THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND WEST PAPUAN NATIONALISM

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The change of status which is synonymous with the history of occupation and external domination of West Papua is symbolised by the change of names and terms used by those who ruled the territory as indicated throughout this thesis.

**West Papua** for the country is the name used by the Papuan nationalists and those in favour of self-determination. Under the Dutch rule it was generally known as Nederlands Nieuw Guinea or West New Guinea. During the dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch, the territory was known in Indonesia as Irian Barat or West Irian. It was renamed Irian Jaya (Glorious Irian) after the territory was integrated into the Indonesian Republic in 1969.

**Papuan** for the people is the oldest name already in use during the Dutch colonial rule of the East Indies. The names West Papua and Papuan were endorsed as national names by the elected Papuan leaders in 1961; among them the brothers, Markus and Frans Kaisiepo who introduced the name Irian in 1946. Papua in general is a word not acceptable to the Indonesian government under any circumstances. The people of the territory are referred to as orang Irian or Irianese.

**OPM**, Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organisation), also known as the Free Papua Movement as a term and as an organisation is strictly banned in Indonesia. In official reports and statements OPM is called GPL, Gerombolan Pengacau Liar or Wild Gangs of Trouble makers.

**Jayapura** is Indonesia's name for the capital of West Papua. During the Dutch rule it was known as Hollandia and under a brief control by the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority between October 1962 and May 1963 it was called Kotabaru. The West Papuan name for the city is Numbai, often referred to as Port Numbai.

**Act of free choice** is the term used by Indonesia to describe the hardly translatable Musyawarah Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (PEPERA) conducted in 1969 in which representatives decided the future of the territory. If directly translated it would mean, discussion to determine the opinions of the people. Casting of votes is not involved under this system. A special chapter of the thesis deals with this method of self-determination.

**ABRI**, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or the Armed Forces of Indonesia.
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INTRODUCTION

The anti-colonial euphoria that swept Indonesia after the Second World War had created the expectation that independence would end foreign domination, restore people’s dignity, guarantee freedom, social justice and bring economic prosperity to all. On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese capitulation, Indonesia unilaterally proclaimed its independence but continued fighting for four more years before its sovereignty was finally recognised by the Dutch on December 27, 1949. The Dutch, however, continued to rule West Papua and gradually attempted to decolonise it. Indonesia disputed the territory which it called Irian Barat or West Irian. After 13 years of conflict Indonesia successfully acquired West Papua in 1963, through a United States mediated settlement. Indonesia claimed that the defeat of the Dutch and the return of West Irian, later re-named Irian Jaya (1973), into the folds of the Indonesian Republic finally ended colonialism in Indonesia. But its misrule of West Papua created a different perception by the indigenous inhabitants. The experience in West Papua showed that the defeat of Dutch colonialism did not end dispossession and injustice to the Papuan people. From all accounts, colonialism began in earnest after the departure of the Dutch. It was a situation of one colonial system being replaced by yet another. For the Papuans it was only a change of mantle from white European colonialism to brown Asian colonialism. Under the Indonesian government, Papuan’s right to rule themselves, the right to practice their own culture and the right to their land and natural resources has been taken away from them. They are treated by the government as colonial subjects, not Indonesian citizens.

Indonesia’s claim over West Papua was based on a colonial, historical fact that the territory had formed part of the former Dutch East Indies, which is now the Republic of Indonesia. It, however, refused to accept another colonial historical fact that boundaries of colonial territories can be divisive. Colonial boundaries can force people of completely different racial and cultural backgrounds to live under a system they do not accept. Defending these boundaries is the same as maintaining the same colonial legacy. India, Pakistan, Srilanka, Burma and Malaysia were once ruled by Great Britain but all have since become separate independent states. Indonesia theoretically advocates unity in diversity, however in West Papua, it has pursued policies of forced cultural assimilation and annihilation, claimed by critics as an attempt to obliterate the Melanesian Papuans.(1)

To safeguard its forced incorporation of West Papua, Indonesia promulgated an anti-subversive law that made enemies of Papuans, instead of protecting them as its citizens. The centralised and militarised Indonesian government, obsessed with security, jailed the educated
West Papuan people or forced them to flee overseas and caused some of the worst cases of human right abuses in the history of the territory. Like other colonial situations, for example Indonesia’s experience in the 1920’s, the injustices committed by the ruling government created the conditions which fuelled people’s resistance. In turn, nationalistic movements were created and the people sought every opportunity to end colonial rule. (2) Indonesia’s remedial approach to create harmony and stability through Indonesianisation or aculturalisation has only strengthened the Melanesian Papuan’s resistance, who view this policy as an instrument of genocide.

This thesis firstly examines the historical and political factors that caused the denial of the West Papuan people’s right to self-determination. It will consider the different colonial experiences which continue to affect the Indonesian and Papuan sense of history and trace West Papua’s experience of colonial neglect, subjugation, decolonisation and Indonesian domination. Consideration is given to the processes in the post world war power politics, where the Papuan people’s future was decided totally by foreign governments. Attention is also given to the Indonesian’s absolute and centralised system of government, that denies Papuans access to the instruments of power and decision making, especially decisions affecting cultural policy and resource utilisation. Denial of participation in government and policy making has always been associated with colonial rule. The thesis will argue why Papuan nationalism is very much a product of external domination and denial of the rights and freedom of the Papuan people.

The second part of this thesis analyses the West Papuan peoples liberation movement, known as the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) or the Organisation for Free Papua and its resistance organisation’s, aims and objectives and method of struggle. Against the prediction that West Papuan nationalism would disappear once absorbed by the overwhelming Indonesian culture, the ideal of a separate Papuan nation state lives on. If in 1969, 1025 carefully selected and indoctrinated representatives voted on behalf of the majority in favour of remaining with Indonesia, 15 years later (1984) 13,000 West Papuans of their own free will voted with their feet against integration. They walked for days across difficult and mountainous terrain to register their votes in the independent state of Papua New Guinea. Some died in the attempt. The strength of the OPM as a liberation organisation and as a national movement is discussed in this chapter. In conclusion the thesis will argue that the government’s misrule unites-Papuan ethnic solidarity, prolong resistance to the Indonesian rule and ultimately strengthen West Papuan nationalism.

Thesis methodology
Because of the difficulty of access to West Papua itself, most information for this thesis was obtained through two methods. The first includes library reference books, periodicals, Irian Jaya government reports, non-government organisation reports and individual reports. These
provide an understanding of historical background and political developments in West Papua. The second method includes interviews with community leaders and refugees who experienced life under the Dutch and the Indonesian rule. I had interviewed Seth Rumkorem, the chairman of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Organisation for Free Papua) and a few others who directly involved with the movement (Appendix I). Apart from those interviewed, there are many others whose knowledge and experience could have been useful, but I was not able to reach them due to unfortunate limitation in time and resources. Another contributing factor and source is my own experience because of my association with many leaders, to name just a few: Mr. Jacob Prai (Sweden), founding member and leader of the Front Command for the Liberation of West Papua, the FKPPB (1968-1971), President of the Senate of the Provisional Republic of West Papua (1971-1976), President of the De'facto Republic of West Papua (1976-1978) and since 1985, in charge of the Political Affairs of OPM; Mr. Marcus Kaisiepo and Mr. Nicholas Jouwe (Holland), both veteran politicians and former members of the New Guinea Council (1960-1962), Fred Korwa, Fred Atabu, D.Waweyai and Sacharias Sawor (Holland), second generation of West Papuan nationalists after the generation of Mr.Kaisiepo and Mr. Jouwe; Mr. Wilhelm Zonganao and Mr. Clemens Runaweri (PNG), former members of the Peoples Representative Assembly, the DPR of then, West Irian Province now Irian Jaya. In the wider Melanesian community there are fine leaders like, Mr. Bernard Narakobi, founding father of the Papua New Guinea's constitution, former Minister of Justice, and the author of the "Melanesian Way," John Momis, former Priest, founding father and leader of the Melanesian Alliance Party and former Minister of Decentralisation; the Late Fr. Patrick Murphy, who taught many Pacific leaders some of them Prime Ministers; he was the catalyst for the empowerment of the people through non formal education, he organised many workshops, seminars and conferences throughout the region; Fr. Walter Lini, the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Mr. Barak Sope, former Roving Ambassador and Minister of Foreign Affairs who twice deported two French Ambassadors; General Ted Diro, the first Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Utula Samana, founding member of the Melanesian Alliance Party, former Premier of Morobe Province, now PNG Ambassador to the United Nations (1996).

"The history of subjugation sets in motion a process of its own negation: "a history of resistance"
Ngugi Wa Thiongo.(3)
CHAPTER 1

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WEST PAPUA.

Background
The later part of the 19th century was a period of world wide imperial expansion and competition. In the Pacific region the newly emerging powers, the United States, Japan and Australia joined the European states in the quest for the control of new colonial territories to secure the supply of raw materials and provide markets for their products. The result was devastating as geographer Supan, A, wrote, "for the first time the world is devidedup so that in the future only division is possible, territories can only pass from one owner to another."(4) The borders drawn by these great powers cut across cultural affinities dividing nations and peoples from their own kin. Expansion of idealism was also equally important during the period. Led by their claim of own superior civilisation and the desire to save souls and the conviction of a mission to civilise the world Christian Europe sent out missionaries to many parts of the world.(5) The annexation of fast territories and the conversion of social values and structures of colonised peoples caused conflicts long after the colonial powers are gone. The adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1946 after the Second World War, brought an end to colonisation and promotes a new era of decolonisation. However decolonisation did not completely dismantled colonialism itself and many of its manifestations. Some newly independent countries found themselves defending colonial inherittance and carried on the same system of their old colonial masters. This era was also greatly influenced by super powers rivalry and balance of world power divided along the lines of ideological alliances. Self-preservation, economic and ideological strategic interests had a major impact on the decolonisation process itself.

New Guinea, the world's second largest island measuring approximately 344, 000 square miles, situated less than one degree south of the equator between the 130th and 150th parallels, directly north of Australia and east of the Indonesian archipelago, despite its isolation did not escape the colonial onslaught of the 19th century.(6) West Papua, formerly Dutch New Guinea and since 1963, a province of Indonesia now called Irian Jaya (Glorious Irian) constitutes half of New Guinea, west of the 141st meridian east of Greenwich. This colonial border established in 1848 put two peoples, the Papuans and Indonesians of completely different racial backgrounds under ono colonial jurisdiction. The Dutch however, colonised the Indonesians and neglected the Papuans.(7) After it granted Indonesia its political independence in 1949, the Dutch attempted to decolonise West Papua but failed. Indonesia successfully re-claimed the territory from the Dutch, but its policies of Indonesianisation widened the racial gap between the two peoples, instead of narrowing it. The Papuans now see themselves as colonised people and seek to end Indonesian rule of their country. They see
political independence as the solution for safeguarding their cultural values and identity. This chapter gives a historical overview of West Papua to provide a basis for the succeeding chapters of the thesis.

Before the arrival of the Europeans in Indonesia in the 16th century West Papua was a source of slaves and plumes of birds of paradise which the Indonesian kingdoms used to maintain their economic ties with China. In the 8th century A.D. New Guinea was known by the Indonesian and Chinese slave traders as Janggi but the Malays called it Papua which means fuzzy haired man. Among the first European explorers who visited the island, it was Inigo Ortiz de Retes, a Spaniard who landed on the north shore in 1545, and named it Nueva Guinea or New Guinea because of similarities between the inhabitants to those of Guinea in West Africa. Many more Europeans have visited but generally the island was regarded as an inhospitable waste land and no one country was able to establish a permanent foothold until the nineteenth century.

The Dutch colonised Indonesia in the seventeenth century and annexed the western half of New Guinea in 1828 to buffer its lucrative spice trade in the Moluccas against other competitors. Germany took possession of the north-eastern part of New Guinea in 1881 and the British claimed the south-eastern half of the island in 1883. In 1906 British New Guinea was ceded to Australia and renamed Papua. Australian forces occupied German New Guinea in 1914 and after World War One the League of Nations mandated it to Australia. After the Second World War, Australia brought the two territories under one single administration, to be known as Papua and New Guinea, which was granted its independence on September 16, 1975 to become Papua New Guinea.

In 1898, apart from a few permanent posts flying the Dutch flag, there was no effective government administration in the territory. West Papua was regarded by the Dutch East India Company as not having any economic potential and left it untouched until the breakout of World War Two. The discovery and extraction of crude oil in 1936 by US and Dutch companies began to change the image of the economic potential of the island, but further exploration was halted by the War.

*Subjugation and domination*

In the absence of direct Dutch colonial rule, Christian missionaries exerted the greatest influence which profoundly affected the Papuan people's social, economic and political life. The same pattern of subjugation was the order all over the Pacific. Their main preoccupation was converting souls, but in the process they destroy the basic social foundations of the society. In West Papua the Protestant missionaries began work in 1855, and concentrated on the northern part of the island. The Roman Catholic missionaries
followed suit in 1905 and established themselves in the southern region. The lingua franca used as medium of instruction was the Bahasa Melayu Pasar (Malay trading Creole or Pidgin).(13) Indonesians were used extensively in these soul-converting activities and later by the colonial administration. Literacy and limited services such as education and health were provided in areas under their effective control.

Missionaries perceived the Pauans as godless and primitive savages. Their social values and culture were regarded as a hindrance to civilisation. The missionary's duty was therefore to liberate them from paganism and make them good people. With the help of the colonial government spiritual houses were destroyed and traditional ceremonies banned. What the Church forbade the colonial government made illegal.(14) Amon Saba Saakana wrote on the same subject, as experienced in the Carribean islands and in Africa under the British rule, and put into perspective the nature of colonialism as being: "the destruction of the culture and values of the colonised and the construction in its place of the culture and values of the coloniser."(15) The Church and the colonial government seemed to cooperate well in the subjugation and control of the Papuan society. The missionaries instilled fear of God, the Church and for that matter authority. The people were made to believe that those who disobeyed or returned to their old traditional practices would burn in hell. The Christian discipline of self-denial and unreserved giving of resources to the Church was maintained at all times. Western values were the standard to follow or the civilised way for a good Christian to live. This approach had given the missionaries and the Church power and authority over the people. As the church expanded, the colonial administration provided them legal protection. A long-serving colonial administrator on the Schouten Islands in the Bird of Paradise Bay area, J. V. de Brujin was quoted by Van der Veur as stating that by the end of 1940 there was nothing left of the old Biak culture. ".that the islanders had assimilated the European mentality and adopted the life ways of their European educators and superiors. After all that was what the civilising mission of state and church had been about."(16)

Most of the missionary work and colonial law enforcement was conducted mainly by Indonesians. The class structure of Europeans at the top, Asians then the Papuans at the bottom was the status quo until the Pacific War in 1940 as Van der Veur observed,

"In this primitive society such men were part of the ruling caste, participating in a system of 'double colonialism'. The expression, Papua bodoh (stupid Papua) was employed by some of these outsiders, whose air of superiority gradually came to be resented by the Papuans."(17)
Many Papuans successfully completed the required level of education, but could never be on the same level with Indonesians or higher as the Research Institute for Oppressed Peoples (RIOP) pointed out,

"In everyday life it was the Indonesians who lorded over the Papuans as enlightened despots and petty satraps, isolating the Papuans from the European elites. They came from a hierarchical society, and despite the fact that they were hardly developed in western terms, or because of that, they tended to view the local population as being stupid, living in an unenlightened dark age." (18)

Between 1938 and 1944 the Koreri, an old Messianic movement that existed on Biak island, the Bird of Paradise Bay area and the Raja Ampat islands long before the arrival of missionaries in 1855 resurfaced.(19) Led by a charismatic woman called Anganetha, it started as a peaceful religion and cultural revival movement. But actions by the authorities forced it to transform into a political movement. Its snowballing influence on the population became a growing concern to the church, the colonial authorities and later the Japanese. When Anganetha was arrested in 1942, by the Japanese, the people's response was severe. They destroyed police and government offices at Bosnik, which brought the movement into direct confrontation with the Dai Nippon Army. Anganetha's successor, Stevanus Simopiaref, proclaimed her the Queen of New Guinea. He created a flag, formed an army and called for the liberation of the main land.(20) The Japanese ruthlessly crushed the movement, but not its spirit as one Biak man stated in 1962 to J.V. van der Veur, in reference to the Indonesian proclamation: "We had our 1942 proclamation, issued not after the Japanese had surrendered but while they were in active control."(21) The resentment as a result of discrimination and injustice existed in the society, but any meaningful expression was discouraged. The Koreri movement then became the catalyst, the agent or the versicle to launched peoples aspirations to a higher ground and full expression, thus emerged the realisation of own identity as a people equal to those who seek to suppress it.(22)

Decolonisation
The allied forces captured Hollandia, now Jayapura in April 1944 and a few months later the whole island of New Guinea was liberated from the Japanese occupation.(23) The Dutch returned to re-establish their colonial authority. But while the war created a sizeable infrastructure in the main centres, there was a serious shortage of man power. Recruitment from other parts of East Indies was not possible, because Japan still controlled these areas. The only possible solution was to train local Melanesian Papuans, a decision that marked the beginning of a new history in the lives of many Papuans in the succeeding years.
A former Police Commissioner in the East Indies, Jan van Eechoud proclaimed himself Resident of West New Guinea and built the first public institutions. The priority institutions he created in 1944 included a Police Training School, a Papuan Battalion of some 400 men, a Continuation School and a Public Administration College. In 1963, the Indonesian government turned the Administrative College into a university, now known as Universitas Chenderawasih or Bird of Paradise University. Jan van Eechoud's efforts to train Papuan elites were genuine for which he became known as the father of Papua. By promoting the Papuans he completely altered the old status quo that always put the Papuans at the bottom of the establishment. Jan van Eechoud's main purpose was to train qualified manpower to run an effective colonial administration in the territory. He recruited Papuans from different tribes who lived in boarding establishments during their training. This new avenue allowed Papuans to learn to appreciate each other in relation to other races and issues of common concern. With the knowledge of racial similarities and interaction with other Papuans, they broadened their horizons, their tribal borders expanded and a new Papuan identity developed. Though unintended, the very institutions that Jan van Eechoud created became nurseries of Papuan national consciousness. As pointed out by Savage, "Almost all those men who played a leading role in the forging of West Irian nationalism attended these institutions between 1944 and 1949."

This new sense of a national Papuan identity was expanded further in the 1950s by the Dutch programs of localisation widely known as Papoeanisering or Papuanisation which embraced self-government. Free elections were held in 1961 for the creation of the Nieuw Guinea Raad (New Guinea Council) and a multi-party system was encouraged. By the end of 1961 the Dutch minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Luns proposed a plan for the internationalisation of West Papua. All these, coupled with external influences, for example, the UN declaration on the Universal Principles of Human Rights and the world wide push for speedy decolonisation, strengthened the Papuan's dream and high expectations for their own nation state. But it was not to be.

Indonesia disputed the West Papuan territory and through konfrontasi or confrontation politics and threat of war successfully acquired it in 1963 through a United States sponsored New York Agreement. The Agreement provided that Indonesia would take over West Papua after a brief United Nations interim government. Indonesia would then organise a plebiscite in 1969 to allow Papuans to determine their own future. An Indonesian system of musyawarah (decision by consensus) called act of free choice was held in 1969, where 1025 selected representatives decided that West Papua should remain part of Indonesia.

During its conflict with Indonesia over the territory between 1950 and 1962, the Dutch defended the view that the Papuans were a separate race and like the Indonesians, they too
had the right to independence. But, the Papuans were excluded from the negotiations and the signing of the USA negotiated New York Agreement to end the conflict. Again in 1969, despite a long record of human rights abuses, open revolts and fraudulent conduct in the act of free choice itself, the Netherlands endorsed the defacto incorporation of West Papua into the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch actions rises more questions than answers which need further study.

