. In the period following the events in East Timor in 1999, Australia’s international standing was increased, particularly in the eyes of the United States, which was happy to let Australia assume the leadership role. In our geo-political region, ‘Australia has become’, as academic Peter King astutely observed, ‘the tail that wags the American dog.’31 Finally, Australia is the society in which I am located. Rather than focus on trying to change Indonesian policy, I argue that solidarity activists should focus on changing those groups within their own society which support the occupation. This is consistent with the theory and strategy argued previously. It is also, I believe, the best way to undermine the power of Indonesia to maintain the occupation. Nonetheless, to maximise the effectiveness of solidarity action, the reader should remember that those who coordinate the nonviolent struggle in West Papua and other places (like Australia) will also need to make contact with solidarity groups committed to nonviolent action in the societies of Indonesia’s other elite allies. As these networks expand and develop a coordinated strategy and undertake cooperative action (made increasingly possible by global communication technologies) the potential for the struggle to bring about change will increase.

I will discuss three campaigns (one existing and two potential) that are representative of the ways strategic solidarity action in Australia could maximise the effectiveness of a nonviolent strategy in West Papua. To act coherently, and to maximise their effectiveness, these campaigns would need to

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be guided by a modified version of the strategic framework. Because popular consciousness about West Papua is not high, any solidarity effort needs to begin with a period of awareness raising, focused on securing the support of groups who are most likely to act in solidarity with the people of West Papua. However, this is often a diffuse and unclear strategic goal. Therefore, as people are drawn into the struggle it is important to design creative and disciplined campaigns of nonviolent action, with specific strategic goals. Campaigns should generate opportunities for people to participate in nonviolent action that assists them to act powerfully whilst systematically undermining the way Australian elites in government, the corporate sector and the military support the problem. Guided by a thorough political and strategic assessment of the conflict, clear strategic goals, and campaigns to achieve them, it should be possible to lessen the time taken to achieve the strategic aims of the resistance.

Of course, these campaigns are not definitive examples of the way solidarity action could support the struggle in West Papua. There are countless practical ways people can act in solidarity. Nonetheless, to maximise effectiveness, nonviolent action should be well organised, strategically focused and undertaken by trained and disciplined activists. As a core part of any strategy it is also particularly important that solidarity activists build relationships with, and devise ways to coordinate and cooperate closely with West Papuans inside West Papua; solidarity activists inside Indonesia and in the societies of Indonesia’s other elite allies; and the Australian West Papuan community in exile.

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32 See for example, a discussion on cross-border third-party nonviolent intervention in Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders*. 
Figure 4.1 The political purpose and strategic aims applied to solidarity campaigns inside Australia

(Adapted from Burrowes, The strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 209)

The political purpose: self-determination for West Papuans

**Strategic Aim 1:**
To increase a support for self-determination in West Papua by developing a network of groups who can assist the struggle

- Religious
- Indigenous people
- Unions
- Activists & students
- Soldiers
- Ethnic communities

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**Strategic Aim 2:**
To alter the will and undermine the power of those groups in Australia that support Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua

- Coordination and organisation of the nonviolent strategy inside Australia

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**Strategic Goals:**
To mobilise key social groups to support the struggle

- Key West Papuans and international solidarity activists who coordinate the strategy

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**Strategic Goals:**
To alter the will and undermine the power of key social groups who support the occupation

- Australian support for Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua
  - Diplomatic support
  - Corporate support
  - Military support
    - Sustained by: ignorance and powerlessness within civil society
    - Sustained by: workers, unions, consumers, shareholders, financial institutions, public opinion
    - Sustained by: soldiers, defence department employees, political representatives, voters, shareholders, arms companies, financial institutions, export finance and insurance corporation and public opinion
Undermining Australian diplomatic support for the occupation: The Act of Free Choice Campaign. One long-term strategic goal of the nonviolent struggle is for there to be some sort of third-party mediated dialogue between Jakarta and West Papua that leads to an internationally acceptable act of self-determination. In order for this to happen the fraudulent process by which West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia, the 1969 Act of Free Choice, needs to be reviewed. Consequently, the intermediate strategic goal of the international Act of Free Choice Campaign is to encourage U.N Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to personally intervene to investigate the conduct of the United Nations during the Act of Free Choice before the UNGA can initiate a review of the results of the Act of Free Choice. The aim of which is to help create the conditions for both dialogue and an internationally acceptable act of self-determination. Action by the U.N. will also help resurrect the U.N.’s reputation as a defender of political and human rights. To achieve this, an international letter writing campaign has been initiated. A sample letter from the campaign is included in the appendix. There is also an online petition to Kofi Annan. These initiatives support an international legal challenge to the Act of Free Choice.

