

This dissertation is an account of Australia's re-orientation of security thinking after the "cathartic experience" of the 1956 Suez crisis. It treats of the Australian Government's realistic assessment of the changed power relationships after Suez and its determination to maximise the security guarantee of its most powerful Western ally in the Pacific.

The story reveals Australia's increasing reliance in defence matters on the United States, where she had formerly striven to satisfy her security needs by balancing her ties between Great Britain and the United States. It discloses how the Menzies Government consciously strove to make itself a politically indispensable ally to the United States. Judging the country's internal development needs to have priority, the Liberal Country Party coalition Government deliberately curtailed defence spending. Instead, it substituted foreign policy co-operation with the United States for substantive contributions to the collective defence effort.

This policy of the Menzies Government was successful in several respects. Externally Australia was able to secure firm American guarantees for Australian security interests and implicit support for most of her foreign policy goals. Internally the reliance on American strength allowed the Government to concentrate on development. Through a conscious policy of assiduously cultivating close personal contacts with American officials at all levels, the Menzies Government succeeded in building up a special relationship. The events of 1963

strengthened the bonds of goodwill between the two Governments. The last two chapters illustrate how that special relationship operated in Australian domestic politics to the advantage of the Menzies Government. The study ends in late 1963, the year which marks the end of "tokenism" in Australia's defence efforts.

Methodology

The approach of this study has been to document Australia's increasing reliance on the United States for the satisfaction of her security needs. This dissertation thus seeks to continue works which treat Australia's search for regional security in earlier periods.

Research has been based on conventional sources such as the various official publications of the two governments, the open literature in the field, as well as an extensive survey of newspapers and journals.

Important insights were made possible by a series of confidential interviews with former Cabinet ministers, high-ranking Service personnel, and key civil servants. My promise that the names of the respondents to these interviews would be kept secret for at least 15 years created an atmosphere of trust. In this way, I gained access to information which fundamentally influenced my conclusions. It is important for future research that this trust be preserved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Precis		i
	1. Introduction	1
I	<u>Strengthening the Alliance After Suez</u>	
	2. Foreign Policy Cooperation: Australia's Supportive Role in the Cold War	30
	3. Tokensim: Australia's Contributions to Collective Security in South East Asia	72
	Laos	76
	Vietnam	94
	China	109
	Seato	123
	Anzus	137
	4. Defence and Technical Cooperation	148
II	<u>The Alliance and Security Threats</u>	
	5. Australia's Security Worries about Dutch New Guinea	191
	6. Australia's Support for Malaysia	246
III	<u>The Alliance and Internal Politics</u>	
	7. North West Cape Naval Communication Station	293
	8. Australia's Decision to Buy the F-111	334
IV	<u>Conclusion</u>	371
	Bibliography	392
	Charts:	
	Defence Statistics	28
	Defence Spending and Total Government Expenditure	29