*De facto control and de jure integration*

Soon after the transfer of administration by the UN interim authority, on May 2, 1963, Indonesia made West Papua its 26th Province, fulfilling its long held dream of unification. Indonesia totally ignored its temporary mandate as stipulated by the New York Agreement. It took no reference at all to the contents of the agreement which, among others, guaranteed freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and rights, including the right to organise or the right of association for the Papuan people. For them the transfer in 1963 was final. The government immediately moved to reverse the whole process of localisation and self-government by the promulgation of Presidential Decree No.8, which abolished democratic institutions created by the Dutch. This was followed by Presidential Decree No.11, dubbed as the anti-subversion decree, which deemed any opposition to the government as criminal.

The general image created by the actions of Indonesian officials was that of an occupying power, triumphant and superior. They regarded educated Papuans as colonial puppets and with suspicion, and the rest, as stupid, an attitude that brought back memories of old times which ultimately caused many conflicts for years after incorporation. The area was sealed off from the rest of the world while indoctrination and re-education, or colonial cleansing, took place as a measure of preparation, in case a plebiscite had to be organised by 1969. Presidential decrees No.8 and No. 11, 1963 made it impossible for any peaceful and organised protest. Consequently, active resistance that was absent during the Dutch rule emerged in different parts of the country. Of these the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or the Free Papua Movement) led revolt of Manokwari on 28 July 1965 was well known. With the powers vested in the armed forces by Presidential Decree No.11, the Manokwari revolt and other resistance that followed were ruthlessly crushed. Chapter 5 of the thesis discusses the OPM in detail.

Under the leadership of the new order government of President Soeharto (1965) Indonesia cleverly conducted and won an act of free choice in West Papua in 1969, which it celebrated by changing the name of the territory from Irian Barat (West Irian) to Irian Jaya (Glorious Irian). The OPM denounced the results of the act of free choice as unrepresentative and claimed that the method of consultation with the Papuan people deviated from the terms of the
New York Agreement. The OPM proclaimed a Provisional Government in 1971 and pledged to continue its struggle to liberate West Papua from Indonesian occupation. (35)

After the successful de'jure integration of West Papua in 1969, Soeharto's government began to intensify its five yearly development plan known as Repelita in West Papua. (36) This was done in recognition that West Papua was the least developed province in Indonesia. The province had abundant land and natural resources but was sparsely populated and lacked skilled manpower. To facilitate development in the territory, the government embarked on a massive transmigration program and opened up the province for national and foreign investment. Increased economic activity especially in the areas of logging, fishing, oil production and mining provided employment opportunities. But West Papuans could not compete successfully against aggressive migrants. (37) Education, especially literacy, was expanded considerably. But everything was planned from the top down and executed with little or no consultation with the people. The authorities always regarded the approval by appointed representatives as the consent of the people. This approach to development, inconsistent with the real conditions and aspirations of the people, consequently caused much of the tension and conflict with the government. For example the giant Freeport copper, gold and silver mine project that started in 1967. The government granted the American mining company Freeport McMoran the concessional right to mine copper, gold and silver in the Timika area without properly consulting with the Amungme and Komoro land owners. As a result, the people resisted the mine since it began operations in 1967 and over the years many have died at the hands of security men and the army that guarded the mine. (38)

The Indonesian government's overly ambitious development plans lacked specific guidelines and policies on public relations especially on matters relating to land use, resource development and manpower training. Consequently the people drew their own conclusions and reacted accordingly as Jakarta Post reported in the case of Freeport Mine in 1995,

"The blunt reality discernible by their simple way of thinking ......" Freeport has extracted a great deal of wealth from their land but has contributed very little to their development. And so far as Irian Jaya is concerned, ......the central government in Jakarta has not returned to them a fair share of the revenues from Freeport's operations." (39)

They saw the government as being dictatorial, stealing their land and plundering resources. Local jobs were given away to pendatang (migrants), which created massive unemployment. The government encouraged migrants to take over land and dominate economic opportunities, leaving the local Papuans with limited employment and economic benefits. (40)
The Indonesian government's reaction to critics and rebellion has always been excessive as Abdul Hakim observed: "The human right violations (extra-judicial killings, disappearance, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture) in the Timika region ... are a product of the denial of the people's right to the enjoyment of their land."(41) They have been given no voice with which to express their grievances. For them there are effectively two forms of political expression, through the churches and through the Free Papua Movement.(42) Thousands of Papuans were forced to become refugees in Papua New Guinea, many were exiled in prisons in Java, others have joined the OPM in the mountains or have simply disappeared.(43)

Summary
After decades of neglect the Dutch government made efforts in the 1950s and early 1960s to develop the territory including the establishment of local governments and the promotion of the idea of self-government. But since the territory reverted to Indonesia, the Indonesian government reversed the localisation and self-government programs. In its place the government introduced a centralised system that denies freedom and rights and effective participation in development by the Papuan people. Policies on land use, and resource development are made without people's consent. This consequently encouraged resistance in the Papuan society. They see the government's policy of Indonesianisation with the promotion of "transmigrasi" as a threat to their culture, land, resources and survival. The suppressive government system forced West Papuans to consider the OPM's ideal of a separate nation state as an attractive proposition.

"Those who enjoy power always arrange matters so as to give their tyranny an appearance of justice,"

(French fableist, La Fontaine, 1668)
CHAPTER 2

The dynamics of the West Papuan issue

The issue of West Papua's political status arose when the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands disputed its future in the late 1940s. The central issue of the dispute was decolonisation or self-determination. Indonesia argued that West Papua should be incorporated into the Republic because it was part of the former Dutch East Indies and on the principle that it would be the final act of decolonisation in the history of Indonesia. The Netherlands, the colonising power, had also ascribed to the same principle, but it wanted to decolonise West Papua outside of Indonesia. The conflict that lasted for 13 years threatened to affect the security balance in the region and was averted only through the intervention of the United States. This chapter discusses claims and counter claims by the two disputing parties and the role of the international community that concentrated its efforts on avoiding war at the expense of the West Papuan's right of self-determination.

Dutch policy

Nothing much had changed since permanent posts were established in West Papua in 1898. Because of the lack of economic prospects, West Papua was neglected until the Second World War. Interestingly, after the war, the Dutch government paid more attention to the territory for non-economic reasons. Pressures in Indonesia, especially the difficulty in resuming full control over the former Dutch East Indies made the idea of a foothold in New Guinea more attractive. Two major groups emerged in Indonesia after the war, the Republicans and Federals who proclaimed their country's independence two days after the capitulation of Japan to the Allied forces in August 1945. The republicans rejected the Dutch but the Federals were willing to cooperate with the pace of Dutch decolonisation. The Dutch negotiated with both groups to form one umbrella structure, with binding instruments that allowed the Dutch access and influence. From the start of negotiations with the Indonesian leaders in 1946, West Papua was already in the Dutch scheme of post-war policy.(44)

The Lingardjati Agreement, signed by all parties in 1946, proposed an independent and democratic Federal United States of Indonesia, linked to The Netherlands by The Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Article 3 and the first clause of Article 4 stipulated that the United States of Indonesia would comprise the entire territory of the Dutch East Indies. The population of any area had the right to choose a special status within the United States of Indonesia and the right not to join Indonesia at all. West Papua was not included, thus not bound by Article 3 and Article 4 of the Agreement. The Dutch government reported to the Parliament on December 10, 1946 that:"It was the government's desire that in the spirit of Articles 3 and 4, New Guinea must also be able to obtain a separate status, in spite of the inability of the Papuans to make a democratic decision."(45) The Republicans signed the
Linggarjati Agreement on March 23, 1947, but still refused to endorse the Dutch unilateral interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 in relation to West New Guinea. The disagreement remained and was not even resolved at the November - December 1949 Round Table Conference in The Hague. Two days after independence was granted to Indonesia, on December 27, 1949, the Dutch government issued a decree to establish a permanent colonial administration for West New Guinea, designated by and responsible solely to the Dutch Crown. After 101 years of neglect, finally the Kingdom of the Netherlands ratified the colonial status of West Papua.

After 1950, the West Papuan people faced changes and political conflicts they had never experienced during the Dutch colonial presence on New Guinea. The first colonial administration was headed by a Governor and was based on the idea of self-government. For the first time, West Papuans were subjected to a real colonial administration and discipline, described by Henderson as "utterly bureaucratic ...."every thing was hierarchically organised: the administration, economic activities, and the church. Criticism of official policy was frowned upon and quickly interpreted as a sign of pro-Indonesian inclinations." Local government councils were established in the major centres following the example of Kankain Karkara Biak established earlier in 1947. The government described these councils as a training ground for the establishment of politically autonomous communities.

During the period between 1950 and 1961, more than three quarters of the population, or just over 700,000 people, had come within the orbit of the Dutch administration. The period saw a rapid expansion in services. Expenditure rose dramatically, from 36.2 million florins in 1950 to 143.7 million florins in 1960. Expenditures on public education quadrupled and the number of students in all categories grew steady. In 1960, there were 32,686 pupils in primary schools, 2,734 in continuation schools, 430 in junior high schools and more than 400 undergoing medical training. A few students went to Holland for higher education. The special School of Administration, established in 1944, increased its intake and expanded Papuan public service officers training. By 1960, more than half of the 8,700 officials running the colonial administration were Papuans. Elementary schools were increasingly staffed by Papuan teachers and 35 of the territory's 74 districts were administered by Papuan officers. During this period, revenues increased from 20.6 million to 59.9 million florins and the deficit grew from 15.6 million to 91.9 million florins. The achievements of these 10 years were remarkable compared to the development under 102 years of Dutch administration of the territory (1848-1950). The Dutch government's subsidy commitments was clearly shown in the high rate of the territory's deficit. A low level of export earnings and the lack of investment during the period also contributed to the deficit. Unlike the Dutch East Indies, the paramount importance of economic development was absent. If the Dutch succeeded in
decolonising the territory, the future West Papuan state would have been heavily dependent, a dilemma later experienced by Papua New Guinea.

The Dutch made considerable progress in localisation. By 1960, ten more local government councils were established. During his address to the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns stated: "Our administration has no other aim than to prepare the population of the Territory within the shortest possible time, for the exercise of its right of self-determination."(50) The Dutch government however, did not clearly state a plan or agenda for decolonisation. Like their Australian counterparts in the eastern half of the island, they thought full decolonisation was a long way off. They thought the Papuan people had neither the political maturity nor enough educated people to run a 20th century state. This situation began to change in a dramatic way during the election of the Nieuw Guinea Raad or the New Guinea Council in April 1961. The level of political awareness in the main centres and regions was much higher than previously envisaged. One out of the twelve electorates recorded the lowest level of poll at 53% votes and the second lowest at 55% votes. The Teminabuan region, that could have qualified the Dutch pessimism, polled the highest at 86% of the votes.(51) The political awareness that drew high level of participation in the elections surprised the authorities. These unexpected outcomes, together with international pressure, forced the Dutch to reconsider its position on decolonisation.

At the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1961 the Dutch position on possible internationalisation of West Papua was elaborated in more detail than the previous year by the Foreign Minister Luns. The main elements of the then called Luns Plan, as outlined in his address during the general debate, were as follows: "First, The Netherlands is prepared to bring the administration and the development of the Territory under the active supervision of the United Nations and is prepared to accept a decision of the General Assembly which clearly guarantees the right of self-determination of the population. Second, to this end The Netherlands is prepared to relinquish sovereignty to the people of Netherlands Nieuw Guinea. Third, in this connection The Netherlands is prepared to transfer its present powers to the extent required by the above purpose, to an organisation or international authority established by and operated under the United Nations which would be vested with executive powers and which could gradually take over tasks and responsibilities and thus prepare the population for early self-determination under stable conditions."(52) Thirteen French speaking nations sponsored a draft resolution endorsing the Dutch proposal for the right of self-determination for the Papuans, with the addition of Dutch - Indonesian negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Fiftythree nations, including for the first time the United States, supported the draft. Fortyone were against and nine nations abstained. The proposal thus failed to register three-quarters of the
votes required for it to be adopted. The Indonesian counter proposal sponsored by 9 countries polled, 41 votes for, 40 against and 21 abstained.\(^{(53)}\)

**Indonesian policy**

During the dispute with The Netherlands over West Papua, Indonesia made two major claims. The first claim was based on an imperial theory, that the whole island of New Guinea was once under the political orbit of Indonesia Raya, ruled by the Great Kingdom of Madjopahit founded C.1293. The areas under this Empire included the Malay peninsula, the whole of Borneo, the Philippine islands, the whole island of New Guinea and the Indonesian archipelago proper including both parts of the island of Timor. Indonesian leaders were known to have made statements in support of the idea. Soekarno for example stated, "I have never said that Indonesia composes only those areas that were ruled by the Dutch. In fact, I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a Pan-Indonesia, which included not only Malaysia and Papua but also the Philippines."\(^{(54)}\)

The theory of Indonesia Raya has been disputed by a number of historians. Bone, for example suggested that possibly only East Java, Madura and Bali were under Madjopahiti's direct control.\(^{(55)}\) Van der Kroef has cited trading contacts between the inhabitants of the eastern Indonesian islands and people on some parts of New Guinea and Lagerberg contends that Biak people of West Papua should claim some parts of Indonesia because of evidence of their influence.\(^{(56)}\) In the 1600's, when the Dutch were negotiating with Sultan Tidore, the eastern islands were still in the grip of constant fear of hongi raids by the Papuans. The islands between Halmahera and New Guinea were known by the Kingdom as Papuan islands ruled by Papuans. There are still Papuan settlements on these islands. Here too, according to Coolhas, there was no direct rule over New Guinea by Tidore. Coolhas cited instead a symbolic and indirect status,

"...The Dutch East Indies Company was glad to make use of the relations the Sultan of Tidore had with the so called rulers of the Papuan Islands, which in their turn had contact with New Guinea, where they obtained Papuan slaves for him. The Company therefore granted the Sultan certain rights under their supervision, but also certain obligations regarding New Guinea." According to Coolhas, "it is on these grounds that the present Indonesian Republic lays claim to the Western half of the island, which is in fact not inhabited by Indonesians."\(^{(57)}\)

The Company required Tidore and his Papuan counterparts to exclude other European countries interested in the island of New Guinea in an attempt to protect its lucrative spice trade in the Moluccas against potential competitors. The symbolic inclusion of West Papua with the Dutch East Indies was further strengthened by the Dutch annexation of the territory
on behalf of Tidore in 1848 which was later acknowledged by Great Britain and Germany in a conference held in Berlin in 1884, where they formalised their own acquisition of Eastern New Guinea.\textsuperscript{(58)}

The second claim was based on colonial territorial integrity. Indonesia claimed that because West Papua was part of the Dutch East Indies colony, it should automatically be incorporated into the Indonesian Republic as the successor state after its liberation from Japan. However in the actual proclamation of Independence on August 17, 1945, the Republic's territories were defined as stretching from Aceh in the extreme west, to Ambon in the extreme east in the archipelago, excluding West Papua.\textsuperscript{(59)} West Papua was already under the Dutch rule after it was liberated from Japan in 1944, and remained so after Indonesia's proclamation in 1945 and the granting of its independence in 1949.

The strength of the Indonesian claims came neither from symbolic imperial nor colonial territorial right but rather from highly subjective and psychological factors as cited in Lijphart's chapter on "Indonesian and Dutch policies," "...the Indonesian struggle to gain West New Guinea was primarily a consequence of strong nationalistic, revolutionary, and anti Dutch sentiments."\textsuperscript{(60)} Also, stability had been a problem for the young republic since independence. After the proclamation of independence in 1945, the building of an Indonesian government was weakened because of relentless Dutch efforts to re-establish authority in the archipelago. Having a Dutch stronghold in the neighbourhood could surely prolong insecurity for the republic.\textsuperscript{(61)} Another contributing factor was economic domination. Until the seizure of Dutch companies in 1958, the Dutch completely dominated the Indonesian economy.\textsuperscript{(62)}

By 1958, after repeated failure at the United Nations and faced with boiling-over nationalist sentiment and anti-colonial hysteria, Indonesia pursued a much more confrontational approach. All Dutch companies and industries, including assets of private Dutch citizens, were confiscated and eventually nationalised.\textsuperscript{(63)} The first indication of the threat of war came from the statement of the Vice President Mohammed Hatta when he stated,

"Indonesia's claim to West Irian represents a continuation of her struggle against colonialism, a struggle to complete her national independence. In the effort to achieve the highest ideal there is no place for compromise, as history in all periods has demonstrated. In the course of the accompanying excitement, armed conflict can hardly be avoided.\textsuperscript{(64)}"

The highly charged anti-colonial rhetoric was accelerated further by the Dutch decision to speed up the decolonisation process in West Papua by the creation of the New Guinea Council, formation of political parties and the creation of national symbols. Soekarno's response was to mobilise for war to liberate West Irian. To maximise his patriotic appeal, he
chose the historic city of Jogjakarta to deliver his threefold popular command, the TRIKORA (Tri Komando Rakyat) on December 19, 1961. The first command was to prevent the creation of a neo-colonial state of Papua in West Irian. The second was to raise the red and white Indonesian flag in West Irian before dawn in the new year and third, to prepare for national mobilisation.(65) Soekarno's national mobilisation strategy to fight an anti-colonial war to liberate West Irian that threatened to draw the superpowers into the conflict forced a solution in his favour. The US-led western block persuaded the Dutch to give in to Indonesia's demands and resolved the issue diplomatically instead of by war. The US and the west's interest is discussed in sub-chapter, *The New York Agreement*.