The Dutch government has already agreed to review their role in the West Papua handover. Moreover, there are international precedents for the U.N. Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the role of the U.N. in a particular event. Investigations were conducted into the role of the U.N. in the cases of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica in 1997. There is even a U.N. ‘Lessons Learned Unit’ in place to investigate past events and help facilitate the integration of these lessons.

If Jakarta was satisfied that the 1969 Act of Free Choice was free and fair then they would not oppose an investigation. In fact, an independent and international investigation supported by Jakarta, even one that revealed that the human and political rights of West Papuan’s were violated, would help resolve the conflict because it would be a recognition of legitimate West Papuan grievances and a

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34 The petition demands that the U.N Secretary-General review the role of the U.N in the Act of Free Choice. This petition has also been signed by many West Papuans who have been greatly encouraged by the initiative. One West Papuan activist even travelled on foot throughout the highlands of West Papua explaining the petition to people in person and collecting signatures which he then sent to the moderator of the petition twenty at a time. The petition can be found at www.petitiononline/westpap/petition.html.

tangible response to core West Papuan demands to ‘rectify history’.

Importantly, it would also help restore Indonesia’s founding identity as a nation that struggles valiantly against colonialism.

The international campaign was launched globally on the 19th March 2002. In Australia a press conference with Dirk Ajamiseba, the most senior surviving Papuan leader at the time of the Act of Free Choice, West Papuan Independence leader Jacob Rumbiak, and Senators Andrew Bartlett and Vikki Bourne from the Australian Democrats, was held in Canberra. The Australian Government (and the Australian Labor Party) supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, including Indonesian sovereignty of West Papua. Not surprisingly therefore, the Australian and Indonesian Governments’ reaction were swift. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard affirmed his Governments support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and a representative of the Indonesian Government in Canberra, Mr. Lutfi Rauf, asserted that the event was ‘a provocative step … which is clearly interference in Indonesian domestic affairs’. These are all signs that even a small press conference severely threatens elite attempts to hold together a consensus that the Act of Free Choice was legitimate. Further nonviolent actions will continue to undermine Indonesian and international elite support for the historical basis of the occupation. In this regard, letter writing by NGOs is critical, because of the collective power of NGOs and the position many NGOs occupy at the U.N.

_Undermining Australian military support for the occupation: a campaign to resist Australia’s arming and training of the TNI._ Since West Papua was occupied by the Indonesian military in the early 1960s, they have terrorised the population. The TNI continue to routinely abuse the human rights of West Papuans. The assassination of PDP leader, Theys Eluay by the TNI, for example, is part of a campaign to systematically eliminate the West Papuan independence movement. Human rights violations are a clear indication that the TNI intends to protect Indonesia’s territorial integrity at all costs, even if that means killing a leader who loved Indonesia and was committed to nonviolence. Justification for human rights abuses such as these are reinforced at the highest level and supported by a political, territorial and ideological structure designed for this purpose. Indonesian

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38 Australian Democrats, _Australian Government implicated in UN’s West Papua sham (Media Release)_ , 19th March 2002;
Australian West Papua Association., _West Papua’s Old Man of the Act of Free Choice Challenges Ortiz Sanz to Come Clean (Media Release)_ , 19th March 2002.
40 Personal communication with ELS-HAM, December 2001.
President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, for example, recently addressed the TNI saying, ‘you must do your duty without having to worry about human rights.’

The capacity of the TNI to maintain the occupation and perpetuate human rights violations, is sustained and supported by training, arms and diplomatic support; willingly provided by a number of states, particularly the United States of America, the European Union and Australia. This support helps re-legitimise the TNI and makes them more effective, efficient and professional human rights abusers. An important strategic goal of solidarity groups, therefore, is to initiate campaigns designed to alter the will and undermine the power of key social groups that help governments support the TNI, an organisation described by Scott Burchill, an expert in international relations at Deakin University, as a ‘terrorist outfit’ and referred to by Andrew McNaughton, veteran East Timor campaigner, as ‘a cross between the SS and the Mafia’.

Recently the Australian and Indonesian Governments signed a memorandum of understanding on bi-lateral defence cooperation, widely viewed as a precursor for a full restoration of military ties with Indonesia. The Australian government supports military relations with the TNI for three reasons: Indonesia is a ‘strategic shield’ for Australia, a belief that the training provided by Australia helps develop a modern, professional and disciplined Defence Force, and finally, that re-engaging the TNI helps create stability in Indonesia and security in the region. Unfortunately, there is not the space to adequately refute the government’s spurious claims here. Nonetheless, it is instructive to remember that years of training the Indonesian military may have limited military engagements between the Australian and Indonesian Defence Forces in East Timor in 1999 and reduce the casualties of Australian soldiers; but it did nothing to reduce violence against the East Timorese by the TNI. Nor did years of defence cooperation with the TNI prevent the torching of East Timor during the orgy of

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43 For a report on arms exports to Indonesia put out by the U.K group, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, see Nicholas Gilby, *Arms Exports to Indonesia*, CAAT, October 1999. More recently, according to Indonesian newspaper reports Indonesia is seeking to reduce its military dependency on the United States by sourcing defence equipment from Eastern Europe. See for example Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, ‘Czech Republic Offers Indonesia Wide-range Defense Equipment’, *The Jakarta Post*, 5th February 2002. This makes the work of nonviolent activists more challenging and heightens the need for global campaigns.
44 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 7th February 2002.
45 Personal communication, December 13th 2002.
46 A thinly veiled euphemism. Rather than fulfilling our international responsibility to protect refugees, the Australian Government is effectively sub-contracting Indonesian security forces to act as bouncers, using the Australian Navy and S.A.S to oversee the operations.
post-ballot destruction in September 1999. In the end, ADF personnel were sent to East Timor to protect ordinary East Timorese from the very people Australia had armed and trained.  

Whilst an end to the use of military violence to solve conflict (and an end to militarism itself) is a long-term vision of any revolutionary nonviolent activist, it will require many intermediate steps: fundamental structural change; a profound values shift in our commitment to violence; and a long protracted struggle to achieve this goal. As a way of systematically working towards this vision, a realistic medium-term strategic goal would be to work to stop the training and arming of all military forces from repressive regimes. In the shorter-term, independent monitoring and evaluation of the ADFs arming and training of military forces from repressive regimes is needed. Currently, this does not happen. Independent monitoring and evaluation of the ADFs training of defence forces like the TNI, is a necessary precursor to legislation and policy to hold human rights violators accountable and substantiate government claims that training the TNI helps create a more disciplined and professional army that respects human rights.

Although the support the Australian government provides to the TNI is extremely small when compared with that of the United States or Britain, it is an extremely significant part of a policy framework that helps re-legitimise the TNI as professional and disciplined army that respects human rights. Campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of those who support Australia’s military relationship with the TNI will help strengthen the hand of those in Indonesia and West Papua working to reform the role of the military in Indonesia.