Dutch - Australian cooperation
Early cooperation between the Dutch and Australia was mainly associated with bilateral relations between the Allies in the Pacific war. In November 1947, the six governments of colonies or dependent territories in the Pacific met in Canberra to decide on a common post-war policy and agenda to address the social and economic realities of their subjects in the region. The six nations namely, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, decided to establish a regional regime to be called the South Pacific Commission (SPC). The stated objectives of the SPC were, "to promote the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the South Pacific."(66)

In 1950, the change of the Australian government from Labor to Liberal-National Party coalition saw closer cooperation with the Dutch in New Guinea. The first meeting between the two governments took place in July, 1953. The principle underlining the proposed cooperation was summed up by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, R. G. Casey, when he stated:

"In view of the similarities between the peoples of the Australian and the Netherlands territories in New Guinea, and of the problems faced by the two administrations, discussions were held on practical measures of cooperation at administrative level between the Territory of Papua and New Guinea and Netherlands New Guinea."(67)

This cooperation was expanded further in 1957, 58, 59 and by 1961, including the exchange of students. Both Australia and The Netherlands proposed in a joint statement in 1957 that their closer administrative cooperation, "...was designed to leave the way open, if the inhabitants of the island one day so chose, for a united New Guinea."(68) Liaison officers were exchanged and the English language was accepted as the common language to be promoted for use on the island. Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck, however, preferred a much slower process of development.(69) But political developments in West New Guinea
moved faster than expected in the Australian half of the island. In April 1961, the first ever free elections were held in West Papua, where a Consultative Assembly, the Neiuw Guinea Raad, was established. One year earlier, in June 1960, as a response to the rapid political development in West Papua, the then Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck declared that: “The Australian half of the island would not be ready for self-government for another 30 years.”(70) Australia attended the opening ceremony of the West New Guinea Council on April 5, 1961 and continued to support Dutch efforts at the United Nations. Its position on the Papuan’s right to self-determination did not change after Indonesia and The Netherlands decided to settle their dispute through negotiation, and was willing to accept any decision made by the two countries. At the signing of the US-sponsored New York Agreement in 1962 by Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Foreign Affairs Minister Sir Garfield Barwick again reiterated Australia’s position when he stated:

“Australia welcomes the fact that the dispute was resolved without war and that the claims of the inhabitants of West New Guinea to be afforded self-determination have been recognised and provided for.” Referring to Australia’s responsibility to achieving same objective for the Papuans on the eastern half of the island, Sir Barwick stated in part; “Our people are sincerely concerned with the welfare and the future of the Papuan people. We have throughout considered it to be part of the self-determination to be given to these people that they should, if possible, have the opportunity to decide for themselves, in due course, whether or not they shall be united in one independent nation with the members of their own race who inhabit the western end of the island.”(71)

**The New York Agreement**

The New York Agreement signed by the Republic of Indonesia and The Kingdom of The Netherlands on August 15, 1962, was the result of successful mediation by President Kennedy’s special envoy, Ellsworth Bunker. The United States intervention to end the dispute had three political objectives. Firstly, to avert armed conflict in the Southwest Pacific that could affect the security interests of the West in the region. Kennedy’s government was very concerned about the consequences of increased backing of Soekarno’s confrontational policies by the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. In his confidential letter to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, President Kennedy stressed in part:

“...Such a conflict would have adverse consequences out of all proportion to the issue at stake. This would be a war in which neither The Netherlands nor the West could win in any real sense. Whatever the outcome of particular military encounters, the entire free world position in Asia would be seriously damaged. Only the communists would benefit from such a conflict.”(72)
By 1961, the conditions for serious confrontation with the Dutch were real and Soekarno had the international and domestic support he needed and the prerogative to give the command. Basically the United States mediation was meant to slow down the momentum of confrontation of which the Indonesian Communist Party was the prime mover in Indonesia. Considering the seriousness of the situation and possible major power conflict, Hilsman observed:

"The spectacle of the Soviet Union and the other communist countries supplying Indonesia with a billion dollars of military arms and equipment and the increasing communist influence that was the logical resultant of this aid had given the United States cause of worry. But the prospect of war between Indonesia and The Netherlands made it even worse."(73)

The second political objective was based on Kennedy's new foreign policy ie. constructive engagement and cooperation to defend the integrity and sovereignty of emerging nations. The policy was based on the assumption that, "emerging nations might be misled into a grand alliance with the communists against the west, even though they were not converted to communism; such an alliance could gravely threaten the world position of the United States."(74)

In 1961, for the first time during the conflict, the United States moved away from its neutral position to support a draft resolution at the United Nations on the West Papuan people's right of self-determination.(75) However, under the new policy and considering the strategic importance of Indonesia to the West, the United States again, changed its position on West Papua. The Dutch government was persuaded to accept a compromise that West Papua was the price to pay to keep Indonesia from going communist.(76) The third political objective of Bunker's plan was to find a workable formula to help the United State's ally, the Dutch, to bow out of the conflict with dignity, a condition, graphically described by the Dutch Prime Minister De Quay in his address to the Dutch Parliament in 1962, when he stated: "The Netherlands had been forced into it against our will and against everything we honour," he further stated that, "The Hague could not count on the support of its allies and for that reason, we had to sign."(77)

The issues of Indonesia's sovereignty over the territory and the Dutch concern for the right of self-determination of the West Papuan people were secondary considerations. The agreement neither endorsed Indonesia's sovereignty over the territory nor provided a protection guarantee for the right of self-determination to the West Papuan people.

The Dutch and Australian concerns for the right of self-determination of the Papuan people was compromised by the western alliance's anticommunist security interests. Indonesia's
territorial claim on the other hand, though weak in itself, succeeded because of Kennedy's intervention. Central to the West Papuan issue though generally ignored is the West Papuan people whose right of self-determination was recognised by the New York agreement but not afforded to them, as the following chapter seeks to analyse.
CHAPTER 3.

The act of free choice and the dilemma of self-determination.
The New York Agreement was formulated in a way to satisfy the basic demands of the parties concerned in the dispute. In the first instance, it fulfilled Indonesia's demand that the territory be incorporated into the Republic. Article 18 of the agreement allowed for direct control by Indonesia, with the condition that Indonesia hold a plebiscite by 1969.(78) This would allow the Papuan people to determine their own future thus satisfying the Dutch demand for the Papuan right to self-determination. The act of free choice in 1969, however, was state managed and raises the question of whether the Papuan people did actually exercise their right of self-determination. This chapter discusses the inconsistencies in the implementation of the principle of self-determination.

System and procedure
It was agreed that Indonesia would implement the act of self-determination in 1969, with the United Nation's advice, assistance, and participation.(79) The basic procedures for the act of free choice were detailed in Article 18 of the New York Agreement. These included: Consultation with people's representative councils to determine the best method and procedure to be used in the exercise; setting of an appropriate date, a clear system or formula whereby the Papuan people could freely decide whether they wanted to remain with Indonesia or whether they wanted to sever their ties with Indonesia.; and lastly, that all the adult West Papuans be guaranteed the right to participate in the act of free choice.(80) The agreement, however, did not provide a compliance mechanism to ensure that all these agreements were carried out and the procedures observed. Consequently, Indonesia felt free to carry out its own agenda outside of the agreement. Indonesia did everything possible from the moment it took over in 1963 to ensure that in the end the Republic would triumph. The transfer of authority by United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to the Indonesian government on May 1, 1963, was regarded by Indonesia as final. In 1964, President Soekarno publicly stated that “the self-determination in 1969 would not take place because the whole people of West Irian are in favour of the Indonesian Republic since they were part of the Proclamation of 1945.”(81) But after Soeharto took over power from Soekarno in 1965, he promised to honour the New York Agreement and would hold the act of free choice in 1969, but warned that, those favouring severance from Indonesia would be treated as traitors.(82) The Indonesian government decided that the appropriate method to determine the Papuan people's wishes was through the Indonesian system of musyawarah, or consultation with appointed representatives.
Rights and freedom.

Article 22 of the New York Agreement fully guaranteed the rights and freedom for the Papuan people, including the right of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly. All these rights and freedoms were already under serious threat while the UNTEA was in control. The Indonesian military presence had already taken its toll. The first Papuan police officer was killed one month after UNTEA took effective control over the territory, as a result of the conflicts of role between the police and the military in a civil society.(83) UNTEA was also forced to cancel a planned demonstration in Jayapura in November 1962 to demand a UN presence in the territory after May 1963 to protect the Papuan people’s rights and freedom, demands which were within the letter of the New York Agreement.(84) On the third of December, 1962, the oldest council in the territory, the Biak Regional Council, formed in 1947, issued a call to the United Nations and the UNTEA Administrator, Dr. Djalal Abdo for a plebiscite to be held under UN auspices in 1964. The Council bitterly resented the suppression of the Papuan people’s rights and freedoms and complained that the UN had handed over the Papuan people from Western colonialism to an even more ruthless power.(85) The Indonesian officials serving under UNTEA made sure the statement never reached the United Nations. Council members who maintained contact with senior non-Indonesian UNTEA officials were told that UNTEA was powerless to protect their rights to press ahead with the statement. This was tragically so, when every head of Department was seconded by an Indonesian and the numbers of battle-hardened Indonesian military in the territory were equal to the numbers of the UN security force. Van der Veur quoted one UNTEA official as telling him: “The astonishing aspect is that they (Indonesians) are doing this right under our noses. They didn’t even wait until the first of May 1963.”(86)

The Indonesians arrived in West Papua highly charged with patriotism and anti-colonialism and did not easily accept the fact that the Dutch had left peacefully. Based on their past bitter colonial experiences, they took necessary steps to prevent a possible Dutch comeback, either by covert means or otherwise. Immediately after the transfer of administration from UNTEA to the Indonesian government on May 2, 1963, Presidential Decree No. 8, 1963 was promulgated imposing a political quarantine on West Papua. Articles one and two of this Decree prohibited the formation of any political parties and any political activity. This was followed soon by Presidential Decree No. 11, 1963 known as the Anti-Subversion Decree. The formulation of subversion in the Decree embraced almost any attitude or behaviour, however passive, considered to undermine the ill-defined “aims of the revolution.”(87) The implementation of Presidential Decrees No. 8 and No.11, resulted in the wide spread repression as described by the first Governor, J. E. Bonay: “At first, I believed that the Papuan people would have the right to decide their fate in 1969 in accordance with the New York Agreement. But as soon as the Indonesians arrived in our country, totally unexpected
things began to happen. There were numerous brutalities, thefts, torture and maltreatment. In many different places, people were arrested; the prisons were full of political detainees.”(88)

Repression increased and so did the people's resistance, right up to the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Insurrection took place in different parts of the country; Sorong in 1964, the Manokwari region in 1965, Biak in 1968, Jayapura, Merauke and Jayawijaya in 1969.(89) A major uprising in the Paniai District of the Western Highlands in 1969, involving 30,000 tribesmen and 35 police deserters, was militarily crushed while the UN Representative Ortiz Sanz was in the country. The Paniai people demanded that the military be withdrawn so that the people could participate freely in the Act of Free Choice. Ortiz Sanz voiced his concern, but instead of investigating the violations he accepted the military report that the situation had been brought under control.(90) Similar demonstrations and protests were reported throughout the territory. One such protest was the public demonstration held outside Ortiz Sanz's office on April 11, 1969. It involved more than 2000 people and was led by Herman Wayoi and Penehas Torrey, both members of the Provincial Peoples Representative Assembly.(91) The demonstrators demanded freedom and the right to vote. Two other leaders of the organising committee and also members of the Provincial Peoples Representative Assembly, Mr William Zonngonao and Mr. Clemens Runaweri, notified the UN staff and attempted to reach the UN via Papua and New Guinea but were prevented by the Australian colonial authorities. They were granted asylum instead in Papua and New Guinea.(92)

Initially the authorities attempted to expand the existing Provincial Peoples Representatives Assembly by adding more members for a wider proportional representation to vote in the act of free choice. But during the initial consultations the sitting members favoured the one man, one vote system, referring to the New York Agreement as the basis of their choice.(93) Consequently, the Assembly was suspended and a new musyawarah (consultative) council of 1,025 representatives was appointed. The 1,025 members, though carefully selected, were constantly reminded that there was only one choice which was remaining with the Republic. The local newspaper, Tjenderawasih, reported on May 24, 1969, that a Major Soewondo of the Army had rounded up village representatives in the Sentani area near the capital Jayapura and reminded them: “I am drawing the line frankly and clearly, I say, I will protect and guarantee the safety of every one who is for Indonesia. But, I will shoot dead any one who is against us and all his followers.”(94)

The Musyawarah began in Merauke on July 14, 1969 and ended in Jayapura on August 2, 1969. The final results of the opinions of the 1,025 delegates were concluded in Jayapura as being 100% in favour of remaining with the Republic of Indonesia.(95)
The role of the United Nations

The ill-defined role of the United Nations as provided for by the New York Agreement was evident in the preparations and the conduct of the Act of Free Choice. Ortiz Sanz's mission was marred by obstructions and deceptions, as graphically described by Brian May's chapter, "The UN Fiasco." (96) Ortiz Sanz's own final report also mentioned the circumstances and difficult conditions under which he conducted his mission. For example, his original team, which included 50 people, was cut to 16 persons, including administrators. Indonesia insisted it could not afford to provide logistical support and accommodation for so many people. Obstructions and delays prevented full participation by members of the Mission, even Ortiz Sanz's advice for the use of universal suffrage in the Act of Free Choice was rejected out of hand as stated in his report: "I could suggest no other method for this delicate political exercise than the democratic, orthodox and universally accepted method of "one man, one vote." (97) While the rights and freedoms of the people were guaranteed by the New York Agreement, they were ignored throughout the exercise, as reported by Ortiz Sanz,

"The petitions opposing annexation to Indonesia, the cases of unrest...The flight of a number of people to the part of the Island that is administered by Australia, and the existence of political detainees, more than 300 of whom were released at my request, show that without doubt certain elements of the population of West Papua held firm convictions in favour of independence." (98)

Dutch reporter Link van Bruggen, of the Dutch News agency the Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau, reported one of the 1,025 delegates, a Papuan Pastor, Rev. P. Hokojoku, told him afterwards:

"The man who had totally destroyed my self-respect was Brigadier General Ali Murtopo, publicly acknowledged as being the chief brainwasher. For two hours, this special envoy of President Soeharto spoke to us. He began by pointing out that Indonesia as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia, is able to strike fear into any country. Jakarta was not interested in us Papuans, but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could create an island in the Pacific for us to immigrate there. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find a place for us there. This was not all. General Murtopo impressed upon us that 115 million Indonesians had fought for West Irian for years. They had made many sacrifices in this struggle, and they would not therefore allow their national aspirations to be crossed by a handful of Papuans. Short shift would be made of those who voted against Indonesia. Their accursed tongues would be torn out, their evil mouths be wrenched open. Upon
them would fall the vengeance of the Indonesian people, among them General Murtopo who would himself shoot the Papuans on the spot.”(99)

Indonesia did every thing possible to win, even terrorising candidates of its own choice to make sure that the end result of the act of free choice would represent the wish of the government.

On September 19, 1969, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a joint Dutch-Indonesian resolution that the General Assembly accept the Secretary General’s Report regarding the implementation of an Act of Free Choice in West Irian.(100)[Appendix 5] The resolution was basically seen as a final agreement by two member nations who decided to end their long standing conflict. The Secretary General’s Report itself was delayed until the resolution was tabled, giving ample time for members to study it. In that little time, Ghana, instead of asking for amendment to the existing resolution it proposed a new resolution “that the Papuan people be given another chance of Act of Free Choice in 1970 to be administered by the UN.” The Ghanian resolution was supported by only 30 countries. The resolution could have been effective if the Dutch, as the other interested party and acting on behalf of the Papuan people questioned or disputed the results of the Act of Free Choice.(101) The normalisation of relations with Indonesia where a lot of economic benefits are to be gained preceded the Dutch concience and moral responsibility to stand by the Papuans as they promised they would in the early 1960s.

While there was no debate on the content of Ortiz Sanz’s report because of the nature of the resolution by the two principal conflicting parties to end their dispute, many African countries questioned the method of musyawarah as a valid system for self-determination. The admission in Indonesia’s own report raises questions as to whether the Papuan people had indeed made a conscious decision of integration. In an attempt to justify the musyawarah system Indonesia stated, “In West Irian, there exists as is generally known, one of the most primitive and under-developed communities in the world.”(102) Tsamenyi and Blay observed, according to international law, that to validly exercise self-determination by integration, two conditions must be met. “Firstly, the integrated territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so its people would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes; Secondly, the integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples, acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted, and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, if deemed necessary, supervise these processes.”(103) Some members of the United Nations contended that,
“the way to ensure the Papuans right to self-determination was not through the musyawarah system but through an accelerated economic development of the territory, under the auspices of the United Nations, to bring them up to a level that could enable them to exercise their right of self-determination meaningfully.” (104) Criticism of the musyawarah system was summed up by the Sierra Leonian delegate who stated: "No society could be so primitive...in the modern world that the vital exercise of democratic government should be indefinitely denied to its people.” (105)

*No right anywhere exist to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property in a game.*

(Thomas W. Wilson, 28th. President of USA, 11th. Feb., 1918).
CHAPTER 4

Papoeanising versus Indonesianisation
In the late fifties and early 1960's, the Dutch made progress in West Papua towards decolonisation. West Papuans were exposed to liberal democracy with guaranteed rights and freedoms, including the right of assembly and the right of expression. They were given the chance to determine their own future with a choice of independence. They formed political parties and created their own national symbols, such as a national flag, national anthem, coat of arms and adopted the name Papua Barat or West Papua as the national name of the country. When Indonesia took over in 1963, it reversed the whole process of decolonisation. Clinging to its patriotic and revolutionary objectives, Indonesia ignored the upsurge of Papuan nationalism that resulted from the concrete measures taken by the Dutch. Indonesia conveniently took the view that Papuan nationalism and democratic institutions, including political parties created in the territory, were parts of Dutch colonialism and abolished them.

Incorporating the territory through political means is one battle won but to make it really a part of Indonesia, which requires the winning of the hearts and minds of the Papuan people, is another. Indonesia assumed that Papuan nationalism was a Dutch creation and could fade away in time if economic and social conditions in the territory improved. But Papuan nationalism has lived on and the idea of self-determination is actively promoted even by the younger generation born after integration.(106)

Writing on self-determination in decolonisation, Davidson proposed that the foundation of decolonisation was:"the recognition and indeed the acceptance of the principle that the consequences of colonial conquest need to be reversed."(107) He proposed the following as the general characteristics of colonial conquest to be reversed in the process of decolonisation:
1. Military or total defeat of the conquered;
2. Land expropriation;
3. Imposition of colonial rule by:
   (a) destabilising the indigenous socio-economic systems to adapt and adjust to the order desired by the conquerors;
   (b) modification or outright rejection of the indigenous culture wherever it conflicted with the culture of the conqueror to ensure the overall dominance of the conquerors over the indigenous ways of life.
4. Systematic and continued subjugation of the conquered people to preserve all that has been mentioned in, 1, 2 and 3 above. Subjugation revolved around the principle of dominance over the conquered.(108)
This chapter discusses differences in the aspects of "Papoeanising" and "Indonesianisation" as subjective propositions of nationalism. Papoeanising is Dutch for "Papuanisation" which refers to localisation in the decolonisation process, but with a strong connotation of Papuan identity which is the opposite of Indonesianisation. Aspects of social and economic development, which are the direct indicators of advancement or otherwise of the Papuan people are discussed in this chapter.

**State control and aspects of domination**

One of the important aspects in the process of decolonisation, is participation by citizens in policy and decision making which entails the empowerment of the people and elimination of external domination. Though not conquered militarily, West Papuan people were subjugated to accept foreign control and domination which the government attempted to reverse in the later part of its rule of the colony. In the 1950s and early 1960s, efforts were made to Papuanise positions in the government institutions. This was encouraged through a democratisation process with two important components. Firstly, Papuans were trained and prepared to take over important functions in the territory's government. Secondly, Papuans were allowed to exercise their democratic rights in a civil society, which included free political debate, participation in elections and the creation of political institutions with public offices to formulate policies on public affairs.(109) The program may have still been in its infancy by any standard, however for the Pauans it was a giant step forward, considering their long history of neglect. The Pauans hoped that being anti colonial, Indonesia would be in the best position to accelerate the programs of localisation or self-government. But the opposite happened, Indonesia regarded Papoeanising as a colonial ploy to mislead the Papuans and put an end to it.(110)

To understand the sentiments on localisation, or Papoeanising, one must also understand the history of the territory itself as mentioned in chapter 2, a point also quoted by RIOP from Van der Kroef, "Indonesians mainly from eastern Indonesia, dominated decision-making positions in the colonial administration as well as the church hierarchy in West Papua."

The localisation programs in the 1950s and early 1960s, removed this domination. Through the Papoeanising process, for the first time in their history of neglect and abuse, the Papuans were directly involved in decisions and policies affecting their lives and country. Lagerberg contended, that the level of political and democratic development in West Papua by 1962 was comparable to Papua New Guinea in 1972.(112) The Dutch policy may have led to a neo-colonial situation, which in their own world the Papuans may not fully comprehend, but whether for the best or worst, they were given the opportunity to participate in a process to shape their own destiny.
The Indonesian government activity during the United Nations mandatory period (1963-1969) concentrated on changing and consolidating the government structure and authority. Greater emphasis was focused on re-educating by way of indoctrination and persuading Papuans to conform with Indonesian values and political way of life, a process that continued beyond integration in 1969. The government’s first action was to eliminate democratic institutions which were regarded as colonial institutions that may hinder the process of integration. To legitimise these actions, Presidential Decree No.8 of 1963 was promulgated to place West Papua under political quarantine; banning all political activity including rights and freedom. Decree No.8 was complemented by Presidential Decree No.11,1963, widely known as anti subversion decree.(113) This decree granted un-limited powers to the security forces to eliminate any opposition in the society. On December 1, 1963, political parties formed during the Dutch administration were abolished. Leaders of seven out of the twelve existing political organisations in the territory were persuaded to sign a declaration to the effect that their organisations had been voluntarily dissolved. At the same time, democratically elected Regional Councils including the Nieuw Guinea Raad (New Guinea Council) were also abolished. In their place appointed Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or Peoples Representative Assemblies (DPRD) were installed. However the government decided to maintain the basic system of administration left by the Dutch (Article 4, Presidential Decree No.1,1963) during the transitional period.(114)

On the transfer of authority in 1963 the administration of the territory consisted of six residencies, 23 districts and 79 sub-districts. Article 7 of Presidential Decree No.1, 1963 empowered the Governor to create further administrative structures if deemed necessary. As a result, by the end of 1969 three additional Kabupatens (Residencies) were created and the number of districts increased from 23 to 36 and sub-districts from 79 to 144.(115) [see, also Appendix 2).