Australia arms the TNI. In 1999/2000 Australia sent 14 shipments of defence related goods and 207 shipments of dual-use goods (goods that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) to Indonesia. In 2000/2001 Australia sent 11 shipments of defence related goods and 143 shipments of dual-use goods to Indonesia. In addition the Australian government agency, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC), also provides loans to the Indonesian government for military equipment. Whilst ‘commercial in confidence’ agreements maintain the veil of secrecy surrounding

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50 For example, during the 1998-1999 financial year the EFIC loaned the Indonesian government US $5.1 million to help buy equipment and services for military transport aircraft (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad., The Globalisation Challenge: Australia’s role in a rapidly changing world, Fitzroy (Victoria, Australia), Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, August 2001: 32).
arms deals, major Australian and Australian based arms companies include Australian Defence Industries (ADI), Tennix and SMA (Scientific Management Associates). These arms companies depend on workers and union members who could be persuaded to withdraw their support. Ironically, weapons, ammunition and military equipment made by workers in Australia could well be used to repress workers in Indonesia, where the TNI and Indonesian police systematically use violence and intimidation against labour organisers and people resisting the social and environmental impacts of local and multinational corporations.

Union action within arms companies is a meaningful and tangible way of expressing global solidarity with working people everywhere, especially in places where military repression is an everyday occurrence. The principal union for workers at ADI plants around the country is the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU). The MUA (Maritime Union of Australia) is also responsible for loading many of the shipments destined for export. All shipments that contain explosive material go through one port (at least in Victoria); the MUA staffed finger wharf at Point Wilson in Victoria, making Australian supply of munitions to the TNI quite vulnerable to nonviolent blockades.51

It is not unrealistic to expect that strategic nonviolent action could persuade union labour to withdraw their support from arming the TNI. The AMWU was one of eleven unions which signed a memorandum of understanding with West Papuan independence leader Jacob Rumbiak on the 24th of October, 2000.52 ‘The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to express solidarity with the aspirations of the West Papuan people….’ The first point of the memorandum expresses union concern about human rights abuses committed by the TNI. Key questions include: how the solidarity movement could assist and support union members working for arms companies to find ways to express their concerns about who defence-related goods are sold to and how they might be used.

Nonviolent solidarity action against an international elite ally which was arming an oppressor ally has also been successful in the past. During West Pakistan’s bloody repression of East Pakistan, a small group of activists and Bengalis nonviolently blockaded ships laden with U.S military and economic aid to West Pakistan. Working strategically, the activists secured the support of the International Longshoremen’s Association (the U.S equivalent of the MUA) whose labour was necessary to load the ships. The International Longshoremen’s Association then agreed to institute

51 Confidential source.
52 Memorandum of Understanding, 24th October 2000.
bans. This campaign successfully helped undermine the legitimacy of U.S foreign policy towards Pakistan at the time.\(^53\)

Nonviolent action intended to persuade key social groups, particularly workers, to withdraw their support from the Australian government’s and Australian-based arms companies’ support for arming the TNI, will assist efforts to undermine the legitimacy of Australian support for Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua. Unions may not necessarily be persuaded to take action themselves, but nonviolent action that shares the cost of struggle with workers, can induce and compel unions and workers to stand in solidarity.\(^54\)

Although the United States is the principal provider of military training to the TNI, the ADF is also an important provider of training to the Indonesian military. Despite the popular impression that Australia ceased to arm and train the Indonesian military after the Indonesian military and militia orchestrated violence in East Timor in September 1999, ‘Australia maintained defence relations with TNI. At no time was the relationship severed. ADF and TNI personnel remained in each other’s country throughout the crisis period.’\(^55\)

In the 1999 to 2000 financial year Australia trained 56 members of the Indonesian military. During the last financial year (2000/2001) this figure increased to 72. These soldiers were trained at bases around Australia and at Australian universities.\(^56\) For the last two years the total cost to the Australian taxpayer is over $10 million dollars.\(^57\) At this stage the training includes non-combat training with all sectors of the TNI, including the notorious Indonesian special forces, KOPASSUS. However, combat training is expected to resume in due course. Any arming and training of the Indonesian military by Australia not only supports the organisational capacity and effectiveness of the Indonesian military to maintain their occupation in West Papua, it also helps legitimise the TNI’s role in society, politics and business and is a clear indication that the international community will not try too hard to hold the TNI accountable for past human rights violations.

Since serving in East Timor and witnessing the devastation and suffering caused by the TNI, ADF personnel have become increasing politicised about Australia’s defence relationship with Indonesia.\(^58\) As a result, not only could the ADF be influenced by external public dissent about

\(^{53}\) Taylor, *Blockade*.