The Governor is appointed by and directly responsible to the President, the same as to the Queen under the Dutch administration. The governor is assisted by the Vice Governor and a Secretariat. He presides over the governing council which consists of Directors or Heads of Departments of which there were eight at the time of the transfer of authority in 1963. The restructuring and consolidation continued after 1969. For example, the number of departments or services increased from eight in 1963 to ten in 1969 and 38 by 1981. Many of these Departments or services were extensions of departments of the central government. The Interior Minister’s decision No.134 and 135, 1970, granted a number of departments autonomy status and came directly under the Governor’s authority.(116) They included the Department of Education and Cultural Affairs, the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Health, the Department of Works, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Forestry. By 1984, two additional departments had been created, they were
the Department of Fisheries and the Department of Finance. The Governor was vested with powers to establish autonomous departments and services further down at the District level if required. (117) While the Dutch and Indonesian administrations follow the same model, based on a revised Javanese Kampong institution, the Indonesian version in West Papua is systematic and complete. This system, with effective personnel management, could be a very effective vehicle for service delivery or society control.

Coleman and Rosberg proposed in their study of political institutions of the newly independent states in tropical Africa that integration of national politics was a necessity in the process of nation building. (118) To achieve this, two dimensions of relationships in the society must be considered; the vertical dimension, that is, the relationship between the elites and the masses, and the horizontal dimension, which concerns the homogeneous relationship between ethnic or regions that constitute parts of the nation state. This approach focussed on citizen's participation in nation building, the main pre-occupation of newly independent countries.

In West Papua the feudal Javanese Kampong institution, which the Dutch had improved and used successfully in Indonesia, seemed to work well for Jakarta's purpose. It is a well structured system, from the Governor right down to the village level, which was the main idea in Coleman and Rosberg analysis, that there is a direct communication between the elites and the masses and closer relationship between regions and the masses themselves. (119) In practice, ideas and policy feedback in Indonesia is minimal. Especially in troublesome areas like West Papua, East Timor and Aceh, effective vertical relationship is more useful for security purposes than for efficient service delivery or ideas and policy feedback. Apart from the centralised civilian institutions, with strategically placed military personnel in them, there is also the military establishment that performs dual functions in the society. The Governor is appointed by the President and is not only the head of the province, but is representative of the central government. However, he has no power over the military. The civilian authority and the military complement each other in the administration and strict control of the society, a fact recognised also by the United Nations Representative Ortiz Sanz in his 1969 report to the United Nations. (120)

**Integration politics**

The process and the manner in which West Papua was incorporated into the Indonesian Republic in 1969 attracted a wide range of criticism. But the effect of integration that followed created an even more lasting debate. Incidents of insurgency, uprisings forcing thousands of refugees across the border into neighbouring Papua New Guinea, punitive action by the Army and human rights abuses seemed to be more frequent after incorporation. It is useful to ask "why did the Papuan people accepted incorporation in 1969 and almost
immediately after, resist Indonesia?" Sjamsuddin suggested the colonial policy as the main reason. He pointed out that there was no political integration between West Papuans and Indonesia, specifically, horizontal integration. He pointed out the factors that exacerbated this condition as being: (1) Lack of communication between Papuans and Indonesia during the Colonial administration. The only meaningful political relations with Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period were promoted by Indonesian political exiles and those serving in the colonial administration. (2) Lack of education which deprived Papuans of access and socio-political relations with Indonesian people and anti-colonial movements that erupted since 1920. (3) The Dutch policy of creating Papuan elites, with the view of separate identity and anti-Indonesia. (4) The deteriorating economic conditions in the 1960's fuelled the separatist view promoted by the Dutch. (121)

According to Sjamsuddin, setbacks in the process of horizontal integration deteriorated further because of some negative actions unconsciously committed by Indonesia. No specific actions were given however, Rumbiak went further by suggesting the mistreatment of the Papuans by the military as one of the set-back factors of development. (122) Sjamsuddin concluded that, to eradicate the roots of discontent and mistrust, these factors must be addressed. Ignoring them would only strengthen Papuan nationalism. (123) In other words treat the symptoms to cure the illness. Interestingly he made this conclusion in 1989, 27 years after Indonesia was in effective control of the territory.

With reference to Sjamsuddin's analysis, we could further draw conclusions, based on new realities of the territory, after 34 years (1962 - 1996) of effective Indonesian rule. (1) On vertical integration, the infrastructure is well entrenched, more than ever recorded in the history of the territory. From Jakarta and the Provincial Governor down to the village level, the whole territory is systematically controlled by the government, which the Dutch never achieved, even though feedback from the masses on policy is questionable. Delegated representation through Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) is also well established. During this period the people have participated in five national elections, through proportional representation. The Dutch only organised one regional election in 1961, in which direct election and proportional representation methods were used.

(2) On horizontal integration, there are much greater socio-political relations between Indonesians and the Papuans at every level of the society. These occur through religious organisations, academic associations, sports organisations, military service, Parliament, political parties and the work place. These horizontal relations help Papuans relate to other Papuan tribes, which was limited during the Dutch colonial administration.

(3) There was a tremendous expansion in all levels of education. Indonesia should pride itself on its achievement in education. The output of educational elites that social scientists and
writers refer to as the brains of Papuan nationalism was by ratio much higher, compared with what the Dutch produced by 1962.

(4) Employment: under the Dutch administration, especially under the Papoeanising program, education and training were planned to meet employment requirements. In other words, people were trained to be employed or employment was guaranteed. The Indonesian government took a different approach. Policy and planning was irregular. The government projected West Papua as well behind in development and the Papuans as the most disadvantaged because of colonial occupation. They should be given priority consideration. But in actual implementation of development plans known as Repelita there were no policy guidelines to guarantee the end results.

Theoretically the huge bureaucracy of the territory should be able to use qualified Papuans. But there are no basic policy directives to achieve or even encourage it. Subsequently the Papuans are denied most opportunities as Savage noted, "If you ask the Indonesian officials about government jobs they tell you, there are no vacancies. But that doesn't stop them from bringing in more and more of their people from Java."(124) Papuans could not complain because migrants are also Indonesians and had the same rights to compete for jobs. But would a Papuan trust the notion of fair competition in an environment where corruption becomes a sub-culture? There are always explanations for why Papuans can't get jobs. Kompas correspondent Nicholas stated (quoting the Papuan Mayor of Jayapura, Michael Menufandu),

"if the people are frustrated because the wealth of their land is reaped but they received nothing in return, and job opportunities are dominated by immigrants, all with government encouragement, naturally they will react; .."and the easiest way for the authorities to shut them up is to link them with the OPM. They were forced to join the OPM."(125)

(5) The notion that the Dutch promoted anti-Indonesia sentiments and Papuan nationalism. This is an old colonial myth, based on the assumption that subjects were too stupid to think for themselves, someone else was therefore responsible for their behaviour. The Dutch used these kind of arguments against Papuans who opposed their authority; they were all regarded as Indonesian revolutionaries. As late as 1993, Aditjondro proposed that Indonesians, especially social scientists, should put Papuan nationalism into its proper perspective in the national integration politics. The approach was to adopt a neutral position to clearly identify the real source and substance of the phenomena.(126) Only then, policy makers were able to provide sound guidelines for dealing with West Papuan public affairs. Commenting on a similar approach to ethno-nationalism that existed in most Pacific island states, Crocombe observed, "....almost every island country and territory has had to deal with ethnicity as a
major social and political force. It might have been better had this been understood earlier, acknowledged and more adequately provided for ."(127) For Jakarta, one of the best solutions was population transfer to assimilate and deculturalise the Papuans and force them to adapt to what they perceived as culturally advanced values and way of life, generally projected as Pancasila (State Ideology).

Transmigration

Though transmigration was part of integration politics, it is treated separately because of its direct impact on the process of Papoeanising versus Indonesianisation. Transmigration is a national program of population transfer from one part of the country to the other which originated from the Dutch colonisation policy implemented in the 1930s. The Dutch policy was to provide cheap labour to develop plantations. Based on the same colonial objective of exploiting cheap labour for increased productivity, the British took 50 - 60,000 Indian labourers to Fiji in 1879, which had devastating effects on Fijian politics in the 1980s. At the time of Fiji's independence, there were 214,000 Indians and 200,000 indigenous Fijians. (128) Increased Indian population and political influence affected traditional leadership and system of control in the Fijian society. France took Vietnamese and Javanese labourers to work in New Caledonia (Kanaky) and New Hebrides (Vanuatu). In West Papua, the Dutch sent a group of Javanese colonists in 1936 to work in coconut plantations and farms near Merauke.(129) Over the years adaptation and assimilation between Melanesian and Malay cultures evolved naturally without any drastic effect. This was possible because the impact of Javanese culture on the predominantly Melanesian culture was minimal.

Indonesia re-introduced the colonisation scheme which it called "transmigrasi" in 1963, with the multi-purpose of national integration and greater security for which subjugation was necessary for places like West Papua and later East Timor where there was opposition to Indonesian rule. The current transmigration schemes that began in West Papua in 1966 and escalated in the 1970s and 1980s had already brought havoc in the minds of Melanesians and caused irreparable damage to their land and culture.(130) Transmigration was an important part of Indonesia's five year development plans, known as Repelita. The target for Repelita 1 (1969-1974) was 45,000 families; for Repelita 2 (1974-1979) -100,000 families; Repelita 3 (1979-1984) - 500,000 families, Repelita 4 (1984-1989) - 750,000 families. If calculated on the standard of 5 persons per household, it was estimated that the operation would have transferred more than 7 million people from over-populated Java to the outer islands by the end of 1989.(131) Areas of settlement were not necessarily fertile, however for the military, they were strategic for civil control as the Anti Slavery Society noted:

"Transmigration fits easily into the army's concept of territorial management, part of its ideology of dwi fungsi (double functions) of military and civil security. This
principle explained the presence of many military personnel in senior government posts and the presence of army posts in most villages throughout West Papua, most specifically along the Papua New Guinean border. (132)

Initially up to $600 million loan was made available for the program by a consortium of international agencies including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Economic Commission, the United Nations Development Program and industrialised countries like the United States, West Germany, The Netherlands and France. The loan commitment was reduced after world wide protest in 1985/1986.

The 1988 reports indicated a shortfall in the number of transmigrants settled in West Papua, because of international protest and local resistance to the program. By funding "Transmigrasi," it was claimed the World Bank violated its funding principle of, "not supporting projects on tribal lands unless the tribal society was in agreement with the objectives of the project as they affect the tribe, and unless it is assured that the borrower had the capacity to safeguard tribal populations and their lands against harmful side-effects." (133) According to the London-based Survival International, Indonesia might have reached the projected target through a new strategy of what is known as spontaneous transmigration. (134) Through its "Move East" development program, the government attracted thousands of migrants from other parts of Indonesia to come to West Papua. The rate of success of settlement for this group was maybe higher because they came well prepared and were determined to make a living in West Papua. It became evident in urban centres that these spontaneous migrants were the most aggressive in seeking jobs or engaging in petty economic activities, often monopolising a whole range of activities. For example, the taxi industry, on-shore fishing and vegetable production for city markets. (135)

*Land alienation and dispossession*

Basic policies and decisions concerning acquisition of land for public purposes for example, transmigration, plantations, logging, mining and industries were made by the central government with no consideration for or consultation with ethnic or tribal peoples in the targeted areas. The policy originated from the Dutch East Indies Agrarian Act of 1870, which declared "swidden lands as waste lands" and were classified as "state lands to be disposed of as the state saw fit." (136) This basic law was re-enforced by the Indonesian constitution. Section 3 of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution states: "Land and water and natural riches therein shall be controlled by the State as the highest authority to manage their utilisation for the maximum well-being of the whole people." (137) Furthermore, the Basic Forestry Act: Clarification Act No. 2823 of 1967, clause 17 which states: "The rights of traditional law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of the establishment of Transmigration settlement." (138) The Indonesian government despite its rhetoric of anticolonialism it
continued to pursue colonial policies on land and resources utilisation. For the Melanesian Papuans, this was a direct intrusion and attack on their tribal laws. Attachment to land is so deep-rooted it is always the most sensitive to deal with and a source of conflict in the Melanesian society. Meggitt noted this when an Enga man, sentenced to prison in a land dispute, said: "You can put me in jail many times, you can kill me, cut my head if you wish, but my body will walk back to that land. It is ours." (139) Unfortunately, this was a court case in Papua New Guinea where Court of Law is still respected. In West Papua, whether through the courts or without them, the Enga man’s suggestion may prove to be the only solution. For example in 1983, three members of the traditional Land Rights Defence Committee of Nimbokran, Southwest of Jayapura were publicly executed by the army for resisting the usurpation of their lands. (140)

About 24 strategic regions throughout West Papua were targeted to provide more than 700,000 hectares of land for transmigration purposes. In these regions 3,000 hectares were allocated to 500 families, which was divided into 3.5 hectares per family of 5 persons. (141) Land was also lost to logging and mining. Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR), centralised community farming was another important economic activity that required land, of which token compensation was offered, with official pressure or military threat; in most cases after the land had already been appropriated. The government appropriated 2 million hectares of land for oil palm, rubber and cocoa plantations. One example was the commercial cocoa plantations in the Manokwari area financed by London-based Commonwealth Development Corporation and locally controlled by PT. Coklat Ransiki. (142)

The US company, Scott Paper, was behind another foreign investment project. In 1988/1989 the company planned to establish a eucalyptus plantation and pulp mill near Merauke at the cost of US $ 653.8 million. It was granted 790,000 hectares of land which covered the entire subsistence farming area belonging to Auyu, Marind, Mandobo, Yahray and Kauum people. A further 15,000 hectares was allocated for townships to house workers and offices and 60,000 hectares for transmigrants to produce fresh food to supply the townships and provide cheap labour. (143) There was a strong international reaction against the project because the company was known to have violated health regulations in Maine in the United States. There was also serious concern because the company used lethal dioxin in the paper bleaching process at its pulp mills. "Eucalyptus plantations are currently the focus of international concern because they absorb too much water, use up nutrients and threaten desertification." (144) In 1989 the company announced its withdrawal, but the project continues under government supervision, with undisclosed investors.

Regardless of protests, land alienation continues because the government views it as essential for development. But for the Papuans, no development and no money on earth will ever heal
the pain of land lost. Spiritually, the land is where the spirits of their ancestors dwell and they can not disown it. Land can not be sold or owned individually as a property. Leasing could be acceptable to the Pauans but the Indonesian government could not compromise what it sees as national interests with individual (Tribal) interests.

**Military involvement**

One of the important objectives of transmigration is "strengthening the nation's security and defence." (145) General Benny Murdani, the former Commander In Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces described it as,

"the only program in the economic field that must quite categorically be tied in with defence and security considerations. The preparation of sites and removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus, because the choice of locations is related to the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) concept of territorial management in the regions. This is why the armed forces must be involved at the earliest possible stage in selecting the sites." (146)

Based on the ABRI's concept of total security, many military personnel were well placed in senior government posts. For example Major General C.T. Santosa, a former Commander in West Papua, who also served in East Timor, was appointed Secretary General of the Transmigration Department. The Army in West Papua, as Whittaker described it, "was another government apart from the Provincial government; it ran the administration of its own civic programs and made its presence known by establishing military posts in villages throughout the country and transmigration sites, especially along the border with Papua New Guinea." (147) In October 1985, President Soeharto issued an instruction to the Army to become involved in the choice and preparation of transmigration sites. He was known to be obsessed with the program and no official dared to oppose it. (148)

Traditionally for the Melanesian Pauans, like elsewhere in Melanesia, occupation of land through deceit was a declaration of war. The Amungme Tribe took action again and again against the Freeport Mine because of the alienation and destruction of their land. The same kind of actions were taken by the Me people in Sorong and the people in the Mamberamo area against oil exploration and the Arso and Genjem people against plantation and transmigration settlement. The most convenient way to justify repressing local opposition is to link them with the separatist movement, the OPM. Officials always blamed OPM as the instigator for people's opposition to government policies. (149)
Exploitation of natural resources.
For the duration of Dutch colonial rule of East Indies, West Papua was perceived as a wasteland, it had no economic value for colonial expansion. Its only useful purpose was to shield the lucrative spice trade in the Moluccas against competitors and as a holding place to isolate Indonesian independence activists.(150) The wasteland myth was shattered by the discovery of oil and some of the largest sources of copper and gold in the world at Ertsberg in 1936.(151) The Second World War prevented further research but the potential of West Papua’s natural wealth was no longer in doubt.

United States and Dutch companies were able to produce oil in the late 1930s, and continued after the war to reach 35,000 barrels per day by 1949. But apart from oil production in the Sorong area, and until the territory was transferred to Indonesia, the Dutch did not exploit copper and gold reserves on Ertsberg. Things changed drastically after Soeharto took over from Soekarno in 1965. Faced with the legacy of economic stagnation and high foreign debt as a result of the politics of confrontation, Soeharto’s New Order government passed Law No.1, 1967 on Foreign Investment and opened Indonesia to foreign investors. (152)

Through geological surveys in the 1970s, including mapping assistance from Australia, the government compiled a detailed district by district natural resource data base which it used to attract national and foreign investment in the Province.(153) The response was massive. With Jakarta’s approval national and foreign companies systematically subdivided the whole of West Papua into concessional regions, completely ignoring the people who lived there. By the 1980s, West Papua was firmly in the grip of colonial exploitation, of which economic interests were more valued than humanitarian considerations, as noted by Nkrumah: “The origin of colonisation is nothing else than enterprise of individual (states) interests, a one-sided and egotistical imposition of the strong upon the weak.”(154) The difference, compared to old colonialism, was that multinationals exploited the resources, Indonesia conducted the subjugation and the suppression, and both shared the profits. In the case of the Freeport mine, the military was employed full-time to guard the mine against the land owners.

Colonial exploitation of the 19th century had finally arrived in West Papua. Problems associated with resource development increased, for example, loss of land, environmental destruction, forceful removal of people, cultural degradation, human rights abuses and denial of employment opportunities and services to locals. Indonesia seems to value resources and investors more than the people it claims to be its citizens. If political independence means anything more than just having their own flag to wave, the Papuans now fully understand the difference.
Mining

Leading the assault on the natural wealth of West Papua was the New Orleans based company, Freeport McMoran, which was incorporated in Indonesia in 1967 as Freeport Indonesia. It started production in 1973 of mainly copper, with gold and silver concentrates at the trial capacity of 3,500 Tons Per Day. Production increased gradually to 9,200 TPD in 1980, more than 20,000 TPD in 1989, 52,000 TPD in 1992 and 61,000 TPD by 1993. Total investments in the project mainly from USA, Japan and Germany grew from a mere $175 million in 1973 to over US$ 1.2 billion in 1993. The capacity production at 61,000 TPD is calculated at the yield of 670 million pounds of copper, 725,000 ounces of gold, at the value of US $ 950 million per year.(155) With the successful introduction of heavier machinery, the expansion of production would increase rapidly as reported by George A. Mealey, Executive Vice President of P.T.Freeport Indonesia: "...we will move by mid year to another plateau of 66,000 TPD throughput. This plateau will be short-lived, however, as the construction activity will continue. Our next goal by mid-1996 will be 90,000 TPD of ore throughput," as shown in the graph of the accompanying page. This will produce nearly one billion pounds of copper, 1.3-1.5 million ounces of gold and 1.7 million ounces of silver. This level of production would put Freeport Indonesia, as stated by Mealey, "the second largest producer of copper and the largest producer of gold outside South Africa." The new discovery at Grassberg, which holds 758 million tons of ore reserves, pushes up the reserve estimates to an expected total output of 15 billion pounds of copper, 22 million ounces of gold and 37.4 million ounces of silver. This would give it the largest published gold reserve of any operating mine in the world.(156) But this is only part of the success story of Freeport Indonesia. It has expanded operations from the original 10,000 hectare lease, location of current mining, to 2.5 million hectares covering an area stretching from Paniai near the Birds of Paradise Bay to the border with Papua New Guinea, as illustrated by the map on appendix V. The whole region is densely populated and culturally, the most sensitive area in the country.

As Indonesia's only copper mine and one of its biggest revenue-raising companies, Freeport is very important to the Government. As such, the government is obliged to provide security for the operations of the mine. Army posts are established at strategic points to provide 24 hours a day protection, especially because of the on-going conflict between Amungme land owners and the mine which would be discussed under sub title Human Rights. Currently there are 20 foreign companies operating in the country, mostly prospecting and the numbers are increasing, encouraged by the success story of Freeport Indonesia.(157)
Oil Production

In 1970, South African controlled company Petromer Trend, together with Indonesia’s own Pertamina, took over the concession areas around Sorong where US and Dutch companies had been drilling in the late 1930s. They struck new finds that produced more than 100,000 barrels per day which climbed to full capacity at 130,000 barrels per day by 1982. Further exploration continued causing conflict in some parts of the country. For example, the conflict in the Inawatan area, south of Sorong, between Conoco – Pertamina, a joint US, Indonesian venture and the local land owners, left several workers dead. More than 600,000 sago palms (source staple food) and other important trees were destroyed during the exploration. Another example was the case of the Mamberamo. Shell (Dutch) was exploring for oil in the Mamberamo area but was forced to abandon its seismic surveys in 1983 because of repeated attacks by the OPM. As with mining, for security reasons oil production provides fewer jobs for the local Papuans, who make up about 20% of the total work force in the oil industry, a big contrast to the intake of 80% Papuans in the work force during the Dutch period.

Logging

Eighty percent of West Papua is covered with primary rain forest which the Papuan people depend on for their subsistence economy. Of this, 75% has been awarded in concessions to national and international investors as shown in the accompanying map. Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese companies involved in the forest industry were awarded 15 million hectares, the rest of the logging concessions are taken out by national companies. Like the mining sector, the central government approved concessional agreements with investors without prior consultation with the land owners. Under this system, compensation to land owners was practically non existent. Consequently, Papuans not only have lost benefits derived from the industry, but also the means of their very livelihood. The Korean company PT You Lin Seri, for example, has destroyed 400,000 hectares of forest, including sago palms (source of staple food, sago) in the Demta area, West of Jayapura. These activities have disrupted the way of life of Yaefer tribe, Tiert and the Amberon people. Further west from Demta is another concession area of 600,000 hectares of forest along the Mamberamo river which is a timber project operated by Mamberamo Forest Industries, a subsidiary of Australian McLean Ltd and an Indonesian company, PT Sansaporinda Mandiri. Mc Lean injected 80% of the finance needed for the project and hopes to make $ 2.5 billion. Tribes directly affected by this project are the Pagai, Dabra, Papansena, Sikari and the Taiyafe people.

Another example of what the Papuans regard as reckless plunder of their resources is the activities of a Japanese Multinational, the Marubeni and an Indonesian company, Pringadi at
Bintuni Bay in the Manokwari region. This joint venture of $7 million, controlled by Marubeni, is logging the extensive mangrove forest in the area and destroyed sago palms, shrimps and prawn breeding grounds in the process. The other companies operating in the same area are PT Agoda Wai Hitam, PT Bintuni Utama Murni Wood Industries and PT Saguindu Sari Lestari. The latter operates a huge sago processing plant in the area.(164)

The Moi people's case at Makbon Sub-district, north of Sorong involved a military-owned company, PT. Intipura. The nine clans of the Moi tribe confronted the company in the forest and took their protest to the authorities, as the Dayak people of North Borneo did in the 1980s. The Moi people never knew that 339,000 hectares of their land had been granted in concession to PT.Intipura. While negotiations were held, logging and destruction continued until their case was recorded on camera by Jakarta and Canadian-based environmental groups and attracted international attention. The following question was put to them on camera by an environmentalist: "If the company offers a very large compensation package, will the people accept it or refuse it?" The answer was direct: "We don't want compensation of any kind, in any form (women's voices in the background), "We don't want it". Our love for nature is firm. It does not matter what kind of compensation they offer, we will firmly refuse it. The only thing that endures is land; the natural environment. That is what is permanent."(165).

Fishing

One of the promising industries in West Papua that started in the 1970s was commercial fishing. Fishing is based in two main centres, Sorong for the southern waters and Biak for the northern region. In the south, the sea between Sorong and Torres Strait Islands is rich with shrimp. Fourteen Japanese shrimping boats comb the area for this natural resource. The ships are refrigerated and their technologically advanced system offers little employment opportunities for the locals.(166)

For the northern region, French company Transporche have built a modern canning factory in Biak in 1987 to cater for lucrative tuna fishing in the northern waters. The southwest Pacific sea, stretching from the Papua New Guinea border in the east to the border with the Philippines in the northwest and between Micronesia in the north and the island of New Guinea is rich with fish, especially tuna. Japanese, Taiwanese and Indonesian fishing boats exploit this readily available resource.(167) However local Papuan participation in the industry is non-existent. The government's rhetoric on priority development in West Papua lacks the incentives to guarantee Papuans participation. Even on-shore fishing is dominated by Bugis and Makasarese fishermen from Sulawesi, whose destructive methods of fishing are well known, as far as the Northern Territory of Australia.
**Human right violations**

Human rights violations occurred during the Dutch rule and increased considerably after West Papua became a Province of Indonesia in 1963. Papuans who genuinely opposed colonialism in all its many guises were persecuted by the Dutch and later by Indonesia. Some leaders, for example Silas Papare, J. Karubui, Moses Weror and Johanes Dimara were forced by the Dutch actions to align themselves with Indonesia in the fight to end colonialism. Others, for example, Herman Wayoi, Lukas Rumkorem, Dirk Ayamiseba, Eliezer Bonay, Johan Arika and Frans Kaisiepo were victims of Dutch mistreatment but remained in West Papua. When the Dutch began to decolonise in the late 1950's, Herman Wajo's group in the Partei Nasional (PARNA) or the National Party was vocal in the push for accelerated development with demands for a definite agenda for independence by 1970. However the brief and belated efforts to decolonise ended when sovereignty over the territory was transferred to Indonesia in 1963.

Because of their anti-Dutch background, most of these leaders were rewarded with important positions and honorary titles which meant they were seen by many Papuans as Indonesian collaborators. Unfortunately, as pointed out by George Aditjondro, they were not recognised as Indonesian patriots in the official history books. But they remained genuinely anti-colonial. When Indonesia committed the same abuses against the people, they opposed the government the same way as they did to the Dutch. This new condition forced them to live a life of double identity. But in a strictly controlled system like in Indonesia, double identity is a constant battle for survival. Eliezer Bonay for example, was made the first Papuan Governor in 1963 but two years later, his double identity cost him his job; he was jailed and upon his release, he escaped to Holland where he continued to support the OPM until he died in 1989. Both Papare and Karubui, members of the Indonesian national Parliament and supporters of integration, were put under house arrest for their criticism of indiscriminate bombings in Manokwari in 1965. Moses Weror, who joined the Indonesian campaign to liberate West Irian, became a staff member of the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra, but escaped to Papua New Guinea in 1970. Weror later became the Chairman of the OPM Revolutionary Council formed in Port Moresby in 1983. Moses Weror and Herman Wayoi addressed a big demonstration in Jayapura on 11 April 1969, to demand freedom and the application of a one man one vote system in the proposed act of free choice. Double identity seemed to be a way of life in West Papua. As soon as one's cover was blown, he either ended up in jail, died mysteriously, escaped into the safety of the jungle with the guerillas or became a refugee in Papua New Guinea. If Indonesia was the safe refuge and ally against Dutch colonialism before, it was now Papua New Guinea, that even though not officially, provided refuge and a natural ally against cultural genocide.
Occasional human right violations occur in other parts of Indonesia, but not in a systematic way as they do in West Papua and East Timor. In West Papua one has to have a Travel Pass to visit relatives in one's own village, or to report to the authorities if one is to go hunting or gardening a long distance from the village.(173) In 1988 a Swiss pilot Theodore Frey, working for the missionaries, stated after escaping from the country for the safety of his own and the others that he worked with: "During my whole stay in West Irian I never met a single family which had not lost at least one member because of torture or other acts of violence by the Indonesians. In my opinion, and based on my own experience...the Indonesians are bringing not development, but systematic extermination."(174)

Patterns of Human Right Violations

Human right violations in West Papua occurred in a variety of forms or patterns. For example, political imprisonment, including exile from West Papua; extrajudicial execution, torture and ill-treatment; disappearance, sterilisation through family planning and institutionalised covert discrimination. The latter mainly involves the exclusion of Papuans from important policies and decisions that may affect the cultural values and way of life of Melanesian Papuans.

In its 1991 report on Indonesia, Amnesty International stated: "There are currently about 130 political prisoners from Irian Jaya serving sentences up to life imprisonment, the majority of whom were convicted under Indonesia's sweeping Anti-Subversion Law (1963). Amnesty International believes that at least 80 of these may be prisoners of conscience, people imprisoned for their non-violent political activities or beliefs. They include 37 people sentenced to prison terms of up to 20 years for their involvement in a peaceful flag-raising ceremony in December 1988 and at least 30 others accused of planning a demonstration to commemorate the 1988 flag-raising one year later. One of those imprisoned was a police officer accused of distributing copies of a patriotic song to high-school students; he was sentenced to 13 years in jail. Four others, who had sought asylum at the Papua New Guinea Consulate a few weeks before their arrest, were sentenced to terms of between 6 and 12 years."(175)

On August 3, 1995, Catholic Bishop Mgr.H.M.Munnighoff of Jayapura disclosed a report on the atrocities committed by the military against the land owners of the Freeport mine area in the Timika Sub-District of Fak-Fak. This is a new development, because in Indonesia, especially in West Papua, NGOs never go public on such issues involving the military. Acting on their behalf, ACFOA (Australian Council For Overseas Aid) released the full details of the report which revealed a systematic campaign of terror against the local Amungme people.(176) The report attracted official responses from both Australia and the Indonesian governments. An investigation by the Indonesia's Human Rights Commission and visits by
the Australian Ambassador confirmed the existence of the atrocities, involving 22 people massacred and another four disappeared, feared dead. If it was not for the Bishop’s report, like many other cases the whole incident could have been gone unnoticed.

The Timika atrocities made public for the first time patterns of human right violations that had occurred in West Papua for many years. Eyewitness accounts and reports by survivors revealed, for example, constant intimidation through surveillance, threats, rapes and destruction of properties; interrogation involving torture, summary executions, murder and disappearances.(177) The Amnesty International reports and other reports from the country for example a personal account given by the chairman of LEMASA in the Timika area revealed that the Timika incident was only the tip of the iceberg.(178)

A report compiled by a group of Papua New Guinean public servants and academics of West Papuan origin for example, gives a year by year graphic description of horrendous atrocities and other human right violations committed in the territory, involving more than 300,000 people reported by researcher Kees Lagerberg as missing.(179) Some of the cases, one in particular as reported also by Amnesty International, involved a 22 year old OPM activist Soleman Daundi: "The soldiers reportedly cut off his head and then carried it with them to the local military head quarters in Wardo, South Biak, displaying it in a number of villages on the way, ..it was than handed over to a priest in Wardo and buried.”(180) Another case involved five prisoners of Teminabuan in the Sorong District. They were Adam Korem, Johan Jelmou, Christian Karet, Otimel Isir, and Arnold Gebse. On the night of January 17, 1967, the five prisoners were taken out of Teminabuan prison and driven to the highway towards Ayamaru. A few miles out of town near a bridge, the truck stopped; they were ordered out and instructed to stand against the bridge. They were then machine-gunned down. Johan Jelmou rolled off the bridge, though mortally wounded with his intestines virtually out of his abdomen, he managed to get back to his mother's house where he lived long enough to recount the story and indicated where his friends bodies could be found before he died in his mother's arms.(181) Johan's older brother, Martin Jelmou was in charge of the International Relations Department of the OPM based at the border with Papua New Guinea. He was arrested on April 13, 1969 after a public demonstration in front of the UN representative's office in Jayapura. His whereabouts have never been known. Unconfirmed reports indicated that he too was executed at night. Another example was the case of five women from Babuma village of Jayawijaya District in the Central Highlands. They were Banduk Thago, Pani Pagawak, Nerak Makna, Yabена Thago, Etina Thago, and Apisa Thago. They were pack-raped first before being shot dead. Their abdomens were ripped open and their vaginas stuffed with sweet potato leaves and red berries. The army unit that committed this atrocity was from the KODIM (Regional Command) Wamena under the command of Colonel Albert Dieng.(182)
The report by these public service officers of West Papuan origin also listed many mysterious deaths and disappearance cases for example (to give only a few prominent names) the case of: (1) Baldus Mofu, former member of the New Guinea Council and member of the Provincial Peoples Representatives Assembly. He had been jailed many times and tortured. On December 8, 1979, he was abducted from his home at night, two months after he was released from jail and bashed to death. (2) Penehas Torey, also former member of the New Guinea Council and member of the Regional Peoples Representatives Assembly. He was last seen, being taken away from his home in Jayapura by the Military on 13 April 1969 for questioning regarding the public demonstration on 11 April, in front of the United Nations Representative's office to demand free elections. He was never to be seen again. (3) Another former member of the New Guinea Council, Godlief Mirino of Sorong. He was also abducted from his home at night in 1968 and never returned. (4) Permenas Awom, a leader of OPM in Manokwari, surrendered following an amnesty granted by President Soeharto in 1967. He was put on board Naval vessel Hyggene sailing from Manokwari to Biak, a trip that normally takes 6 hours (one way). The boat returned 2 hours later without Permenas. Queries by members of his family were silenced by threats. (5) Silas Papare, was a member of the Indonesian National Parliament and supporter of integration but who turned into a critic of government policies in West Papua. He went to hospital in Jakarta on 19 February 1979 after he felt unwell. He died in hospital but his wife and family were not notified for several days. Cause of death was not established. (6) Rev. Johannes Mamoribo, then Deputy Governor. He felt unwell and went for check up at the military hospital in Jakarta in 1976. He died from an operation which his wife discovered only after the body was sent home in a swollen condition. (7) Frans Kaisiepo, former Governor, witness of the vote on the resolution at the United Nations in 1969, the very person who invented the name Iryan (Irian), died in hospital in 1979 in exactly similar conditions as Silas Papare.(183)

There was no hard evidence that the government was involved in all these mysterious deaths and disappearances. However, the government's actions of withholding information about the causes of death and/or threatening relatives who requested evidence were regarded as sufficient indication the government has something to hide. The Timika case seemed to confirm the existence of human right abuses and strengthened the Papuan's long held belief that many other cases before Timika were indeed committed by the government in a disguised plan of genocide. Realistically, it was more of an attempt by the government to prevent popular resistance.

Mr. Dirk Ayamiseba claimed that the government was indeed responsible for all these mysterious deaths and disappearances. "Whether collaborators or not, Indonesia never trusted Papuans."(184) Mr. Dirk Ayamiseba was the former chairman of the Regional Peoples Representative Assembly (1969) and together with the late Frans Kaisiepo formed part of the
 Indonesian delegation to New York in 1969. Ayamiseba and Kaisiepo planned to reveal the truth about the fraudulent nature in the conduct of the act of free choice and express the true wishes of the Papuan people. But, while in New York, they were strictly guarded and were never given a chance. They realised too late that they were brought to New York as a show case to endorse the Indonesian claim that Papuans wanted integration. The results of the Act of Free Choice were never debated. Ayamiseba and Kaisiepo returned home very bitter; their attitudes and behaviour changed completely after that experience. According to Dirk Ayamiseba, like his close associate, the late Frans Kaisiepo, his days were also numbered. Most specifically, because himself and Kaisiepo were important witnesses of the fraudulent act of free choice and also because while he was the chairman of the Regional Peoples Representatives Assembly he attempted to cooperate with the United Nations representative Dr. Ortiz Sanz to administer a "one man one vote " system in 1969. For Jakarta, such actions by a high ranking official were a serious treason for which the penalty is severe. His attempt prompted the government to suspend the Assembly and appoint a new body to conduct the act of free choice on behalf of the people. Originally, before Ayamiseba's attempt, it was proposed that the existing Assembly be expanded to have a wider proportional representation. Mr. Dirk Ayamiseba escaped from Indonesia in 1969 with the help of the pop band, the Black Brothers, of which his son Andy was the manager. He followed the band to Papua New Guinea and then to Holland where he re-claimed his Dutch citizenship. In 1984, he moved with the band to Vanuatu and after the change of politics in that country where the Papuans were no longer welcomed, they moved to Australia in 1988 where they now live.(185)

The ultimate goal of decolonisation as proposed by Davidson (1978: 185) was the restoration of the colonised people's dignity by recognising their identity as a people with values. This includes the recognition of their existence on their land with resources and culture and traditions as they were before being conquered. Based on the same principle the Dutch conducted local government systems in West Papua and promoted the idea of self-government. Under Indonesia, the process of decolonisation was reversed back to a colonial situation where the Papuans are now a conquered people stripped of their power, their land, resources, their culture and values. As early as 1964 (5 years before the "act of free choice") Van der Veer detected this trend of recolonisation when he wrote:

"To speak now of Papuan "freedom of choice" in the light of recent developments would be like beating a dead horse. And indeed the plebiscite was to provide not the opportunity for commencing a transition from colonialism to self-government, but further proof of the need for armed struggle."(186)
CHAPTER 5.

The OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) resistance
Organisasi Papua Merdeka, literally means Organisation for Independent Papua. It was a name given by Indonesian officials in the early 1960s as reference to organised Papuan resistance against Indonesian rule and with the aim of establishing a separate West Papuan state.(187) Otherwise the most common term used by the Papuans is Gerakan Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement. OPM has become a symbol of resistance to cultural, economic and social injustices perpetrated against the Papuan people, their land and environment. In essence OPM represents West Papuan nationalism. It unites the hopes and aspirations of all tribes and regions in West Papua in their efforts to establish an independent state of West Papua. However, in terms of democratic centralism, OPM is not a clear cut organisation. It represents an aggregation of patriotic forces in West Papuan society at home and abroad. Independent study of the OPM is difficult, which leaves writers and social scientists to depend on secondary information. Robin Osborne, Peter Savage, Beverley Blaskekk and Ron May for example, through diverse sources of information were able to piece together a profile of the OPM. Others for example Sharp, Lagerberg, Nyeneke and Blay concentrate on some specific aspects of the OPM in relation to the West Papuan society as a whole. The latest attempt is by Djopari, an Indonesian scholar of Papuan origin. Djopari analysed OPM and its resistance to Indonesian rule within the acceptable norms of self-censure and constraint as normally practised in Indonesia. His careful analysis, though radical by Indonesian standards fell short of defining West Papuan entity and Papuanisation as a proponent to Indonesianisation, even localisation within Indonesia.