\(^{56}\) Commonwealth, *Parliamentary Debates*.

\(^{57}\) Commonwealth, *Parliamentary Debates*.

\(^{58}\) Conversations with former and serving soldiers. The leaks from the DSD, I believe, are also an indication of the ADF’s politicisation over East Timor.
defence-related activities with the TNI, the ADF is also subject to internal dissent within the military and defence department. One strategic goal of nonviolent action should therefore be to help create and widen spaces for internal dissent within the ADF and Defence Department. This will help undermine the power of the ADF and the Australian government to support TNI repression, not just in West Papua but throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

As Cortright and Watts have shown, dissent within the armed forces is more widespread than is popularly believed.\textsuperscript{59} Top secret intelligence information was leaked to sympathetic supporters when it became clear the government was not taking into consideration information that clearly showed the TNI were responsible for militia violence in East Timor but was instead pursuing its own agenda and interests.\textsuperscript{60} This dissent has continued. Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) staff, deeply disappointed that this information has still not been shared with UN staff investigating serious crimes in East Timor, recently exposed the cover-up by leaking documents to \textit{The Age}.\textsuperscript{61} Amongst many ADF personnel, one officer says half-jokingly, TNI stands for ‘Trust No Indonesian’.\textsuperscript{62} The previously staunch apologist for Suharto, former minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, who once claimed that the invasion of East Timor was ‘irreversible’ now admits (to his credit) that ‘many of our earlier training efforts helped only to produce more professional human rights abusers’.\textsuperscript{63} As the TNI continues its campaign of repression throughout Indonesia, and support for independence gains momentum, both dissent within and without the ADF will grow.

\textbf{Undermining Australian-based corporate support for the occupation: corporate campaigns.} As we saw in Chapter One, West Papua is a lucrative source of wealth for the TNI who operate hand-in-glove with global capital. Chapter three demonstrated that in some situations oppressors do not want the people of a territory they occupy, they want the land. Tom Beanal, an Amungme tribal leader and chairperson of the PDP asks: ‘Could it be that the Indonesian government is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its natural resources?’\textsuperscript{64} To continue to extract these resources, multinational companies do not significantly depend on the people whose land they exploit, but on the support of

\textsuperscript{59} Cortright and Watts, \textit{Left Face}.
\textsuperscript{60} Ball, \textquote{Silent Witness}'.
\textsuperscript{61} Hamish McDonald, \textquote{Defence finds Indonesian Commanders linked to Timor Violence}, \textit{The Age}, 14\textsuperscript{th} March 2001. See also the article by Andrew West quoting defence leaks over Australian government cover-ups of the Biak massacre ....
\textsuperscript{62} \textquote{Under the Scar Tissue}, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2001. This attitude has been confirmed to me in personal conversations with ADF soldiers who served in East Timor (April 2002).
\textsuperscript{63} Gareth Evans, \textquote{Indonesia’s Military Culture has to be Reformed}: comment by Gareth Evans first published in the International Herald Tribune, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2001, posted on the International Crisis Group website, 
\textsuperscript{64} Abrash and Kennedy, \textquote{Repressive Mining in West Papua}, 71.
employees, contractors, unions, shareholders, investment fund managers, international financial institutions and export credit, finance and insurance agencies as well as governments and public opinion. This relationship has transnational dimensions. This section will examine the vulnerability of Freeport to potential solidarity campaigns as a result of the company’s dependency on the support of social groups in societies like Australia.