Because of its armed resistance and separatist nature, OPM is not only outlawed but also declared as subversive by the Indonesian government.(188) For over 33 years the military arm of the OPM has engaged the Indonesian armed forces in an undeclared liberation war. This chapter will discuss OPM in its literal form as a nationalist force and as a opponent of Indonesian rule and Indonesianisation.

Organisation and resistance before 1969.
Writers and journalists assess the effectiveness of OPM, using the Western model of organisation based on the principle of democratic centralism. In practice this model can not be separated from demographic considerations which form the basis for the nation state as noted by Lagerberg,"though people have always associated in some sort of localised units, congregation into nation states is a modern development; indeed in its fully fledged style it is essentially contemporary."(189) In a colonial situation, the state is created long before the formation of a nation. In the West Papuan situation, both factors were absent until after the Second World War.
Forced to abandon control over Indonesia with economic interests at stake the Dutch began to develop both the state bureaucracy and the Papuan nation towards the end of 1950s and maintain its presence in the region. But the bureaucracy and democratic institutions, for example, local government councils and political parties that were supposed to form the basis for a would be Papuan Nation state were regarded by Indonesia as Dutch colonial instruments. They were banned or easily removed by the Indonesian government. The Papuan elite promoted by the Dutch was forced to go under ground. The best known resistance organisation was the one led by Terianus Arongear in Manokwari which launched military operations against the Indonesian armed forces on 28 July 1965. The Manokwari based OPM however, due to the strict containment policies of the government, could not effectively communicate with leaders overseas for international support. Uprisings occurred on Biak island, in Teminabuan and Ayamaru but the biggest uprising after the 28 July 1965 attack on Manokwari, was the Paniai uprising in 1969 involving some 30,000 tribesmen and a platoon of police deserters. (190) The second well organised OPM group was the FKPPB (Front Komando Pembebasan Papua Barat or Front Command for the Liberation of West Papua) based at the border with Papua and New Guinea, led by Agus Jarisetow, Jacob Prai and Bob Kubia. This group had the advantage of communicating with exiled leaders for example, Nicholas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, Phillemon Juffuway and Herman Womsiwor through Papua New Guinea. (191)

The strategic idea of starting resistance activities on the border with the Territory of Papua New Guinea was born in a meeting in 1964 on the rocky coast between Tami river East of Jayapura and Territory of Papua and New Guinea border village of Wutung. In attendance were then governor Eliezer J.Bonay, A. Kubia, Fred Atabu, Robby Itaar, D. Ayamiseba and Agus Jarisetow. This rocky coast is now commonly known as Pantai Bonay or the Bonay Beach to remember that historic decision. The organisation established at the time was known as GENAPA (Gerakan Nasional Papua or the Papuan National Movement). As it approached the 1969 act of self determination, GENAPA was transformed into FKPPB (Front Komando Pembebasan Papua Barat or Front Command for the Liberation of West Papua). More people from different organisations and groups joined up with FKPPB including Dutch trained Sergeant George Tukayo, former member of New Guinea Council, S. Suwae, senior bureaucrat Ben Joku, Martin Jelmaw, Dan Kafiari, Rex Rumakiek, Uri Joweni and a group of College students. Recruitment prospects were very high but the movement lacked weapons. Most of the pre-occupation of FKPPB was on anti-Indonesian propaganda, which was communicated to leaders overseas, journalists and Australian Intelligence Officers active in the area. (192) The other OPM groups, apart from occasional attacks on the military to register their opposition to Indonesia, smuggled out thousands of signatures, statements and letters addressed to the United Nations and foreign governments. Individual overseas West Papuans were issued with mandates to speak on behalf of the people and represent West Papua. (193)
Even though it was a one way communication, expectations were high that the world was listening and West Papua would be delivered its independence in 1969. The only practical achievement of FKPPB in 1969 was a big demonstration by 2000 people on 11th April in front of the United Nations office in Dok 5, Jayapura demanding a one man one vote. But that did not affect the government's total control over how self-determination was conducted. The result of PEPERA (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat or Peoples Consultations) was as bad as expected but the news of United Nations endorsement of the results was devastating for the Papuans. (194)

A new chapter of resistance, the OPM after 1969

For almost one year the OPM leadership and the people could not recover quick enough from the shock of the UN endorsement of Pepera. The Chairman of FKPPB, Agus Jarisetow was seriously wounded in an Indonesian attack and after treatment in PNG, he decided to stay. On advice from leaders in Europe the majority of FKPPB staff also sought asylum in PNG which the Australian government was too willing to offer. However this was only a temporary setback for OPM. In that critical situation a new leadership emerged. The remaining leaders of FKPPB under Mr. Jacob Prai, Phillemon Jarisetow and Uri Joweni, were joined by Lieutenant Seth J. Rumkorem, Dr. D. Mauri, Administrator Amos Indei and Martin Tabu. Later, James Njaro, John Otto Ondowame and many more under ground activists and deserters from the capital Jayapura also joined. (195)

On 15 July 1970, OPM leaders decided in a meeting at Victoria Head Quarters that the struggle must continue while efforts be made to improve the short comings within the OPM. One year later on 1st July 1971, Rumkorem led forces which captured the Waris military command post of ABRI and used the Radio to proclaim an independent West Papua under a Provisional Revolutionary Government. A simultaneous declaration was also made in London by veteran politicians, Herman Womsiwor and Phillemon Juffuway. On the 22nd of July 1971, a draft liberation program, full cabinet and constitution were finalised. Seth Rumkorem was elected by the National Council as President to head the Executive Branch of the government while Mr. Jacob H. Prai was elected the Chairman of a 35 member Senate. (196) [see, also, Appendix 8]. In general the Provisional government seeks to challenge every policy of the Indonesian government.

Important parts of the liberation program included: (1) Training of full time guerilla fighters and regional commanders. Candidates were fully instructed in guerilla war fare and national politics. At graduation after 4 to 5 months they were sent back to their home regions and districts to set up similar command structures. The recruitment included some OPM supporters from Papua New Guinea. (2) Establishment of liberated zones where alternative education, health and economic activities would be implemented to challenge Indonesian
policies. Foreign representatives, both cabinet members and envoys with credentials were given specific instructions to lobby for diplomatic and material support to these programs. As a rule these officials must take a National oath before performing their duties. The rule applied also to those who have completed guerilla war fare training. (197)

On June 10, 1974 the first Foreign Minister of then self governing Papua and New Guinea, Mr. Maori Kiki, invited Rumkorem to Port Moresby for consultation. Aided by an Australian adviser, Kiki urged Rumkorem and the OPM to work with Indonesia to attain full autonomy. He offered to mediate with Jakarta. Rumkorem replied that he had to report back to the National Council and the people. On August 10, 1974, Mr. Maori Kiki expanded his consultation by inviting Revolutionary Provisional Government as well as overseas leaders in Europe for a meeting in Madang on the north coast of PNG. Only Herman Womsiwor from New York and Phillemon Juffuay of Holland joined Rumkorem’s group to fulfil Maori Kiki’s invitation. Mr. Nicholas Jowe and Mr. Markus Kaisiepo of Holland decided not to go. A further meeting was called for October 1974, but again Jouwe and Kaisiepo did not turn up, which angered Somare’s government. The cost of all these initiatives were met by the Papua New Guinean government. (198) Somare’s government initiative to engage OPM leadership was in an effort to understand the strength and the weaknesses of the OPM which then provide data for its future policy with Indonesia especially about its common border.

As Papua New Guinea was preparing to attain full independence in 1975, Herman Womsiwor succeeded in securing diplomatic support for RPG from President Sedar Sengor of Senegal in West Africa. The Bureau of Information of RPG was officially opened in Dakar, Senegal on the 1st of July 1975, headed by Mr. Ben Tanggahma. On 1st of September, 1975, 15 days before Papua New Guinea’s independence, Maori Kiki wrote to Rumkorem conveying a demand from Jakarta endorsed by Somare’s government that OPM leaders should surrender with their weapons to Papua New Guinea or Indonesia and would be pardoned. It took only 3 minutes for the National Council to decide that, “we will never surrender.” (199) In December 1975 Indonesia launched an attack on Victoria head quarters from the air but there were no casualties.

Organisational change and leadership conflict
As Papua New Guinea celebrated independence on the 16th September 1975, RPG also celebrated two important events. The first training program for full time guerilla fighters was completed successfully. Also news came through that apart from recognition by Senegal, Guinea offered $ 10 million worth of logistical support to RPG. Rumkorem's commanders decided that 10 million worth of material is too much to handle; there was no secure libered zone yet. They agreed instead for $ 1 million, which would be used to plan for a bigger project code named "Mammbruk 1." A visiting official from Guinea, Mr. Carlos was fully
briefed and satisfied with the scheme. As soon as Mr. Carlos left the Melanesian region with out incident, planning and preparation began. Survey and patrol teams were dispatched immediately to collect data from targeted zones to complete the final plan. While this plan was under way a total black out was imposed on personal contacts outside OPM areas; all letters were censored and visits by supporters and overseas members were carefully supervised. Most members did not know about the details of the project. However the strict security checks and activity have already created expectations that some thing big was going to happen. Only the top commanders and the Executive members knew where the aid would come from but no details were given on when and how it was going to be delivered. According to Rumkorem, for security reasons, details would be made available only after 95 percent of the whole plan was accomplished.(200)

In February 1976 the information about African countries promising material aid to RPG appeared in the local media in Papua New Guinea. A thorough check revealed that the information was leaked through Mr. Jacob Prai’s personal contact in Papua New Guinea in the form of boasting about the successes of RPG. But the damage was already done, renegotiation would be difficult. Rumkorem demanded an explanation from Mr. Prai. But instead of attending a full Council meeting for the purpose, he retreated to his tribal home grounds taking with him one third of the members of the Council. The second attempt for an emergency meeting on 26 March 1976 also failed, Prai and his followers refused to attend. On the 1st of April 1976, Rumkorem applied special emergency powers of the constitution by dissolving the Council. "This was done to show some credibility while attempting to repair the damaged relationship with our friends in Africa" said Rumkorem.(201) Prai retaliated by calling Rumkorem a dictator and in turn he used his position as Chairman of the Senate to sack Rumkorem. The latter claimed that Prai’s decision to sack him was unconstitutional. The majority of the members of the National Council were still with him but he considered it necessary to settle the differences before calling a full Council meeting as required by the constitution. Through intermediaries including Papua New Guinea officials he asked Prai to work out a conciliation, but Prai refused to have any thing to do with Rumkorem.(202)

On 18 May 1977, troops loyal to Prai arrested two Cabinet members, Dr. D. Mauri and M. Indey. They also held captive two families loyal to Rumkorem, M.Womsiwor and Rumanasen as insurance against retaliation. Chief of Staff Col. P.Jarisetow ordered a full operation to free the hostages. But, Rumkorem intervened to avert unnecessary blood shed and also to prevent possible prolonged after effects of the conflict.(203)

On the 15th July 1977, the OPM National Congress re-affirmed Rumkorem’s position as the Chairman of the OPM and Philemon Jarisetouw as Secretary General. The congress recognised the 3 main ideologies that existed in the West Papuan society i.e. Liberalism,
Nationalism and Socialism. Rumkorem claimed that these three ideologies had existed in the main political orientation of political parties formed in the late 1950s. The congress also defined the role and responsibilities of OPM and its members in a crisis situation such as the damaging effect of the conflict between Prai and Rumkorem. Prai’s group did not attend the meeting. In October 1977, Papua New Guinea’s Defence Commander, Gen. Ted Diro, arranged a secret meeting with Rumkorem. Rumkorem’s team was flown to Wewak for the meeting. Diro was later reprimanded by the Prime Minister Michael Somare for not consulting with him about the meeting. In April 1978, PNG’s Foreign Minister Mr. Ebia Olewale invited Rumkorem and Prai for a meeting arranged for 14 April 1978. Rumkorem attended the meeting which was also attended by Gen. Ted Diro and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr. Tony Siaguru. The Defence Force Head Quarters at Murray Barracks in Port Moresby was chosen as the venue for the meeting. According to Rumkorem, Prai did not turn up; the plane that was sent to pick him up came back with a message that he wanted to consult with Mr. Nicholas Jouwe in Holland first. The Hon. Ebia Olewale MP gave him a further time until 18th April 1978, but Prai remained absent. John Ondowame, deputy to Mr. Prai claimed that Rumkorem’s account was inaccurate, himself and Prai did meet with the Papua New Guinean officials.

Instead of reconciliation Prai declared a Defacto Republic of West Papua and invited Mr. Nicholas Jouwe of Holland to form a government. But Jouwe did not want to take charge, forcing Prai to take full responsibility. The Head Quarters of the Defacto Republic of West Papua is known as "Markas Besar" or the Central Headquarters. The Military arm of the Defacto RWP is known as PAPENAL which shares the same meaning as Rumkorem’s TPN or the National Liberation Army. Unlike the RPG, most of the Ministers of the Defacto Republic of West Papua are overseas based, making it difficult for regular meetings. The Defacto Republic of West Papua adopted the same constitution as the RPG and accepted July 1, as West Papuan National Day. The OPM Secretary General Phillement Jarisetouw called it a coup d’etat against RPG which failed a long time before it was even declared.

On the 10th of January 1979, Prai instructed a clean up of the border region from the coastal people and islanders. This was done in an attempt to destroy RPG that still operates as normal maintaining the office in Senegal and other international support networks. The first casualties being two youths, Jan Nussy and Enos Burumi, who were shot dead near Skotiaha village. Both of them were adopted by villagers of Skotiaha. Prai’s instruction forced most of Rumkorem’s men to move camp to the Mamberamo District, 60 kilometres west of the Capital Jayapura and maintained only two forward posts at the border. Rumkorem claimed that his Cabinet took that decision in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and bloodshed among fellow patriots.
On 27th September 1978, Mr. Jacob Prai and his deputy Otto Ondowame were arrested by the Papua New Guinean police in the northern border town of Vanimo. They were invited by West Papuan residents in Papua New Guinea to meet Prime Minister Michael Somare. Both Prai and Ondowame were granted asylum by the Swedish government. Efforts by mediators to avert further fighting that may cause harm to the struggle failed. On the 8th July 1981, troops loyal to Prai attacked one of Rumkorem’s camps. The main targets were the Chairman, Seth Rumkorem and the Secretary General, Phillemo Jarisetow. Both men had already moved to the new Mamberamo Head Quarters known as Markas Mamta. The attack resulted in 5 people being killed.

**Aim and Program.**

The political agenda of the OPM is to end Indonesian occupation and establish an independent and democratic state of West Papua. The first step towards the realisation of this national goal was the proclamation and formation of a provisional government with a constitution on the 1st of July 1971 simultaneously with the launching of a national liberation program which Rumkorem detailed as follows:

"Stage 1, the Preparatory stage which was planned for 1973 - 1975/6, which involved the building of a strong and disciplined national organisation. The training of full time guerilla fighters in guerilla warfare and national politics. This is a pre-condition for any Papuans who want to dedicate their time and energy for the national struggle. At the completion of their training after 4 to 5 months they are sent back to their home Districts to establish command structures and begin the process of national political education and defence against Indonesia. Commanders from the Victoria Headquaters will be sent out to follow up and provide leadership direction. They will assess the strength and weaknesses of each regional organisation which is important for further planning. Urban guerilla training was put off because of the conflict and split between Prai and Rumkorem.

Stage 2 (1977-1980 delayed to 1980 - 1983), elimination of Indonesian presence and influence in the rural areas by adopting Mao Tse Tung’s offensive-defensive strategy. This stage involved the attack on military posts and networks which is also a means to accumulate weapons and supplies. The main aim is to establish and control liberated zones. It is assumed that counter attack and active engagement by the TPN and Indonesian forces will create a population movement either to urban centres or to OPM controlled areas. The organisation was well prepared for that situation. Supporters in the urban centres were strictly advised that unless they are in real danger, they must remain in towns for the implementation of stage 3 of the liberation program. Only a few Papuans in the Indonesian armed forces were able to desert to assist in the training of new
recruits. Also teachers and health workers were asked to retreat to run schools and clinics. The success of stage 2 will very much influence the implementation of Stage 3.

Stage 3 (1984 - 1987), putting pressure on towns by way of calculated attacks and propaganda. If conditions allow, the OPM will occupy some towns for as long as possible while assessing the progress of the international lobby. The length of time between stage one, two and three could be shortened or extended, depending on the success of each stage. The realisation of each stage may also create its own conditions which the organisation must accommodate without altering the main plan. For example OPM would have to run schools, clinics and enforce law and order in the liberated zones." (212)

Two other important parts of the RPG program taken over by the OPM in 1977 were, the "cultural aspects of resistance" and "international lobby for support." Rumkorem was satisfied with the cultural program under the late Arnold Ap and Tom Ireuw. Ap and Ireuw's cultural group known as the Mambesak Group was well known through out the country. Some of the positive outcomes of the programs were the growing realisation of Papuan identity and the sharp contrast it created between Indonesians and Melanesian Papuans which directly challenge the government programs of Indonesianisation. The formation of the also well known Pop Band, "the Black Brothers" was one of the outcomes of this cultural renaissance. The band under the leadership of Andy Ayamiseba have taken up the challenge of promoting West Papuan culture and with it the West Papuan and Melanesian identity on the level of popular music. The Black Brothers was used by the OPM in 1979 to assist the escape of two prominent leaders, the former governor E.J.Bonay and the former Chairman of the Peoples Representative Assembly, Mr. Dirk Ayamiseba. (213) The music of Arnold Ap's string band the Mambesak and Andy Ayamiseba's Black Brothers have been instrumental in the fostering of West Papuan or increasingly Melanesian identity and unity. The two bands have created a new musical revolution in West Papua and the whole region of Melanesia. Andy claimed that his band is always ready to take up any assignment from the OPM as long as it is a realistic plan with clear and achievable objectives. (214)

Rumkorem was not convinced by the strategy of his International Affairs Director Ben Tanggahma (Minister of Foreign Affairs under the RPG structure), after the conflict with Prai. African supporters lost confidence in the OPM because of that. This is one of the main reasons why he was to leave West Papua in 1982. Apart from some of the pre arranged contacts he will also spend time with Tanggahma to tie up specific aspects of the lobby with the national efforts and re-assure OPM friends in Africa. "We are not aiming to fight an all out war with Indonesia, therefore we have to capitalise politically on our successes in the field "said Rumkorem. (215) But as a matter of priority the effect of Prai - Rumkorem conflict
needed to be explained to friends in Africa. He was planning to return to West Papua with concrete ideas and support for Stage 3 of his national liberation program. In September 1982, Rumbkorem's party in a motorised outrigger canoe was intercepted by Papua New Guinean officials off Rabaul and charged with illegally entering Papua New Guinean waters. He was accompanied by his lawyer Mr. Fred Atabu S.H., body guard Cpt. Louis Nussy and 5 crew members. They were on the way to Vanuatu from where further travel was prepared. Rumbkorem's group won the court case claiming that they entered PNG territorial waters only to seek fuel assistance, after which they will continue their journey to Vanuatu. Rumbkorem, his lawyer, and Body Guard were granted political asylum by the Greek government and were flown to Athens where they have lived ever since.(216)

As refugees with limited resources and far removed from West Papua, both Prai (Sweden) and Rumbkorem (Greece) have lost most of their influence and power to re-organise. In the absence of Mr. Jacob Prai, his leadership was taken over by Martin Tabu who surrendered to Indonesia in 1980. Elki Bemey took over the leadership but after his troops raided one of Rumbkorem's camps and killed 5 people, he himself was murdered by his own men. The leadership was taken over by James Nyaro who surrendered to PNG in 1985 and was granted political asylum in Ghana, West Africa. On Nyaro's departure Laurence Doga and Fissor Jarisetouw contested the right for the leadership. Doga's men captured Fissor and handed him over to the Papua New Guinean officials in October 1986. In December 1986, Fissor's men retaliated and Doga died as a consequence.(217)

Rumbkorem's leadership was handed over temporarily in an official ceremony to Chief of Staff Col. Philemon Jarisetow, the Secretary General of the OPM in July 1982. In November 1988, Philemon was ambushed and killed by an Indonesian patrol near Nimbokran, south west of the capital Jayapura. The leadership was taken over by the highest commander Col. Uri Joweni who was the Minister for Defence and Security under the RPG structure. Joweni is still in the country and resumed all responsibilities of the resistance however he lost many of his commanders and instructors during the Stage 2, campaign (1980-1983/4). His senior commander in charge of general operations, Eliezer Awom was captured by the Indonesian army and is now serving life imprisonment in Java while some junior officers became refugees in Papua New Guinea.(218) The conflict between Prai and Rumbkorem thus greatly affected the implementation of Phase 2 of the Program. Communication between national and overseas leaders and between Headquarters and Regions was damaged. As a consequence Phase 3 was never implemented. Also Phase 2 was partially implemented and only in Region 1 in the north stretching from Mamberamo river to the border with Papua New Guinea. The other Regions especially the Central Highlands and the Southern Region have carried on their own without Central command or support and direction, resulting in much unnecessary loss of lives. The Phase 2 campaign drove many refugees into Papua New Guinea.(219)
The decimation of RPG, bitter infighting and strong Indonesian lobbying caused the withdrawal of Senegalese government support of a $60,000 annual budget to run the Information Bureau in Dakar, Senegal. It was a devastating set-back for the OPM, "thanks to Prai’s action," said Rumkorem. Another secret contact with a promise of material support from a country whose name Rumkorem did not want to reveal, could not be followed up. The secret communication code has been decoded by one of Rumkorem's former Cabinet members in Europe who disagreed with the country in question.(220) The only remaining contact is Vanuatu within the Melanesian region itself. The OPM, through its representative Rex Rumakiek has built a close relationship with the leaders of the then New Hebrides National Party since the early 1970s. The Party changed its name in 1979 to Vanuaaku Pati. During the celebrations of Vanuatu’s independence in July 1980 the Chairman of the OPM was invited as one of the VIP guests to the festivities. However, he was not able to fulfil the invitation and delegated Rumakiek to attend on his behalf, together with 3 other OPM officials including the Foreign Affairs Director from Senegal. After the celebrations Rumakiek (the author) was invited by the ruling Vanuaaku Pati to open an umbrella organisation in Port Vila to assist the struggles of Liberation and Land Right Movements in the Pacific region. It was hoped that the West Papuan cause together with similar causes in the region could be represented by international networks of this umbrella organisation.(221)

Problems and future prospects

The OPM national motto is "one people one soul" which is an ideal and guiding principle for national unity. But would all the diverse tribes of West Papua abide by this principle? It would be hard for tribal warriors to contain their feelings while working along side their traditional enemies. It was therefore very important when the OPM leadership decided in 1971 to include political education in their 4 months guerilla war fare training program. The training provided basic understanding of the complex relationships between the 250 tribes in West Papua and how each one of them relate to the national struggle.(222) "We could not afford to give them the military skills and weapons to kill each other or to kill innocent people, that will only benefit Indonesia", said Rumkorem. According to Rumkorem, suppressed feelings of hatred because of many years of injustice could make any uprising explosive and dangerous. Violence is inevitable in any liberation struggle, but it could be minimised. It is therefore very important for the struggle to have a disciplined organisation to control such a situation when it happens, these all need training.(223) RPG and the training program no longer exist but this doesn't mean that the OPM is short of skilled man power to re-start similar programs. It is rather a policy matter which requires organisational decision and direction.

Lack of central leadership

Since the departure of Prai and Rumkorem followed by the death of Secretary General, Phillemeson Jarisetow, and the capture of Eliezer Awom, the OPM never regained the RPG
level of national leadership. Col. Uri Joweni, Minister for Defence and Security under the RPG structure is the only member of the National Council who is still in the country. But with the capture of his senior commander and instructors in exile he found himself again in a defensive situation. The Indonesian army re-captured the liberated zones which contributed to the flood of refugees into Papua New Guinea in the 1980s.

Leaders promoted by overseas based factions can not regain the confidence and support of urbanised and educated elites in West Papua itself. The upraising in Manokwari in 1965, 1967 and the upraising in Enarotali in 1969 proved that cooperation between rural and urbanised Papuans is very important for any successful campaign against Indonesia. But to win back the urbanised Papuan's trust and cooperation the Prai, Rumkorem factor must be eliminated or reduced to manageable level. The conflict between Prai and Rumkorem had created tension and enemies between inland and coastal tribes; as a result people, who otherwise could have been useful to the OPM ended up as refugees in Papua New Guinea. Whenever urbanised Papuan's underground activities are discovered, instead of joining the guerrillas they escape overseas. Another aspect of Prai, Rumkorem factor is the insensitivity of coastal and urbanised Papuans to the dignity and social values of Tribes that provide sanctuary and food supply to OPM men whilst endangered safety network and sustain ability of programs. The delicate tribal relations in West Papua require special qualities in Papuans who seek to lead. Those who claim Papuan national leadership should never attempt to exploit tribal conflicts to pursue national fame and glory. On the same premise no national objective, it doesn't matter how important, should ever ignore local values and integrity.

There have been a number of attempts to unite all the overseas Papuans in order to provide better leadership and better communication between different West Papuan groups and organisations in the struggle. A National Congress held in Holland in 1982 was well attended but lacked input from West Papua itself. The Congress established a Presidium that will gradually represent all known West Papuan groups and organisations. If endorsed by a full Congress planned for July 1982, this body could have become the highest authority of the West Papuan people overseas.(224) The Presidium chaired by veteran politician Mr. Marcus Kaisiepo in its first working meeting, appointed Rex Rumakiek as the West Papuan people's representative in the Pacific based in Vanuatu.(225) [Appendix 9] The proposed Congress was postponed indefinitely because of lack of finance. The following year, 1983, a similar meeting was held in Papua New Guinea for the same reasons. Unlike the one held in Holland that condemned action taken by Prai's group by attacking and killing other West Papuan patriots, the meeting disapproved the use of Government structure such as under RPG and DEFACTO to pursue an international campaign.(226) They claimed that the basic idea of provisional government based in West Papua pursuing a program to challenge Indonesia had beed destroyed by the creation of DEFACTO. To return to that situation there needs to be
much organising in the country. Two groups emerged from this meeting, one led by Mr. Bas Fairio and Mr. Martinus Kambu and another one by Mr. Moses Weror. Fairio and Kambu’s group sought to bring all different groups under one united front. Their approach included dialogue with Prai and Rumkorem. Weror took a giant step ahead of the Holland based Presidium and Fairio, Kambu’s United Front and formed the West Papua Niugini Revolutionary Council. The idea of national council originated from the collective meeting between RPG and DEFACTO supporters but never materialised because of Weror’s action. Both sides regard him as an opportunist. He is indeed a political opportunist as most politicians are, when riding on the popularity image created by the media. To make his organisation look more credible he used the OPM address in Vanuatu to capitalise on the progressive image created by the independent foreign policy of that country.(227)

In September 1984 the National Congress of the ruling Vanuaaku Pati of Vanuatu held on the island of Pama resolved to recognise the OPM and requested its government under the leadership of Fr. Walter Lini and Barak Sope to provide whatever assistance deemed necessary to advance the West Papuan cause. Subsequently the two important leaders of the OPM, Seth Rumkorem and Jacob Prai were brought to Vanuatu in 1985 for consultation. They were told by the Vanuatu officials that sponsoring the West Papuan case at international forums including United Nations would not be a problem.(228)[Appendix, 10], the problem was with the OPM itself. It was not so clear whether the OPM is really a united force with full backing of the people. In other words, whether the OPM has organisational control over the people that it claimed to represent.(229) The same message was conveyed to West Papuans in Holland by Barak Sope, the Roving Ambassador and Secretary General of Vanuaaku Pati at a public meeting held at Nieuwegein on September 1, 1985.(230) [Appendix 11]. Rumkorem and Prai had also addressed the meeting as this was a follow up from their declaration of unity in Vanuatu.(231) [Appendix, 12]. Efforts to have a National Congress to reorganise the OPM and put together a National Liberation program were repeatedly postponed until the Vanuaaku Pati split in 1988 and lost power in the following national elections. West Papuans were forced to abandon their foothold in Port Vila and the prospect of diplomatic support by an independent Melanesian country.(232)

Disillusioned by endless efforts for national unity with no definite agenda for liberation, John Koknak a West Papuan resident in Papua New Guinea, returned into the jungle in 1992 after exposure visits to Europe and the Philippines. He made himself the supreme leader and appointed Jacob Prai in Sweden as the head of the international information office for his new order OPM.(233) Koknak claimed that his mandate derived from an election that had taken place between 25 August and 15 October, 1992, involving 52,000 people in the major Districts.(234) Many West Papuans disputed the election. If the election did take place, it must have been a spectacular operation considering the near impossible transportation and
communication system in the country especially under the watchful eyes of the security forces. The only possible way to reach many people in that short period of polling is by chartered planes. What may have happened was polling in the refugee camps before or during the planned Congress in 1991. But other inmates of the camps discounted the existence of such an important election. The Congress itself that was supposed to be attended by delegates from outside the camps had never got off the ground because of off limit restrictions by the government. Only Moses Weror managed to visit the camps but he too denied the existence of any election for the OPM leadership.\(^{(235)}\) The appointment of Prai doesn’t elaborate whether Prai had resigned his membership of the National Council of the 1971 declared OPM based on a constitution, and whether he was willing to serve the new order OPM. The structure of the organisation is vague, it has not even made any reference to the 1971 declaration and constitution whilst it should be regarded as a new organisation. John Ondowame, Prai’s deputy, could not see a reason why Prai should serve under John Koknak.\(^{(236)}\)

In 1990 after attaining his Dutch citizenship Rumkorem, as the Chairman of the OPM declared in 1971, made efforts to reunite the organisation. He appointed Mr. James Nyaro a former leader in Prai’s faction as the new Secretary General to fill the position left vacant by the late Phillemon Jarisetow. Since then Nyaro and Rumkorem, both based in Holland, began to consult inactive staff and members of the National Council if they liked to serve again. If they decline they must resign in order for their positions to be filled by new people. This is necessary because they were sworn to office under national oath of duty.\(^{(237)}\) This attempt to resolve the power structure of the organisation was long overdue. Many other Papuans have taken initiatives in the past to unite the Papuan people but in the end they can only assume caretaker and add hoc positions. Others started their own organisations and acted as representatives of OPM. It is rather urgent for the OPM to resolve its national leadership and image if it is to be taken seriously by the other Melanesian nations and international organisations.

**Communications**
Communication has always been a major problem for the OPM. During the RPG period (1971-1976) command and control between the Headquarters and regional leaders, national leaders to international representatives was always slow and difficult at times to organise. Most of the OPM clandestine network is by runners and it takes a lot of time for the information to reach its intended destination. Also the secretive nature of the OPM, often too cautious for fear of interception unnecessarily slowed down the passing on of information. But with training and the availability of modern communication technology and the relaxation of contact by the governments of both sides of the border West Papuans may slowly overcome this problem.
In the late 1980s Indonesia cautiously relaxed its strict control over West Papua in an attempt to attract investment to the Province. The policy was successful in attracting not only investors but also allowing overseas West Papuans to visit relatives. There were return visits as well and also a number of West Papuans won sponsorships to study abroad. Many have also attended international conferences. These contacts made it possible for Papuans to interact and be exposed to national and International socio-political realities. These could slowly help to defuse the false expectation of liberation from without.

John Rumbiak, who has done much community development work in rural West Papua after an overseas exposure trip, claimed that protection of the environment, human rights and the fight for equal opportunities could be pursued within the Indonesian system. “These are all but parts of the process of development. The people don’t know yet, that their basic rights are protected by the national constitution. Unfortunately, there are still problems of inexcusable human right abuses committed by some members of the military. But, the newly established Human Rights Commission would eventually attend to all these issues, as it has already demonstrated in the Freeport mine case.”

The refugee exodus of the early 1980s had increased the overseas West Papuan population. Among these exiles there are many highly educated and well informed people. There is also an increasing number of the younger generation with better education, and like John Koknak, they are willing to join the ranks of the OPM. The good relationship between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia doesn’t give comfort to the OPM along the border, but in other ways it does open up new social and political possibilities. Across border visits provide greater access for the flow of information in both directions. There are pockets of OPM sympathisers in the Melanesian governments, but none have given official support as yet, even though they all support self-determination for Kanaky (New Caledonia). In general most leaders are cautious, as Papua New Guinea demonstrated in the early 1970s and Vanuatu in the early 1980s. This is because of the OPM’s unpredictable strength, factionalism and inconsistency of action. Recently as part of his re-organisation attempt, Rumkorem led a delegation to Melanesia to revive contacts and re-build confidence with leaders in the region. He was pleased with the results of this visit, fondly quoting the statement by Danny Philip, the Foreign Minister of the Solomon Islands when he said: "It is not right for some people to enjoy a good life at the expense of the blood and suffering of others.”
CONCLUSION

The Melanesian Papuans of West Papua belong to the same ethnic origin as the people of Papua New Guinea. But, as a consequence of colonisation in the 19th century, the Western half of New Guinea was annexed by the Dutch to become part of the Dutch East Indies, forcing two completely different peoples, Indonesians and the Papuans under the same colonial jurisdiction. West Papua, however, was excluded from the colonial administration of Dutch East Indies. There was very little contact between the people of Indonesia and the people of West Papua over the duration of the Dutch rule of East Indies. Effective contact and relationship between the two peoples was only established after Indonesia acquired the territory in 1963. But, differences of colonial experience greatly affected the Indonesian and the Papuan sense of history.

The Indonesians on their part had long resisted Dutch oppression and domination. Many Indonesians who opposed Dutch colonialism were jailed or exiled in the remote parts of West Papua. These nationalist exiles had later played an important role in the anti-Dutch activities during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West Papua. The focus of Indonesia’s anti-colonialism and foreign domination had always been anti-European colonialism of which, in their case, the Netherlands was the main perpetrator.

West Papuans on the other hand, were neglected for the duration of the history of Dutch East Indies. They neither share the experience of oppression and exploitation nor the patriotic spirit of the Indonesian struggle. Their main exposure to outside influence and domination was from the work of Christian missionaries. The missionary’s activities of converting Papuans to become Christian subjugated Papuan culture and values. Indonesians were used extensively in this work and were resented by the Papuans for their discriminative and cruel practices. Based on these experiences, the West Papuan anti-colonialism had been basically against external domination, be it Dutch or Indonesian.

This thesis has presented an analysis of the effects of colonisation that influenced the relationship between the Indonesian government and the people of West Papua. It gives an understanding of how differences of colonial experience influenced the construct of people’s perceptions on national identity. Even nationalism within the Indonesian multi-ethnic relationships can suffer if not properly understood and managed. Cultural barriers do exist between the West Papuans and the diverse Indonesian ethnic groups. In West Papua as it seemed, wrong policies have aggravated the already fraught ethnic relations. Forced by necessity to survive or to be safe from persecution, the Papuans behaved like Indonesians as was expected of them by the authorities but they continued to perceive themselves as a
separate people. In terms of development priority, the government has done considerably well for the territory, more than what the Dutch were able to achieve; especially in the areas of education, transport and communications and public administration. The government’s efforts to advance the development of the Province to the same level as the other Provinces was interpreted by the Papuans differently. For the Papuans, priority should be given to them in all aspects of development as what the Dutch had attempted to accomplish in the late 1950s. The development policy of the territory in various fields however, was to benefit all Indonesians. Consequently, West Papuans continued to be disadvantaged. They could not successfully compete in many aspects in the development process and became resentful of the government. They claimed that their chances for specialised training, employment opportunities, their land and resources were all taken over by migrants from other Provinces as a deliberate denial policy of the government to marginalise and eliminate the Papuans.

Both Indonesians and the Papuans opposed colonialism, however, the process through which they attained decolonisation were completely different. The Indonesians, after a long struggle with many sacrifices, unilaterally proclaimed their independence and then successfully negotiated recognition by the former colonial power. West Papuans on the other hand, were promoted from decades of neglect directly into a process of gradual decolonisation. But, their process of decolonisation, was abruptly halted by the transfer of defacto control of the territory to Indonesia in 1963, followed by de'jure integration through the Indonesian method of act of free choice in 1969. The conduct of this act of free choice was marginally observed by the United Nations Representative Ortiz Sanz. However, his advice for improvement in the conduct to comply with the articles of the New York Agreement were rejected by Indonesia. All decisions in the processes of negotiation and agreement for the transfer of the territory to Indonesia were made by foreign powers without Papuan involvement. After incorporation, the Indonesian government reversed the whole process of decolonisation. It denied Papuan rights and freedoms including the right of self-determination. Because of that, Indonesia was perceived by the Papuans as a neo colonial power. Consequently, a cycle of uprisings occurred and people’s resistance movements developed in the territory, popularly known as the OPM. The government's efforts of integration through various forms of control and domination of processes in civil government including transmigration which Papuan nationalists called colonisation and the use of ruthless methods to quell opposition were fiercely resisted by the Papuan peoples movement the OPM, pushing the political level of resistance to new heights and international concern.

But the OPM is only popular as a resistance Movement. Its only national organisation was proclaimed in 1970 to provide an alternative government. After that it had split up into different factions in 1976, and never regained its original strength to seriously challenge the Indonesian government. Infighting in the OPM ranks cost the resistance movement dearly.
OPM had lost official support by the Senegalese government of President Sedar Senghor and was forced to abandon its foothold in Vanuatu. The national principle that OPM stands for is privately supported by many Melanesian leaders in the region but, in the final analysis it is up to the OPM as a national organisation to determine the kind of actions that may attract this support, diplomatically or otherwise. The OPM is yet to have a national council meeting to put its house in order and propose a national liberation plan before it can seek international support. A number of overseas Papuan organisations had organised national congresses and provide a useful analysis on the West Papuan cause which OPM national council should take note of. Whatever direction the OPM may choose to take it must also take into serious consideration the interests of the immediate powers in the region who have to weigh their relationship with Indonesia against the West Papuan's rights to self-determination. The OPM resistance versus regional interests needs further study. But, for the OPM purpose in the immediate future, as a matter of urgency, the organisation needs to grasp the reality of the current progress of the Indonesianisation programs implemented in the country. The OPM should seriously consider the effects of these changes to its national claim in the next 10 to 50 years if OPM doesn't match the changes with the right actions. As late as April 1996, the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands Hon. Solomon Mamaloni expressed the same concern when he told the chairman of the OPM, “these are real problems that we, Melanesian leaders have to face. If we don’t do anything about them, we would stand to be condemned by our future generations” (242).

The strength of Papuan nationalism or its future as analysed in the thesis is like in the case of the OPM itself, actively promoted in reverse by the severity of subjugation practices of the Indonesian government. Papuan nationalism and the hope for their own nation state is also kept alive by the fact that there are other free Melanesians, for example, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu who run their own governments. The OPM hasn’t yet grasped the need of urgency or desperation in its campaign to end Indonesian occupation of their country. But once it does, it has the potential and the capacity to affect the security and stability in the region as it showed in the actions of early 1980s that drove thousands of refugees across the border into Papua New Guinea. The following statement by a West Papuan in response to the deportation of refugees indeed reflects possible action from frustration if the OPM is pushed too far:”There could be no other solution, if people that we regarded as our blood brothers treat us the same way as foreigners, we may have to adopt the East Timor solution, it is whether, we all join Indonesia or we all become independent” (243).
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## NOTES ON APPENDICES

**APPENDIX 1**: Name and background of respondents.

**APPENDIX 2**: A 1970 map of New Guinea showing Districts and main centres; source, Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy.