The Freeport mine, is significantly dependent on Australia. Freeport McMoRan is a United States based transnational company with its head office in New Orleans. However, its supply base is located in Australia. Coordinated by the Cairns-based 100% owned Australian purveying company, International Purveying Incorporated (IPI), ‘some 740 Australian companies supply the gargantuan gold and copper mine, including 296 in Cairns’. According to the chair of the Cairns Chamber of Commerce, Freeport (through IPI) is the largest purchaser of goods in Cairns generating at least AUS $50-70 million dollars worth of business for local companies each year. Fruit and vegetables for Freeport employees are supplied by Tong Sing, a Cairns based supplier. Beef is supplied from cattle stations in the Northern Territory, some of which are believed to be owned by the Bakrie Brothers, an Indonesian conglomerate which has 10% shares in PT Freeport Indonesia. The vast bulk of these goods, along with a range of materials necessary for maintaining the infrastructure of the mine and the three townships that supply the mine, are transported to West Papua every ten days by Freeport’s supply ship, the Java Sea. Freight is also supplied by air from Darwin and Cairns. In addition, most of the expatriate employees, including several hundred contractors, regularly fly into either Darwin or Cairns on recreational leave.

Freeport is also heavily supported by the Australian British mining giant Rio Tinto, a company whose name is ‘synonymous with abuse of social, labour, environmental and human rights wherever

66 Confidential source, December 2001. ‘Ten years ago, Freeport dismissed the right of the Amungme people to supply fruit and vegetables to the company and decided to support them from Australia and Java’ (see Inside Indonesia., ‘Goldman winner’, Inside Indonesia – West Papua: Towards a new Papua, July No. 67 September 2001: 14).
69 Confidential source, December 2001.
70 Confidential source, December 2001.
they operate.\textsuperscript{71} Rio Tinto, holds an effective 20\% stake in Freeport’s West Papua operations through it’s 13\% equity stake in Freeport McMoRan.\textsuperscript{72} In addition, Rio Tinto hold a 40\% of the Grasberg deposit.

As we also saw in Chapter One, Freeport is locked into an uneasy alliance with the TNI who provide security and operate legal and illegal businesses around the mine. According to Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), human rights violations ‘are directly connected to [the TNI] … acting as protection for the mining business of PT Freeport Indonesia.’\textsuperscript{73} Because the TNI is so intimately involved with Freeport, the Amungme people have concluded that ‘the root cause of the human rights violations is Freeport’.\textsuperscript{74} Consequently, it is important to link campaigns to alter the will and undermine the power of both the Australian military and corporations based in Australia.

International campaigns of nonviolent action in solidarity with nonviolent action in West Papua will strengthen Amungme and Kamoro demands to Freeport.\textsuperscript{75} As well as directing campaigns at the directors of Freeport itself, campaigns should be directed at the key social groups that support Freeport: employees, contractors, unions, shareholders, investment fund managers, international financial institutions, insurance and export credit agencies, governments and public opinion. These campaigns should be designed to alter the will of these groups to support Freeport and undermine their power to do so until the company respects Amungme and Kamoro wishes.

The two major Australian unions associated with Freeport are the MUA, who handle freight to and from the mine and the CFMEU, whose members work at the mine. Every ten days or so, MUA stevedores at the Cairns dock load and unload freight from the \textit{Java Sea}. Freeport is extremely vulnerable to nonviolent blockades at both Cairns and also in Darwin, the company’s other supply base. Although it is increasingly costly for unions like the MUA to take solidarity action due to new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Project Underground, \textit{Risky Business}, 2. Environmental destruction, social dislocation and exploitation at Rio Tinto’s Panguna copper mine in Bougainville precipitated a civil war whose embers are still smoldering. The mine remains closed. Rio Tinto is also the current owner of the Jabiluka uranium mine, the scene of blockade during 1997 and a national and international campaign of nonviolent action in solidarity with the Mirrar. Currently there is a moratorium on mining. The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) is also currently embroiled in an industrial dispute with the Rio Tinto over the company’s attempt to de-unionise the workforce.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Komnas HAM cited in Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’. Although it is widely known that the TNI have used Freeport equipment to detain and transport West Papuans and to carry the TNI on military operations, Freeport’s involvement in human rights violations has never been investigated (Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’).
\item \textsuperscript{74} Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’.
\item \textsuperscript{75} See Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’ and Abrash and Kennedy, ‘Repressive Mining in West Papua’, 62.
\end{itemize}
industrial relations laws, unions may be induced or compelled to take action or to remain neutral by a campaign of nonviolent action.\textsuperscript{76}

Mining companies such as Freeport are heavily dependent on large injections of capital and support from insurance agencies and export credit agencies to begin, expand and continue resource extraction.\textsuperscript{77} Increasingly this finance is being politicised. For example, in 1994, as a result of widespread environmental and human rights concerns, the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) cancelled Freeport’s political risk insurance.\textsuperscript{78}

There are also opportunities for people to engage a company, (for example through shareholder resolutions),\textsuperscript{79} or for individuals (and organisations), such as ethical fund managers, to be induced to take action themselves or be compelled to take action by others.\textsuperscript{80} Freeport’s shareholders have already raised concerns at shareholder meetings in the past.\textsuperscript{81} Aware of the politicisation of their activities that results from such public action, Freeport and the TNI blocked Amungme leader, Yosepha Alomang from attending Rio Tinto’s 1998 AGM in London.\textsuperscript{82} Directing campaigns at organisations and individuals and organisations that finance companies like Freeport are sources of leverages. According to Hugh Morgan, the CEO of the Australian-based mining transnational, WMC (Western Mining Corporation), financial restraints caused by the increasing requirement to be culturally and environmentally sensitive coupled with the increasing difficulty of securing capital, ‘are effectively “starving” the mining industry of funds’.\textsuperscript{83}

Despite the company’s arrogant and cavalier style, Freeport is significantly dependent on the consent and cooperation of key social groups to continue exploitation and repression in West Papua. A mosaic of nonviolent actions are possible ranging from reform to fundamental change. A nonviolent strategy could help coordinate and guide these actions and help de-legitimise and politicise the activity

\textsuperscript{76} See for instance Burrowes, ‘Jupiter Island Blockaded in the Yarra River’.
\textsuperscript{77} The Australian government agency that assists Australian companies in the majority (developing) world is the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad., \textit{The Globalisation Challenge}, pp. 32-33).
\textsuperscript{78} OPIC stated that the mine had ‘...created and continues to pose unreasonable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the surrounding terrestrial ecosystem and the local inhabitants.’ Freeport’s average daily deposition of the tailings has doubled since OPIC’s 1994 assessment.’ See Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’.
\textsuperscript{80} For example Westpac Bank was a major target of Jabiluka protests because of its investment in North Limited who was mining Jabiluka uranium mine before they were bought out by Rio Tinto. For the time being Rio Tinto has placed a moratorium on mining Jabiluka.
\textsuperscript{81} See John Rumbiak’s criticism of Freeport at Freeport’s website, \url{http://www.fcx.com/news/051401.pdf}, accessed 16\textsuperscript{th} May 2001.
\textsuperscript{82} Abrash, ‘The Amungme, Kamoro and Freeport’.
of TNCs such as Freeport. Importantly they will also help maximise the effectiveness of nonviolent action inside West Papua. Visible solidarity will also strengthen the morale of the resistance.

Conclusion

Nonviolent action for self-determination in West Papua is waged in a number of domains: the struggle inside West Papua; engaging the TNI inside West Papua; engaging Indonesia’s domestic constituencies; and engaging constituencies within the societies of Indonesia’s elite allies that support the occupation. Failure to identify the oppressors centre of gravity will inevitably result in serious strategic shortcomings of any nonviolent campaign. This chapter concluded by briefly examining some of the ways elites in Australia support the occupation, highlighting the focus of potential nonviolent campaigns of solidarity action.

The challenge for nonviolent activists in West Papua and the solidarity movement, are twofold. First, to analyse the key sources of power which Indonesia and Indonesia’s key allies are dependent on to sustain the occupation, whilst also strengthening and expanding the network of groups that support the resistance. Second, to design a series of strategic nonviolent campaigns to alter the will of key constituencies that support the problem and undermine their power to do so. In addition to the importance of a strategy, because Indonesia depends on the support of key international allies, solidarity action in the societies of those allies is crucial if nonviolent struggle inside West Papua is to be effective. Nonviolent action by West Papuans will undermine the legitimacy of Indonesian rule while legitimising international solidarity. International solidarity action will amplify West Papuans demands and boost local morale. By revealing Australian diplomatic, military and corporate support for Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua, I have highlighted the vulnerability of Indonesia’s continued rule and demonstrated the potential of international nonviolent solidarity campaigns to maximise the effectiveness of a nonviolent strategy for self-determination in West Papua.
Conclusion