**APPENDIX 3**: Statement by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick at the 16th cession of the UN General Assembly in 1962.

**APPENDIX 4**: Confidential letter from President F.J. Kennedy to Dr. J.E. de Quay; Prime Minister of the Netherlands, published in Rotterdam in 1977, by J.G. de Beus, page 408 of his book: "Morgen by het aanbreken van de dag (The Morning at Day Break)."

**APPENDIX 5**: Indonesia and Dutch Resolution at the UN General Assembly in 1969 where the Assembly took note of the implementation of an "act of free choice" in Irian Jaya.

**APPENDIX 6**: Map on areas of concession granted to Freeport Indonesia.

**APPENDIX 7**: List of major foreign companies and interests in West Papua.

**APPENDIX 8**: Newspaper cutting from the Catholic Weekly, Sydney, regarding massacres in Timika and the Freeport mine as reported by ACFOA in 1995.

**APPENDIX 9**: Anatomy of OPM or the Free Papua Movement.

**APPENDIX 10**: Letter of appointment of Rex Rumakiek by the OPM national committee and Persidium in Holland.

**APPENDIX 11**: Newspaper cutting on a UN address by Sela Molisa, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vanuatu.

**APPENDIX 12**: Prai and Rumkorem declaration of unity in Vanuatu.

**APPENDIX 13**: Newspaper cutting from the West Papuan Observer regarding Public Meeting in Holland, addressed by Mr. Barak Sope, the former Roving Ambassador of the Republic of Vanuatu.

**APPENDIX 14**: Submission to the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Parliament of the Solomon Islands by Prime Minister Solomon Mamalon on behalf of OPM.
APPENDIX

NAME AND BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

1. Ayamiseba Dirk: Under the Dutch: Teacher and District Administrator. In 1961 elected member of the New Guinea Council the Nieuw Guinea Raad. Under Indonesia: Chairman of the Provincial Peoples Representative Assembly (DPRD, 1977-1971). After he escaped to Holland he was elected as member of the Persidium Committee of OPM in exile.

2. Ayamiseba Andy Jr.: Businessman, Manager of the famous Pop Band, the Black Brothers, instrumental in the OPM efforts to help two leaders, his own father Dirk Ayamiseba and the former Governor Eliezer Bonay to escape overseas as witness to Indonesia's misrule and manipulation of the act of free choice. This was done in anticipation of the big upraising that was to happen in the early 1980s. He was also instrumental in the organising of a unity meeting between OPM leaders Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in Vanuatu in 1985.

3. Boway Bob: Instructor and Political Education Officer as part of the Training Staff of the four moths guerilla war-fare training program of the OPM (1975-1983).

4. Fairio Bas: Chief of Staff of the Front Command for the Liberation of West Papua (FKPPB) under Jacob Prai (1969-1970)


11. Rumbiak John: Senior Staff member of the Irian Jaya Rural Development Foundation (YPMD).


FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SIR GARFIELD BARRICK


ON SEPTEMBER 21ST, 1962, (UNITED NATIONS DOC. A/2771, P. 96-100)

IN THE XLIITH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
Primer Minister of the Netherlands

His Excellency Dr. J. E. de Gaulle

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

The Hague

April 2, 1962

SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE FOREIGN MINISTER

Telegram addressed to President Kennedy

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have been informed, through diplomatic channels, that the United States has decided to evacuate its military personnel and civilians from the Netherlands. This decision is based on the belief that continued presence of U.S. forces in Western Europe is no longer necessary. I regret to inform you that this will lead to the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from the Netherlands.

I understand that this decision is the result of careful consideration and consultation with our allies. The United States has made every effort to ensure that the transition is smooth and that the rights and interests of the United States citizens in the Netherlands are protected.

I hope that this decision will not lead to unnecessary tensions. I am confident that we can continue to work together to maintain a strong and close relationship.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Jung-Fr. Prime Minister

APPENDIX 4
A/RES/2504 (XXIV), 25th November, 1969
Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)

The General Assembly
Recalling its resolution 1752 (XVII) of 21 September 1962, in which it took note of the Agreement of 15 August 1962 between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), acknowledged the role conferred upon the Secretary-General in the Agreement and authorised him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein,

Recalling also its decision of 6 November 1963 to take note of the report of the Secretary-General on the completion of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West Irian,

Recalling further that the arrangements for the Act of Free Choice were the responsibility of Indonesia with the advice, assistance and participation of a special representative of the Secretary-General, as stipulated in the Agreement,

Having received the report on the conduct and results of the Act of Free Choice submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with article XXI, paragraph 1, of the Agreement,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with article XXI, paragraph 2, both parties to the Agreement have recognised these results and abide by them,

Noting that the Government of Indonesia, in implementing its national development plan, is giving special attention to the progress of West Irian, bearing in mind the specific conditions of its population, and that the Government of the Netherlands, in close co-operation with the Government of Indonesia, will continue to render financial assistance for this purpose, in particular through the Asian Development Bank and the institutions of the United Nations,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and acknowledges with appreciation the fulfilment by the Secretary-General and his representative of the tasks entrusted to them under the Agreement of 15 August 1962 between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian);

2. Appreciates any assistance provided through the Asian Development Bank, through institutions of the United Nations or through other means to the government of Indonesia in its efforts to promote the economic and social development of West Irian.

Copied on 5/9/92 on behalf of the University of Sydney pursuant to Part VB of the Copyright Act as amended Req. 391753
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY/JOINT VENTURE</th>
<th>REGION AND CONCESSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montague Gold NL and PT Krueng Tengah operate two Geophysical Survey (GS) leases: PT.Montague Mimika and PT. Montague Batanta Minerals</td>
<td>Fak Fak, 403, 292 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorong District, 331, 791 hectares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Resources Ltd. and PT Krueng Tengah operate one lease: PT Sentani Maju Minerals</td>
<td>Jayapura, 431, 775 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingellic Minerals NL and PT Krueng Tengah, operating one lease: P.T. Pulau Yapen Minerals</td>
<td>Yapen Waropen, 496, 570 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Goldfields Ltd. and PT Kreung Tengah operate one lease: PT Pulau Waigeo Minerals</td>
<td>Raja Ampat islands, Sorong, 537,035 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concession included exploration for uranium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teweti Ltd. and PT Woka Yamau operate one lease: PT Kepala Burung Mining</td>
<td>Sorong, 701.529 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Queensland Coalfields</td>
<td>Eiland River area, exploring for gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Nabire, Enarotali Gold Project, PT. Darma Bakti</td>
<td>Paniai, 824,581 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exploring for gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Anggai Chemaloy</td>
<td>Ransiki area, Manokwari, exploring for uranium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Aneka Tambang</td>
<td>To begin mining of Nickel on Gebe and Gag islands, Sorong.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ashton Mining, PT.Kapuas Alluvial Jaya
Commercially viable gold mining, Sorong region.

Queensland Nickel Ltd, PT.Aneka Tambang
Sorong District

Ingold Holding Indonesia Inc.
and PT. Sansaporinda Pertiwi
Details, not available (N/A).

Cominco Resources International
and PT. Sansaporinda Pertiwi
Details, N/A

Ingold Holding Indonesia Inc.
and PT.Kalirindo Gunung Minerals
Details, N/A

Continental Oil Company (Conoco)
Bintuni, Manokwari District

BHP and Mobil Oil
Bomberai Penins.15,875 sq.kms

Occidental International and
Exploration and Development Co.
Details, N/A

Billiton Indonesia BV and PT.Teladan
Utama and PT.Indomineratama
Details, N/A

Enterprise Exploration and PT.Arlia
Karyamaska
Details, N/A

Freeport Indonesia
Fak Fak, Paniai and Jayawijaya
Districts, 2.5 million ha.

Source: Mathew Jamieson, Northern Territory Environment Centre.
APPENDIX

17

I. PAN ARM

A Therapeutic Alarm

and Death in Iran

By our order

Catholic Weekly, 10-9-75

The anguish of the

Iraqi people, who

have suffered under

more than 25 years of

occupation by the

Iraqi forces, is

immeasurable. The

collaboration of the

Iraqi forces with the

Iranian forces under

the leadership of

Khomeini has

resulted in the
destruction of

human life, property,

and national

resources.

The IRA (Islamic

Republic of

Azerbaijan) has

provided

military and

financial support

to the Iranian

forces in their

struggle against

Iraq.

In the face of

these challenges,

the Iranian

people have

shown unprecedented

courage and

determination.

The Iranian

military has

demonstrated its

ability to

defend the

independence of

the country and

its national

resources.

The economy of

Iran has

suffered under

the occupation

of Iraq, but the

Iranian people

have continued

to work hard

to rebuild

their country.

The government

of Iran has

taken various

measures to

address the

economic

problems caused

by the occupation.

The Iranian

people have

shown a strong

commitment to

national

unity and

patriotism.

The government

of Iran has

promised to

continue to

work towards

the recovery

of the

occupied

territories.

The Iranian

people have

pledged their

support to the

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endeavor.
I. National Congress meets once every 2 (two) years.

II. National Executive Committee (NEC): 43 Members meets once a year.

- Chairman/President
- Vice President/Chairman (1) National
- Vice President/Chairman (2) International
- Vice President/Chairman (3) Military
- Vice President/Chairman (4) Logistic

   - Secretary General
   - Assistant Sec. General
   - Subcommittees/Depart.
   - Treasurer

III. Regional Committees meet once a month.

- Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer etc. Other Committees may be formed depending on demand in each Region further down to the village level.

IV. Membership:

- Peoples Democratic Party
- National Party
- Socialist Democratic Party
- National Organisations
- Regional Organisations
- Intellectuals who accept the Constitution of FPM/BPM
FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT

KOMITE NASIONAL FPM/OPM
No. 007/P.KN/83

Mendahului keputusan Paduka Jang Mulia
Presiden Republik West Papua New Guinea, Komite Nasional Free Papua Movement/Organisasi Papua Merdeka
diluar negeri, memutuskan dan menetapkan :

Tuan JOSEPH REX RUMAKIEK

sebagai wakil tetap Free Papua Movement/Organisasi
Papua Merdeka di kawasan Pacific dan bertempat kedudukan
di Port Vila, Ibu kota Republik Vanuatu.

Keputusan dan Penetapan ini berlaku sedjak tanggal
ditetapkan, sampai ada ketentuan lain dari Paduka Jane
Mulia, Presiden sendiri.

30 Juni 1983

[Signature]

Copied on [Redacted] on behalf of the University of Sydney pursuant
to Part VB of the Copyright Act as amended Req. [Redacted]
APPENDIX 12

FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT - APP. UNITE MENT
Yom Kippur, Melanesian Style

United we are strong! The two West Papuan guerilla leaders in exile, Jakob Prai and Seth Rumoren have signed a Treaty of Unity. (See the Declaration in this issue.) For all the misery their rivalry has caused the West Papuans and their freedom fight, this reconciliation is a milestone in West Papuan history, a one-time Pacific Yom Kippur. On 1/9/85 a great diversity of West Papuans in Holland were to witness the two resurrected war commanders in the Eaten Conference hall of Utrecht (The Netherlands). As the West Papuan People's Front (WPPF) cleared the road for both leaders, they were given the opportunity to receive them in the presence of Mr. Sarak Sopo, the Secretary General of the reigning Yanuatu Pasi of Yanuatu, which country the reconciliation took place. On the front-wall of the Conference hall the two flags were suspended of Yanuatu and West Papua, joining each other like hands. No press was invited except WO.

this was to be a brotherly Melanesian matter.

The West Papuan Cultural group Sambar introduced the happening in original song and drumbeat. Rex Rumakie, OFP, representative in Yanuatu, Jakob Prai, Sarak Sopo, Seth Rumoren, Andy Amanza and Max Ireeuw. All decorated with flower strings, took their seats behind the forum table. Victor Kalsione, as the spokesman of the WPPF welcomed the men and the audience in 3 languages: English, Dutch and Malay. Both National Anthems were heard from a tape and Mrs. Betty Irewe opened the session with a confession prayer, remembering those who suffer in the oppressed mother country. Recommending all and everything into God's hands, she read a few verses from Isaiah 32, in which the Messianic Kingdom is announced with peace and justice for all.

Max Ireeuw, as representative of the WPPF in the Netherlands, thanked Sarak Sopo, his party and his country for their support of the West Papuan freedom struggle. He emphasized the example Yanuatu is setting to the whole world as the champion of Melanesian Solidarity, a rising star in the threatened Pacific.

Rex Rumakie, the next speaker, took on West Papuan unity as prior importance in the struggle for freedom. "You can, "he insisted, "be sure that the enemy will grasp every opportunity to split up and harass the West Papuans against each other, perfect pupils as the Indonesians are of the old colonial masters in their "divide and rule" policy. He read out the Declaration under a pin-dropping silence, followed by strong applause.

Seth Rumoren was the first guerilla leader to speak. Obviously delighted with his release after 3 years of almost total isolation in Greece, he thanked those who provided him the chance and the finances, Yanuatu for the support and the friendship and God for the providence of this new start in the West Papuan freedom fight. The historical survey and personal experiences he then related to the audience took more time than allotted in the scheme and he had to cut his speech short. Jakob Prai, starting in a low voice but becoming more and more militant in the course of his short discourse, beseched the WPPF to preserve the unity which had been reached after so much trouble and guard it as the most precious weapon in their struggle for independence.

The last speaker was the Guest of Honour, the Yanuatu Representative Barak Sopo, speaking in Plugin (that was simultaneously translated by Rumakie) to emphasize the unity of Melanesian countries; he conveyed the greetings of his people to the West Papuans, ensuring them that not only the new reigning government but also the Yanuatu opposition...
stands behind the Free Papuan Movement, "Kanaky is our first target," he stated, "but West Papua is the very next one. Vanuatu rejects the Indonesian name of Irian Jaya and only recognizes the genuine and authentic name of West Papua and the OPM as the only legitimate expression of the West Papuan people. He told that the present Lini government not only used the name of West Papua in the UN for the first time in its history, but will also promote the West Papuan cause in the Assembly of Non-aligned Countries and in the Commonwealth gatherings. Temperature rose at the heart-warming speech of Barak Sopo, which was repeatedly interrupted by enthusiastic applause. Apart from the emotive steps taken by Vanuatu in favour of West Papua, Mr. Sopo revealed the preparation of the first studio, called "Vanu-Wespa," to emphasize the cooperation of the two peoples and the broadcasting of "Radio Free Papua" that will reach the oppressed brothers and sisters in Papuasia itself. Barak Sopo also showed that he and his country know where they stand. Referring to the smallness of the nation, he did ask what a tiny country like Vanuatu could do for New Caledonia and Sopo called out: "Today Kanaky is front-page news in the nations. Nations are asking us how they can help to seek New Caledonia free!" The same thing, he assured, is going to happen to West Papua. The West Papuan struggle is ours and must also be a Melanesian struggle. First Kanaky and then West Papua!"

The final applause was long, strong and warm. Victor Kaisiepo, closing the speakers' list, impersonated the feelings of brotherhood between West Papuans and Vanuatu and, with the dignity of a Melanesian ceremony, a traditional plate was offered to the Governor General, Mr. Tomohon, one of the elderly West Papuans. Mambesak musicians concluded the meeting with powerful traditional melodies. Snacks of mubi fish, coconut and other homemade food had been prepared and when your reporter was obliged to leave later in the evening, there was a dominating atmosphere of unity and confidence, with people talking and listening to the Mambesak music, reminding all of the beauty of Arnhem Land and all the relatives and friends at home.

Short comment. With this meeting, the hour of ultimate truth is approaching. No person seriously involved can escape this hour of reflection. No people divided in itself can ever win a freedom struggle. From the OPM's interior front enthusiasts receive news that have already been received by the denizens the absence of especially the new leaders Kaisiepo and Jouwe. Some men accepted the personal plea of Rumporo and PAI, denouncing their unity for obscure reasons. Jouwe withdrew his support from his former war commander Prat, his supporters in Port Moresby (Franz Jaku etc.) did not answer the unity-explaining letter. As we can, on this short-term, only judge about the West Papuans in exile, of which the majority supports the new unity, the impression occurs that the two old leaders merely stick to tribal (personal) interests. This would provide the life-size danger that they will fall victim of the Indonesians in order to break the rest of the force. This strategy always works in tribal situations. The horrible Indonesian repression policy with its thousands of murders has forced union at home. But an exile every small tribe can have its drinking parties under the disguise of "bou- nomen duties to nationalistic goals" without any life-threat. And the results of these parties may well cause death to more hundreds of West Papuan men, women and children who, not even having proper drinks, just desperately long to live in freedom and peace. This is the hour of ultimate truth, the very moment to come to your senses and make a choice: Either embrace Indonesian triumph over your God-given wealth or irreversibly stand for the soil in which your umbilical string was buried and of which your ancestors have always been the Masters.

There is No Escape!!!
NATIONAL PARLIAMENT

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBMISSIONS AND INFORMATION
ON THE SITUATION IN WEST PAPUA/IRIAN JAYA

JULY 1996

HONIARA

SOLOMON ISLANDS
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

1.1 The question of the situation in West Papua/Irian Jaya has been formally presented to the Foreign Relations Committee by the Prime Minister - The Honourable Solomon S.Mamaloni in his letter - PM : 1/43 - of 26 May 1996. That letter appears as section 2 of this document.

1.2 The other attachments to the Prime Minister’s letter are listed down as sections 3, 4, and 5. The Committee presents these as information to Parliament and for any future action we, the Committee, or any member of Parliament, may wish to pursue for Parliament’s or the Government’s consideration and decision.

1.3 The Committee is grateful to the Prime Minister for availing to us those various documents. We are also grateful to the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), without prejudice to anyone or authority, for addressing the question of the situation in West Papua/Irian Jaya to the Committee through the Prime Minister.
26 May 1996

Hon. F.J. Saemala MP
Chairman Foreign Relations Committee
National Parliament
HONIARA.

My dear Chairman,

ORGANISATION OF PAPUA MERDEKA (OPM)

As yet the Solomon Islands Government has not taken a firm position on this issue although I am sure a few of us political leaders have at one time or another may have been auditioned by the representatives of the Organisation.

Your Committee is in a much better position to examine this matter and to render your expertise advice to Solomon Islands Government in the future. In the meantime I forward you a copy of this interesting report for purposes of viewing and if you think it merits the attention of your Committee then you may wish to take it further.

With sincere regards,

Yours aye,

[Signature]
Hon. S.S. Mamaloni
PRIME MINISTER

Attach.

[Handwritten note: Please photocopy and circulate to all members.]

Copied on 28/6/96 on behalf of the University of Sydney pursuant to Part VB of the Copyright Act as amended Req. 30175.
ORGANISASI PAPUA MERDEKA (OPM)
West Papuan people's movement for liberation, freedom and independence

The Right Honorable Solomon Mamaloni MP.,
Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands,
Government Offices, Honiara,
Solomon Islands.

Honiara,
26 April, 1996.

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

On behalf of the unfortunate Melanesian people of West Papua and our national liberation movement, the OPM, I thank you, your government and the people of the Solomon Islands most sincerely for the opportunity you have given my delegation to visit and meet with you and your government. We also had the opportunity to confer with the Foreign Affairs spokesman of the Opposition, the Hon. Mr Francis Saemala MP.

We are pleased and very encouraged by your understanding and willingness to support our cause. As we depart from these beautiful islands we are convinced that only Melanesians are able to find solutions to their problems.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Seth J. Rumkorem.
Chairman, OPM.