This thesis began with a question: how can the nonviolent struggle in West Papua maximise its effectiveness? In seeking to answer this question, I have examined the causes of the conflict, and the nonviolent struggle to date. I have argued that the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua will be dramatically enhanced by developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy of nonviolence. The strategy includes coordinated solidarity campaigns. Even without strategic guidance nonviolence is extremely powerful but a coordinated and comprehensive strategy will significantly focus and strengthen the struggle..

The purpose of a nonviolent strategy in West Papua is to create the policy, process, structural, and systemic conditions that will satisfy human needs. In West Papua, these needs include self-determination, the protection of human rights and an end to structural violence. Two strategic aims guide the strategy. The first strategic aim is to consolidate the power and will of the nonviolent resistance to resist the aggression. This requires developing networks of West Papuan, Indonesian and international groups to assist the struggle. The second strategic aim is to alter Indonesia’s will to maintain the occupation of West Papua, and to undermine its power to do so. These strategic aims would be realised through campaigns guided by a modified version of Burrowes’ strategic framework.

Campaigns should be designed to achieve clear and specific intermediate strategic goals. The objective of campaigns inside West Papua and solidarity campaigns outside West Papua, should be to re-create the conditions for dialogue in Indonesia and the international arena. It remains to be seen whether the Special Autonomy package can meet both West Papuan and Indonesian needs. To date, the signs are not promising, although there may be limited opportunities to discuss human rights and development issues. Given the collapse of dialogue and a return to repression beginning from August 2000 it is unlikely that further attempts at dialogue will convince Jakarta of West Papua’s need for self-determination. If the will of Indonesian elites cannot be altered, then strategic campaigns of nonviolent action need to be directed at undermining Indonesia’s power to avoid a problem-solving dialogue. Campaigns of nonviolent action need to be directed at inducing and compelling the key social groups inside Indonesia and Internationally to withdraw their support for the occupation.

Jakarta is indirectly dependent on key social groups that support its international allies. Therefore, solidarity campaigns need to be designed to alter the will and undermine the support of the social groups that support Indonesia’s elite allies. I have demonstrated Indonesia’s vulnerable indirect dependency on key social groups in Australia by examining three key ways Australian elites support
the occupation. Given the high levels of elite support for Indonesia’s continued occupation of West Papua in Australia, a solidarity campaign intended to induce or compel key social groups to withdraw their consent and cooperation is imperative.

This thesis has also been a reflection on practice, and written with a specific purpose: to reflect on how Australian nonviolent activists can best support the nonviolent struggle in West Papua. Because Australia exports terror, ecological destruction and social dislocation to West Papua, Australians are ethically compelled to act in solidarity with people in West Papua. As Australians committed to doing justice, our task is to transform Australia. In doing so, the perennial hope is that we will not only make Australia a more just, peaceful and sustainable place, but that we will help make our region and even the world, a better place too. It is extremely naïve to expect that government, corporate and military elites will change their policy just because we ask. As can be seen in the case of West Papua, those policies protect powerful vested interests, secured and maintained by military violence.

Inspired by West Papuans themselves, this thesis has been written in the belief that ordinary people in Australia do not have to be resigned to playing out the role of passive observers of the world outside their window, but can be the subjects of history. It is a great privilege and joy to accompany those who struggle for freedom. Doing so is a small way we can share the cost of the struggle with our sisters and brothers in West Papua and throughout our region. Self-determination in West Papua will take time. There will be a cost. But it can be done.
Postscript

The Road to a New Papua

by Benny Giay

The road to a New Papua,
free from fear, manipulation
and intimidation is a long one,
but it has to be trod.

Many thorn bushes litter the path.
That is why the journey must be
well planned, and Papuans
[accompanied by those who walk in solidarity]
must undertake it in a great spirit
of liberty. So may it be.

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